* refs/heads/tmp-a9d0273:
Linux 4.9.84
crypto: s5p-sss - Fix kernel Oops in AES-ECB mode
KVM: nVMX: invvpid handling improvements
KVM: VMX: clean up declaration of VPID/EPT invalidation types
KVM: async_pf: Fix #DF due to inject "Page not Present" and "Page Ready" exceptions simultaneously
x86/microcode/AMD: Change load_microcode_amd()'s param to bool to fix preemptibility bug
usb: phy: msm add regulator dependency
arm64: fix warning about swapper_pg_dir overflow
idle: i7300: add PCI dependency
spi: bcm-qspi: shut up warning about cfi header inclusion
binfmt_elf: compat: avoid unused function warning
arm64: sunxi: always enable reset controller
drm/i915: hide unused intel_panel_set_backlight function
kasan: rework Kconfig settings
clk: meson: gxbb: fix build error without RESET_CONTROLLER
ISDN: eicon: reduce stack size of sig_ind function
tw5864: use dev_warn instead of WARN to shut up warning
em28xx: only use mt9v011 if camera support is enabled
go7007: add MEDIA_CAMERA_SUPPORT dependency
tc358743: fix register i2c_rd/wr functions
shmem: fix compilation warnings on unused functions
KVM: add X86_LOCAL_APIC dependency
Input: tca8418_keypad - hide gcc-4.9 -Wmaybe-uninitialized warning
drm/nouveau: hide gcc-4.9 -Wmaybe-uninitialized
rbd: silence bogus -Wmaybe-uninitialized warning
drm: exynos: mark pm functions as __maybe_unused
security/keys: BIG_KEY requires CONFIG_CRYPTO
cw1200: fix bogus maybe-uninitialized warning
reiserfs: avoid a -Wmaybe-uninitialized warning
ALSA: hda/ca0132 - fix possible NULL pointer use
arm64: Kconfig: select COMPAT_BINFMT_ELF only when BINFMT_ELF is set
scsi: advansys: fix uninitialized data access
x86/vm86: Fix unused variable warning if THP is disabled
x86/platform: Add PCI dependency for PUNIT_ATOM_DEBUG
dmaengine: zx: fix build warning
x86: add MULTIUSER dependency for KVM
thermal: fix INTEL_SOC_DTS_IOSF_CORE dependencies
x86/build: Silence the build with "make -s"
tools build: Add tools tree support for 'make -s'
x86/fpu/math-emu: Fix possible uninitialized variable use
arm64: define BUG() instruction without CONFIG_BUG
gpio: xgene: mark PM functions as __maybe_unused
x86/ras/inject: Make it depend on X86_LOCAL_APIC=y
scsi: advansys: fix build warning for PCI=n
video: fbdev: via: remove possibly unused variables
perf: xgene: Include module.h
PCI: Change pci_host_common_probe() visibility
usb: musb: fix compilation warning on unused function
platform/x86: intel_mid_thermal: Fix suspend handlers unused warning
gpio: intel-mid: Fix build warning when !CONFIG_PM
PCI: vmd: Fix suspend handlers defined-but-not-used warning
perf/x86: Shut up false-positive -Wmaybe-uninitialized warning
vmxnet3: prevent building with 64K pages
clk: sunxi-ng: fix build error without CONFIG_RESET_CONTROLLER
shmem: avoid maybe-uninitialized warning
drm/i915: fix intel_backlight_device_register declaration
crypto: talitos - fix Kernel Oops on hashing an empty file
powerpc/64s: Improve RFI L1-D cache flush fallback
powerpc/64s: Simple RFI macro conversions
powerpc/64s: Fix conversion of slb_miss_common to use RFI_TO_USER/KERNEL
hippi: Fix a Fix a possible sleep-in-atomic bug in rr_close
xen: XEN_ACPI_PROCESSOR is Dom0-only
platform/x86: dell-laptop: Fix keyboard max lighting for Dell Latitude E6410
x86/mm/kmmio: Fix mmiotrace for page unaligned addresses
mm/early_ioremap: Fix boot hang with earlyprintk=efi,keep
usb: dwc3: of-simple: fix missing clk_disable_unprepare
usb: dwc3: gadget: Wait longer for controller to end command processing
dmaengine: jz4740: disable/unprepare clk if probe fails
drm/armada: fix leak of crtc structure
xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds with misconfigured transport mode policies.
spi: sun4i: disable clocks in the remove function
ASoC: rockchip: disable clock on error
clk: fix a panic error caused by accessing NULL pointer
dmaengine: at_hdmac: fix potential NULL pointer dereference in atc_prep_dma_interleaved
dmaengine: ioat: Fix error handling path
gianfar: Disable EEE autoneg by default
509: fix printing uninitialized stack memory when OID is empty
net: ethernet: arc: fix error handling in emac_rockchip_probe
brcmfmac: Avoid build error with make W=1
btrfs: Fix possible off-by-one in btrfs_search_path_in_tree
net_sched: red: Avoid illegal values
net_sched: red: Avoid devision by zero
gianfar: fix a flooded alignment reports because of padding issue.
ARM: dts: Fix elm interrupt compiler warning
s390/dasd: prevent prefix I/O error
powerpc/perf: Fix oops when grouping different pmu events
m68k: add missing SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT linker section
ipvlan: Add the skb->mark as flow4's member to lookup route
scripts/kernel-doc: Don't fail with status != 0 if error encountered with -none
sctp: only update outstanding_bytes for transmitted queue when doing prsctp_prune
RDMA/cma: Make sure that PSN is not over max allowed
i40iw: Correct ARP index mask
pinctrl: sunxi: Fix A64 UART mux value
pinctrl: sunxi: Fix A80 interrupt pin bank
media: s5k6aa: describe some function parameters
perf bench numa: Fixup discontiguous/sparse numa nodes
perf top: Fix window dimensions change handling
ARM: dts: am437x-cm-t43: Correct the dmas property of spi0
ARM: dts: am4372: Correct the interrupts_properties of McASP
ARM: dts: logicpd-somlv: Fix wl127x pinmux
ARM: dts: logicpd-som-lv: Fix gpmc addresses for NAND and enet
ARM: dts: Fix omap4 hang with GPS connected to USB by using wakeupgen
ARM: AM33xx: PRM: Remove am33xx_pwrdm_read_prev_pwrst function
ARM: OMAP2+: Fix SRAM virt to phys translation for save_secure_ram_context
usb: build drivers/usb/common/ when USB_SUPPORT is set
usbip: keep usbip_device sockfd state in sync with tcp_socket
staging: iio: ad5933: switch buffer mode to software
staging: iio: adc: ad7192: fix external frequency setting
binder: check for binder_thread allocation failure in binder_poll()
staging: android: ashmem: Fix a race condition in pin ioctls
dn_getsockoptdecnet: move nf_{get/set}sockopt outside sock lock
arm64: dts: add #cooling-cells to CPU nodes
ARM: 8743/1: bL_switcher: add MODULE_LICENSE tag
video: fbdev/mmp: add MODULE_LICENSE
ASoC: ux500: add MODULE_LICENSE tag
crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key
crypto: hash - annotate algorithms taking optional key
net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload on IS_ERR
rds: tcp: atomically purge entries from rds_tcp_conn_list during netns delete
netfilter: xt_RATEEST: acquire xt_rateest_mutex for hash insert
netfilter: xt_cgroup: initialize info->priv in cgroup_mt_check_v1()
netfilter: on sockopt() acquire sock lock only in the required scope
netfilter: ipt_CLUSTERIP: fix out-of-bounds accesses in clusterip_tg_check()
netfilter: x_tables: avoid out-of-bounds reads in xt_request_find_{match|target}
netfilter: x_tables: fix int overflow in xt_alloc_table_info()
kcov: detect double association with a single task
KVM: x86: fix escape of guest dr6 to the host
blk_rq_map_user_iov: fix error override
staging: android: ion: Switch from WARN to pr_warn
staging: android: ion: Add __GFP_NOWARN for system contig heap
crypto: x86/twofish-3way - Fix %rbp usage
selinux: skip bounded transition processing if the policy isn't loaded
selinux: ensure the context is NUL terminated in security_context_to_sid_core()
Provide a function to create a NUL-terminated string from unterminated data
ptr_ring: fail early if queue occupies more than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE
drm: Require __GFP_NOFAIL for the legacy drm_modeset_lock_all
blktrace: fix unlocked registration of tracepoints
sctp: set frag_point in sctp_setsockopt_maxseg correctly
xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()
xfrm: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read on socket policy lookup.
mm,vmscan: Make unregister_shrinker() no-op if register_shrinker() failed.
xfrm: skip policies marked as dead while rehashing
cfg80211: check dev_set_name() return value
kcm: Only allow TCP sockets to be attached to a KCM mux
kcm: Check if sk_user_data already set in kcm_attach
vhost: use mutex_lock_nested() in vhost_dev_lock_vqs()
ANDROID: sdcardfs: Hold i_mutex for i_size_write
UPSTREAM: ANDROID: binder: synchronize_rcu() when using POLLFREE.
BACKPORT, FROMGIT: crypto: speck - add test vectors for Speck64-XTS
BACKPORT, FROMGIT: crypto: speck - add test vectors for Speck128-XTS
BACKPORT, FROMGIT: crypto: arm/speck - add NEON-accelerated implementation of Speck-XTS
FROMGIT: crypto: speck - export common helpers
BACKPORT, FROMGIT: crypto: speck - add support for the Speck block cipher
f2fs: updates on v4.16-rc1
Linux 4.9.83
media: r820t: fix r820t_write_reg for KASAN
ARM: dts: Delete bogus reference to the charlcd
arm: dts: mt2701: Add reset-cells
ARM: dts: s5pv210: add interrupt-parent for ohci
arm64: dts: msm8916: Add missing #phy-cells
ARM: pxa/tosa-bt: add MODULE_LICENSE tag
ARM: dts: exynos: fix RTC interrupt for exynos5410
vfs: don't do RCU lookup of empty pathnames
x86: fix build warnign with 32-bit PAE
x86/cpu: Change type of x86_cache_size variable to unsigned int
x86/spectre: Fix an error message
x86/cpu: Rename cpu_data.x86_mask to cpu_data.x86_stepping
selftests/x86/mpx: Fix incorrect bounds with old _sigfault
x86/speculation: Add <asm/msr-index.h> dependency
nospec: Move array_index_nospec() parameter checking into separate macro
x86/speculation: Fix up array_index_nospec_mask() asm constraint
selftests/x86: Do not rely on "int $0x80" in single_step_syscall.c
selftests/x86: Do not rely on "int $0x80" in test_mremap_vdso.c
selftests/x86/pkeys: Remove unused functions
x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related details
X86/nVMX: Properly set spec_ctrl and pred_cmd before merging MSRs
KVM/x86: Reduce retpoline performance impact in slot_handle_level_range(), by always inlining iterator helper methods
x86/speculation: Correct Speculation Control microcode blacklist again
x86/speculation: Update Speculation Control microcode blacklist
compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __optimize function attribute
x86/entry/64/compat: Clear registers for compat syscalls, to reduce speculation attack surface
arm: spear13xx: Fix spics gpio controller's warning
arm: spear13xx: Fix dmas cells
arm: spear600: Add missing interrupt-parent of rtc
ARM: dts: nomadik: add interrupt-parent for clcd
ARM: dts: STi: Add gpio polarity for "hdmi,hpd-gpio" property
ARM: lpc3250: fix uda1380 gpio numbers
arm64: dts: msm8916: Correct ipc references for smsm
s390: fix handling of -1 in set{,fs}[gu]id16 syscalls
ocfs2: try a blocking lock before return AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE
PM / devfreq: Propagate error from devfreq_add_device()
cpufreq: powernv: Dont assume distinct pstate values for nominal and pmin
RDMA/rxe: Fix a race condition related to the QP error state
kselftest: fix OOM in memory compaction test
IB/mlx4: Fix incorrectly releasing steerable UD QPs when have only ETH ports
IB/qib: Fix comparison error with qperf compare/swap test
powerpc: fix build errors in stable tree
dm: correctly handle chained bios in dec_pending()
usb: Move USB_UHCI_BIG_ENDIAN_* out of USB_SUPPORT
mvpp2: fix multicast address filter
ALSA: seq: Fix racy pool initializations
ALSA: usb-audio: add implicit fb quirk for Behringer UFX1204
ALSA: hda/realtek: PCI quirk for Fujitsu U7x7
ALSA: hda/realtek - Enable Thinkpad Dock device for ALC298 platform
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix UAC2 get_ctl request with a RANGE attribute
ALSA: hda - Fix headset mic detection problem for two Dell machines
mtd: nand: vf610: set correct ooblayout
9p/trans_virtio: discard zero-length reply
Btrfs: fix unexpected -EEXIST when creating new inode
Btrfs: fix btrfs_evict_inode to handle abnormal inodes correctly
Btrfs: fix extent state leak from tree log
Btrfs: fix crash due to not cleaning up tree log block's dirty bits
Btrfs: fix deadlock in run_delalloc_nocow
target/iscsi: avoid NULL dereference in CHAP auth error path
rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Fix connection lost problem correctly
console/dummy: leave .con_font_get set to NULL
video: fbdev: atmel_lcdfb: fix display-timings lookup
PCI: keystone: Fix interrupt-controller-node lookup
MIPS: Fix typo BIG_ENDIAN to CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
mm: Fix memory size alignment in devm_memremap_pages_release()
mm: hide a #warning for COMPILE_TEST
ext4: correct documentation for grpid mount option
ext4: save error to disk in __ext4_grp_locked_error()
ext4: fix a race in the ext4 shutdown path
jbd2: fix sphinx kernel-doc build warnings
mbcache: initialize entry->e_referenced in mb_cache_entry_create()
rtc-opal: Fix handling of firmware error codes, prevent busy loops
drm/radeon: adjust tested variable
drm/radeon: Add dpm quirk for Jet PRO (v2)
scsi: smartpqi: allow static build ("built-in")
BACKPORT: tee: shm: Potential NULL dereference calling tee_shm_register()
BACKPORT: tee: shm: don't put_page on null shm->pages
BACKPORT: tee: shm: make function __tee_shm_alloc static
BACKPORT: tee: optee: check type of registered shared memory
BACKPORT: tee: add start argument to shm_register callback
BACKPORT: tee: optee: fix header dependencies
BACKPORT: tee: shm: inline tee_shm_get_id()
BACKPORT: tee: use reference counting for tee_context
BACKPORT: tee: optee: enable dynamic SHM support
BACKPORT: tee: optee: add optee-specific shared pool implementation
BACKPORT: tee: optee: store OP-TEE capabilities in private data
BACKPORT: tee: optee: add registered buffers handling into RPC calls
BACKPORT: tee: optee: add registered shared parameters handling
BACKPORT: tee: optee: add shared buffer registration functions
BACKPORT: tee: optee: add page list manipulation functions
BACKPORT: tee: optee: Update protocol definitions
BACKPORT: tee: shm: add page accessor functions
BACKPORT: tee: shm: add accessors for buffer size and page offset
BACKPORT: tee: add register user memory
BACKPORT: tee: flexible shared memory pool creation
BACKPORT: optee: support asynchronous supplicant requests
BACKPORT: tee: add TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_META
BACKPORT: tee: add tee_param_is_memref() for driver use
UPSTREAM: tcp: fix access to sk->sk_state in tcp_poll()
BACKPORT: tcp: fix potential double free issue for fastopen_req
BACKPORT: xfrm: Fix return value check of copy_sec_ctx.
time: Fix ktime_get_raw() incorrect base accumulation
FROMLIST: coresight: ETM: Add support for ARM Cortex-A73
FROMLIST: coresight: tmc: implementing TMC-ETR AUX space API
UPSTREAM: coresight: etm_perf: Fix using uninitialised work
UPSTREAM: coresight: fix kernel panic caused by invalid CPU
UPSTREAM: coresight: Fix disabling of CoreSight TPIU
UPSTREAM: coresight: perf: Add a missing call to etm_free_aux
UPSTREAM: coresight: tmc: Remove duplicate memset
UPSTREAM: coresight: tmc: Get rid of mode parameter for helper routines
UPSTREAM: coresight: tmc: Cleanup operation mode handling
UPSTREAM: coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be
sched/fair: prevent possible infinite loop in sched_group_energy
ANDROID: qtaguid: Fix the UAF probelm with tag_ref_tree
UPSTREAM: ANDROID: binder: remove waitqueue when thread exits.
ANDROID: sdcardfs: Protect set_top
ANDROID: fsnotify: Notify lower fs of open
Revert "ANDROID: sdcardfs: notify lower file of opens"
ANDROID: sdcardfs: Use lower getattr times/size
ANDROID: sched: EAS: check energy_aware() before calling select_energy_cpu_brute() in up-migrate path
UPSTREAM: eventpoll.h: add missing epoll event masks
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Add support for hi3660 SoC
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Prepare to add support for other hisi platforms
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Add platform prefix to function name
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Put platform code together
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Use round up step value
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Move the clk setup in the corresponding functions
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Remove mutex_lock in the code
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Remove thermal data back pointer
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Convert long to int
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Rename and remove unused field
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Remove costly sensor inspection
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Fix configuration register setting
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Encapsulate register writes into helpers
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Remove pointless lock
BACKPORT: thermal/drivers/hisi: Remove the multiple sensors support
BACKPORT: thermal: hisilicon: constify thermal_zone_of_device_ops structures
ANDROID: xattr: Pass EOPNOTSUPP to permission2
ANDROID: sdcardfs: Move default_normal to superblock
UPSTREAM: tcp: fix a request socket leak
UPSTREAM: tcp: fix possible deadlock in TCP stack vs BPF filter
UPSTREAM: tcp: Add a tcp_filter hook before handle ack packet
FROMLIST: arm64: kpti: Fix the interaction between ASID switching and software PAN
FROMLIST: arm64: Move post_ttbr_update_workaround to C code
fscrypt: updates on 4.15-rc4
ANDROID: uid_sys_stats: fix the comment
BACKPORT: optee: fix invalid of_node_put() in optee_driver_init()
BACKPORT: tee: optee: sync with new naming of interrupts
BACKPORT: tee: indicate privileged dev in gen_caps
BACKPORT: tee: optee: interruptible RPC sleep
BACKPORT: tee: optee: add const to tee_driver_ops and tee_desc structures
BACKPORT: tee: tee_shm: Constify dma_buf_ops structures.
BACKPORT: tee: add forward declaration for struct device
BACKPORT: tee: optee: fix uninitialized symbol 'parg'
BACKPORT: tee.txt: standardize document format
BACKPORT: tee: add ARM_SMCCC dependency
clocksource: arch_timer: make virtual counter access configurable
arm64: issue isb when trapping CNTVCT_EL0 access
BACKPORT: arm64: Add CNTFRQ_EL0 trap handler
BACKPORT: arm64: Add CNTVCT_EL0 trap handler
ANDROID: sdcardfs: Fix missing break on default_normal
ANDROID: arm64: kaslr: fixup Falkor workaround for 4.9
ANDROID: usb: f_fs: Prevent gadget unbind if it is already unbound
arm64: Kconfig: Reword UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 kconfig entry
arm64: use RET instruction for exiting the trampoline
UPSTREAM: arm64: kaslr: Put kernel vectors address in separate data page
UPSTREAM: arm64: mm: Introduce TTBR_ASID_MASK for getting at the ASID in the TTBR
UPSTREAM: arm64: Kconfig: Add CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
UPSTREAM: arm64: entry: Add fake CPU feature for unmapping the kernel at EL0
UPSTREAM: arm64: tls: Avoid unconditional zeroing of tpidrro_el0 for native tasks
UPSTREAM: arm64: erratum: Work around Falkor erratum #E1003 in trampoline code
UPSTREAM: arm64: entry: Hook up entry trampoline to exception vectors
UPSTREAM: arm64: entry: Explicitly pass exception level to kernel_ventry macro
UPSTREAM: arm64: mm: Map entry trampoline into trampoline and kernel page tables
UPSTREAM: arm64: entry: Add exception trampoline page for exceptions from EL0
UPSTREAM: arm64: mm: Invalidate both kernel and user ASIDs when performing TLBI
UPSTREAM: arm64: mm: Add arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0 helper
UPSTREAM: arm64: mm: Allocate ASIDs in pairs
UPSTREAM: arm64: mm: Fix and re-enable ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
UPSTREAM: arm64: mm: Rename post_ttbr0_update_workaround
UPSTREAM: arm64: mm: Move ASID from TTBR0 to TTBR1
UPSTREAM: arm64: mm: Temporarily disable ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
UPSTREAM: arm64: mm: Use non-global mappings for kernel space
UPSTREAM: arm64: factor out entry stack manipulation
ANDROID: sdcardfs: Add default_normal option
ANDROID: sdcardfs: notify lower file of opens
blkdev: Refactoring block io latency histogram codes
UPSTREAM: netfilter: conntrack: use power efficient workqueue
ANDROID: binder: Remove obsolete proc waitqueue.
UPSTREAM: arm64: setup: introduce kaslr_offset()
UPSTREAM: kcov: fix comparison callback signature
UPSTREAM: kcov: support comparison operands collection
UPSTREAM: kcov: remove pointless current != NULL check
UPSTREAM: kcov: support compat processes
UPSTREAM: kcov: simplify interrupt check
UPSTREAM: kcov: make kcov work properly with KASLR enabled
UPSTREAM: kcov: add more missing includes
BACKPORT: irq: Make the irqentry text section unconditional
UPSTREAM: kasan: make get_wild_bug_type() static
UPSTREAM: kasan: separate report parts by empty lines
UPSTREAM: kasan: improve double-free report format
UPSTREAM: kasan: print page description after stacks
UPSTREAM: kasan: improve slab object description
UPSTREAM: kasan: change report header
UPSTREAM: kasan: simplify address description logic
UPSTREAM: kasan: change allocation and freeing stack traces headers
UPSTREAM: kasan: unify report headers
UPSTREAM: kasan: introduce helper functions for determining bug type
BACKPORT: kasan: report only the first error by default
UPSTREAM: kasan: fix races in quarantine_remove_cache()
UPSTREAM: kasan: resched in quarantine_remove_cache()
UPSTREAM: kasan, sched/headers: Uninline kasan_enable/disable_current()
UPSTREAM: kasan: drain quarantine of memcg slab objects
UPSTREAM: kasan: eliminate long stalls during quarantine reduction
UPSTREAM: kasan: support panic_on_warn
ANDROID: dma-buf/sw_sync: Rename active_list to link
ANDROID: initramfs: call free_initrd() when skipping init
BACKPORT: Documentation: tee subsystem and op-tee driver
BACKPORT: tee: add OP-TEE driver
BACKPORT: tee: generic TEE subsystem
BACKPORT: dt/bindings: add bindings for optee
BACKPORT: schedutil: Reset cached freq if it is not in sync with next_freq
sched: EAS/WALT: Don't take into account of running task's util
sched: EAS/WALT: take into account of waking task's load
sched: EAS: upmigrate misfit current task
sched: avoid pushing tasks to an offline CPU
sched: Extend active balance to accept 'push_task' argument
sched: walt: Correct WALT window size initialization
sched: WALT: account cumulative window demand
sched: EAS/WALT: finish accounting prior to task_tick
sched/fair: prevent meaningless active migration
sched: walt: Leverage existing helper APIs to apply invariance
UPSTREAM: net: xfrm: allow clearing socket xfrm policies.
UPSTREAM: time: Clean up CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW time handling
UPSTREAM: arm64: vdso: fix clock_getres for 4GiB-aligned res
f2fs: updates on 4.15-rc1
UPSTREAM: android: binder: fix type mismatch warning
BACKPORT: arm64: Use __pa_symbol for empty_zero_page
UPSTREAM: arm64: Use __pa_symbol for kernel symbols
UPSTREAM: mm: Introduce lm_alias
FROMLIST: binder: fix proc->files use-after-free
BACKPORT: xfrm: Clear sk_dst_cache when applying per-socket policy.
sched: WALT: fix potential overflow
sched: Update task->on_rq when tasks are moving between runqueues
sched: WALT: fix window mis-alignment
sched: EAS: kill incorrect nohz idle cpu kick
sched: EAS: fix incorrect energy delta calculation due to rounding error
sched: EAS/WALT: use cr_avg instead of prev_runnable_sum
sched: WALT: fix broken cumulative runnable average accounting
sched: deadline: WALT: account cumulative runnable avg
ANDROID: binder: clarify deferred thread work.
BACKPORT: net/tcp-fastopen: Add new API support
UPSTREAM: net: Remove __sk_dst_reset() in tcp_v6_connect()
UPSTREAM: net/tcp-fastopen: refactor cookie check logic
sched: compute task utilisation with WALT consistently
FROMLIST: arm64: Avoid aligning normal memory pointers in __memcpy_{to,from}io
UPSTREAM: security: bpf: replace include of linux/bpf.h with forward declarations
UPSTREAM: selinux: bpf: Add addtional check for bpf object file receive
UPSTREAM: selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations
BACKPORT: security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall
BACKPORT: bpf: Add file mode configuration into bpf maps
cpufreq: Drop schedfreq governor
ANDROID: Revert "arm64: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB"
ANDROID: Revert "arm: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4MB"
sched: EAS: Fix the condition to distinguish energy before/after
sched: EAS: update trg_cpu to backup_cpu if no energy saving for target_cpu
sched/fair: consider task utilization in group_max_util()
sched/fair: consider task utilization in group_norm_util()
sched/fair: enforce EAS mode
sched/fair: ignore backup CPU when not valid
sched/fair: trace energy_diff for non boosted tasks
UPSTREAM: sched/fair: Sync task util before slow-path wakeup
UPSTREAM: sched/core: Add missing update_rq_clock() call in set_user_nice()
UPSTREAM: sched/core: Add missing update_rq_clock() call for task_hot()
UPSTREAM: sched/core: Add missing update_rq_clock() in detach_task_cfs_rq()
UPSTREAM: sched/core: Add missing update_rq_clock() in post_init_entity_util_avg()
UPSTREAM: sched/fair: Fix task group initialization
cpufreq/sched: Consider max cpu capacity when choosing frequencies
cpufreq/sched: Use cpu max freq rather than policy max
sched/fair: remove erroneous RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN from start_cpu()
FROMLIST: ALSA: usx2y: Suppress kernel warning at page allocation failures
FROMLIST: kbuild: clang: fix build failures with sparse check
Revert "Revert "BACKPORT: efi/libstub/arm64: Set -fpie when building the EFI stub""
BACKPORT: efi/libstub: Unify command line param parsing
ANDROID: sched/walt: Fix divide by zero error in cpufreq notifier
ANDROID: binder: show high watermark of alloc->pages.
ANDROID: binder: Add thread->process_todo flag.
ANDROID: sched/fair: Select correct capacity state for energy_diff
ANDROID: cpufreq-dt: Set sane defaults for schedutil rate limits
BACKPORT: cpufreq: schedutil: Use policy-dependent transition delays
Revert "BACKPORT: efi/libstub/arm64: Set -fpie when building the EFI stub"
FROMLIST: android: binder: Fix null ptr dereference in debug msg
FROMLIST: android: binder: Change binder_shrinker to static
UPSTREAM: arm64: compat: Remove leftover variable declaration
ANDROID: HACK: arm64: use -mno-implicit-float instead of -mgeneral-regs-only
ANDROID: Kbuild, LLVMLinux: allow overriding clang target triple
CHROMIUM: arm64: Disable asm-operand-width warning for clang
CHROMIUM: kbuild: clang: Disable the 'duplicate-decl-specifier' warning
BACKPORT: x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang
BACKPORT: efi/libstub/arm64: Set -fpie when building the EFI stub
UPSTREAM: efi/libstub/arm64: Force 'hidden' visibility for section markers
UPSTREAM: efi/libstub/arm64: Use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference
UPSTREAM: x86/build: Use cc-option to validate stack alignment parameter
UPSTREAM: x86/build: Fix stack alignment for CLang
UPSTREAM: compiler, clang: always inline when CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING is disabled
UPSTREAM: x86/boot: #undef memcpy() et al in string.c
UPSTREAM: llist: clang: introduce member_address_is_nonnull()
UPSTREAM: crypto: arm64/sha - avoid non-standard inline asm tricks
UPSTREAM: kbuild: clang: Disable 'address-of-packed-member' warning
UPSTREAM: x86/build: Specify stack alignment for clang
UPSTREAM: x86/build: Use __cc-option for boot code compiler options
UPSTREAM: kbuild: Add __cc-option macro
UPSTREAM: x86/mm/kaslr: Use the _ASM_MUL macro for multiplication to work around Clang incompatibility
UPSTREAM: crypto, x86: aesni - fix token pasting for clang
UPSTREAM: x86/kbuild: Use cc-option to enable -falign-{jumps/loops}
UPSTREAM: compiler, clang: properly override 'inline' for clang
UPSTREAM: compiler, clang: suppress warning for unused static inline functions
UPSTREAM: modules: mark __inittest/__exittest as __maybe_unused
UPSTREAM: kbuild: Add support to generate LLVM assembly files
UPSTREAM: kbuild: use -Oz instead of -Os when using clang
UPSTREAM: kbuild, LLVMLinux: Add -Werror to cc-option to support clang
UPSTREAM: kbuild: drop -Wno-unknown-warning-option from clang options
UPSTREAM: kbuild: fix asm-offset generation to work with clang
UPSTREAM: kbuild: consolidate redundant sed script ASM offset generation
UPSTREAM: kbuild: Consolidate header generation from ASM offset information
UPSTREAM: kbuild: clang: add -no-integrated-as to KBUILD_[AC]FLAGS
UPSTREAM: kbuild: Add better clang cross build support
FROMLIST: f2fs: expose some sectors to user in inline data or dentry case
UPSTREAM: sched/fair: Fix usage of find_idlest_group() when the local group is idlest
UPSTREAM: sched/fair: Fix usage of find_idlest_group() when no groups are allowed
UPSTREAM: sched/fair: Fix find_idlest_group() when local group is not allowed
UPSTREAM: sched/fair: Remove unnecessary comparison with -1
UPSTREAM: sched/fair: Move select_task_rq_fair() slow-path into its own function
UPSTREAM: sched/fair: Force balancing on NOHZ balance if local group has capacity
UPSTREAM: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
f2fs: catch up to v4.14-rc1
UPSTREAM: sched: use load_avg for selecting idlest group
UPSTREAM: sched: fix find_idlest_group for fork
ANDROID: binder: fix node sched policy calculation
ANDROID: binder: init desired_prio.sched_policy before use it
BACKPORT: net: xfrm: support setting an output mark.
FROMLIST: tracing: Add support for preempt and irq enable/disable events
FROMLIST: tracing: Prepare to add preempt and irq trace events
Conflicts:
arch/arm64/Kconfig
arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu_context.h
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
arch/arm64/kernel/io.c
arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c
arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c
arch/arm64/mm/context.c
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
drivers/Kconfig
drivers/Makefile
drivers/cpufreq/Kconfig
drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.c
drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-priv.h
drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c
drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight.c
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h
drivers/staging/android/ion/ion-ioctl.c
drivers/staging/android/ion/ion_system_heap.c
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c
include/linux/sched.h
include/trace/events/sched.h
kernel/kcov.c
kernel/sched/core.c
kernel/sched/cpufreq_sched.c
kernel/sched/cpufreq_schedutil.c
kernel/sched/fair.c
kernel/sched/sched.h
kernel/sched/walt.c
kernel/sched/walt.h
mm/kasan/report.c
security/security.c
security/selinux/hooks.c
Change-Id: I0ec8cbca6cb6384e22fbbe8def8a9d228229dc48
Signed-off-by: Blagovest Kolenichev <bkolenichev@codeaurora.org>
1993 lines
56 KiB
C
1993 lines
56 KiB
C
/*
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* Security plug functions
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
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* Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
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* Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <linux/bpf.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/dcache.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
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#include <linux/integrity.h>
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#include <linux/ima.h>
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#include <linux/evm.h>
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#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
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#include <net/flow.h>
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#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
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/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
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#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
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/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
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static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
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CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
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static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
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{
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initcall_t *call;
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call = __security_initcall_start;
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while (call < __security_initcall_end) {
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(*call) ();
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call++;
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}
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}
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/**
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* security_init - initializes the security framework
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*
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* This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence.
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*/
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int __init security_init(void)
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{
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pr_info("Security Framework initialized\n");
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/*
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* Load minor LSMs, with the capability module always first.
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*/
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capability_add_hooks();
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yama_add_hooks();
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loadpin_add_hooks();
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/*
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* Load all the remaining security modules.
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*/
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do_security_initcalls();
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return 0;
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}
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/* Save user chosen LSM */
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static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
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{
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strncpy(chosen_lsm, str, SECURITY_NAME_MAX);
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return 1;
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}
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__setup("security=", choose_lsm);
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/**
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* security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ?
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* @module: the name of the module
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*
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* Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations
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* to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used
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* to check if your LSM is currently loaded during kernel initialization.
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*
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* Return true if:
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* -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time,
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* -or the passed LSM is configured as the default and the user did not
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* choose an alternate LSM at boot time.
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* Otherwise, return false.
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*/
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int __init security_module_enable(const char *module)
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{
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return !strcmp(module, chosen_lsm);
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}
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/*
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* Hook list operation macros.
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*
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* call_void_hook:
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* This is a hook that does not return a value.
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*
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* call_int_hook:
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* This is a hook that returns a value.
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*/
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#define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \
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do { \
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struct security_hook_list *P; \
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\
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list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \
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P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
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} while (0)
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#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
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int RC = IRC; \
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do { \
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struct security_hook_list *P; \
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\
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list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
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RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
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if (RC != 0) \
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break; \
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} \
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} while (0); \
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RC; \
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})
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/* Security operations */
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int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
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{
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return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
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}
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int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
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struct task_struct *to)
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{
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return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
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}
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int security_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
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struct task_struct *to)
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{
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return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to);
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}
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int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
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struct task_struct *to, struct file *file)
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{
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return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file);
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}
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int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
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{
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return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode);
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}
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int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
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{
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return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent);
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}
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int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
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kernel_cap_t *effective,
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kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
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kernel_cap_t *permitted)
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{
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return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target,
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effective, inheritable, permitted);
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}
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int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
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const kernel_cap_t *effective,
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const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
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const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
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{
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return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old,
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effective, inheritable, permitted);
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}
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int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
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int cap)
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{
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return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
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}
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int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
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int cap)
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{
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return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
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}
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int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
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{
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return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb);
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}
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int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
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{
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return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry);
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}
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int security_syslog(int type)
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{
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return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type);
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}
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int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
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{
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return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz);
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}
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int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
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{
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struct security_hook_list *hp;
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int cap_sys_admin = 1;
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int rc;
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/*
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* The module will respond with a positive value if
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* it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be
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* made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules
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* agree that it should be set it will. If any module
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* thinks it should not be set it won't.
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*/
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list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) {
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rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
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if (rc <= 0) {
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cap_sys_admin = 0;
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break;
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}
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}
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return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
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}
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int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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{
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return call_int_hook(bprm_set_creds, 0, bprm);
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}
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int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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{
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int ret;
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ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
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}
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void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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{
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call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
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}
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void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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{
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call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
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}
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int security_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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{
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return call_int_hook(bprm_secureexec, 0, bprm);
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}
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int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
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{
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return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
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}
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void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
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{
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call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
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}
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int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
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{
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return call_int_hook(sb_copy_data, 0, orig, copy);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_copy_data);
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int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
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{
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return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, data);
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}
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int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
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{
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return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb, flags, data);
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}
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int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
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{
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return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb);
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}
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int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
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{
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return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry);
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}
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int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
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const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
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{
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return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
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}
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int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
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{
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return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags);
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}
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int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path)
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{
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return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path);
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}
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int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
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struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
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unsigned long kern_flags,
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unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
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{
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return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts,
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opts->num_mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb,
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opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
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int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
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struct super_block *newsb)
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{
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return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
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int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
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{
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return call_int_hook(sb_parse_opts_str, 0, options, opts);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_parse_opts_str);
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int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
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{
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inode->i_security = NULL;
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return call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
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}
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void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
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{
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integrity_inode_free(inode);
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call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
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}
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int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
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const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
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u32 *ctxlen)
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{
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return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
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name, ctx, ctxlen);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
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int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
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struct qstr *name,
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const struct cred *old, struct cred *new)
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{
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return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode,
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name, old, new);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
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int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
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const struct qstr *qstr,
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const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
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{
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struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1];
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struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
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int ret;
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if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
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return 0;
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if (!initxattrs)
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return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode,
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dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL);
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memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
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lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
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ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
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&lsm_xattr->name,
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&lsm_xattr->value,
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&lsm_xattr->value_len);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
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ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
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if (ret)
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goto out;
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ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
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out:
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for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++)
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kfree(xattr->value);
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return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
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int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
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const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
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void **value, size_t *len)
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{
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if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir,
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qstr, name, value, len);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security);
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
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int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
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unsigned int dev)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
|
|
|
|
int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
|
|
|
|
int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
|
|
|
|
int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
const char *old_name)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
|
|
struct dentry *new_dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
|
|
const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
|
|
unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
|
|
(d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
int err = call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
|
|
old_dir, old_dentry);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
|
|
new_dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
|
|
|
|
int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_chown);
|
|
|
|
int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
|
|
struct dentry *new_dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
|
|
const char *old_name)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
|
|
struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
|
|
unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
|
|
(d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
|
|
int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
|
|
old_dir, old_dentry);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry,
|
|
new_dir, new_dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
|
|
bool rcu)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return evm_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
|
|
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
|
|
* so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, dentry, name, value, size,
|
|
flags);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 1)
|
|
ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
|
|
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return;
|
|
call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
|
|
evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
|
|
* so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, dentry, name);
|
|
if (ret == 1)
|
|
ret = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, dentry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
|
|
*/
|
|
list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc);
|
|
if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
|
|
*/
|
|
list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size,
|
|
flags);
|
|
if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
|
|
|
|
void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up_xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP, name);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
|
|
|
|
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
return fsnotify_perm(file, mask);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_file_free(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
|
|
* it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about...
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
|
|
return prot;
|
|
if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
|
|
return prot;
|
|
/*
|
|
* if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!file)
|
|
return prot | PROT_EXEC;
|
|
/*
|
|
* ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
|
|
* NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) {
|
|
#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
|
|
if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) {
|
|
unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file);
|
|
if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC))
|
|
return prot;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return prot | PROT_EXEC;
|
|
}
|
|
/* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
|
|
return prot;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
|
|
unsigned long flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot,
|
|
mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
|
|
unsigned long prot)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
|
|
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file, cred);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_create, 0, clone_flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(task_free, task);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_read_file(file, id);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
|
|
|
|
int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
|
|
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
|
|
|
|
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
|
|
int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
*secid = 0;
|
|
call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
|
|
struct rlimit *new_rlim)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
|
|
int sig, u32 secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(task_wait, 0, p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
|
|
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
|
{
|
|
int thisrc;
|
|
int rc = -ENOSYS;
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) {
|
|
thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
|
if (thisrc != -ENOSYS) {
|
|
rc = thisrc;
|
|
if (thisrc != 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
*secid = 0;
|
|
call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_msg_queue_free(struct msg_queue *msq)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq,
|
|
struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
|
|
struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_shm_alloc(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_shm_free(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sem_alloc(struct sem_array *sma)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_sem_free(struct sem_array *sma)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
|
|
unsigned nsops, int alter)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
|
|
return;
|
|
call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
|
|
|
|
int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
|
|
|
|
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
|
|
seclen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
|
|
|
|
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
*secid = 0;
|
|
return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
|
|
|
|
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
|
|
|
|
void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
|
|
|
|
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
|
|
|
|
int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
|
|
|
|
int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
|
|
int type, int protocol, int kern)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type,
|
|
protocol, kern);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
|
|
int size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
|
|
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
|
|
optval, optlen, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
|
|
skb, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
|
|
|
|
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone);
|
|
|
|
void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &fl->flowi_secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
|
|
|
|
void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, fl);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
|
|
|
|
void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft);
|
|
|
|
int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request);
|
|
|
|
void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
|
|
const struct request_sock *req)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
|
|
struct sk_buff *skb)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
|
|
|
|
void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc);
|
|
|
|
void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security);
|
|
|
|
void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_create(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
|
|
|
|
int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
|
|
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
|
|
gfp_t gfp)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
|
|
struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free);
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
|
|
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
|
|
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete);
|
|
|
|
void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid, dir);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
|
|
struct xfrm_policy *xp,
|
|
const struct flowi *fl)
|
|
{
|
|
struct security_hook_list *hp;
|
|
int rc = 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment
|
|
* becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately,
|
|
* we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux
|
|
* supplies this call.
|
|
*
|
|
* For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than
|
|
* using the macro
|
|
*/
|
|
list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
|
|
list) {
|
|
rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &fl->flowi_secid,
|
|
0);
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(rc);
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
|
|
|
|
int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
|
|
unsigned long flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_key_free(struct key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(key_free, key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
|
|
const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, perm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
|
|
{
|
|
*_buffer = NULL;
|
|
return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
|
|
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
|
|
struct audit_context *actx)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
|
|
actx);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
|
|
int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size);
|
|
}
|
|
int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode);
|
|
}
|
|
int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog);
|
|
}
|
|
int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map);
|
|
}
|
|
int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
|
|
{
|
|
return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux);
|
|
}
|
|
void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map);
|
|
}
|
|
void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
|
|
{
|
|
call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
|
|
|
|
struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init = {
|
|
.binder_set_context_mgr =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_set_context_mgr),
|
|
.binder_transaction =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_transaction),
|
|
.binder_transfer_binder =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_transfer_binder),
|
|
.binder_transfer_file =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_transfer_file),
|
|
|
|
.ptrace_access_check =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ptrace_access_check),
|
|
.ptrace_traceme =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ptrace_traceme),
|
|
.capget = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.capget),
|
|
.capset = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.capset),
|
|
.capable = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.capable),
|
|
.quotactl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.quotactl),
|
|
.quota_on = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.quota_on),
|
|
.syslog = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.syslog),
|
|
.settime = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.settime),
|
|
.vm_enough_memory =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory),
|
|
.bprm_set_creds =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_set_creds),
|
|
.bprm_check_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_check_security),
|
|
.bprm_secureexec =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_secureexec),
|
|
.bprm_committing_creds =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_committing_creds),
|
|
.bprm_committed_creds =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_committed_creds),
|
|
.sb_alloc_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_alloc_security),
|
|
.sb_free_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_free_security),
|
|
.sb_copy_data = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_copy_data),
|
|
.sb_remount = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_remount),
|
|
.sb_kern_mount =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_kern_mount),
|
|
.sb_show_options =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_show_options),
|
|
.sb_statfs = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_statfs),
|
|
.sb_mount = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_mount),
|
|
.sb_umount = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_umount),
|
|
.sb_pivotroot = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_pivotroot),
|
|
.sb_set_mnt_opts =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_set_mnt_opts),
|
|
.sb_clone_mnt_opts =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_clone_mnt_opts),
|
|
.sb_parse_opts_str =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_parse_opts_str),
|
|
.dentry_init_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security),
|
|
.dentry_create_files_as =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.dentry_create_files_as),
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
|
|
.path_unlink = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_unlink),
|
|
.path_mkdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_mkdir),
|
|
.path_rmdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_rmdir),
|
|
.path_mknod = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_mknod),
|
|
.path_truncate =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_truncate),
|
|
.path_symlink = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_symlink),
|
|
.path_link = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_link),
|
|
.path_rename = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_rename),
|
|
.path_chmod = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_chmod),
|
|
.path_chown = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_chown),
|
|
.path_chroot = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_chroot),
|
|
#endif
|
|
.inode_alloc_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_alloc_security),
|
|
.inode_free_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_free_security),
|
|
.inode_init_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_init_security),
|
|
.inode_create = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_create),
|
|
.inode_link = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_link),
|
|
.inode_unlink = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_unlink),
|
|
.inode_symlink =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_symlink),
|
|
.inode_mkdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_mkdir),
|
|
.inode_rmdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_rmdir),
|
|
.inode_mknod = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_mknod),
|
|
.inode_rename = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_rename),
|
|
.inode_readlink =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_readlink),
|
|
.inode_follow_link =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_follow_link),
|
|
.inode_permission =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_permission),
|
|
.inode_setattr =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setattr),
|
|
.inode_getattr =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getattr),
|
|
.inode_setxattr =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setxattr),
|
|
.inode_post_setxattr =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_post_setxattr),
|
|
.inode_getxattr =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getxattr),
|
|
.inode_listxattr =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_listxattr),
|
|
.inode_removexattr =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_removexattr),
|
|
.inode_need_killpriv =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_need_killpriv),
|
|
.inode_killpriv =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_killpriv),
|
|
.inode_getsecurity =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity),
|
|
.inode_setsecurity =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity),
|
|
.inode_listsecurity =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_listsecurity),
|
|
.inode_getsecid =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid),
|
|
.inode_copy_up =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up),
|
|
.inode_copy_up_xattr =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr),
|
|
.file_permission =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_permission),
|
|
.file_alloc_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_alloc_security),
|
|
.file_free_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_free_security),
|
|
.file_ioctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_ioctl),
|
|
.mmap_addr = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.mmap_addr),
|
|
.mmap_file = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.mmap_file),
|
|
.file_mprotect =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_mprotect),
|
|
.file_lock = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_lock),
|
|
.file_fcntl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_fcntl),
|
|
.file_set_fowner =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_set_fowner),
|
|
.file_send_sigiotask =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_send_sigiotask),
|
|
.file_receive = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_receive),
|
|
.file_open = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_open),
|
|
.task_create = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_create),
|
|
.task_free = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_free),
|
|
.cred_alloc_blank =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_alloc_blank),
|
|
.cred_free = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_free),
|
|
.cred_prepare = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_prepare),
|
|
.cred_transfer =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_transfer),
|
|
.kernel_act_as =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as),
|
|
.kernel_create_files_as =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_create_files_as),
|
|
.kernel_module_request =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_request),
|
|
.kernel_read_file =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_read_file),
|
|
.kernel_post_read_file =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_post_read_file),
|
|
.task_fix_setuid =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_fix_setuid),
|
|
.task_setpgid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setpgid),
|
|
.task_getpgid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getpgid),
|
|
.task_getsid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getsid),
|
|
.task_getsecid =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getsecid),
|
|
.task_setnice = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setnice),
|
|
.task_setioprio =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setioprio),
|
|
.task_getioprio =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getioprio),
|
|
.task_setrlimit =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setrlimit),
|
|
.task_setscheduler =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setscheduler),
|
|
.task_getscheduler =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getscheduler),
|
|
.task_movememory =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_movememory),
|
|
.task_kill = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_kill),
|
|
.task_wait = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_wait),
|
|
.task_prctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_prctl),
|
|
.task_to_inode =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_to_inode),
|
|
.ipc_permission =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ipc_permission),
|
|
.ipc_getsecid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid),
|
|
.msg_msg_alloc_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_msg_alloc_security),
|
|
.msg_msg_free_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_msg_free_security),
|
|
.msg_queue_alloc_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_alloc_security),
|
|
.msg_queue_free_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_free_security),
|
|
.msg_queue_associate =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_associate),
|
|
.msg_queue_msgctl =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_msgctl),
|
|
.msg_queue_msgsnd =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_msgsnd),
|
|
.msg_queue_msgrcv =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_msgrcv),
|
|
.shm_alloc_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_alloc_security),
|
|
.shm_free_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_free_security),
|
|
.shm_associate =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_associate),
|
|
.shm_shmctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_shmctl),
|
|
.shm_shmat = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_shmat),
|
|
.sem_alloc_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_alloc_security),
|
|
.sem_free_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_free_security),
|
|
.sem_associate =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_associate),
|
|
.sem_semctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_semctl),
|
|
.sem_semop = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_semop),
|
|
.netlink_send = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.netlink_send),
|
|
.d_instantiate =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.d_instantiate),
|
|
.getprocattr = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.getprocattr),
|
|
.setprocattr = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.setprocattr),
|
|
.ismaclabel = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ismaclabel),
|
|
.secid_to_secctx =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx),
|
|
.secctx_to_secid =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid),
|
|
.release_secctx =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.release_secctx),
|
|
.inode_invalidate_secctx =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_invalidate_secctx),
|
|
.inode_notifysecctx =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_notifysecctx),
|
|
.inode_setsecctx =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setsecctx),
|
|
.inode_getsecctx =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx),
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
|
|
.unix_stream_connect =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.unix_stream_connect),
|
|
.unix_may_send =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.unix_may_send),
|
|
.socket_create =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_create),
|
|
.socket_post_create =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_post_create),
|
|
.socket_bind = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_bind),
|
|
.socket_connect =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_connect),
|
|
.socket_listen =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_listen),
|
|
.socket_accept =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_accept),
|
|
.socket_sendmsg =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_sendmsg),
|
|
.socket_recvmsg =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_recvmsg),
|
|
.socket_getsockname =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getsockname),
|
|
.socket_getpeername =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getpeername),
|
|
.socket_getsockopt =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getsockopt),
|
|
.socket_setsockopt =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_setsockopt),
|
|
.socket_shutdown =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_shutdown),
|
|
.socket_sock_rcv_skb =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_sock_rcv_skb),
|
|
.socket_getpeersec_stream =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream),
|
|
.socket_getpeersec_dgram =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram),
|
|
.sk_alloc_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_alloc_security),
|
|
.sk_free_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_free_security),
|
|
.sk_clone_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_clone_security),
|
|
.sk_getsecid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_getsecid),
|
|
.sock_graft = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sock_graft),
|
|
.inet_conn_request =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inet_conn_request),
|
|
.inet_csk_clone =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inet_csk_clone),
|
|
.inet_conn_established =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inet_conn_established),
|
|
.secmark_relabel_packet =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet),
|
|
.secmark_refcount_inc =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secmark_refcount_inc),
|
|
.secmark_refcount_dec =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secmark_refcount_dec),
|
|
.req_classify_flow =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.req_classify_flow),
|
|
.tun_dev_alloc_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_alloc_security),
|
|
.tun_dev_free_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_free_security),
|
|
.tun_dev_create =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_create),
|
|
.tun_dev_attach_queue =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_attach_queue),
|
|
.tun_dev_attach =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_attach),
|
|
.tun_dev_open = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_open),
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
|
|
.xfrm_policy_alloc_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_alloc_security),
|
|
.xfrm_policy_clone_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_clone_security),
|
|
.xfrm_policy_free_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_free_security),
|
|
.xfrm_policy_delete_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_delete_security),
|
|
.xfrm_state_alloc =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_alloc),
|
|
.xfrm_state_alloc_acquire =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
|
|
.xfrm_state_free_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_free_security),
|
|
.xfrm_state_delete_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_delete_security),
|
|
.xfrm_policy_lookup =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_lookup),
|
|
.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
|
|
.xfrm_decode_session =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_decode_session),
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
|
|
.key_alloc = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_alloc),
|
|
.key_free = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_free),
|
|
.key_permission =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_permission),
|
|
.key_getsecurity =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_getsecurity),
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
|
|
.audit_rule_init =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init),
|
|
.audit_rule_known =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_known),
|
|
.audit_rule_match =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match),
|
|
.audit_rule_free =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free),
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
|
|
.bpf =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bpf),
|
|
.bpf_map =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bpf_map),
|
|
.bpf_prog =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bpf_prog),
|
|
.bpf_map_alloc_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bpf_map_alloc_security),
|
|
.bpf_map_free_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bpf_map_free_security),
|
|
.bpf_prog_alloc_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bpf_prog_alloc_security),
|
|
.bpf_prog_free_security =
|
|
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bpf_prog_free_security),
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
|
|
};
|