70f98fe87ab5b332fa6308ae9f05da170d65e9f6
5105 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cyber Knight
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12049fb992 |
treewide: Introduce CONFIG_ZSTD_COMMON
- This accomodates the common drivers between the ZSTD Compressor and the ZSTD Decompressor. Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Cyber Knight
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58b76ec284 |
lib: zstd: Fix a warning in zstd_reset_dstream()
- ZSTD_resetDstream() is deprecated hence it is wise to make zstd_reset_dstream() functionally identical to ZSTD_resetDstream() as we have done for the compression stream in [1].
- Also make ZSTD_startingInputLength() visible for the decompression driver to be able to use it.
- This fixes the below warning:
../lib/zstd/zstd_decompress_module.c: In function 'zstd_reset_dstream':
../lib/zstd/zstd_decompress_module.c:80:9: warning: 'ZSTD_resetDStream' is deprecated [-Wdeprecated-declarations]
80 | return ZSTD_resetDStream(dstream);
| ^~~~~~
In file included from ../include/linux/zstd.h:26,
from ../lib/zstd/zstd_decompress_module.c:15:
../include/linux/zstd_lib.h:2569:27: note: declared here
2569 | ZSTDLIB_STATIC_API size_t ZSTD_resetDStream(ZSTD_DStream* zds);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[1]: https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/3088
Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com>
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Cyber Knight
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74aac73e75 |
lib: zstd: Upgrade to latest upstream zstd version 1.5.4
- Syncs latest upstream ZSTD from [1]. - This update retains the following commits: |
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Cyber Knight
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0f17eaf799 |
lib: zstd: Revise the warning fix at zstd_reset_cstream()
Subsequent to 95ce392b774c1 {"lib: zstd: Fix a warning in zstd_reset_cstream()"}
- As referenced by Nick Terrelln ~ the ZSTD maintainer in the linux kernel [1], making zstd_reset_cstream() functionally identical to ZSTD_resetCStream() would be the perfect way to fix the warning without touching any core functions or breaking other parts of the code.
[1]: https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/3088#discussion_r822064161
Suggested-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com>
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Cyber Knight
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3584b70909 |
lib: zstd: Fix a warning in zstd_reset_cstream()
- This fixes the below warning:
../lib/zstd/zstd_compress_module.c: In function 'zstd_reset_cstream':
../lib/zstd/zstd_compress_module.c:136:9: warning: 'ZSTD_resetCStream' is deprecated [-Wdeprecated-declarations]
136 | return ZSTD_resetCStream(cstream, pledged_src_size);
| ^~~~~~
In file included from ../include/linux/zstd.h:26,
from ../lib/zstd/zstd_compress_module.c:15:
../include/linux/zstd_lib.h:2277:8: note: declared here
2277 | size_t ZSTD_resetCStream(ZSTD_CStream* zcs, unsigned long long pledgedSrcSize);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ZSTD_resetCstream is deprecated and zstd_CCtx_reset is suggested to use hence let's switch to it.
Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com>
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Cyber Knight
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983fec7ba9 |
lib: zstd: Upgrade to latest upstream zstd version 1.5.2
Syncs latest upstream ZSTD from [1]. This update retains the following commits: |
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Cyber Knight
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cf5381be98 |
lib: zstd: Rework Makefile
- This fixes inlining. Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Cyber Knight
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48ba4bfddc |
lib: decompress_unzstd: Define UINTPTR_MAX
- Define UINTPTR_MAX as it is used by decompress_unzstd.c . Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Cyber Knight
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bdd2b6d804 |
lib: zstd: Include a missing header
- This is needed to use size_t and I wonder why GCC does not throw an error about it while clang explicitly shouts about how size_t is an unknown type. - Thanks to @jebaitedneko for pointing this out. Suggested-by: Jebaitedneko <Jebaitedneko@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Cyber Knight
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214adb3978 |
lib: zstd: Fix attribute declaration
- fallthrough, __fallthrough__ and [[fallthrough]] are compiler dependent. - Hence let's use a generic fallthrough implementation which is __attribute__((__fallthrough__)) Test: lib/zstd/ compiled successfully with this change using GCC 12.0.0 / Clang 14.0.0 . Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Nick Terrell
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c5dabd9692 |
BACKPORT: lib: zstd: Fix unused variable warning
Backport the fix from upstream PR #2838 [0]. Found by the Kernel test robot in [1]. [0] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/2838 [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202111120312.833wII4i-lkp@intel.com/T/ Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com> [cyberknight777: backport to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Nick Terrell
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9160a34dbb |
BACKPORT: lib: zstd: Don't inline functions in zstd_opt.c
`zstd_opt.c` contains the match finder for the highest compression levels. These levels are already very slow, and are unlikely to be used in the kernel. If they are used, they shouldn't be used in latency sensitive workloads, so slowing them down shouldn't be a big deal. This saves 188 KB of the 288 KB regression reported by Geert Uytterhoeven [0]. I've also opened an issue upstream [1] so that we can properly tackle the code size issue in `zstd_opt.c` for all users, and can hopefully remove this hack in the next zstd version we import. Bloat-o-meter output on x86-64: ``` > ../scripts/bloat-o-meter vmlinux.old vmlinux add/remove: 6/5 grow/shrink: 1/9 up/down: 16673/-209939 (-193266) Function old new delta ZSTD_compressBlock_opt_generic.constprop - 7559 +7559 ZSTD_insertBtAndGetAllMatches - 6304 +6304 ZSTD_insertBt1 - 1731 +1731 ZSTD_storeSeq - 693 +693 ZSTD_BtGetAllMatches - 255 +255 ZSTD_updateRep - 128 +128 ZSTD_updateTree 96 99 +3 ZSTD_insertAndFindFirstIndexHash3 81 - -81 ZSTD_setBasePrices.constprop 98 - -98 ZSTD_litLengthPrice.constprop 138 - -138 ZSTD_count 362 181 -181 ZSTD_count_2segments 1407 938 -469 ZSTD_insertBt1.constprop 2689 - -2689 ZSTD_compressBlock_btultra2 19990 423 -19567 ZSTD_compressBlock_btultra 19633 15 -19618 ZSTD_initStats_ultra 19825 - -19825 ZSTD_compressBlock_btopt 20374 12 -20362 ZSTD_compressBlock_btopt_extDict 29984 12 -29972 ZSTD_compressBlock_btultra_extDict 30718 15 -30703 ZSTD_compressBlock_btopt_dictMatchState 32689 12 -32677 ZSTD_compressBlock_btultra_dictMatchState 33574 15 -33559 Total: Before=6611828, After=6418562, chg -2.92% ``` [0] https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/11/14/189 [1] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/issues/2862 Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com> [cyberknight777: backport to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Nick Terrell
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2acd3b8cd6 |
BACKPORT: lib: zstd: Don't add -O3 to cflags
After the update to zstd-1.4.10 passing -O3 is no longer necessary to get good performance from zstd. Using the default optimization level -O2 is sufficient to get good performance. This fixes the reported parisc -Wframe-larger-than=1536 errors [0]. The gcc-8-hppa-linux-gnu compiler performed very poorly with -O3, generating stacks that are ~3KB. With -O2 these same functions generate stacks in the ~300B range, completely fixing the problem. Additionally, this improves the reported code bloat [1]. With gcc-11 bloat-o-meter shows an 80KB code size improvement: ``` > ../scripts/bloat-o-meter vmlinux.old vmlinux add/remove: 31/8 grow/shrink: 24/155 up/down: 25734/-107924 (-82190) Total: Before=6418562, After=6336372, chg -1.28% ``` Compared to before the zstd-1.4.10 update we see a total code size regression of 105KB, down from 374KB at v5.16-rc1: ``` > ../scripts/bloat-o-meter vmlinux.old vmlinux add/remove: 292/62 grow/shrink: 56/88 up/down: 235009/-127487 (107522) Total: Before=6228850, After=6336372, chg +1.73% ``` [0] https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/11/15/710 [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/11/14/189 Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com> [cyberknight777: backport to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Nathan Chancellor
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46136918be |
BACKPORT: lib: zstd: Add cast to silence clang's -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical
A new warning in clang warns that there is an instance where boolean
expressions are being used with bitwise operators instead of logical
ones:
lib/zstd/decompress/huf_decompress.c:890:25: warning: use of bitwise '&' with boolean operands [-Wbitwise-instead-of-logical]
(BIT_reloadDStreamFast(&bitD1) == BIT_DStream_unfinished)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
zstd does this frequently to help with performance, as logical operators
have branches whereas bitwise ones do not.
To fix this warning in other cases, the expressions were placed on
separate lines with the '&=' operator; however, this particular instance
was moved away from that so that it could be surrounded by LIKELY, which
is a macro for __builtin_expect(), to help with a performance
regression, according to upstream zstd pull #1973.
Aside from switching to logical operators, which is likely undesirable
in this instance, or disabling the warning outright, the solution is
casting one of the expressions to an integer type to make it clear to
clang that the author knows what they are doing. Add a cast to U32 to
silence the warning. The first U32 cast is to silence an instance of
-Wshorten-64-to-32 because __builtin_expect() returns long so it cannot
be moved.
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1486
Link: https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/1973
Reported-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com>
[cyberknight777: backport to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com>
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Nick Terrell
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518865dca3 |
BACKPORT: lib: zstd: Upgrade to latest upstream zstd version 1.4.10
Upgrade to the latest upstream zstd version 1.4.10. This patch is 100% generated from upstream zstd commit 20821a46f412 [0]. This patch is very large because it is transitioning from the custom kernel zstd to using upstream directly. The new zstd follows upstreams file structure which is different. Future update patches will be much smaller because they will only contain the changes from one upstream zstd release. As an aid for review I've created a commit [1] that shows the diff between upstream zstd as-is (which doesn't compile), and the zstd code imported in this patch. The verion of zstd in this patch is generated from upstream with changes applied by automation to replace upstreams libc dependencies, remove unnecessary portability macros, replace `/**` comments with `/*` comments, and use the kernel's xxhash instead of bundling it. The benefits of this patch are as follows: 1. Using upstream directly with automated script to generate kernel code. This allows us to update the kernel every upstream release, so the kernel gets the latest bug fixes and performance improvements, and doesn't get 3 years out of date again. The automation and the translated code are tested every upstream commit to ensure it continues to work. 2. Upgrades from a custom zstd based on 1.3.1 to 1.4.10, getting 3 years of performance improvements and bug fixes. On x86_64 I've measured 15% faster BtrFS and SquashFS decompression+read speeds, 35% faster kernel decompression, and 30% faster ZRAM decompression+read speeds. 3. Zstd-1.4.10 supports negative compression levels, which allow zstd to match or subsume lzo's performance. 4. Maintains the same kernel-specific wrapper API, so no callers have to be modified with zstd version updates. One concern that was brought up was stack usage. Upstream zstd had already removed most of its heavy stack usage functions, but I just removed the last functions that allocate arrays on the stack. I've measured the high water mark for both compression and decompression before and after this patch. Decompression is approximately neutral, using about 1.2KB of stack space. Compression levels up to 3 regressed from 1.4KB -> 1.6KB, and higher compression levels regressed from 1.5KB -> 2KB. We've added unit tests upstream to prevent further regression. I believe that this is a reasonable increase, and if it does end up causing problems, this commit can be cleanly reverted, because it only touches zstd. I chose the bulk update instead of replaying upstream commits because there have been ~3500 upstream commits since the 1.3.1 release, zstd wasn't ready to be used in the kernel as-is before a month ago, and not all upstream zstd commits build. The bulk update preserves bisectablity because bugs can be bisected to the zstd version update. At that point the update can be reverted, and we can work with upstream to find and fix the bug. Note that upstream zstd release 1.4.10 doesn't exist yet. I have cut a staging branch at 20821a46f412 [0] and will apply any changes requested to the staging branch. Once we're ready to merge this update I will cut a zstd release at the commit we merge, so we have a known zstd release in the kernel. The implementation of the kernel API is contained in zstd_compress_module.c and zstd_decompress_module.c. [0] |
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Nick Terrell
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b01ac80b3d |
BACKPORT: lib: zstd: Add decompress_sources.h for decompress_unzstd
Adds decompress_sources.h which includes every .c file necessary for zstd decompression. This is used in decompress_unzstd.c so the internal structure of the library isn't exposed. This allows us to upgrade the zstd library version without modifying any callers. Instead we just need to update decompress_sources.h. Signed-off-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com> Tested By: Paul Jones <paul@pauljones.id.au> Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> # LLVM/Clang v13.0.0 on x86-64 Tested-by: Jean-Denis Girard <jd.girard@sysnux.pf> [cyberknight777: backport to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Nick Terrell
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5bdb5bf7fd |
BACKPORT: lib: zstd: Add kernel-specific API
This patch: - Moves `include/linux/zstd.h` -> `include/linux/zstd_lib.h` - Updates modified zstd headers to yearless copyright - Adds a new API in `include/linux/zstd.h` that is functionally equivalent to the in-use subset of the current API. Functions are renamed to avoid symbol collisions with zstd, to make it clear it is not the upstream zstd API, and to follow the kernel style guide. - Updates all callers to use the new API. There are no functional changes in this patch. Since there are no functional change, I felt it was okay to update all the callers in a single patch. Once the API is approved, the callers are mechanically changed. This patch is preparing for the 3rd patch in this series, which updates zstd to version 1.4.10. Since the upstream zstd API is no longer exposed to callers, the update can happen transparently. Signed-off-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com> Tested By: Paul Jones <paul@pauljones.id.au> Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> # LLVM/Clang v13.0.0 on x86-64 Tested-by: Jean-Denis Girard <jd.girard@sysnux.pf> [cyberknight777: backport to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Zhen Lei
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b9958a9894 |
BACKPORT: lib/decompressors: fix spelling mistakes
Fix some spelling mistakes in comments: sentinal ==> sentinel compresed ==> compressed dependeny ==> dependency immediatelly ==> immediately dervied ==> derived splitted ==> split nore ==> not independed ==> independent asumed ==> assumed Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210604085656.12257-1-thunder.leizhen@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [cyberknight777: backport to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Paul Cercueil
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59066d6945 |
BACKPORT: lib: decompress_unzstd: Limit output size
The zstd decompression code, as it is right now, will most likely fail on 32-bit systems, as the default output buffer size causes the buffer's end address to overflow. Address this issue by setting a sane default to the default output size, with a value that won't overflow the buffer's end address. Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net> Reviewed-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> [cyberknight777: backport to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Nick Terrell
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8e30d314fc |
BACKPORT: lib: Add zstd support to decompress
- Add unzstd() and the zstd decompress interface. - Add zstd support to decompress_method(). The decompress_method() and unzstd() functions are used to decompress the initramfs and the initrd. The __decompress() function is used in the preboot environment to decompress a zstd compressed kernel. The zstd decompression function allows the input and output buffers to overlap because that is used by x86 kernel decompression. Signed-off-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200730190841.2071656-3-nickrterrell@gmail.com [cyberknight777: backport to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Nick Terrell
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4f8f6f1b94 |
BACKPORT: lib: Prepare zstd for preboot environment, improve performance
These changes are necessary to get the build to work in the preboot environment, and to get reasonable performance: - Remove a double definition of the CHECK_F macro when the zstd library is amalgamated. - Switch ZSTD_copy8() to __builtin_memcpy(), because in the preboot environment on x86 gcc can't inline `memcpy()` otherwise. - Limit the gcc hack in ZSTD_wildcopy() to the broken gcc version. See https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=81388. ZSTD_copy8() and ZSTD_wildcopy() are in the core of the zstd hot loop. So outlining these calls to memcpy(), and having an extra branch are very detrimental to performance. Signed-off-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200730190841.2071656-2-nickrterrell@gmail.com [cyberknight777: backport to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Rasmus Villemoes
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e419d9d94a |
BACKPORT: lib/zstd/mem.h: replace __inline by inline
Currently, compiler_types.h #defines __inline as inline (and further not change functionality. It serves as preparation for removing the While at it, also remove the __attribute__((unused)) - it's already included in the definition of the inline macro, and "open-coded" __attribute__(()) should be avoided. Since commit a95b37e20db9 (kbuild: get <linux/compiler_types.h> out of <linux/kconfig.h>), compiler_types.h is automatically included by all kernel C code - i.e., the definition of inline including the unused attribute is guaranteed to be in effect whenever ZSTD_STATIC is expanded. Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com> [cyberknight777: backport to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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Gustavo A. R. Silva
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241ff853b3 |
BACKPORT: lib: zstd: Mark expected switch fall-throughs
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
cases where we are expecting to fall through.
This patch fixes the following warnings:
lib/zstd/bitstream.h:261:30: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
lib/zstd/bitstream.h:262:30: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
lib/zstd/bitstream.h:263:30: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
lib/zstd/bitstream.h:264:30: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
lib/zstd/bitstream.h:265:30: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
lib/zstd/compress.c:3183:16: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
lib/zstd/decompress.c:1770:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
lib/zstd/decompress.c:2376:15: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
lib/zstd/decompress.c:2404:15: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
lib/zstd/decompress.c:2435:16: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
lib/zstd/huf_compress.c: In function ‘HUF_compress1X_usingCTable’:
lib/zstd/huf_compress.c:535:5: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
if (sizeof((stream)->bitContainer) * 8 < HUF_TABLELOG_MAX * 4 + 7) \
^
lib/zstd/huf_compress.c:558:54: note: in expansion of macro ‘HUF_FLUSHBITS_2’
case 3: HUF_encodeSymbol(&bitC, ip[n + 2], CTable); HUF_FLUSHBITS_2(&bitC);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
lib/zstd/huf_compress.c:559:2: note: here
case 2: HUF_encodeSymbol(&bitC, ip[n + 1], CTable); HUF_FLUSHBITS_1(&bitC);
^~~~
lib/zstd/huf_compress.c:531:5: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
if (sizeof((stream)->bitContainer) * 8 < HUF_TABLELOG_MAX * 2 + 7) \
^
lib/zstd/huf_compress.c:559:54: note: in expansion of macro ‘HUF_FLUSHBITS_1’
case 2: HUF_encodeSymbol(&bitC, ip[n + 1], CTable); HUF_FLUSHBITS_1(&bitC);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
lib/zstd/huf_compress.c:560:2: note: here
case 1: HUF_encodeSymbol(&bitC, ip[n + 0], CTable); HUF_FLUSHBITS(&bitC);
^~~~
AR lib/zstd//built-in.a
Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
[cyberknight777: backport to 4.14]
Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com>
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Masahiro Yamada
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43bb229b5b |
BACKPORT: lib: zstd: clean up Makefile for simpler composite object handling
Now, Kbuild nicely handles composite objects to avoid multiple definition. Makefiles can simply add the same objects multiple times across composite objects. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> [cyberknight777: backport to 4.14] Signed-off-by: Cyber Knight <cyberknight755@gmail.com> |
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balgxmr
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434f599332 | Merge branch 'upstream-linux-4.14.y' of https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common into rebase | ||
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Ben Hutchings
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53c1353ad7 |
lib: cpu_rmap: Fix potential use-after-free in irq_cpu_rmap_release()
[ Upstream commit 7c5d4801ecf0564c860033d89726b99723c55146 ]
irq_cpu_rmap_release() calls cpu_rmap_put(), which may free the rmap.
So we need to clear the pointer to our glue structure in rmap before
doing that, not after.
Fixes: 4e0473f1060a ("lib: cpu_rmap: Avoid use after free on rmap->obj array entries")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZHo0vwquhOy3FaXc@decadent.org.uk
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Nathan Chancellor
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681eb3c36d |
lib/dynamic_debug.c: use address-of operator on section symbols
commit 8306b057a85ec07482da5d4b99d5c0b47af69be1 upstream.
Clang warns:
../lib/dynamic_debug.c:1034:24: warning: array comparison always
evaluates to false [-Wtautological-compare]
if (__start___verbose == __stop___verbose) {
^
1 warning generated.
These are not true arrays, they are linker defined symbols, which are just
addresses. Using the address of operator silences the warning and does
not change the resulting assembly with either clang/ld.lld or gcc/ld
(tested with diff + objdump -Dr).
Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/894
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200220051320.10739-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eli Cohen
|
981f339d29 |
lib: cpu_rmap: Avoid use after free on rmap->obj array entries
[ Upstream commit 4e0473f1060aa49621d40a113afde24818101d37 ] When calling irq_set_affinity_notifier() with NULL at the notify argument, it will cause freeing of the glue pointer in the corresponding array entry but will leave the pointer in the array. A subsequent call to free_irq_cpu_rmap() will try to free this entry again leading to possible use after free. Fix that by setting NULL to the array entry and checking that we have non-zero at the array entry when iterating over the array in free_irq_cpu_rmap(). The current code does not suffer from this since there are no cases where irq_set_affinity_notifier(irq, NULL) (note the NULL passed for the notify arg) is called, followed by a call to free_irq_cpu_rmap() so we don't hit and issue. Subsequent patches in this series excersize this flow, hence the required fix. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <elic@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Herbert Xu
|
e8e03c84b1 |
lib/mpi: Fix buffer overrun when SG is too long
[ Upstream commit 7361d1bc307b926cbca214ab67b641123c2d6357 ]
The helper mpi_read_raw_from_sgl sets the number of entries in
the SG list according to nbytes. However, if the last entry
in the SG list contains more data than nbytes, then it may overrun
the buffer because it only allocates enough memory for nbytes.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Dave Hansen
|
e0fbff18bb |
uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user()
commit 74e19ef0ff8061ef55957c3abd71614ef0f42f47 upstream. The results of "access_ok()" can be mis-speculated. The result is that you can end speculatively: if (access_ok(from, size)) // Right here even for bad from/size combinations. On first glance, it would be ideal to just add a speculation barrier to "access_ok()" so that its results can never be mis-speculated. But there are lots of system calls just doing access_ok() via "copy_to_user()" and friends (example: fstat() and friends). Those are generally not problematic because they do not _consume_ data from userspace other than the pointer. They are also very quick and common system calls that should not be needlessly slowed down. "copy_from_user()" on the other hand uses a user-controller pointer and is frequently followed up with code that might affect caches. Take something like this: if (!copy_from_user(&kernelvar, uptr, size)) do_something_with(kernelvar); If userspace passes in an evil 'uptr' that *actually* points to a kernel addresses, and then do_something_with() has cache (or other) side-effects, it could allow userspace to infer kernel data values. Add a barrier to the common copy_from_user() code to prevent mis-speculated values which happen after the copy. Also add a stub for architectures that do not define barrier_nospec(). This makes the macro usable in generic code. Since the barrier is now usable in generic code, the x86 #ifdef in the BPF code can also go away. Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> # BPF bits Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Zhengchao Shao
|
ed5cbafaf7 |
test_firmware: fix memory leak in test_firmware_init()
[ Upstream commit 7610615e8cdb3f6f5bbd9d8e7a5d8a63e3cabf2e ]
When misc_register() failed in test_firmware_init(), the memory pointed
by test_fw_config->name is not released. The memory leak information is
as follows:
unreferenced object 0xffff88810a34cb00 (size 32):
comm "insmod", pid 7952, jiffies 4294948236 (age 49.060s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
74 65 73 74 2d 66 69 72 6d 77 61 72 65 2e 62 69 test-firmware.bi
6e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 n...............
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81b21fcb>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x4b/0xc0
[<ffffffff81affb96>] kstrndup+0x46/0xc0
[<ffffffffa0403a49>] __test_firmware_config_init+0x29/0x380 [test_firmware]
[<ffffffffa040f068>] 0xffffffffa040f068
[<ffffffff81002c41>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x780
[<ffffffff816a72c3>] do_init_module+0x1c3/0x630
[<ffffffff816adb9e>] load_module+0x623e/0x76a0
[<ffffffff816af471>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x181/0x240
[<ffffffff89978f99>] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0
[<ffffffff89a0008b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Fixes:
|
||
|
Akinobu Mita
|
89e9a3568c |
lib/notifier-error-inject: fix error when writing -errno to debugfs file
[ Upstream commit f883c3edd2c432a2931ec8773c70a570115a50fe ]
The simple attribute files do not accept a negative value since the commit
488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in
simple_attr_write()").
This restores the previous behaviour by using newly introduced
DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE_SIGNED instead of DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220919172418.45257-3-akinobu.mita@gmail.com
Fixes: 488dac0c9237 ("libfs: fix error cast of negative value in simple_attr_write()")
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhao Gongyi <zhaogongyi@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Eric Dumazet
|
7ebf22461c |
once: add DO_ONCE_SLOW() for sleepable contexts
commit 62c07983bef9d3e78e71189441e1a470f0d1e653 upstream.
Christophe Leroy reported a ~80ms latency spike
happening at first TCP connect() time.
This is because __inet_hash_connect() uses get_random_once()
to populate a perturbation table which became quite big
after commit 4c2c8f03a5ab ("tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16")
get_random_once() uses DO_ONCE(), which block hard irqs for the duration
of the operation.
This patch adds DO_ONCE_SLOW() which uses a mutex instead of a spinlock
for operations where we prefer to stay in process context.
Then __inet_hash_connect() can use get_random_slow_once()
to populate its perturbation table.
Fixes: 4c2c8f03a5ab ("tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16")
Fixes: 190cc82489f4 ("tcp: change source port randomizarion at connect() time")
Reported-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iLAEYBaoYajy0Y9UmGFff5GPxDUoG-ErVB2jDdRNQ5Tug@mail.gmail.com/T/#t
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Tested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
baalgx
|
b23e675de4 | Merge remote-tracking branch 'SOVIET-ANDROID' into thirteen | ||
|
baalgx
|
a585a8d508 | Merge remote-tracking branch 'soviet/13.0' into soviet-13 | ||
|
pwnrazr
|
78e51d5384 | Merge remote-tracking branch 'android-stable/android-4.14-stable' into dev-base | ||
|
Jim Cromie
|
5ab880557f |
dyndbg: let query-modname override actual module name
[ Upstream commit e75ef56f74965f426dd819a41336b640ffdd8fbc ]
dyndbg's control-parser: ddebug_parse_query(), requires that search
terms: module, func, file, lineno, are used only once in a query; a
thing cannot be named both foo and bar.
The cited commit added an overriding module modname, taken from the
module loader, which is authoritative. So it set query.module 1st,
which disallowed its use in the query-string.
But now, its useful to allow a module-load to enable classes across a
whole (or part of) a subsystem at once.
# enable (dynamic-debug in) drm only
modprobe drm dyndbg="class DRM_UT_CORE +p"
# get drm_helper too
modprobe drm dyndbg="class DRM_UT_CORE module drm* +p"
# get everything that knows DRM_UT_CORE
modprobe drm dyndbg="class DRM_UT_CORE module * +p"
# also for boot-args:
drm.dyndbg="class DRM_UT_CORE module * +p"
So convert the override into a default, by filling it only when/after
the query-string omitted the module.
NB: the query class FOO handling is forthcoming.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Jason A. Donenfeld
|
c415a5cd38 |
[REAPPLY] UPSTREAM: crypto: blake2s - generic C library implementation and selftest
The C implementation was originally based on Samuel Neves' public domain reference implementation but has since been heavily modified for the kernel. We're able to do compile-time optimizations by moving some scaffolding around the final function into the header file. Information: https://blake2.net/ Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt> Co-developed-by: Samuel Neves <sneves@dei.uc.pt> [ardb: - move from lib/zinc to lib/crypto - remove simd handling - rewrote selftest for better coverage - use fixed digest length for blake2s_hmac() and rename to blake2s256_hmac() ] Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> (cherry picked from commit 66d7fb94e4ffe5acc589e0b2b4710aecc1f07a28) Bug: 152722841 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com> Change-Id: Ia9f421fda204693adf8726c6b68f9eebdb4eb789 Signed-off-by: Danny Lin <danny@kdrag0n.dev> |
||
|
Catalin Marinas
|
986f02cc0c |
mm: kmemleak: use the memory pool for early allocations
Currently kmemleak uses a static early_log buffer to trace all memory allocation/freeing before the slab allocator is initialised. Such early log is replayed during kmemleak_init() to properly initialise the kmemleak metadata for objects allocated up that point. With a memory pool that does not rely on the slab allocator, it is possible to skip this early log entirely. In order to remove the early logging, consider kmemleak_enabled == 1 by default while the kmem_cache availability is checked directly on the object_cache and scan_area_cache variables. The RCU callback is only invoked after object_cache has been initialised as we wouldn't have any concurrent list traversal before this. In order to reduce the number of callbacks before kmemleak is fully initialised, move the kmemleak_init() call to mm_init(). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove WARN_ON(), per Catalin] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190812160642.52134-4-catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrzej Perczak <linux@andrzejperczak.com> |
||
|
Kees Cook
|
bdc954aee6 |
treewide: Use array_size() in vzalloc()
The vzalloc() function has no 2-factor argument form, so multiplication
factors need to be wrapped in array_size(). This patch replaces cases of:
vzalloc(a * b)
with:
vzalloc(array_size(a, b))
as well as handling cases of:
vzalloc(a * b * c)
with:
vzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c))
This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:
vzalloc(4 * 1024)
though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.
Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.
The Coccinelle script used for this was:
// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@
(
vzalloc(
- (sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+ sizeof(TYPE) * E
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- (sizeof(THING)) * E
+ sizeof(THING) * E
, ...)
)
// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@
(
vzalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@
(
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@
vzalloc(
- SIZE * COUNT
+ array_size(COUNT, SIZE)
, ...)
// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@
(
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@
(
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@
(
vzalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
)
// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
vzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- E1 * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
)
// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants.
@@
expression E1, E2;
constant C1, C2;
@@
(
vzalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- E1 * E2
+ array_size(E1, E2)
, ...)
)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Adam W. Willis <return.of.octobot@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Fiqri Ardyansyah <fiqri15072019@gmail.com>
|
||
|
Kees Cook
|
cdbed38e31 |
treewide: kvmalloc() -> kvmalloc_array()
The kvmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kvmalloc_array(). This
patch replaces cases of:
kvmalloc(a * b, gfp)
with:
kvmalloc_array(a * b, gfp)
as well as handling cases of:
kvmalloc(a * b * c, gfp)
with:
kvmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)
as it's slightly less ugly than:
kvmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)
This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:
kvmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)
though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.
Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.
The Coccinelle script used for this was:
// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@
(
kvmalloc(
- (sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+ sizeof(TYPE) * E
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- (sizeof(THING)) * E
+ sizeof(THING) * E
, ...)
)
// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@
(
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@
(
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- SIZE * COUNT
+ COUNT, SIZE
, ...)
// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@
(
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@
(
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@
(
kvmalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
)
// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
kvmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- (E1) * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- (E1) * (E2) * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- (E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kvmalloc(
- E1 * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
)
// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
kvmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
kvmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
kvmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
kvmalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+ E2, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+ E2, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+ E2, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(THING) * E2
+ E2, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- (E1) * E2
+ E1, E2
, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- (E1) * (E2)
+ E1, E2
, ...)
|
- kvmalloc
+ kvmalloc_array
(
- E1 * E2
+ E1, E2
, ...)
)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Adam W. Willis <return.of.octobot@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Fiqri Ardyansyah <fiqri15072019@gmail.com>
Conflicts:
net/wireguard/src/compat/ptr_ring/include/linux/ptr_ring.h
pwnrazr: original commit:
|
||
|
Kees Cook
|
05a0b1bd1c |
treewide: kzalloc_node() -> kcalloc_node()
The kzalloc_node() function has a 2-factor argument form, kcalloc_node(). This
patch replaces cases of:
kzalloc_node(a * b, gfp, node)
with:
kcalloc_node(a * b, gfp, node)
as well as handling cases of:
kzalloc_node(a * b * c, gfp, node)
with:
kzalloc_node(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp, node)
as it's slightly less ugly than:
kcalloc_node(array_size(a, b), c, gfp, node)
This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:
kzalloc_node(4 * 1024, gfp, node)
though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.
Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.
The Coccinelle script used for this was:
// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@
(
kzalloc_node(
- (sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+ sizeof(TYPE) * E
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- (sizeof(THING)) * E
+ sizeof(THING) * E
, ...)
)
// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@
(
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@
(
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- SIZE * COUNT
+ COUNT, SIZE
, ...)
// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@
(
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@
(
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@
(
kzalloc_node(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
)
// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
kzalloc_node(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- (E1) * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- (E1) * (E2) * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- (E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(
- E1 * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
)
// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
kzalloc_node(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
kzalloc_node(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+ E2, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+ E2, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+ E2, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- sizeof(THING) * E2
+ E2, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- (E1) * E2
+ E1, E2
, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- (E1) * (E2)
+ E1, E2
, ...)
|
- kzalloc_node
+ kcalloc_node
(
- E1 * E2
+ E1, E2
, ...)
)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Adam W. Willis <return.of.octobot@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Fiqri Ardyansyah <fiqri15072019@gmail.com>
|
||
|
Kees Cook
|
84e16102a1 |
treewide: kzalloc() -> kcalloc()
The kzalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kcalloc(). This
patch replaces cases of:
kzalloc(a * b, gfp)
with:
kcalloc(a * b, gfp)
as well as handling cases of:
kzalloc(a * b * c, gfp)
with:
kzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)
as it's slightly less ugly than:
kzalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)
This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:
kzalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)
though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.
Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.
The Coccinelle script used for this was:
// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- (sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+ sizeof(TYPE) * E
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (sizeof(THING)) * E
+ sizeof(THING) * E
, ...)
)
// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@
(
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- SIZE * COUNT
+ COUNT, SIZE
, ...)
// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
)
// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (E1) * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (E1) * (E2) * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- E1 * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
)
// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
kzalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
kzalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
kzalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+ E2, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+ E2, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+ E2, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * E2
+ E2, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- (E1) * E2
+ E1, E2
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- (E1) * (E2)
+ E1, E2
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- E1 * E2
+ E1, E2
, ...)
)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Adam W. Willis <return.of.octobot@gmail.com>
[fiqri19102002: Adapt to new extcon.c changes]
Signed-off-by: Fiqri Ardyansyah <fiqri15072019@gmail.com>
Conflicts:
arch/arm64/mm/context.c
pwnrazr: an upstream commit conflicted, but I think upstream one is better?
Original commit:
|
||
|
Kees Cook
|
b6399c388a |
treewide: kmalloc() -> kmalloc_array()
The kmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kmalloc_array(). This
patch replaces cases of:
kmalloc(a * b, gfp)
with:
kmalloc_array(a * b, gfp)
as well as handling cases of:
kmalloc(a * b * c, gfp)
with:
kmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)
as it's slightly less ugly than:
kmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)
This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:
kmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)
though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.
Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.
The tools/ directory was manually excluded, since it has its own
implementation of kmalloc().
The Coccinelle script used for this was:
// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@
(
kmalloc(
- (sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+ sizeof(TYPE) * E
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- (sizeof(THING)) * E
+ sizeof(THING) * E
, ...)
)
// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@
(
kmalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@
(
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- SIZE * COUNT
+ COUNT, SIZE
, ...)
// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@
(
kmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@
(
kmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@
(
kmalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
)
// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- (E1) * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- (E1) * (E2) * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- (E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kmalloc(
- E1 * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
)
// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
kmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
kmalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+ E2, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+ E2, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+ E2, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- sizeof(THING) * E2
+ E2, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- (E1) * E2
+ E1, E2
, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- (E1) * (E2)
+ E1, E2
, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
(
- E1 * E2
+ E1, E2
, ...)
)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Adam W. Willis <return.of.octobot@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Fiqri Ardyansyah <fiqri15072019@gmail.com>
|
||
|
Kees Cook
|
a964966fa1 |
UPSTREAM: fortify: Detect struct member overflows in memset() at compile-time
As done for memcpy(), also update memset() to use the same tightened compile-time bounds checking under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com> Change-Id: Id7d4281835029779b3d8aeac8c4992b5cf7bd9e0 Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com> |
||
|
Kees Cook
|
7a5972e8a2 |
UPSTREAM: fortify: Detect struct member overflows in memmove() at compile-time
As done for memcpy(), also update memmove() to use the same tightened compile-time checks under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com> Change-Id: I8e68ddd623f8c49d8f6aebf4e841151779583299 Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com> |
||
|
Kees Cook
|
9a48f41875 |
UPSTREAM: fortify: Detect struct member overflows in memcpy() at compile-time
memcpy() is dead; long live memcpy()
tl;dr: In order to eliminate a large class of common buffer overflow
flaws that continue to persist in the kernel, have memcpy() (under
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE) perform bounds checking of the destination struct
member when they have a known size. This would have caught all of the
memcpy()-related buffer write overflow flaws identified in at least the
last three years.
Background and analysis:
While stack-based buffer overflow flaws are largely mitigated by stack
canaries (and similar) features, heap-based buffer overflow flaws continue
to regularly appear in the kernel. Many classes of heap buffer overflows
are mitigated by FORTIFY_SOURCE when using the strcpy() family of
functions, but a significant number remain exposed through the memcpy()
family of functions.
At its core, FORTIFY_SOURCE uses the compiler's __builtin_object_size()
internal[0] to determine the available size at a target address based on
the compile-time known structure layout details. It operates in two
modes: outer bounds (0) and inner bounds (1). In mode 0, the size of the
enclosing structure is used. In mode 1, the size of the specific field
is used. For example:
struct object {
u16 scalar1; /* 2 bytes */
char array[6]; /* 6 bytes */
u64 scalar2; /* 8 bytes */
u32 scalar3; /* 4 bytes */
u32 scalar4; /* 4 bytes */
} instance;
__builtin_object_size(instance.array, 0) == 22, since the remaining size
of the enclosing structure starting from "array" is 22 bytes (6 + 8 +
4 + 4).
__builtin_object_size(instance.array, 1) == 6, since the remaining size
of the specific field "array" is 6 bytes.
The initial implementation of FORTIFY_SOURCE used mode 0 because there
were many cases of both strcpy() and memcpy() functions being used to
write (or read) across multiple fields in a structure. For example,
it would catch this, which is writing 2 bytes beyond the end of
"instance":
memcpy(&instance.array, data, 25);
While this didn't protect against overwriting adjacent fields in a given
structure, it would at least stop overflows from reaching beyond the
end of the structure into neighboring memory, and provided a meaningful
mitigation of a subset of buffer overflow flaws. However, many desirable
targets remain within the enclosing structure (for example function
pointers).
As it happened, there were very few cases of strcpy() family functions
intentionally writing beyond the end of a string buffer. Once all known
cases were removed from the kernel, the strcpy() family was tightened[1]
to use mode 1, providing greater mitigation coverage.
What remains is switching memcpy() to mode 1 as well, but making the
switch is much more difficult because of how frustrating it can be to
find existing "normal" uses of memcpy() that expect to write (or read)
across multiple fields. The root cause of the problem is that the C
language lacks a common pattern to indicate the intent of an author's
use of memcpy(), and is further complicated by the available compile-time
and run-time mitigation behaviors.
The FORTIFY_SOURCE mitigation comes in two halves: the compile-time half,
when both the buffer size _and_ the length of the copy is known, and the
run-time half, when only the buffer size is known. If neither size is
known, there is no bounds checking possible. At compile-time when the
compiler sees that a length will always exceed a known buffer size,
a warning can be deterministically emitted. For the run-time half,
the length is tested against the known size of the buffer, and the
overflowing operation is detected. (The performance overhead for these
tests is virtually zero.)
It is relatively easy to find compile-time false-positives since a warning
is always generated. Fixing the false positives, however, can be very
time-consuming as there are hundreds of instances. While it's possible
some over-read conditions could lead to kernel memory exposures, the bulk
of the risk comes from the run-time flaws where the length of a write
may end up being attacker-controlled and lead to an overflow.
Many of the compile-time false-positives take a form similar to this:
memcpy(&instance.scalar2, data, sizeof(instance.scalar2) +
sizeof(instance.scalar3));
and the run-time ones are similar, but lack a constant expression for the
size of the copy:
memcpy(instance.array, data, length);
The former is meant to cover multiple fields (though its style has been
frowned upon more recently), but has been technically legal. Both lack
any expressivity in the C language about the author's _intent_ in a way
that a compiler can check when the length isn't known at compile time.
A comment doesn't work well because what's needed is something a compiler
can directly reason about. Is a given memcpy() call expected to overflow
into neighbors? Is it not? By using the new struct_group() macro, this
intent can be much more easily encoded.
It is not as easy to find the run-time false-positives since the code path
to exercise a seemingly out-of-bounds condition that is actually expected
may not be trivially reachable. Tightening the restrictions to block an
operation for a false positive will either potentially create a greater
flaw (if a copy is truncated by the mitigation), or destabilize the kernel
(e.g. with a BUG()), making things completely useless for the end user.
As a result, tightening the memcpy() restriction (when there is a
reasonable level of uncertainty of the number of false positives), needs
to first WARN() with no truncation. (Though any sufficiently paranoid
end-user can always opt to set the panic_on_warn=1 sysctl.) Once enough
development time has passed, the mitigation can be further intensified.
(Note that this patch is only the compile-time checking step, which is
a prerequisite to doing run-time checking, which will come in future
patches.)
Given the potential frustrations of weeding out all the false positives
when tightening the run-time checks, it is reasonable to wonder if these
changes would actually add meaningful protection. Looking at just the
last three years, there are 23 identified flaws with a CVE that mention
"buffer overflow", and 11 are memcpy()-related buffer overflows.
(For the remaining 12: 7 are array index overflows that would be
mitigated by systems built with CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y: CVE-2019-0145,
CVE-2019-14835, CVE-2019-14896, CVE-2019-14897, CVE-2019-14901,
CVE-2019-17666, CVE-2021-28952. 2 are miscalculated allocation
sizes which could be mitigated with memory tagging: CVE-2019-16746,
CVE-2019-2181. 1 is an iovec buffer bug maybe mitigated by memory tagging:
CVE-2020-10742. 1 is a type confusion bug mitigated by stack canaries:
CVE-2020-10942. 1 is a string handling logic bug with no mitigation I'm
aware of: CVE-2021-28972.)
At my last count on an x86_64 allmodconfig build, there are 35,294
calls to memcpy(). With callers instrumented to report all places
where the buffer size is known but the length remains unknown (i.e. a
run-time bounds check is added), we can count how many new run-time
bounds checks are added when the destination and source arguments of
memcpy() are changed to use "mode 1" bounds checking: 1,276. This means
for the future run-time checking, there is a worst-case upper bounds
of 3.6% false positives to fix. In addition, there were around 150 new
compile-time warnings to evaluate and fix (which have now been fixed).
With this instrumentation it's also possible to compare the places where
the known 11 memcpy() flaw overflows manifested against the resulting
list of potential new run-time bounds checks, as a measure of potential
efficacy of the tightened mitigation. Much to my surprise, horror, and
delight, all 11 flaws would have been detected by the newly added run-time
bounds checks, making this a distinctly clear mitigation improvement: 100%
coverage for known memcpy() flaws, with a possible 2 orders of magnitude
gain in coverage over existing but undiscovered run-time dynamic length
flaws (i.e. 1265 newly covered sites in addition to the 11 known), against
only <4% of all memcpy() callers maybe gaining a false positive run-time
check, with only about 150 new compile-time instances needing evaluation.
Specifically these would have been mitigated:
CVE-2020-24490 https://git.kernel.org/linus/a2ec905d1e160a33b2e210e45ad30445ef26ce0e
CVE-2020-12654 https://git.kernel.org/linus/3a9b153c5591548612c3955c9600a98150c81875
CVE-2020-12653 https://git.kernel.org/linus/b70261a288ea4d2f4ac7cd04be08a9f0f2de4f4d
CVE-2019-14895 https://git.kernel.org/linus/3d94a4a8373bf5f45cf5f939e88b8354dbf2311b
CVE-2019-14816 https://git.kernel.org/linus/7caac62ed598a196d6ddf8d9c121e12e082cac3a
CVE-2019-14815 https://git.kernel.org/linus/7caac62ed598a196d6ddf8d9c121e12e082cac3a
CVE-2019-14814 https://git.kernel.org/linus/7caac62ed598a196d6ddf8d9c121e12e082cac3a
CVE-2019-10126 https://git.kernel.org/linus/69ae4f6aac1578575126319d3f55550e7e440449
CVE-2019-9500 https://git.kernel.org/linus/1b5e2423164b3670e8bc9174e4762d297990deff
no-CVE-yet https://git.kernel.org/linus/130f634da1af649205f4a3dd86cbe5c126b57914
no-CVE-yet https://git.kernel.org/linus/d10a87a3535cce2b890897914f5d0d83df669c63
To accelerate the review of potential run-time false positives, it's
also worth noting that it is possible to partially automate checking
by examining the memcpy() buffer argument to check for the destination
struct member having a neighboring array member. It is reasonable to
expect that the vast majority of run-time false positives would look like
the already evaluated and fixed compile-time false positives, where the
most common pattern is neighboring arrays. (And, FWIW, many of the
compile-time fixes were actual bugs, so it is reasonable to assume we'll
have similar cases of actual bugs getting fixed for run-time checks.)
Implementation:
Tighten the memcpy() destination buffer size checking to use the actual
("mode 1") target buffer size as the bounds check instead of their
enclosing structure's ("mode 0") size. Use a common inline for memcpy()
(and memmove() in a following patch), since all the tests are the
same. All new cross-field memcpy() uses must use the struct_group() macro
or similar to target a specific range of fields, so that FORTIFY_SOURCE
can reason about the size and safety of the copy.
For now, cross-member "mode 1" _read_ detection at compile-time will be
limited to W=1 builds, since it is, unfortunately, very common. As the
priority is solving write overflows, read overflows will be part of a
future phase (and can be fixed in parallel, for anyone wanting to look
at W=1 build output).
For run-time, the "mode 0" size checking and mitigation is left unchanged,
with "mode 1" to be added in stages. In this patch, no new run-time
checks are added. Future patches will first bounds-check writes,
and only perform a WARN() for now. This way any missed run-time false
positives can be flushed out over the coming several development cycles,
but system builders who have tested their workloads to be WARN()-free
can enable the panic_on_warn=1 sysctl to immediately gain a mitigation
against this class of buffer overflows. Once that is under way, run-time
bounds-checking of reads can be similarly enabled.
Related classes of flaws that will remain unmitigated:
- memcpy() with flexible array structures, as the compiler does not
currently have visibility into the size of the trailing flexible
array. These can be fixed in the future by refactoring such cases
to use a new set of flexible array structure helpers to perform the
common serialization/deserialization code patterns doing allocation
and/or copying.
- memcpy() with raw pointers (e.g. void *, char *, etc), or otherwise
having their buffer size unknown at compile time, have no good
mitigation beyond memory tagging (and even that would only protect
against inter-object overflow, not intra-object neighboring field
overflows), or refactoring. Some kind of "fat pointer" solution is
likely needed to gain proper size-of-buffer awareness. (e.g. see
struct membuf)
- type confusion where a higher level type's allocation size does
not match the resulting cast type eventually passed to a deeper
memcpy() call where the compiler cannot see the true type. In
theory, greater static analysis could catch these, and the use
of -Warray-bounds will help find some of these.
[0] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Object-Size-Checking.html
[1] https://git.kernel.org/linus/6a39e62abbafd1d58d1722f40c7d26ef379c6a2f
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com>
Change-Id: I181d8e2943a5b7820a1dfb02ad24a29d256415e0
Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com>
|
||
|
Kees Cook
|
7764c00e39 |
BACKPORT: fortify: Move remaining fortify helpers into fortify-string.h
When commit a28a6e860c6c ("string.h: move fortified functions definitions
in a dedicated header.") moved the fortify-specific code, some helpers
were left behind. Move the remaining fortify-specific helpers into
fortify-string.h so they're together where they're used. This requires
that any FORTIFY helper function prototypes be conditionally built to
avoid "no prototype" warnings. Additionally removes unused helpers.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Francis Laniel <laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com>
Change-Id: Ic8ab725bad666ef419902456f001cf9cd35b0ac1
Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com>
|
||
|
Kees Cook
|
693a659592 |
BACKPORT: lib/string: Move helper functions out of string.c
The core functions of string.c are those that may be implemented by per-architecture functions, or overloaded by FORTIFY_SOURCE. As a result, it needs to be built with __NO_FORTIFY. Without this, macros will collide with function declarations. This was accidentally working due to -ffreestanding (on some architectures). Make this deterministic by explicitly setting __NO_FORTIFY and move all the helper functions into string_helpers.c so that they gain the fortification coverage they had been missing. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Andy Lavr <andy.lavr@gmail.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Bartosz Golaszewski <bgolaszewski@baylibre.com> Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com> Change-Id: I79bf34f3854d088c5bdf1535d472568a46ba86f6 Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com> |
||
|
Alexey Dobriyan
|
4b475169b4 |
UPSTREAM: lib: cleanup kstrto*() usage
Use proper conversion functions. kstrto*() variants exist for all standard types. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201122123410.GB92364@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com> Change-Id: Ia8a671b7f181987dfced17ca73fc9d976fdb21a1 Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com> |