chelsio/chtls: prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit
commit fbbd84af6ba70334335bdeba3ae536cf751c14c6 upstream.
The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from
process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len +
sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition
could have an integer wrapping bug. Use size_add() to prevent this.
Fixes: a089439478 ("crypto: chtls - Register chtls with net tls")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/c6bfb23c-2db2-4e1b-b8ab-ba3925c82ef5@stanley.mountain
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent
4b794b6e59
commit
8e9f1f405a
@@ -339,8 +339,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *copy_gl_to_skb_pkt(const struct pkt_gl *gl,
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* driver. Once driver synthesizes cpl_pass_accpet_req the skb will go
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* through the regular cpl_pass_accept_req processing in TOM.
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*/
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skb = alloc_skb(gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req)
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- pktshift, GFP_ATOMIC);
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skb = alloc_skb(size_add(gl->tot_len,
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sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req)) -
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pktshift, GFP_ATOMIC);
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if (unlikely(!skb))
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return NULL;
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__skb_put(skb, gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req)
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