From 1e2a2c71e50870e3ed06f5dfcb84ad24c3c4f4b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Konstantin Khlebnikov Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 11:13:16 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 01/81] Revert "e1000e: fix cyclic resets at link up with active tx" commit caff422ea81e144842bc44bab408d85ac449377b upstream. This reverts commit 0f9e980bf5ee1a97e2e401c846b2af989eb21c61. That change cased false-positive warning about hardware hang: e1000e: eth0 NIC Link is Up 1000 Mbps Full Duplex, Flow Control: Rx/Tx IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): eth0: link becomes ready e1000e 0000:00:1f.6 eth0: Detected Hardware Unit Hang: TDH <0> TDT <1> next_to_use <1> next_to_clean <0> buffer_info[next_to_clean]: time_stamp next_to_watch <0> jiffies next_to_watch.status <0> MAC Status <40080080> PHY Status <7949> PHY 1000BASE-T Status <0> PHY Extended Status <3000> PCI Status <10> e1000e: eth0 NIC Link is Up 1000 Mbps Full Duplex, Flow Control: Rx/Tx Besides warning everything works fine. Original issue will be fixed property in following patch. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov Reported-by: Joseph Yasi Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203175 Tested-by: Joseph Yasi Tested-by: Aaron Brown Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c index 3c214a47c1c4..5c364321d3c6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c @@ -5306,13 +5306,8 @@ static void e1000_watchdog_task(struct work_struct *work) /* 8000ES2LAN requires a Rx packet buffer work-around * on link down event; reset the controller to flush * the Rx packet buffer. - * - * If the link is lost the controller stops DMA, but - * if there is queued Tx work it cannot be done. So - * reset the controller to flush the Tx packet buffers. */ - if ((adapter->flags & FLAG_RX_NEEDS_RESTART) || - e1000_desc_unused(tx_ring) + 1 < tx_ring->count) + if (adapter->flags & FLAG_RX_NEEDS_RESTART) adapter->flags |= FLAG_RESTART_NOW; else pm_schedule_suspend(netdev->dev.parent, @@ -5335,6 +5330,14 @@ link_up: adapter->gotc_old = adapter->stats.gotc; spin_unlock(&adapter->stats64_lock); + /* If the link is lost the controller stops DMA, but + * if there is queued Tx work it cannot be done. So + * reset the controller to flush the Tx packet buffers. + */ + if (!netif_carrier_ok(netdev) && + (e1000_desc_unused(tx_ring) + 1 < tx_ring->count)) + adapter->flags |= FLAG_RESTART_NOW; + /* If reset is necessary, do it outside of interrupt context. */ if (adapter->flags & FLAG_RESTART_NOW) { schedule_work(&adapter->reset_task); From 28b6ba947975982a51015645a03d39854211ad46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Konstantin Khlebnikov Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 11:13:20 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 02/81] e1000e: start network tx queue only when link is up commit d17ba0f616a08f597d9348c372d89b8c0405ccf3 upstream. Driver does not want to keep packets in Tx queue when link is lost. But present code only reset NIC to flush them, but does not prevent queuing new packets. Moreover reset sequence itself could generate new packets via netconsole and NIC falls into endless reset loop. This patch wakes Tx queue only when NIC is ready to send packets. This is proper fix for problem addressed by commit 0f9e980bf5ee ("e1000e: fix cyclic resets at link up with active tx"). Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov Suggested-by: Alexander Duyck Tested-by: Joseph Yasi Tested-by: Aaron Brown Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c index 5c364321d3c6..1ad345796e80 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c @@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ void e1000e_up(struct e1000_adapter *adapter) e1000_configure_msix(adapter); e1000_irq_enable(adapter); - netif_start_queue(adapter->netdev); + /* Tx queue started by watchdog timer when link is up */ e1000e_trigger_lsc(adapter); } @@ -4604,6 +4604,7 @@ int e1000e_open(struct net_device *netdev) pm_runtime_get_sync(&pdev->dev); netif_carrier_off(netdev); + netif_stop_queue(netdev); /* allocate transmit descriptors */ err = e1000e_setup_tx_resources(adapter->tx_ring); @@ -4664,7 +4665,6 @@ int e1000e_open(struct net_device *netdev) e1000_irq_enable(adapter); adapter->tx_hang_recheck = false; - netif_start_queue(netdev); hw->mac.get_link_status = true; pm_runtime_put(&pdev->dev); @@ -5286,6 +5286,7 @@ static void e1000_watchdog_task(struct work_struct *work) if (phy->ops.cfg_on_link_up) phy->ops.cfg_on_link_up(hw); + netif_wake_queue(netdev); netif_carrier_on(netdev); if (!test_bit(__E1000_DOWN, &adapter->state)) @@ -5299,6 +5300,7 @@ static void e1000_watchdog_task(struct work_struct *work) /* Link status message must follow this format */ pr_info("%s NIC Link is Down\n", adapter->netdev->name); netif_carrier_off(netdev); + netif_stop_queue(netdev); if (!test_bit(__E1000_DOWN, &adapter->state)) mod_timer(&adapter->phy_info_timer, round_jiffies(jiffies + 2 * HZ)); From a4740bcd6666cc8ff741b54bacdff27766a80840 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cole Rogers Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2019 00:47:48 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 03/81] Input: synaptics - enable SMBUS on T480 thinkpad trackpad commit abbe3acd7d72ab4633ade6bd24e8306b67e0add3 upstream. Thinkpad t480 laptops had some touchpad features disabled, resulting in the loss of pinch to activities in GNOME, on wayland, and other touch gestures being slower. This patch adds the touchpad of the t480 to the smbus_pnp_ids whitelist to enable the extra features. In my testing this does not break suspend (on fedora, with wayland, and GNOME, using the rc-6 kernel), while also fixing the feature on a T480. Signed-off-by: Cole Rogers Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c b/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c index a5f279da83a1..1a6a05c45ee7 100644 --- a/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c +++ b/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c @@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static const char * const smbus_pnp_ids[] = { "LEN0072", /* X1 Carbon Gen 5 (2017) - Elan/ALPS trackpoint */ "LEN0073", /* X1 Carbon G5 (Elantech) */ "LEN0092", /* X1 Carbon 6 */ + "LEN0093", /* T480 */ "LEN0096", /* X280 */ "LEN0097", /* X280 -> ALPS trackpoint */ "LEN200f", /* T450s */ From fabe505475bb0eb59d84f28c8655bd4331084fdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Masahiro Yamada Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2019 20:52:18 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 04/81] nilfs2: do not use unexported cpu_to_le32()/le32_to_cpu() in uapi header commit c32cc30c0544f13982ee0185d55f4910319b1a79 upstream. cpu_to_le32/le32_to_cpu is defined in include/linux/byteorder/generic.h, which is not exported to user-space. UAPI headers must use the ones prefixed with double-underscore. Detected by compile-testing exported headers: include/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h: In function `nilfs_checkpoint_set_snapshot': include/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h:536:17: error: implicit declaration of function `cpu_to_le32' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] cp->cp_flags = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) | \ ^ include/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h:552:1: note: in expansion of macro `NILFS_CHECKPOINT_FNS' NILFS_CHECKPOINT_FNS(SNAPSHOT, snapshot) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ include/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h:536:29: error: implicit declaration of function `le32_to_cpu' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] cp->cp_flags = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) | \ ^ include/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h:552:1: note: in expansion of macro `NILFS_CHECKPOINT_FNS' NILFS_CHECKPOINT_FNS(SNAPSHOT, snapshot) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ include/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h: In function `nilfs_segment_usage_set_clean': include/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h:622:19: error: implicit declaration of function `cpu_to_le64' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration] su->su_lastmod = cpu_to_le64(0); ^~~~~~~~~~~ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190605053006.14332-1-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com Fixes: e63e88bc53ba ("nilfs2: move ioctl interface and disk layout to uapi separately") Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Greg KH Cc: Joe Perches Cc: [4.9+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/uapi/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h b/include/uapi/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h index a7e66ab11d1d..c23f91ae5fe8 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/nilfs2_ondisk.h @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ #include #include - +#include #define NILFS_INODE_BMAP_SIZE 7 @@ -533,19 +533,19 @@ enum { static inline void \ nilfs_checkpoint_set_##name(struct nilfs_checkpoint *cp) \ { \ - cp->cp_flags = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) | \ - (1UL << NILFS_CHECKPOINT_##flag)); \ + cp->cp_flags = __cpu_to_le32(__le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) | \ + (1UL << NILFS_CHECKPOINT_##flag)); \ } \ static inline void \ nilfs_checkpoint_clear_##name(struct nilfs_checkpoint *cp) \ { \ - cp->cp_flags = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) & \ + cp->cp_flags = __cpu_to_le32(__le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) & \ ~(1UL << NILFS_CHECKPOINT_##flag)); \ } \ static inline int \ nilfs_checkpoint_##name(const struct nilfs_checkpoint *cp) \ { \ - return !!(le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) & \ + return !!(__le32_to_cpu(cp->cp_flags) & \ (1UL << NILFS_CHECKPOINT_##flag)); \ } @@ -595,20 +595,20 @@ enum { static inline void \ nilfs_segment_usage_set_##name(struct nilfs_segment_usage *su) \ { \ - su->su_flags = cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags) | \ + su->su_flags = __cpu_to_le32(__le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags) | \ (1UL << NILFS_SEGMENT_USAGE_##flag));\ } \ static inline void \ nilfs_segment_usage_clear_##name(struct nilfs_segment_usage *su) \ { \ su->su_flags = \ - cpu_to_le32(le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags) & \ + __cpu_to_le32(__le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags) & \ ~(1UL << NILFS_SEGMENT_USAGE_##flag)); \ } \ static inline int \ nilfs_segment_usage_##name(const struct nilfs_segment_usage *su) \ { \ - return !!(le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags) & \ + return !!(__le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags) & \ (1UL << NILFS_SEGMENT_USAGE_##flag)); \ } @@ -619,15 +619,15 @@ NILFS_SEGMENT_USAGE_FNS(ERROR, error) static inline void nilfs_segment_usage_set_clean(struct nilfs_segment_usage *su) { - su->su_lastmod = cpu_to_le64(0); - su->su_nblocks = cpu_to_le32(0); - su->su_flags = cpu_to_le32(0); + su->su_lastmod = __cpu_to_le64(0); + su->su_nblocks = __cpu_to_le32(0); + su->su_flags = __cpu_to_le32(0); } static inline int nilfs_segment_usage_clean(const struct nilfs_segment_usage *su) { - return !le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags); + return !__le32_to_cpu(su->su_flags); } /** From b6ac72d9ea7698fa36b5a56c98ad40fa5693c96f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: James Morse Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 18:36:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 05/81] drivers: base: cacheinfo: Ensure cpu hotplug work is done before Intel RDT commit 83b44fe343b5abfcb1b2261289bd0cfcfcfd60a8 upstream. The cacheinfo structures are alloced/freed by cpu online/offline callbacks. Originally these were only used by sysfs to expose the cache topology to user space. Without any in-kernel dependencies CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN was an appropriate choice. resctrl has started using these structures to identify CPUs that share a cache. It updates its 'domain' structures from cpu online/offline callbacks. These depend on the cacheinfo structures (resctrl_online_cpu()->domain_add_cpu()->get_cache_id()-> get_cpu_cacheinfo()). These also run as CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN. Now that there is an in-kernel dependency, move the cacheinfo work earlier so we know its done before resctrl's CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN work runs. Fixes: 2264d9c74dda1 ("x86/intel_rdt: Build structures for each resource based on cache topology") Cc: Cc: Fenghua Yu Cc: Reinette Chatre Signed-off-by: James Morse Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190624173656.202407-1-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/base/cacheinfo.c | 3 ++- include/linux/cpuhotplug.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/cacheinfo.c b/drivers/base/cacheinfo.c index 07532d83be0b..e405ea3ca8d8 100644 --- a/drivers/base/cacheinfo.c +++ b/drivers/base/cacheinfo.c @@ -669,7 +669,8 @@ static int cacheinfo_cpu_pre_down(unsigned int cpu) static int __init cacheinfo_sysfs_init(void) { - return cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "base/cacheinfo:online", + return cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE, + "base/cacheinfo:online", cacheinfo_cpu_online, cacheinfo_cpu_pre_down); } device_initcall(cacheinfo_sysfs_init); diff --git a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h index 6376e2dcb0b7..0c78ad0cc515 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h +++ b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h @@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state { CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_THREAD_IMC_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE, + CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE, CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN_END = CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN + 30, CPUHP_AP_X86_HPET_ONLINE, From abee7cfad6e2b813b209882b46511f1051ea5cca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christophe Leroy Date: Tue, 21 May 2019 13:34:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 06/81] crypto: talitos - rename alternative AEAD algos. commit a1a42f84011fae6ff08441a91aefeb7febc984fc upstream. The talitos driver has two ways to perform AEAD depending on the HW capability. Some HW support both. It is needed to give them different names to distingish which one it is for instance when a test fails. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy Fixes: 7405c8d7ff97 ("crypto: talitos - templates for AEAD using HMAC_SNOOP_NO_AFEU") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index 4388f4e3840c..1f8fe1795964 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -2185,7 +2185,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { .base = { .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))", .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-" - "cbc-aes-talitos", + "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna", .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, }, @@ -2229,7 +2229,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1)," "cbc(des3_ede))", .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-" - "cbc-3des-talitos", + "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna", .cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE, .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, }, @@ -2271,7 +2271,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { .base = { .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(aes))", .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-" - "cbc-aes-talitos", + "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna", .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, }, @@ -2315,7 +2315,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha224)," "cbc(des3_ede))", .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha224-" - "cbc-3des-talitos", + "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna", .cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE, .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, }, @@ -2357,7 +2357,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { .base = { .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))", .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-" - "cbc-aes-talitos", + "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna", .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, }, @@ -2401,7 +2401,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256)," "cbc(des3_ede))", .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-" - "cbc-3des-talitos", + "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna", .cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE, .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, }, @@ -2527,7 +2527,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { .base = { .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(aes))", .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-" - "cbc-aes-talitos", + "cbc-aes-talitos-hsna", .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, }, @@ -2569,7 +2569,7 @@ static struct talitos_alg_template driver_algs[] = { .base = { .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(des3_ede))", .cra_driver_name = "authenc-hmac-md5-" - "cbc-3des-talitos", + "cbc-3des-talitos-hsna", .cra_blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE, .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC, }, From c83caff2c12f18e68e51635eb31fd4e5146ebf55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aaron Ma Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 22:09:10 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 07/81] Input: elantech - enable middle button support on 2 ThinkPads [ Upstream commit aa440de3058a3ef530851f9ef373fbb5f694dbc3 ] Adding 2 new touchpad PNPIDs to enable middle button support. Signed-off-by: Aaron Ma Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/input/mouse/elantech.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/input/mouse/elantech.c b/drivers/input/mouse/elantech.c index fda33fc3ffcc..ab4888d043f0 100644 --- a/drivers/input/mouse/elantech.c +++ b/drivers/input/mouse/elantech.c @@ -1191,6 +1191,8 @@ static const char * const middle_button_pnp_ids[] = { "LEN2132", /* ThinkPad P52 */ "LEN2133", /* ThinkPad P72 w/ NFC */ "LEN2134", /* ThinkPad P72 */ + "LEN0407", + "LEN0408", NULL }; From 1772f38b97a22616a503a7d61c921fd72ba1200b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chang-Hsien Tsai Date: Sun, 19 May 2019 09:05:44 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 08/81] samples, bpf: fix to change the buffer size for read() [ Upstream commit f7c2d64bac1be2ff32f8e4f500c6e5429c1003e0 ] If the trace for read is larger than 4096, the return value sz will be 4096. This results in off-by-one error on buf: static char buf[4096]; ssize_t sz; sz = read(trace_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (sz > 0) { buf[sz] = 0; puts(buf); } Signed-off-by: Chang-Hsien Tsai Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- samples/bpf/bpf_load.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c b/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c index 2325d7ad76df..e8e8b756dc52 100644 --- a/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c +++ b/samples/bpf/bpf_load.c @@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ void read_trace_pipe(void) static char buf[4096]; ssize_t sz; - sz = read(trace_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + sz = read(trace_fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); if (sz > 0) { buf[sz] = 0; puts(buf); From 635e92cfe1ac6b4e0806c08a59d575d5562adccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Fastabend Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 08:01:00 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 09/81] bpf: sockmap, fix use after free from sleep in psock backlog workqueue [ Upstream commit bd95e678e0f6e18351ecdc147ca819145db9ed7b ] Backlog work for psock (sk_psock_backlog) might sleep while waiting for memory to free up when sending packets. However, while sleeping the socket may be closed and removed from the map by the user space side. This breaks an assumption in sk_stream_wait_memory, which expects the wait queue to be still there when it wakes up resulting in a use-after-free shown below. To fix his mark sendmsg as MSG_DONTWAIT to avoid the sleep altogether. We already set the flag for the sendpage case but we missed the case were sendmsg is used. Sockmap is currently the only user of skb_send_sock_locked() so only the sockmap paths should be impacted. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in remove_wait_queue+0x31/0x70 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888069a0c4e8 by task kworker/0:2/110 CPU: 0 PID: 110 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2-00335-g28f9d1a3d4fe-dirty #14 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-2.fc27 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog Call Trace: print_address_description+0x6e/0x2b0 ? remove_wait_queue+0x31/0x70 kasan_report+0xfd/0x177 ? remove_wait_queue+0x31/0x70 ? remove_wait_queue+0x31/0x70 remove_wait_queue+0x31/0x70 sk_stream_wait_memory+0x4dd/0x5f0 ? sk_stream_wait_close+0x1b0/0x1b0 ? wait_woken+0xc0/0xc0 ? tcp_current_mss+0xc5/0x110 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x634/0x15d0 ? tcp_set_state+0x2e0/0x2e0 ? __kasan_slab_free+0x1d1/0x230 ? kmem_cache_free+0x70/0x140 ? sk_psock_backlog+0x40c/0x4b0 ? process_one_work+0x40b/0x660 ? worker_thread+0x82/0x680 ? kthread+0x1b9/0x1e0 ? ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 ? check_preempt_curr+0xaf/0x130 ? iov_iter_kvec+0x5f/0x70 ? kernel_sendmsg_locked+0xa0/0xe0 skb_send_sock_locked+0x273/0x3c0 ? skb_splice_bits+0x180/0x180 ? start_thread+0xe0/0xe0 ? update_min_vruntime.constprop.27+0x88/0xc0 sk_psock_backlog+0xb3/0x4b0 ? strscpy+0xbf/0x1e0 process_one_work+0x40b/0x660 worker_thread+0x82/0x680 ? process_one_work+0x660/0x660 kthread+0x1b9/0x1e0 ? __kthread_create_on_node+0x250/0x250 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Fixes: 20bf50de3028c ("skbuff: Function to send an skbuf on a socket") Reported-by: Jakub Sitnicki Tested-by: Jakub Sitnicki Signed-off-by: John Fastabend Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/core/skbuff.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index 2b3b0307dd89..6d9fd7d4bdfa 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -2299,6 +2299,7 @@ do_frag_list: kv.iov_base = skb->data + offset; kv.iov_len = slen; memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); + msg.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT; ret = kernel_sendmsg_locked(sk, &msg, &kv, 1, slen); if (ret <= 0) From d193f70750cec5b59277bf427b9d971532b03174 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Melissa Wen Date: Sat, 18 May 2019 22:04:56 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 10/81] staging:iio:ad7150: fix threshold mode config bit [ Upstream commit df4d737ee4d7205aaa6275158aeebff87fd14488 ] According to the AD7150 configuration register description, bit 7 assumes value 1 when the threshold mode is fixed and 0 when it is adaptive, however, the operation that identifies this mode was considering the opposite values. This patch renames the boolean variable to describe it correctly and properly replaces it in the places where it is used. Fixes: 531efd6aa0991 ("staging:iio:adc:ad7150: chan_spec conv + i2c_smbus commands + drop unused poweroff timeout control.") Signed-off-by: Melissa Wen Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/staging/iio/cdc/ad7150.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/iio/cdc/ad7150.c b/drivers/staging/iio/cdc/ad7150.c index a6f249e9c1e1..4d218d554878 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/iio/cdc/ad7150.c +++ b/drivers/staging/iio/cdc/ad7150.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ * Licensed under the GPL-2 or later. */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ static int ad7150_read_event_config(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, { int ret; u8 threshtype; - bool adaptive; + bool thrfixed; struct ad7150_chip_info *chip = iio_priv(indio_dev); ret = i2c_smbus_read_byte_data(chip->client, AD7150_CFG); @@ -137,21 +138,23 @@ static int ad7150_read_event_config(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, return ret; threshtype = (ret >> 5) & 0x03; - adaptive = !!(ret & 0x80); + + /*check if threshold mode is fixed or adaptive*/ + thrfixed = FIELD_GET(AD7150_CFG_FIX, ret); switch (type) { case IIO_EV_TYPE_MAG_ADAPTIVE: if (dir == IIO_EV_DIR_RISING) - return adaptive && (threshtype == 0x1); - return adaptive && (threshtype == 0x0); + return !thrfixed && (threshtype == 0x1); + return !thrfixed && (threshtype == 0x0); case IIO_EV_TYPE_THRESH_ADAPTIVE: if (dir == IIO_EV_DIR_RISING) - return adaptive && (threshtype == 0x3); - return adaptive && (threshtype == 0x2); + return !thrfixed && (threshtype == 0x3); + return !thrfixed && (threshtype == 0x2); case IIO_EV_TYPE_THRESH: if (dir == IIO_EV_DIR_RISING) - return !adaptive && (threshtype == 0x1); - return !adaptive && (threshtype == 0x0); + return thrfixed && (threshtype == 0x1); + return thrfixed && (threshtype == 0x0); default: break; } From b5a48f04c912d31f730e928de8fb7ce147a08bf4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Pedersen Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 21:16:24 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 11/81] mac80211: mesh: fix RCU warning [ Upstream commit 551842446ed695641a00782cd118cbb064a416a1 ] ifmsh->csa is an RCU-protected pointer. The writer context in ieee80211_mesh_finish_csa() is already mutually exclusive with wdev->sdata.mtx, but the RCU checker did not know this. Use rcu_dereference_protected() to avoid a warning. fixes the following warning: [ 12.519089] ============================= [ 12.520042] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 12.520652] 5.1.0-rc7-wt+ #16 Tainted: G W [ 12.521409] ----------------------------- [ 12.521972] net/mac80211/mesh.c:1223 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 12.522928] other info that might help us debug this: [ 12.523984] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 12.524855] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:2/152: [ 12.525438] #0: 00000000057be08c ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1a2/0x620 [ 12.526607] #1: 0000000059c6b07a ((work_completion)(&sdata->csa_finalize_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1a2/0x620 [ 12.528001] #2: 00000000f184ba7d (&wdev->mtx){+.+.}, at: ieee80211_csa_finalize_work+0x2f/0x90 [ 12.529116] #3: 00000000831a1f54 (&local->mtx){+.+.}, at: ieee80211_csa_finalize_work+0x47/0x90 [ 12.530233] #4: 00000000fd06f988 (&local->chanctx_mtx){+.+.}, at: ieee80211_csa_finalize_work+0x51/0x90 Signed-off-by: Thomas Pedersen Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/mac80211/mesh.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh.c b/net/mac80211/mesh.c index 96e57d7c2872..aca054539f4a 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mesh.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.c @@ -1209,7 +1209,8 @@ int ieee80211_mesh_finish_csa(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) ifmsh->chsw_ttl = 0; /* Remove the CSA and MCSP elements from the beacon */ - tmp_csa_settings = rcu_dereference(ifmsh->csa); + tmp_csa_settings = rcu_dereference_protected(ifmsh->csa, + lockdep_is_held(&sdata->wdev.mtx)); RCU_INIT_POINTER(ifmsh->csa, NULL); if (tmp_csa_settings) kfree_rcu(tmp_csa_settings, rcu_head); @@ -1231,6 +1232,8 @@ int ieee80211_mesh_csa_beacon(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, struct mesh_csa_settings *tmp_csa_settings; int ret = 0; + lockdep_assert_held(&sdata->wdev.mtx); + tmp_csa_settings = kmalloc(sizeof(*tmp_csa_settings), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!tmp_csa_settings) From ad3ce300690665da156dd1ee514393e8aabc2b92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pradeep Kumar Chitrapu Date: Tue, 28 May 2019 16:36:16 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 12/81] mac80211: free peer keys before vif down in mesh [ Upstream commit 0112fa557c3bb3a002bc85760dc3761d737264d3 ] freeing peer keys after vif down is resulting in peer key uninstall to fail due to interface lookup failure. so fix that. Signed-off-by: Pradeep Kumar Chitrapu Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/mac80211/mesh.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh.c b/net/mac80211/mesh.c index aca054539f4a..c6edae051e9b 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mesh.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.c @@ -922,6 +922,7 @@ void ieee80211_stop_mesh(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) /* flush STAs and mpaths on this iface */ sta_info_flush(sdata); + ieee80211_free_keys(sdata, true); mesh_path_flush_by_iface(sdata); /* stop the beacon */ From d50f6b58d7ad30ad8e96c0bbc3e5ecfe9b91ba77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 14:52:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 13/81] mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows at parsing bss descriptor [ Upstream commit 13ec7f10b87f5fc04c4ccbd491c94c7980236a74 ] mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie() calls memcpy() unconditionally in a couple places without checking the destination size. Since the source is given from user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow. Fix it by putting the length check before performing memcpy(). This fix addresses CVE-2019-3846. Reported-by: huangwen Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c index c9d41ed77fc7..c08a4574c396 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c @@ -1244,6 +1244,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, } switch (element_id) { case WLAN_EID_SSID: + if (element_len > IEEE80211_MAX_SSID_LEN) + return -EINVAL; bss_entry->ssid.ssid_len = element_len; memcpy(bss_entry->ssid.ssid, (current_ptr + 2), element_len); @@ -1253,6 +1255,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, break; case WLAN_EID_SUPP_RATES: + if (element_len > MWIFIEX_SUPPORTED_RATES) + return -EINVAL; memcpy(bss_entry->data_rates, current_ptr + 2, element_len); memcpy(bss_entry->supported_rates, current_ptr + 2, From 461117876d9087cc018328f6636e4ae82b58b508 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jia-Ju Bai Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 16:39:54 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 14/81] iwlwifi: Fix double-free problems in iwl_req_fw_callback() [ Upstream commit a8627176b0de7ba3f4524f641ddff4abf23ae4e4 ] In the error handling code of iwl_req_fw_callback(), iwl_dealloc_ucode() is called to free data. In iwl_drv_stop(), iwl_dealloc_ucode() is called again, which can cause double-free problems. To fix this bug, the call to iwl_dealloc_ucode() in iwl_req_fw_callback() is deleted. This bug is found by a runtime fuzzing tool named FIZZER written by us. Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-drv.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-drv.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-drv.c index 99676d6c4713..6c10b8c4ddbe 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-drv.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-drv.c @@ -1509,7 +1509,6 @@ static void iwl_req_fw_callback(const struct firmware *ucode_raw, void *context) goto free; out_free_fw: - iwl_dealloc_ucode(drv); release_firmware(ucode_raw); out_unbind: complete(&drv->request_firmware_complete); From 55434796882f53da87f05d294ffd1b386953299b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2019 15:13:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 15/81] netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: fix leakage of unqueued fragments [ Upstream commit a0d56cb911ca301de81735f1d73c2aab424654ba ] With commit 997dd9647164 ("net: IP6 defrag: use rbtrees in nf_conntrack_reasm.c"), nf_ct_frag6_reasm() is now called from nf_ct_frag6_queue(). With this change, nf_ct_frag6_queue() can fail after the skb has been added to the fragment queue and nf_ct_frag6_gather() was adapted to handle this case. But nf_ct_frag6_queue() can still fail before the fragment has been queued. nf_ct_frag6_gather() can't handle this case anymore, because it has no way to know if nf_ct_frag6_queue() queued the fragment before failing. If it didn't, the skb is lost as the error code is overwritten with -EINPROGRESS. Fix this by setting -EINPROGRESS directly in nf_ct_frag6_queue(), so that nf_ct_frag6_gather() can propagate the error as is. Fixes: 997dd9647164 ("net: IP6 defrag: use rbtrees in nf_conntrack_reasm.c") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c index cb1b4772dac0..73c29ddcfb95 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c @@ -293,7 +293,11 @@ static int nf_ct_frag6_queue(struct frag_queue *fq, struct sk_buff *skb, skb->_skb_refdst = 0UL; err = nf_ct_frag6_reasm(fq, skb, prev, dev); skb->_skb_refdst = orefdst; - return err; + + /* After queue has assumed skb ownership, only 0 or + * -EINPROGRESS must be returned. + */ + return err ? -EINPROGRESS : 0; } skb_dst_drop(skb); @@ -481,12 +485,6 @@ int nf_ct_frag6_gather(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user) ret = 0; } - /* after queue has assumed skb ownership, only 0 or -EINPROGRESS - * must be returned. - */ - if (ret) - ret = -EINPROGRESS; - spin_unlock_bh(&fq->q.lock); inet_frag_put(&fq->q); return ret; From 9f150b4badbf822f0bcdb1e691fbd79419d59575 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 18:04:00 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 16/81] netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: accept duplicate fragments again [ Upstream commit 8a3dca632538c550930ce8bafa8c906b130d35cf ] When fixing the skb leak introduced by the conversion to rbtree, I forgot about the special case of duplicate fragments. The condition under the 'insert_error' label isn't effective anymore as nf_ct_frg6_gather() doesn't override the returned value anymore. So duplicate fragments now get NF_DROP verdict. To accept duplicate fragments again, handle them specially as soon as inet_frag_queue_insert() reports them. Return -EINPROGRESS which will translate to NF_STOLEN verdict, like any accepted fragment. However, such packets don't carry any new information and aren't queued, so we just drop them immediately. Fixes: a0d56cb911ca ("netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: fix leakage of unqueued fragments") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c index 73c29ddcfb95..35d5a76867d0 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c @@ -265,8 +265,14 @@ static int nf_ct_frag6_queue(struct frag_queue *fq, struct sk_buff *skb, prev = fq->q.fragments_tail; err = inet_frag_queue_insert(&fq->q, skb, offset, end); - if (err) + if (err) { + if (err == IPFRAG_DUP) { + /* No error for duplicates, pretend they got queued. */ + kfree_skb(skb); + return -EINPROGRESS; + } goto insert_error; + } if (dev) fq->iif = dev->ifindex; @@ -304,8 +310,6 @@ static int nf_ct_frag6_queue(struct frag_queue *fq, struct sk_buff *skb, return -EINPROGRESS; insert_error: - if (err == IPFRAG_DUP) - goto err; inet_frag_kill(&fq->q); err: skb_dst_drop(skb); From 2b0ce4096f1aad23fdc541156299bd7b00728e68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Nyekjaer Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 11:34:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 17/81] dt-bindings: can: mcp251x: add mcp25625 support [ Upstream commit 0df82dcd55832a99363ab7f9fab954fcacdac3ae ] Fully compatible with mcp2515, the mcp25625 have integrated transceiver. This patch add the mcp25625 to the device tree bindings documentation. Signed-off-by: Sean Nyekjaer Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt index ee3723beb701..33b38716b77f 100644 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/can/microchip,mcp251x.txt @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ Required properties: - compatible: Should be one of the following: - "microchip,mcp2510" for MCP2510. - "microchip,mcp2515" for MCP2515. + - "microchip,mcp25625" for MCP25625. - reg: SPI chip select. - clocks: The clock feeding the CAN controller. - interrupt-parent: The parent interrupt controller. From 905610fde81cb58338c96f8c02389be531f0c337 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Nyekjaer Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 11:34:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 18/81] can: mcp251x: add support for mcp25625 [ Upstream commit 35b7fa4d07c43ad79b88e6462119e7140eae955c ] Fully compatible with mcp2515, the mcp25625 have integrated transceiver. This patch adds support for the mcp25625 to the existing mcp251x driver. Signed-off-by: Sean Nyekjaer Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/can/spi/Kconfig | 5 +++-- drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251x.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/spi/Kconfig b/drivers/net/can/spi/Kconfig index 8f2e0dd7b756..792e9c6c4a2f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/spi/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/net/can/spi/Kconfig @@ -8,9 +8,10 @@ config CAN_HI311X Driver for the Holt HI311x SPI CAN controllers. config CAN_MCP251X - tristate "Microchip MCP251x SPI CAN controllers" + tristate "Microchip MCP251x and MCP25625 SPI CAN controllers" depends on HAS_DMA ---help--- - Driver for the Microchip MCP251x SPI CAN controllers. + Driver for the Microchip MCP251x and MCP25625 SPI CAN + controllers. endmenu diff --git a/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251x.c b/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251x.c index f3f05fea8e1f..d8c448beab24 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251x.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251x.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * CAN bus driver for Microchip 251x CAN Controller with SPI Interface + * CAN bus driver for Microchip 251x/25625 CAN Controller with SPI Interface * * MCP2510 support and bug fixes by Christian Pellegrin * @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ * static struct spi_board_info spi_board_info[] = { * { * .modalias = "mcp2510", - * // or "mcp2515" depending on your controller + * // "mcp2515" or "mcp25625" depending on your controller * .platform_data = &mcp251x_info, * .irq = IRQ_EINT13, * .max_speed_hz = 2*1000*1000, @@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ static const struct can_bittiming_const mcp251x_bittiming_const = { enum mcp251x_model { CAN_MCP251X_MCP2510 = 0x2510, CAN_MCP251X_MCP2515 = 0x2515, + CAN_MCP251X_MCP25625 = 0x25625, }; struct mcp251x_priv { @@ -280,7 +281,6 @@ static inline int mcp251x_is_##_model(struct spi_device *spi) \ } MCP251X_IS(2510); -MCP251X_IS(2515); static void mcp251x_clean(struct net_device *net) { @@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ static int mcp251x_hw_reset(struct spi_device *spi) /* Wait for oscillator startup timer after reset */ mdelay(MCP251X_OST_DELAY_MS); - + reg = mcp251x_read_reg(spi, CANSTAT); if ((reg & CANCTRL_REQOP_MASK) != CANCTRL_REQOP_CONF) return -ENODEV; @@ -821,9 +821,8 @@ static irqreturn_t mcp251x_can_ist(int irq, void *dev_id) /* receive buffer 0 */ if (intf & CANINTF_RX0IF) { mcp251x_hw_rx(spi, 0); - /* - * Free one buffer ASAP - * (The MCP2515 does this automatically.) + /* Free one buffer ASAP + * (The MCP2515/25625 does this automatically.) */ if (mcp251x_is_2510(spi)) mcp251x_write_bits(spi, CANINTF, CANINTF_RX0IF, 0x00); @@ -832,7 +831,7 @@ static irqreturn_t mcp251x_can_ist(int irq, void *dev_id) /* receive buffer 1 */ if (intf & CANINTF_RX1IF) { mcp251x_hw_rx(spi, 1); - /* the MCP2515 does this automatically */ + /* The MCP2515/25625 does this automatically. */ if (mcp251x_is_2510(spi)) clear_intf |= CANINTF_RX1IF; } @@ -1007,6 +1006,10 @@ static const struct of_device_id mcp251x_of_match[] = { .compatible = "microchip,mcp2515", .data = (void *)CAN_MCP251X_MCP2515, }, + { + .compatible = "microchip,mcp25625", + .data = (void *)CAN_MCP251X_MCP25625, + }, { } }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, mcp251x_of_match); @@ -1020,6 +1023,10 @@ static const struct spi_device_id mcp251x_id_table[] = { .name = "mcp2515", .driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)CAN_MCP251X_MCP2515, }, + { + .name = "mcp25625", + .driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)CAN_MCP251X_MCP25625, + }, { } }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(spi, mcp251x_id_table); @@ -1260,5 +1267,5 @@ module_spi_driver(mcp251x_can_driver); MODULE_AUTHOR("Chris Elston , " "Christian Pellegrin "); -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Microchip 251x CAN driver"); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Microchip 251x/25625 CAN driver"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); From e086121ec28d44c7be58fbc112d67dc1b56313ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eugen Hristev Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2019 14:44:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 19/81] can: m_can: implement errata "Needless activation of MRAF irq" [ Upstream commit 3e82f2f34c930a2a0a9e69fdc2de2f2f1388b442 ] During frame reception while the MCAN is in Error Passive state and the Receive Error Counter has thevalue MCAN_ECR.REC = 127, it may happen that MCAN_IR.MRAF is set although there was no Message RAM access failure. If MCAN_IR.MRAF is enabled, an interrupt to the Host CPU is generated. Work around: The Message RAM Access Failure interrupt routine needs to check whether MCAN_ECR.RP = '1' and MCAN_ECR.REC = '127'. In this case, reset MCAN_IR.MRAF. No further action is required. This affects versions older than 3.2.0 Errata explained on Sama5d2 SoC which includes this hardware block: http://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/en/DeviceDoc/SAMA5D2-Family-Silicon-Errata-and-Data-Sheet-Clarification-DS80000803B.pdf chapter 6.2 Reproducibility: If 2 devices with m_can are connected back to back, configuring different bitrate on them will lead to interrupt storm on the receiving side, with error "Message RAM access failure occurred". Another way is to have a bad hardware connection. Bad wire connection can lead to this issue as well. This patch fixes the issue according to provided workaround. Signed-off-by: Eugen Hristev Reviewed-by: Ludovic Desroches Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c b/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c index d3ce904e929e..ebad93ac8f11 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c @@ -818,6 +818,27 @@ static int m_can_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int quota) if (!irqstatus) goto end; + /* Errata workaround for issue "Needless activation of MRAF irq" + * During frame reception while the MCAN is in Error Passive state + * and the Receive Error Counter has the value MCAN_ECR.REC = 127, + * it may happen that MCAN_IR.MRAF is set although there was no + * Message RAM access failure. + * If MCAN_IR.MRAF is enabled, an interrupt to the Host CPU is generated + * The Message RAM Access Failure interrupt routine needs to check + * whether MCAN_ECR.RP = ’1’ and MCAN_ECR.REC = 127. + * In this case, reset MCAN_IR.MRAF. No further action is required. + */ + if ((priv->version <= 31) && (irqstatus & IR_MRAF) && + (m_can_read(priv, M_CAN_ECR) & ECR_RP)) { + struct can_berr_counter bec; + + __m_can_get_berr_counter(dev, &bec); + if (bec.rxerr == 127) { + m_can_write(priv, M_CAN_IR, IR_MRAF); + irqstatus &= ~IR_MRAF; + } + } + psr = m_can_read(priv, M_CAN_PSR); if (irqstatus & IR_ERR_STATE) work_done += m_can_handle_state_errors(dev, psr); From 7f0359b6bf37a8d13ada0a6db93e54196eb4e08f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YueHaibing Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 22:36:26 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 20/81] can: af_can: Fix error path of can_init() [ Upstream commit c5a3aed1cd3152429348ee1fe5cdcca65fe901ce ] This patch add error path for can_init() to avoid possible crash if some error occurs. Fixes: 0d66548a10cb ("[CAN]: Add PF_CAN core module") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/can/af_can.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/af_can.c b/net/can/af_can.c index 9de9678fa7d0..46c85731d16f 100644 --- a/net/can/af_can.c +++ b/net/can/af_can.c @@ -959,6 +959,8 @@ static struct pernet_operations can_pernet_ops __read_mostly = { static __init int can_init(void) { + int err; + /* check for correct padding to be able to use the structs similarly */ BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct can_frame, can_dlc) != offsetof(struct canfd_frame, len) || @@ -972,15 +974,31 @@ static __init int can_init(void) if (!rcv_cache) return -ENOMEM; - register_pernet_subsys(&can_pernet_ops); + err = register_pernet_subsys(&can_pernet_ops); + if (err) + goto out_pernet; /* protocol register */ - sock_register(&can_family_ops); - register_netdevice_notifier(&can_netdev_notifier); + err = sock_register(&can_family_ops); + if (err) + goto out_sock; + err = register_netdevice_notifier(&can_netdev_notifier); + if (err) + goto out_notifier; + dev_add_pack(&can_packet); dev_add_pack(&canfd_packet); return 0; + +out_notifier: + sock_unregister(PF_CAN); +out_sock: + unregister_pernet_subsys(&can_pernet_ops); +out_pernet: + kmem_cache_destroy(rcv_cache); + + return err; } static __exit void can_exit(void) From ae8524861443d7e7f74145f722d9641883190943 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Falcon Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2019 16:03:54 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 21/81] ibmvnic: Refresh device multicast list after reset [ Upstream commit be32a24372cf162e825332da1a7ccef058d4f20b ] It was observed that multicast packets were no longer received after a device reset. The fix is to resend the current multicast list to the backing device after recovery. Signed-off-by: Thomas Falcon Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c index c914b338691b..956fbb164e6f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c @@ -1489,6 +1489,9 @@ static int do_reset(struct ibmvnic_adapter *adapter, return 0; } + /* refresh device's multicast list */ + ibmvnic_set_multi(netdev); + /* kick napi */ for (i = 0; i < adapter->req_rx_queues; i++) napi_schedule(&adapter->napi[i]); From 0e717dabc81195496d4beb66676c25a491d053db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teresa Remmet Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 15:19:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 22/81] ARM: dts: am335x phytec boards: Fix cd-gpios active level [ Upstream commit 8a0098c05a272c9a68f6885e09755755b612459c ] Active level of the mmc1 cd gpio needs to be low instead of high. Fix PCM-953 and phyBOARD-WEGA. Signed-off-by: Teresa Remmet Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-wega.dtsi | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi index 1ec8e0d80191..572fbd254690 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ bus-width = <4>; pinctrl-names = "default"; pinctrl-0 = <&mmc1_pins>; - cd-gpios = <&gpio0 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>; + cd-gpios = <&gpio0 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>; status = "okay"; }; diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-wega.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-wega.dtsi index 8ce541739b24..83e4fe595e37 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-wega.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-wega.dtsi @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ bus-width = <4>; pinctrl-names = "default"; pinctrl-0 = <&mmc1_pins>; - cd-gpios = <&gpio0 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>; + cd-gpios = <&gpio0 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>; status = "okay"; }; From b7c93cafd5a7eba38e6e0ef8b5679e43a37b49ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anson Huang Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 17:50:44 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 23/81] Input: imx_keypad - make sure keyboard can always wake up system [ Upstream commit ce9a53eb3dbca89e7ad86673d94ab886e9bea704 ] There are several scenarios that keyboard can NOT wake up system from suspend, e.g., if a keyboard is depressed between system device suspend phase and device noirq suspend phase, the keyboard ISR will be called and both keyboard depress and release interrupts will be disabled, then keyboard will no longer be able to wake up system. Another scenario would be, if a keyboard is kept depressed, and then system goes into suspend, the expected behavior would be when keyboard is released, system will be waked up, but current implementation can NOT achieve that, because both depress and release interrupts are disabled in ISR, and the event check is still in progress. To fix these issues, need to make sure keyboard's depress or release interrupt is enabled after noirq device suspend phase, this patch moves the suspend/resume callback to noirq suspend/resume phase, and enable the corresponding interrupt according to current keyboard status. Signed-off-by: Anson Huang Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/input/keyboard/imx_keypad.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/keyboard/imx_keypad.c b/drivers/input/keyboard/imx_keypad.c index 2165f3dd328b..842c0235471d 100644 --- a/drivers/input/keyboard/imx_keypad.c +++ b/drivers/input/keyboard/imx_keypad.c @@ -530,11 +530,12 @@ static int imx_keypad_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return 0; } -static int __maybe_unused imx_kbd_suspend(struct device *dev) +static int __maybe_unused imx_kbd_noirq_suspend(struct device *dev) { struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(dev); struct imx_keypad *kbd = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); struct input_dev *input_dev = kbd->input_dev; + unsigned short reg_val = readw(kbd->mmio_base + KPSR); /* imx kbd can wake up system even clock is disabled */ mutex_lock(&input_dev->mutex); @@ -544,13 +545,20 @@ static int __maybe_unused imx_kbd_suspend(struct device *dev) mutex_unlock(&input_dev->mutex); - if (device_may_wakeup(&pdev->dev)) + if (device_may_wakeup(&pdev->dev)) { + if (reg_val & KBD_STAT_KPKD) + reg_val |= KBD_STAT_KRIE; + if (reg_val & KBD_STAT_KPKR) + reg_val |= KBD_STAT_KDIE; + writew(reg_val, kbd->mmio_base + KPSR); + enable_irq_wake(kbd->irq); + } return 0; } -static int __maybe_unused imx_kbd_resume(struct device *dev) +static int __maybe_unused imx_kbd_noirq_resume(struct device *dev) { struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(dev); struct imx_keypad *kbd = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); @@ -574,7 +582,9 @@ err_clk: return ret; } -static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(imx_kbd_pm_ops, imx_kbd_suspend, imx_kbd_resume); +static const struct dev_pm_ops imx_kbd_pm_ops = { + SET_NOIRQ_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(imx_kbd_noirq_suspend, imx_kbd_noirq_resume) +}; static struct platform_driver imx_keypad_driver = { .driver = { From 7a00b9c2f800245f076c4fb969c175ec28ad2d6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Martin Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 11:58:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 24/81] KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: Fix kvm_device leak in vgic_its_destroy [ Upstream commit 4729ec8c1e1145234aeeebad5d96d77f4ccbb00a ] kvm_device->destroy() seems to be supposed to free its kvm_device struct, but vgic_its_destroy() is not currently doing this, resulting in a memory leak, resulting in kmemleak reports such as the following: unreferenced object 0xffff800aeddfe280 (size 128): comm "qemu-system-aar", pid 13799, jiffies 4299827317 (age 1569.844s) [...] backtrace: [<00000000a08b80e2>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x178/0x208 [<00000000dcad2bd3>] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x350/0xbc0 Fix it. Cc: Andre Przywara Fixes: 1085fdc68c60 ("KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Introduce new KVM ITS device") Signed-off-by: Dave Martin Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c b/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c index dc06f5e40041..526d808ecbbd 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c +++ b/virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c @@ -1677,6 +1677,7 @@ static void vgic_its_destroy(struct kvm_device *kvm_dev) mutex_unlock(&its->its_lock); kfree(its); + kfree(kvm_dev);/* alloc by kvm_ioctl_create_device, free by .destroy */ } int vgic_its_has_attr_regs(struct kvm_device *dev, From 8fdce8fec4227acd14984afa1f5c3a26dd9f00d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ido Schimmel Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 10:19:46 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 25/81] mlxsw: spectrum: Disallow prio-tagged packets when PVID is removed [ Upstream commit 4b14cc313f076c37b646cee06a85f0db59cf216c ] When PVID is removed from a bridge port, the Linux bridge drops both untagged and prio-tagged packets. Align mlxsw with this behavior. Fixes: 148f472da5db ("mlxsw: reg: Add the Switch Port Acceptable Frame Types register") Acked-by: Jiri Pirko Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/reg.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/reg.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/reg.h index 5acfbe5b8b9d..8ab7a4f98a07 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/reg.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/reg.h @@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ static inline void mlxsw_reg_spaft_pack(char *payload, u8 local_port, MLXSW_REG_ZERO(spaft, payload); mlxsw_reg_spaft_local_port_set(payload, local_port); mlxsw_reg_spaft_allow_untagged_set(payload, allow_untagged); - mlxsw_reg_spaft_allow_prio_tagged_set(payload, true); + mlxsw_reg_spaft_allow_prio_tagged_set(payload, allow_untagged); mlxsw_reg_spaft_allow_tagged_set(payload, true); } From 41c22387d2d1f632cf341da61521c553d4e1a4d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bartosz Golaszewski Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2019 11:02:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 26/81] ARM: davinci: da850-evm: call regulator_has_full_constraints() [ Upstream commit 0c0c9b5753cd04601b17de09da1ed2885a3b42fe ] The BB expander at 0x21 i2c bus 1 fails to probe on da850-evm because the board doesn't set has_full_constraints to true in the regulator API. Call regulator_has_full_constraints() at the end of board registration just like we do in da850-lcdk and da830-evm. Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski Signed-off-by: Sekhar Nori Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/mach-davinci/board-da850-evm.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-davinci/board-da850-evm.c b/arch/arm/mach-davinci/board-da850-evm.c index 2f6ac1afa804..686e7e6f2eb3 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-davinci/board-da850-evm.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-davinci/board-da850-evm.c @@ -1464,6 +1464,8 @@ static __init void da850_evm_init(void) if (ret) pr_warn("%s: dsp/rproc registration failed: %d\n", __func__, ret); + + regulator_has_full_constraints(); } #ifdef CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE From 2ec7fa2c45403b935edf0ac52fe960a8564fea7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bartosz Golaszewski Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2019 16:33:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 27/81] ARM: davinci: da8xx: specify dma_coherent_mask for lcdc [ Upstream commit 68f2515bb31a664ba3e2bc1eb78dd9f529b10067 ] The lcdc device is missing the dma_coherent_mask definition causing the following warning on da850-evm: da8xx_lcdc da8xx_lcdc.0: found Sharp_LK043T1DG01 panel ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/dma/mapping.c:247 dma_alloc_attrs+0xc8/0x110 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.2.0-rc3-00077-g16d72dd4891f #18 Hardware name: DaVinci DA850/OMAP-L138/AM18x EVM [] (unwind_backtrace) from [] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [] (show_stack) from [] (__warn+0xec/0x114) [] (__warn) from [] (warn_slowpath_null+0x3c/0x48) [] (warn_slowpath_null) from [] (dma_alloc_attrs+0xc8/0x110) [] (dma_alloc_attrs) from [] (fb_probe+0x228/0x5a8) [] (fb_probe) from [] (platform_drv_probe+0x48/0x9c) [] (platform_drv_probe) from [] (really_probe+0x1d8/0x2d4) [] (really_probe) from [] (driver_probe_device+0x5c/0x168) [] (driver_probe_device) from [] (device_driver_attach+0x58/0x60) [] (device_driver_attach) from [] (__driver_attach+0x80/0xbc) [] (__driver_attach) from [] (bus_for_each_dev+0x64/0xb4) [] (bus_for_each_dev) from [] (bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x1d8) [] (bus_add_driver) from [] (driver_register+0x78/0x10c) [] (driver_register) from [] (do_one_initcall+0x48/0x1bc) [] (do_one_initcall) from [] (kernel_init_freeable+0x10c/0x1d8) [] (kernel_init_freeable) from [] (kernel_init+0x8/0xf4) [] (kernel_init) from [] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x34) Exception stack(0xc6837fb0 to 0xc6837ff8) 7fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 7fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 7fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 ---[ end trace 8a8073511be81dd2 ]--- Add a 32-bit mask to the platform device's definition. Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski Signed-off-by: Sekhar Nori Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/mach-davinci/devices-da8xx.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-davinci/devices-da8xx.c b/arch/arm/mach-davinci/devices-da8xx.c index 22440c05d66a..7120f93eab0b 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-davinci/devices-da8xx.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-davinci/devices-da8xx.c @@ -699,6 +699,9 @@ static struct platform_device da8xx_lcdc_device = { .id = 0, .num_resources = ARRAY_SIZE(da8xx_lcdc_resources), .resource = da8xx_lcdc_resources, + .dev = { + .coherent_dma_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(32), + } }; int __init da8xx_register_lcdc(struct da8xx_lcdc_platform_data *pdata) From 4efb3c121b3c9b99f78af1c6fa7cc837752e92f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yibo Zhao Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 19:01:52 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 28/81] mac80211: only warn once on chanctx_conf being NULL [ Upstream commit 563572340173865a9a356e6bb02579e6998a876d ] In multiple SSID cases, it takes time to prepare every AP interface to be ready in initializing phase. If a sta already knows everything it needs to join one of the APs and sends authentication to the AP which is not fully prepared at this point of time, AP's channel context could be NULL. As a result, warning message occurs. Even worse, if the AP is under attack via tools such as MDK3 and massive authentication requests are received in a very short time, console will be hung due to kernel warning messages. WARN_ON_ONCE() could be a better way for indicating warning messages without duplicate messages to flood the console. Johannes: We still need to address the underlying problem, but we don't really have a good handle on it yet. Suppress the worst side-effects for now. Signed-off-by: Zhi Chen Signed-off-by: Yibo Zhao [johannes: add note, change subject] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h index a133acb43eb1..0e209a88d88a 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h +++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h @@ -1405,7 +1405,7 @@ ieee80211_get_sband(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) rcu_read_lock(); chanctx_conf = rcu_dereference(sdata->vif.chanctx_conf); - if (WARN_ON(!chanctx_conf)) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!chanctx_conf)) { rcu_read_unlock(); return NULL; } From 0d34ea83b1c13beb6f939760fe9c7b6b73617997 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Reinhard Speyerer Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 19:02:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 29/81] qmi_wwan: add support for QMAP padding in the RX path [ Upstream commit 61356088ace1866a847a727d4d40da7bf00b67fc ] The QMAP code in the qmi_wwan driver is based on the CodeAurora GobiNet driver which does not process QMAP padding in the RX path correctly. Add support for QMAP padding to qmimux_rx_fixup() according to the description of the rmnet driver. Fixes: c6adf77953bc ("net: usb: qmi_wwan: add qmap mux protocol support") Cc: Daniele Palmas Signed-off-by: Reinhard Speyerer Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c index 063daa3435e4..75fe5c5abec4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static bool qmimux_has_slaves(struct usbnet *dev) static int qmimux_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) { - unsigned int len, offset = 0; + unsigned int len, offset = 0, pad_len, pkt_len; struct qmimux_hdr *hdr; struct net_device *net; struct sk_buff *skbn; @@ -171,10 +171,16 @@ static int qmimux_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) if (hdr->pad & 0x80) goto skip; + /* extract padding length and check for valid length info */ + pad_len = hdr->pad & 0x3f; + if (len == 0 || pad_len >= len) + goto skip; + pkt_len = len - pad_len; + net = qmimux_find_dev(dev, hdr->mux_id); if (!net) goto skip; - skbn = netdev_alloc_skb(net, len); + skbn = netdev_alloc_skb(net, pkt_len); if (!skbn) return 0; skbn->dev = net; @@ -191,7 +197,7 @@ static int qmimux_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) goto skip; } - skb_put_data(skbn, skb->data + offset + qmimux_hdr_sz, len); + skb_put_data(skbn, skb->data + offset + qmimux_hdr_sz, pkt_len); if (netif_rx(skbn) != NET_RX_SUCCESS) return 0; From 4f8544dd54b12faefec3f6c58c2dad28c6b4d37f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Reinhard Speyerer Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 19:03:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 30/81] qmi_wwan: avoid RCU stalls on device disconnect when in QMAP mode [ Upstream commit a8fdde1cb830e560208af42b6c10750137f53eb3 ] Switch qmimux_unregister_device() and qmi_wwan_disconnect() to use unregister_netdevice_queue() and unregister_netdevice_many() instead of unregister_netdevice(). This avoids RCU stalls which have been observed on device disconnect in certain setups otherwise. Fixes: c6adf77953bc ("net: usb: qmi_wwan: add qmap mux protocol support") Cc: Daniele Palmas Signed-off-by: Reinhard Speyerer Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c index 75fe5c5abec4..76c4afac71f7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -247,13 +247,14 @@ out_free_newdev: return err; } -static void qmimux_unregister_device(struct net_device *dev) +static void qmimux_unregister_device(struct net_device *dev, + struct list_head *head) { struct qmimux_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev); struct net_device *real_dev = priv->real_dev; netdev_upper_dev_unlink(real_dev, dev); - unregister_netdevice(dev); + unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, head); /* Get rid of the reference to real_dev */ dev_put(real_dev); @@ -424,7 +425,7 @@ static ssize_t del_mux_store(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr, c ret = -EINVAL; goto err; } - qmimux_unregister_device(del_dev); + qmimux_unregister_device(del_dev, NULL); if (!qmimux_has_slaves(dev)) info->flags &= ~QMI_WWAN_FLAG_MUX; @@ -1423,6 +1424,7 @@ static void qmi_wwan_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) struct qmi_wwan_state *info; struct list_head *iter; struct net_device *ldev; + LIST_HEAD(list); /* called twice if separate control and data intf */ if (!dev) @@ -1435,8 +1437,9 @@ static void qmi_wwan_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) } rcu_read_lock(); netdev_for_each_upper_dev_rcu(dev->net, ldev, iter) - qmimux_unregister_device(ldev); + qmimux_unregister_device(ldev, &list); rcu_read_unlock(); + unregister_netdevice_many(&list); rtnl_unlock(); info->flags &= ~QMI_WWAN_FLAG_MUX; } From 065cf4159258caf507d96fa5449c601e5a9e865a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Reinhard Speyerer Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 19:03:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 31/81] qmi_wwan: extend permitted QMAP mux_id value range [ Upstream commit 36815b416fa48766ac5a98e4b2dc3ebc5887222e ] Permit mux_id values up to 254 to be used in qmimux_register_device() for compatibility with ip(8) and the rmnet driver. Fixes: c6adf77953bc ("net: usb: qmi_wwan: add qmap mux protocol support") Cc: Daniele Palmas Signed-off-by: Reinhard Speyerer Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi | 4 ++-- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi index 7122d6264c49..c310db4ccbc2 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-net-qmi @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Contact: Bjørn Mork Description: Unsigned integer. - Write a number ranging from 1 to 127 to add a qmap mux + Write a number ranging from 1 to 254 to add a qmap mux based network device, supported by recent Qualcomm based modems. @@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ Contact: Bjørn Mork Description: Unsigned integer. - Write a number ranging from 1 to 127 to delete a previously + Write a number ranging from 1 to 254 to delete a previously created qmap mux based network device. diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c index 76c4afac71f7..4b0144b2a252 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -363,8 +363,8 @@ static ssize_t add_mux_store(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr, c if (kstrtou8(buf, 0, &mux_id)) return -EINVAL; - /* mux_id [1 - 0x7f] range empirically found */ - if (mux_id < 1 || mux_id > 0x7f) + /* mux_id [1 - 254] for compatibility with ip(8) and the rmnet driver */ + if (mux_id < 1 || mux_id > 254) return -EINVAL; if (!rtnl_trylock()) From a113e3324cded82bfeba4ef84d85ad9b0831f6df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mariusz Tkaczyk Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:11:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 32/81] md: fix for divide error in status_resync [ Upstream commit 9642fa73d073527b0cbc337cc17a47d545d82cd2 ] Stopping external metadata arrays during resync/recovery causes retries, loop of interrupting and starting reconstruction, until it hit at good moment to stop completely. While these retries curr_mark_cnt can be small- especially on HDD drives, so subtraction result can be smaller than 0. However it is casted to uint without checking. As a result of it the status bar in /proc/mdstat while stopping is strange (it jumps between 0% and 99%). The real problem occurs here after commit 72deb455b5ec ("block: remove CONFIG_LBDAF"). Sector_div() macro has been changed, now the divisor is casted to uint32. For db = -8 the divisior(db/32-1) becomes 0. Check if db value can be really counted and replace these macro by div64_u64() inline. Signed-off-by: Mariusz Tkaczyk Signed-off-by: Song Liu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/md/md.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/md.c b/drivers/md/md.c index b27a69388dcd..764ed9c46629 100644 --- a/drivers/md/md.c +++ b/drivers/md/md.c @@ -7605,9 +7605,9 @@ static void status_unused(struct seq_file *seq) static int status_resync(struct seq_file *seq, struct mddev *mddev) { sector_t max_sectors, resync, res; - unsigned long dt, db; - sector_t rt; - int scale; + unsigned long dt, db = 0; + sector_t rt, curr_mark_cnt, resync_mark_cnt; + int scale, recovery_active; unsigned int per_milli; if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_SYNC, &mddev->recovery) || @@ -7677,22 +7677,30 @@ static int status_resync(struct seq_file *seq, struct mddev *mddev) * db: blocks written from mark until now * rt: remaining time * - * rt is a sector_t, so could be 32bit or 64bit. - * So we divide before multiply in case it is 32bit and close - * to the limit. - * We scale the divisor (db) by 32 to avoid losing precision - * near the end of resync when the number of remaining sectors - * is close to 'db'. - * We then divide rt by 32 after multiplying by db to compensate. - * The '+1' avoids division by zero if db is very small. + * rt is a sector_t, which is always 64bit now. We are keeping + * the original algorithm, but it is not really necessary. + * + * Original algorithm: + * So we divide before multiply in case it is 32bit and close + * to the limit. + * We scale the divisor (db) by 32 to avoid losing precision + * near the end of resync when the number of remaining sectors + * is close to 'db'. + * We then divide rt by 32 after multiplying by db to compensate. + * The '+1' avoids division by zero if db is very small. */ dt = ((jiffies - mddev->resync_mark) / HZ); if (!dt) dt++; - db = (mddev->curr_mark_cnt - atomic_read(&mddev->recovery_active)) - - mddev->resync_mark_cnt; + + curr_mark_cnt = mddev->curr_mark_cnt; + recovery_active = atomic_read(&mddev->recovery_active); + resync_mark_cnt = mddev->resync_mark_cnt; + + if (curr_mark_cnt >= (recovery_active + resync_mark_cnt)) + db = curr_mark_cnt - (recovery_active + resync_mark_cnt); rt = max_sectors - resync; /* number of remaining sectors */ - sector_div(rt, db/32+1); + rt = div64_u64(rt, db/32+1); rt *= dt; rt >>= 5; From 39e006a60360316ab4ca803bc867fe2160528a93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Mauro S. M. Rodrigues" Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:25:40 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 33/81] bnx2x: Check if transceiver implements DDM before access [ Upstream commit cf18cecca911c0db96b868072665347efe6df46f ] Some transceivers may comply with SFF-8472 even though they do not implement the Digital Diagnostic Monitoring (DDM) interface described in the spec. The existence of such area is specified by the 6th bit of byte 92, set to 1 if implemented. Currently, without checking this bit, bnx2x fails trying to read sfp module's EEPROM with the follow message: ethtool -m enP5p1s0f1 Cannot get Module EEPROM data: Input/output error Because it fails to read the additional 256 bytes in which it is assumed to exist the DDM data. This issue was noticed using a Mellanox Passive DAC PN 01FT738. The EEPROM data was confirmed by Mellanox as correct and similar to other Passive DACs from other manufacturers. Signed-off-by: Mauro S. M. Rodrigues Acked-by: Sudarsana Reddy Kalluru Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_ethtool.c | 3 ++- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_ethtool.c index 3fd1085a093f..65bc1929d1a8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_ethtool.c @@ -1581,7 +1581,8 @@ static int bnx2x_get_module_info(struct net_device *dev, } if (!sff8472_comp || - (diag_type & SFP_EEPROM_DIAG_ADDR_CHANGE_REQ)) { + (diag_type & SFP_EEPROM_DIAG_ADDR_CHANGE_REQ) || + !(diag_type & SFP_EEPROM_DDM_IMPLEMENTED)) { modinfo->type = ETH_MODULE_SFF_8079; modinfo->eeprom_len = ETH_MODULE_SFF_8079_LEN; } else { diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.h index b7d251108c19..7115f5025664 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.h @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ #define SFP_EEPROM_DIAG_TYPE_ADDR 0x5c #define SFP_EEPROM_DIAG_TYPE_SIZE 1 #define SFP_EEPROM_DIAG_ADDR_CHANGE_REQ (1<<2) +#define SFP_EEPROM_DDM_IMPLEMENTED (1<<6) #define SFP_EEPROM_SFF_8472_COMP_ADDR 0x5e #define SFP_EEPROM_SFF_8472_COMP_SIZE 1 From 8945fba0e3799246bfaf26b15fd28cdad0b26b26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 16:18:43 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 34/81] drm: return -EFAULT if copy_to_user() fails [ Upstream commit 74b67efa8d7b4f90137f0ab9a80dd319da050350 ] The copy_from_user() function returns the number of bytes remaining to be copied but we want to return a negative error code. Otherwise the callers treat it as a successful copy. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Sean Paul Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190618131843.GA29463@mwanda Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c | 5 ++++- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioc32.c | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c index 0f05b8d8fefa..b829fde80f7b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bufs.c @@ -1321,7 +1321,10 @@ static int copy_one_buf(void *data, int count, struct drm_buf_entry *from) .size = from->buf_size, .low_mark = from->low_mark, .high_mark = from->high_mark}; - return copy_to_user(to, &v, offsetof(struct drm_buf_desc, flags)); + + if (copy_to_user(to, &v, offsetof(struct drm_buf_desc, flags))) + return -EFAULT; + return 0; } int drm_legacy_infobufs(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioc32.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioc32.c index f8e96e648acf..bfeeb6a56135 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioc32.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_ioc32.c @@ -372,7 +372,10 @@ static int copy_one_buf32(void *data, int count, struct drm_buf_entry *from) .size = from->buf_size, .low_mark = from->low_mark, .high_mark = from->high_mark}; - return copy_to_user(to + count, &v, offsetof(drm_buf_desc32_t, flags)); + + if (copy_to_user(to + count, &v, offsetof(drm_buf_desc32_t, flags))) + return -EFAULT; + return 0; } static int drm_legacy_infobufs32(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, From 95a00fa0d43d201bd06422e5208d3b803394adba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 21:34:14 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 35/81] ip6_tunnel: allow not to count pkts on tstats by passing dev as NULL [ Upstream commit 6f6a8622057c92408930c31698394fae1557b188 ] A similar fix to Patch "ip_tunnel: allow not to count pkts on tstats by setting skb's dev to NULL" is also needed by ip6_tunnel. Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/ip6_tunnel.h | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h b/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h index d66f70f63734..3b0e3cdee1c3 100644 --- a/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h +++ b/include/net/ip6_tunnel.h @@ -152,9 +152,12 @@ static inline void ip6tunnel_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, memset(skb->cb, 0, sizeof(struct inet6_skb_parm)); pkt_len = skb->len - skb_inner_network_offset(skb); err = ip6_local_out(dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev), sk, skb); - if (unlikely(net_xmit_eval(err))) - pkt_len = -1; - iptunnel_xmit_stats(dev, pkt_len); + + if (dev) { + if (unlikely(net_xmit_eval(err))) + pkt_len = -1; + iptunnel_xmit_stats(dev, pkt_len); + } } #endif #endif From 9bd41f5634118567ae19a6c87029579985e12dc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Ian King Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 17:12:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 36/81] net: lio_core: fix potential sign-extension overflow on large shift [ Upstream commit 9476274093a0e79b905f4cd6cf6d149f65e02c17 ] Left shifting the signed int value 1 by 31 bits has undefined behaviour and the shift amount oq_no can be as much as 63. Fix this by using BIT_ULL(oq_no) instead. Addresses-Coverity: ("Bad shift operation") Fixes: f21fb3ed364b ("Add support of Cavium Liquidio ethernet adapters") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_core.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_core.c index 23f6b60030c5..8c16298a252d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/lio_core.c @@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ static void liquidio_schedule_droq_pkt_handlers(struct octeon_device *oct) if (droq->ops.poll_mode) { droq->ops.napi_fn(droq); - oct_priv->napi_mask |= (1 << oq_no); + oct_priv->napi_mask |= BIT_ULL(oq_no); } else { tasklet_schedule(&oct_priv->droq_tasklet); } From 8907e1a6bbfc2e61b91a83bf9d55d16c659d1686 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: yangerkun Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2019 22:00:02 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 37/81] quota: fix a problem about transfer quota [ Upstream commit c6d9c35d16f1bafd3fec64b865e569e48cbcb514 ] Run below script as root, dquot_add_space will return -EDQUOT since __dquot_transfer call dquot_add_space with flags=0, and dquot_add_space think it's a preallocation. Fix it by set flags as DQUOT_SPACE_WARN. mkfs.ext4 -O quota,project /dev/vdb mount -o prjquota /dev/vdb /mnt setquota -P 23 1 1 0 0 /dev/vdb dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/test-file bs=4K count=1 chattr -p 23 test-file Fixes: 7b9ca4c61bc2 ("quota: Reduce contention on dq_data_lock") Signed-off-by: yangerkun Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/quota/dquot.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/quota/dquot.c b/fs/quota/dquot.c index 4cd0c2336624..9c81fd973418 100644 --- a/fs/quota/dquot.c +++ b/fs/quota/dquot.c @@ -1989,8 +1989,8 @@ int __dquot_transfer(struct inode *inode, struct dquot **transfer_to) &warn_to[cnt]); if (ret) goto over_quota; - ret = dquot_add_space(transfer_to[cnt], cur_space, rsv_space, 0, - &warn_to[cnt]); + ret = dquot_add_space(transfer_to[cnt], cur_space, rsv_space, + DQUOT_SPACE_WARN, &warn_to[cnt]); if (ret) { spin_lock(&transfer_to[cnt]->dq_dqb_lock); dquot_decr_inodes(transfer_to[cnt], inode_usage); From 3dc99f53b053cf3993409144845c0b234e0d86d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rasmus Villemoes Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 10:02:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 38/81] net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: fix shift of FID bits in mv88e6185_g1_vtu_loadpurge() [ Upstream commit 48620e341659f6e4b978ec229f6944dabe6df709 ] The comment is correct, but the code ends up moving the bits four places too far, into the VTUOp field. Fixes: 11ea809f1a74 (net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: support 256 databases) Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_vtu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_vtu.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_vtu.c index 8c8a0ec3d6e9..f260bd30c73a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_vtu.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_vtu.c @@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ int mv88e6185_g1_vtu_loadpurge(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, * VTU DBNum[7:4] are located in VTU Operation 11:8 */ op |= entry->fid & 0x000f; - op |= (entry->fid & 0x00f0) << 8; + op |= (entry->fid & 0x00f0) << 4; } return mv88e6xxx_g1_vtu_op(chip, op); From 5636cbbe30c5895bc62a3fb030e9992e651141be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lin Yi Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2019 10:16:56 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 39/81] net :sunrpc :clnt :Fix xps refcount imbalance on the error path [ Upstream commit b96226148491505318228ac52624956bd98f9e0c ] rpc_clnt_add_xprt take a reference to struct rpc_xprt_switch, but forget to release it before return, may lead to a memory leak. Signed-off-by: Lin Yi Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/sunrpc/clnt.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c index 6d118357d9dc..9259529e0412 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c @@ -2706,6 +2706,7 @@ int rpc_clnt_add_xprt(struct rpc_clnt *clnt, xprt = xprt_iter_xprt(&clnt->cl_xpi); if (xps == NULL || xprt == NULL) { rcu_read_unlock(); + xprt_switch_put(xps); return -EAGAIN; } resvport = xprt->resvport; From 9f805849e1f14c23c469196508fab7ed104cc2ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hongjie Fang Date: Wed, 22 May 2019 10:02:53 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 40/81] fscrypt: don't set policy for a dead directory commit 5858bdad4d0d0fc18bf29f34c3ac836e0b59441f upstream. The directory may have been removed when entering fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(). If so, the empty_dir() check will return error for ext4 file system. ext4_rmdir() sets i_size = 0, then ext4_empty_dir() reports an error because 'inode->i_size < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2)'. If the fs is mounted with errors=panic, it will trigger a panic issue. Add the check IS_DEADDIR() to fix this problem. Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support") Cc: # v4.1+ Signed-off-by: Hongjie Fang Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/crypto/policy.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/crypto/policy.c b/fs/crypto/policy.c index a120649beeca..d13a154c8424 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/policy.c +++ b/fs/crypto/policy.c @@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg) if (ret == -ENODATA) { if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) ret = -ENOTDIR; + else if (IS_DEADDIR(inode)) + ret = -ENOENT; else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode)) ret = -ENOTEMPTY; else From 541cb89c7581d59abeff3e9a51d50e6bf81572cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven J. Magnani" Date: Sun, 30 Jun 2019 21:39:35 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 41/81] udf: Fix incorrect final NOT_ALLOCATED (hole) extent length commit fa33cdbf3eceb0206a4f844fe91aeebcf6ff2b7a upstream. In some cases, using the 'truncate' command to extend a UDF file results in a mismatch between the length of the file's extents (specifically, due to incorrect length of the final NOT_ALLOCATED extent) and the information (file) length. The discrepancy can prevent other operating systems (i.e., Windows 10) from opening the file. Two particular errors have been observed when extending a file: 1. The final extent is larger than it should be, having been rounded up to a multiple of the block size. B. The final extent is not shorter than it should be, due to not having been updated when the file's information length was increased. [JK: simplified udf_do_extend_final_block(), fixed up some types] Fixes: 2c948b3f86e5 ("udf: Avoid IO in udf_clear_inode") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1561948775-5878-1-git-send-email-steve@digidescorp.com Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/udf/inode.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/udf/inode.c b/fs/udf/inode.c index 28b9d7cca29b..3c1b54091d6c 100644 --- a/fs/udf/inode.c +++ b/fs/udf/inode.c @@ -470,13 +470,15 @@ static struct buffer_head *udf_getblk(struct inode *inode, long block, return NULL; } -/* Extend the file by 'blocks' blocks, return the number of extents added */ +/* Extend the file with new blocks totaling 'new_block_bytes', + * return the number of extents added + */ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode, struct extent_position *last_pos, struct kernel_long_ad *last_ext, - sector_t blocks) + loff_t new_block_bytes) { - sector_t add; + uint32_t add; int count = 0, fake = !(last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK); struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; struct kernel_lb_addr prealloc_loc = {}; @@ -486,7 +488,7 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode, /* The previous extent is fake and we should not extend by anything * - there's nothing to do... */ - if (!blocks && fake) + if (!new_block_bytes && fake) return 0; iinfo = UDF_I(inode); @@ -517,13 +519,12 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode, /* Can we merge with the previous extent? */ if ((last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_FLAG_MASK) == EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED) { - add = ((1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize - - (last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK)) >> - sb->s_blocksize_bits; - if (add > blocks) - add = blocks; - blocks -= add; - last_ext->extLength += add << sb->s_blocksize_bits; + add = (1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize - + (last_ext->extLength & UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK); + if (add > new_block_bytes) + add = new_block_bytes; + new_block_bytes -= add; + last_ext->extLength += add; } if (fake) { @@ -544,28 +545,27 @@ static int udf_do_extend_file(struct inode *inode, } /* Managed to do everything necessary? */ - if (!blocks) + if (!new_block_bytes) goto out; /* All further extents will be NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED */ last_ext->extLocation.logicalBlockNum = 0; last_ext->extLocation.partitionReferenceNum = 0; - add = (1 << (30-sb->s_blocksize_bits)) - 1; - last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED | - (add << sb->s_blocksize_bits); + add = (1 << 30) - sb->s_blocksize; + last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED | add; /* Create enough extents to cover the whole hole */ - while (blocks > add) { - blocks -= add; + while (new_block_bytes > add) { + new_block_bytes -= add; err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation, last_ext->extLength, 1); if (err) return err; count++; } - if (blocks) { + if (new_block_bytes) { last_ext->extLength = EXT_NOT_RECORDED_NOT_ALLOCATED | - (blocks << sb->s_blocksize_bits); + new_block_bytes; err = udf_add_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation, last_ext->extLength, 1); if (err) @@ -596,6 +596,24 @@ out: return count; } +/* Extend the final block of the file to final_block_len bytes */ +static void udf_do_extend_final_block(struct inode *inode, + struct extent_position *last_pos, + struct kernel_long_ad *last_ext, + uint32_t final_block_len) +{ + struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; + uint32_t added_bytes; + + added_bytes = final_block_len - + (last_ext->extLength & (sb->s_blocksize - 1)); + last_ext->extLength += added_bytes; + UDF_I(inode)->i_lenExtents += added_bytes; + + udf_write_aext(inode, last_pos, &last_ext->extLocation, + last_ext->extLength, 1); +} + static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize) { @@ -605,10 +623,12 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize) int8_t etype; struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; sector_t first_block = newsize >> sb->s_blocksize_bits, offset; + unsigned long partial_final_block; int adsize; struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode); struct kernel_long_ad extent; - int err; + int err = 0; + int within_final_block; if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT) adsize = sizeof(struct short_ad); @@ -618,18 +638,8 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize) BUG(); etype = inode_bmap(inode, first_block, &epos, &eloc, &elen, &offset); + within_final_block = (etype != -1); - /* File has extent covering the new size (could happen when extending - * inside a block)? */ - if (etype != -1) - return 0; - if (newsize & (sb->s_blocksize - 1)) - offset++; - /* Extended file just to the boundary of the last file block? */ - if (offset == 0) - return 0; - - /* Truncate is extending the file by 'offset' blocks */ if ((!epos.bh && epos.offset == udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode)) || (epos.bh && epos.offset == sizeof(struct allocExtDesc))) { /* File has no extents at all or has empty last @@ -643,7 +653,22 @@ static int udf_extend_file(struct inode *inode, loff_t newsize) &extent.extLength, 0); extent.extLength |= etype << 30; } - err = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &epos, &extent, offset); + + partial_final_block = newsize & (sb->s_blocksize - 1); + + /* File has extent covering the new size (could happen when extending + * inside a block)? + */ + if (within_final_block) { + /* Extending file within the last file block */ + udf_do_extend_final_block(inode, &epos, &extent, + partial_final_block); + } else { + loff_t add = ((loff_t)offset << sb->s_blocksize_bits) | + partial_final_block; + err = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &epos, &extent, add); + } + if (err < 0) goto out; err = 0; @@ -745,6 +770,7 @@ static sector_t inode_getblk(struct inode *inode, sector_t block, /* Are we beyond EOF? */ if (etype == -1) { int ret; + loff_t hole_len; isBeyondEOF = true; if (count) { if (c) @@ -760,7 +786,8 @@ static sector_t inode_getblk(struct inode *inode, sector_t block, startnum = (offset > 0); } /* Create extents for the hole between EOF and offset */ - ret = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &prev_epos, laarr, offset); + hole_len = (loff_t)offset << inode->i_blkbits; + ret = udf_do_extend_file(inode, &prev_epos, laarr, hole_len); if (ret < 0) { *err = ret; newblock = 0; From 1f1d1d8e8941879d7e185f256f95879dbac019b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kailang Yang Date: Thu, 4 Jul 2019 16:02:10 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 42/81] ALSA: hda/realtek - Headphone Mic can't record after S3 commit d07a9a4f66e944fcc900812cbc2f6817bde6a43d upstream. Dell headset mode platform with ALC236. It doesn't recording after system resume from S3. S3 mode was deep. s2idle was not has this issue. S3 deep will cut of codec power. So, the register will back to default after resume back. This patch will solve this issue. Signed-off-by: Kailang Yang Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 3552b4b1f902..20914a33ca5d 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -3114,6 +3114,7 @@ static void alc256_init(struct hda_codec *codec) alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x57, 0x04, 0x0007, 0x4); /* Hight power */ alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 1 << 15); /* Clear bit */ alc_update_coefex_idx(codec, 0x53, 0x02, 0x8000, 0 << 15); + alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x36, 1 << 13, 1 << 5); /* Switch pcbeep path to Line in path*/ } static void alc256_shutup(struct hda_codec *codec) @@ -7218,7 +7219,6 @@ static int patch_alc269(struct hda_codec *codec) spec->shutup = alc256_shutup; spec->init_hook = alc256_init; spec->gen.mixer_nid = 0; /* ALC256 does not have any loopback mixer path */ - alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x36, 1 << 13, 1 << 5); /* Switch pcbeep path to Line in path*/ break; case 0x10ec0257: spec->codec_variant = ALC269_TYPE_ALC257; From 340a4da3c16aa73f9ce7b409e3e65786b7abb202 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Douglas Anderson Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 21:44:09 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 43/81] block, bfq: NULL out the bic when it's no longer valid commit dbc3117d4ca9e17819ac73501e914b8422686750 upstream. In reboot tests on several devices we were seeing a "use after free" when slub_debug or KASAN was enabled. The kernel complained about: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 6b6b6c2b ...which is a classic sign of use after free under slub_debug. The stack crawl in kgdb looked like: 0 test_bit (addr=, nr=) 1 bfq_bfqq_busy (bfqq=) 2 bfq_select_queue (bfqd=) 3 __bfq_dispatch_request (hctx=) 4 bfq_dispatch_request (hctx=) 5 0xc056ef00 in blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched (hctx=0xed249440) 6 0xc056f728 in blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests (hctx=0xed249440) 7 0xc0568d24 in __blk_mq_run_hw_queue (hctx=0xed249440) 8 0xc0568d94 in blk_mq_run_work_fn (work=) 9 0xc024c5c4 in process_one_work (worker=0xec6d4640, work=0xed249480) 10 0xc024cff4 in worker_thread (__worker=0xec6d4640) Digging in kgdb, it could be found that, though bfqq looked fine, bfqq->bic had been freed. Through further digging, I postulated that perhaps it is illegal to access a "bic" (AKA an "icq") after bfq_exit_icq() had been called because the "bic" can be freed at some point in time after this call is made. I confirmed that there certainly were cases where the exact crashing code path would access the "bic" after bfq_exit_icq() had been called. Sspecifically I set the "bfqq->bic" to (void *)0x7 and saw that the bic was 0x7 at the time of the crash. To understand a bit more about why this crash was fairly uncommon (I saw it only once in a few hundred reboots), you can see that much of the time bfq_exit_icq_fbqq() fully frees the bfqq and thus it can't access the ->bic anymore. The only case it doesn't is if bfq_put_queue() sees a reference still held. However, even in the case when bfqq isn't freed, the crash is still rare. Why? I tracked what happened to the "bic" after the exit routine. It doesn't get freed right away. Rather, put_io_context_active() eventually called put_io_context() which queued up freeing on a workqueue. The freeing then actually happened later than that through call_rcu(). Despite all these delays, some extra debugging showed that all the hoops could be jumped through in time and the memory could be freed causing the original crash. Phew! To make a long story short, assuming it truly is illegal to access an icq after the "exit_icq" callback is finished, this patch is needed. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Paolo Valente Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/bfq-iosched.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/block/bfq-iosched.c b/block/bfq-iosched.c index 7d45ac451745..e65b0da1007b 100644 --- a/block/bfq-iosched.c +++ b/block/bfq-iosched.c @@ -3760,6 +3760,7 @@ static void bfq_exit_icq_bfqq(struct bfq_io_cq *bic, bool is_sync) unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&bfqd->lock, flags); + bfqq->bic = NULL; bfq_exit_bfqq(bfqd, bfqq); bic_set_bfqq(bic, NULL, is_sync); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&bfqd->lock, flags); From f41c1f4ead14745f4985a6e2cbe5427e072a823e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dianzhang Chen Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 23:30:17 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 44/81] x86/ptrace: Fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg() commit 31a2fbb390fee4231281b939e1979e810f945415 upstream. The index to access the threads ptrace_bps is controlled by userspace via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. The index can be controlled from: ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg. Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it access thread->ptrace_bps. Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561476617-3759-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c index ed5c4cdf0a34..2a65ab291312 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -651,9 +652,11 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n) { struct thread_struct *thread = &tsk->thread; unsigned long val = 0; + int index = n; if (n < HBP_NUM) { - struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n]; + struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[index]; + index = array_index_nospec(index, HBP_NUM); if (bp) val = bp->hw.info.address; From 30a9b8b4b767c8d4d05c999d7bd1e502fc4df06a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dianzhang Chen Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 12:50:30 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 45/81] x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area() commit 993773d11d45c90cb1c6481c2638c3d9f092ea5b upstream. The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. The index can be controlled from: ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area. Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it to access the p->thread.tls_array. Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561524630-3642-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/tls.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c index a5b802a12212..71d3fef1edc9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx, struct user_desc __user *u_info) { struct user_desc info; + int index; if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number)) return -EFAULT; @@ -227,8 +229,11 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struct *p, int idx, if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX) return -EINVAL; - fill_user_desc(&info, idx, - &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]); + index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN; + index = array_index_nospec(index, + GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + 1); + + fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]); if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info))) return -EFAULT; From d30cb648f3ec77ca5f773a9b74d565cca1561aa1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tim Chen Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 16:10:50 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 46/81] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre commit 6e88559470f581741bcd0f2794f9054814ac9740 upstream. Add documentation for Spectre vulnerability and the mitigation mechanisms: - Explain the problem and risks - Document the mitigation mechanisms - Document the command line controls - Document the sysfs files Co-developed-by: Andi Kleen Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen Co-developed-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Tim Chen Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 697 ++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 2 + 3 files changed, 700 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst index ffc064c1ec68..49311f3da6f2 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst @@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. .. toctree:: :maxdepth: 1 + spectre l1tf mds diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..25f3b2532198 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -0,0 +1,697 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +Spectre Side Channels +===================== + +Spectre is a class of side channel attacks that exploit branch prediction +and speculative execution on modern CPUs to read memory, possibly +bypassing access controls. Speculative execution side channel exploits +do not modify memory but attempt to infer privileged data in the memory. + +This document covers Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2. + +Affected processors +------------------- + +Speculative execution side channel methods affect a wide range of modern +high performance processors, since most modern high speed processors +use branch prediction and speculative execution. + +The following CPUs are vulnerable: + + - Intel Core, Atom, Pentium, and Xeon processors + + - AMD Phenom, EPYC, and Zen processors + + - IBM POWER and zSeries processors + + - Higher end ARM processors + + - Apple CPUs + + - Higher end MIPS CPUs + + - Likely most other high performance CPUs. Contact your CPU vendor for details. + +Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the Spectre +vulnerability files in sysfs. See :ref:`spectre_sys_info`. + +Related CVEs +------------ + +The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants: + + ============= ======================= ================= + CVE-2017-5753 Bounds check bypass Spectre variant 1 + CVE-2017-5715 Branch target injection Spectre variant 2 + ============= ======================= ================= + +Problem +------- + +CPUs use speculative operations to improve performance. That may leave +traces of memory accesses or computations in the processor's caches, +buffers, and branch predictors. Malicious software may be able to +influence the speculative execution paths, and then use the side effects +of the speculative execution in the CPUs' caches and buffers to infer +privileged data touched during the speculative execution. + +Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of +conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative +execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory. +See :ref:`[1] ` :ref:`[5] ` :ref:`[7] ` +:ref:`[10] ` :ref:`[11] `. + +Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass) +--------------------------------------- + +The bounds check bypass attack :ref:`[2] ` takes advantage +of speculative execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions +used for memory access bounds check (e.g. checking if the index of an +array results in memory access within a valid range). This results in +memory accesses to invalid memory (with out-of-bound index) that are +done speculatively before validation checks resolve. Such speculative +memory accesses can leave side effects, creating side channels which +leak information to the attacker. + +There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data +over the network, see :ref:`[12] `. However such attacks +are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk. + +Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection) +------------------------------------------- + +The branch target injection attack takes advantage of speculative +execution of indirect branches :ref:`[3] `. The indirect +branch predictors inside the processor used to guess the target of +indirect branches can be influenced by an attacker, causing gadget code +to be speculatively executed, thus exposing sensitive data touched by +the victim. The side effects left in the CPU's caches during speculative +execution can be measured to infer data values. + +.. _poison_btb: + +In Spectre variant 2 attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect +branches in the victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target +buffer of a CPU used for predicting indirect branch addresses. Such +poisoning could be done by indirect branching into existing code, +with the address offset of the indirect branch under the attacker's +control. Since the branch prediction on impacted hardware does not +fully disambiguate branch address and uses the offset for prediction, +this could cause privileged code's indirect branch to jump to a gadget +code with the same offset. + +The most useful gadgets take an attacker-controlled input parameter (such +as a register value) so that the memory read can be controlled. Gadgets +without input parameters might be possible, but the attacker would have +very little control over what memory can be read, reducing the risk of +the attack revealing useful data. + +One other variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the +return stack buffer (RSB) :ref:`[13] ` to cause speculative +subroutine return instruction execution to go to a gadget. An attacker's +imbalanced subroutine call instructions might "poison" entries in the +return stack buffer which are later consumed by a victim's subroutine +return instructions. This attack can be mitigated by flushing the return +stack buffer on context switch, or virtual machine (VM) exit. + +On systems with simultaneous multi-threading (SMT), attacks are possible +from the sibling thread, as level 1 cache and branch target buffer +(BTB) may be shared between hardware threads in a CPU core. A malicious +program running on the sibling thread may influence its peer's BTB to +steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the +speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the +victim's data. + +Attack scenarios +---------------- + +The following list of attack scenarios have been anticipated, but may +not cover all possible attack vectors. + +1. A user process attacking the kernel +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or + via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may + be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive + a pointer for a Spectre variant 1 attack. The index or pointer + is invalid, but bound checks are bypassed in the code branch taken + for speculative execution. This could cause privileged memory to be + accessed and leaked. + + For kernel code that has been identified where data pointers could + potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor + macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data. + + Spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison ` the branch + target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack. + After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch + target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative + execution. + + If an attacker tries to control the memory addresses leaked during + speculative execution, he would also need to pass a parameter to the + gadget, either through a register or a known address in memory. After + the gadget has executed, he can measure the side effect. + + The kernel can protect itself against consuming poisoned branch + target buffer entries by using return trampolines (also known as + "retpoline") :ref:`[3] ` :ref:`[9] ` for all + indirect branches. Return trampolines trap speculative execution paths + to prevent jumping to gadget code during speculative execution. + x86 CPUs with Enhanced Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation + (Enhanced IBRS) available in hardware should use the feature to + mitigate Spectre variant 2 instead of retpoline. Enhanced IBRS is + more efficient than retpoline. + + There may be gadget code in firmware which could be exploited with + Spectre variant 2 attack by a rogue user process. To mitigate such + attacks on x86, Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) feature + is turned on before the kernel invokes any firmware code. + +2. A user process attacking another user process +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + A malicious user process can try to attack another user process, + either via a context switch on the same hardware thread, or from the + sibling hyperthread sharing a physical processor core on simultaneous + multi-threading (SMT) system. + + Spectre variant 1 attacks generally require passing parameters + between the processes, which needs a data passing relationship, such + as remote procedure calls (RPC). Those parameters are used in gadget + code to derive invalid data pointers accessing privileged memory in + the attacked process. + + Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue process by + :ref:`poisoning ` the branch target buffer. This can + influence the indirect branch targets for a victim process that either + runs later on the same hardware thread, or running concurrently on + a sibling hardware thread sharing the same physical core. + + A user process can protect itself against Spectre variant 2 attacks + by using the prctl() syscall to disable indirect branch speculation + for itself. An administrator can also cordon off an unsafe process + from polluting the branch target buffer by disabling the process's + indirect branch speculation. This comes with a performance cost + from not using indirect branch speculation and clearing the branch + target buffer. When SMT is enabled on x86, for a process that has + indirect branch speculation disabled, Single Threaded Indirect Branch + Predictors (STIBP) :ref:`[4] ` are turned on to prevent the + sibling thread from controlling branch target buffer. In addition, + the Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) is issued to clear the + branch target buffer when context switching to and from such process. + + On x86, the return stack buffer is stuffed on context switch. + This prevents the branch target buffer from being used for branch + prediction when the return stack buffer underflows while switching to + a deeper call stack. Any poisoned entries in the return stack buffer + left by the previous process will also be cleared. + + User programs should use address space randomization to make attacks + more difficult (Set /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2). + +3. A virtualized guest attacking the host +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + The attack mechanism is similar to how user processes attack the + kernel. The kernel is entered via hyper-calls or other virtualization + exit paths. + + For Spectre variant 1 attacks, rogue guests can pass parameters + (e.g. in registers) via hyper-calls to derive invalid pointers to + speculate into privileged memory after entering the kernel. For places + where such kernel code has been identified, nospec accessor macros + are used to stop speculative memory access. + + For Spectre variant 2 attacks, rogue guests can :ref:`poison + ` the branch target buffer or return stack buffer, causing + the kernel to jump to gadget code in the speculative execution paths. + + To mitigate variant 2, the host kernel can use return trampolines + for indirect branches to bypass the poisoned branch target buffer, + and flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit. This prevents rogue + guests from affecting indirect branching in the host kernel. + + To protect host processes from rogue guests, host processes can have + indirect branch speculation disabled via prctl(). The branch target + buffer is cleared before context switching to such processes. + +4. A virtualized guest attacking other guest +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + A rogue guest may attack another guest to get data accessible by the + other guest. + + Spectre variant 1 attacks are possible if parameters can be passed + between guests. This may be done via mechanisms such as shared memory + or message passing. Such parameters could be used to derive data + pointers to privileged data in guest. The privileged data could be + accessed by gadget code in the victim's speculation paths. + + Spectre variant 2 attacks can be launched from a rogue guest by + :ref:`poisoning ` the branch target buffer or the return + stack buffer. Such poisoned entries could be used to influence + speculation execution paths in the victim guest. + + Linux kernel mitigates attacks to other guests running in the same + CPU hardware thread by flushing the return stack buffer on VM exit, + and clearing the branch target buffer before switching to a new guest. + + If SMT is used, Spectre variant 2 attacks from an untrusted guest + in the sibling hyperthread can be mitigated by the administrator, + by turning off the unsafe guest's indirect branch speculation via + prctl(). A guest can also protect itself by turning on microcode + based mitigations (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) within the guest. + +.. _spectre_sys_info: + +Spectre system information +-------------------------- + +The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current +mitigation status of the system for Spectre: whether the system is +vulnerable, and which mitigations are active. + +The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is: + + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 + +The possible values in this file are: + + ======================================= ================================= + 'Mitigation: __user pointer sanitation' Protection in kernel on a case by + case base with explicit pointer + sanitation. + ======================================= ================================= + +However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis, +and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre +variant 1 are covered. + +The spectre_v2 kernel file reports if the kernel has been compiled with +retpoline mitigation or if the CPU has hardware mitigation, and if the +CPU has support for additional process-specific mitigation. + +This file also reports CPU features enabled by microcode to mitigate +attack between user processes: + +1. Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) to add additional + isolation between processes of different users. +2. Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP) to add additional + isolation between CPU threads running on the same core. + +These CPU features may impact performance when used and can be enabled +per process on a case-by-case base. + +The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 2 mitigation status is: + + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 + +The possible values in this file are: + + - Kernel status: + + ==================================== ================================= + 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable + 'Vulnerable' Vulnerable, no mitigation + 'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline' Software-focused mitigation + 'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline' AMD-specific software mitigation + 'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation + ==================================== ================================= + + - Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is + used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only). + + ========== ============================================================= + 'IBRS_FW' Protection against user program attacks when calling firmware + ========== ============================================================= + + - Indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB) status for protection between + processes of different users. This feature can be controlled through + prctl() per process, or through kernel command line options. This is + an x86 only feature. For more details see below. + + =================== ======================================================== + 'IBPB: disabled' IBPB unused + 'IBPB: always-on' Use IBPB on all tasks + 'IBPB: conditional' Use IBPB on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks + =================== ======================================================== + + - Single threaded indirect branch prediction (STIBP) status for protection + between different hyper threads. This feature can be controlled through + prctl per process, or through kernel command line options. This is x86 + only feature. For more details see below. + + ==================== ======================================================== + 'STIBP: disabled' STIBP unused + 'STIBP: forced' Use STIBP on all tasks + 'STIBP: conditional' Use STIBP on SECCOMP or indirect branch restricted tasks + ==================== ======================================================== + + - Return stack buffer (RSB) protection status: + + ============= =========================================== + 'RSB filling' Protection of RSB on context switch enabled + ============= =========================================== + +Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU +vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will +report vulnerability. + +Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2 +----------------------------------------------------------------- + +1. Kernel mitigation +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined + by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case + basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2] + ` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may + not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1. + + For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or + jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines) + :ref:`[3] ` :ref:`[9] ` to go to the target + addresses. Speculative execution paths under retpolines are trapped + in an infinite loop to prevent any speculative execution jumping to + a gadget. + + To turn on retpoline mitigation on a vulnerable CPU, the kernel + needs to be compiled with a gcc compiler that supports the + -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options. + If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs + to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option. The kernel config + CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with + the latest updated microcode. + + On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all, + cases. See :ref:`[3] ` for more details. + + On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced + IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time. + + The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable + CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator + via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See + :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`. + + On x86, indirect branch restricted speculation is turned on by default + before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits + using the firmware. + + Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y + and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes + attacks on the kernel generally more difficult. + +2. User program mitigation +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + User programs can mitigate Spectre variant 1 using LFENCE or "bounds + clipping". For more details see :ref:`[2] `. + + For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs + can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches. + This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch + target buffer left by malicious software. Alternatively, the + programs can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl() + (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst `). + On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the + sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to + flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program. + + Restricting indirect branch speculation on a user program will + also prevent the program from launching a variant 2 attack + on x86. All sand-boxed SECCOMP programs have indirect branch + speculation restricted by default. Administrators can change + that behavior via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. + See :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`. + + Programs that disable their indirect branch speculation will have + more overhead and run slower. + + User programs should use address space randomization + (/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space = 1 or 2) to make attacks more + difficult. + +3. VM mitigation +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + Within the kernel, Spectre variant 1 attacks from rogue guests are + mitigated on a case by case basis in VM exit paths. Vulnerable code + uses nospec accessor macros for "bounds clipping", to avoid any + usable disclosure gadgets. However, this may not cover all variant + 1 attack vectors. + + For Spectre variant 2 attacks from rogue guests to the kernel, the + Linux kernel uses retpoline or Enhanced IBRS to prevent consumption of + poisoned entries in branch target buffer left by rogue guests. It also + flushes the return stack buffer on every VM exit to prevent a return + stack buffer underflow so poisoned branch target buffer could be used, + or attacker guests leaving poisoned entries in the return stack buffer. + + To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks in the same CPU hardware thread, + the branch target buffer is sanitized by flushing before switching + to a new guest on a CPU. + + The above mitigations are turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs. + + To mitigate guest-to-guest attacks from sibling thread when SMT is + in use, an untrusted guest running in the sibling thread can have + its indirect branch speculation disabled by administrator via prctl(). + + The kernel also allows guests to use any microcode based mitigation + they choose to use (such as IBPB or STIBP on x86) to protect themselves. + +.. _spectre_mitigation_control_command_line: + +Mitigation control on the kernel command line +--------------------------------------------- + +Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the +kernel command line. + + nospectre_v2 + + [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 + (indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may + allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent + to spectre_v2=off. + + + spectre_v2= + + [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 + (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability. + The default operation protects the kernel from + user space attacks. + + on + unconditionally enable, implies + spectre_v2_user=on + off + unconditionally disable, implies + spectre_v2_user=off + auto + kernel detects whether your CPU model is + vulnerable + + Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a + mitigation method at run time according to the + CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the + CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the + compiler with which the kernel was built. + + Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation + against user space to user space task attacks. + + Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and + the user space protections. + + Specific mitigations can also be selected manually: + + retpoline + replace indirect branches + retpoline,generic + google's original retpoline + retpoline,amd + AMD-specific minimal thunk + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + spectre_v2=auto. + +For user space mitigation: + + spectre_v2_user= + + [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 + (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between + user space tasks + + on + Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is + enforced by spectre_v2=on + + off + Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is + enforced by spectre_v2=off + + prctl + Indirect branch speculation is enabled, + but mitigation can be enabled via prctl + per thread. The mitigation control state + is inherited on fork. + + prctl,ibpb + Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is + controlled per thread. IBPB is issued + always when switching between different user + space processes. + + seccomp + Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp + threads will enable the mitigation unless + they explicitly opt out. + + seccomp,ibpb + Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is + controlled per thread. IBPB is issued + always when switching between different + user space processes. + + auto + Kernel selects the mitigation depending on + the available CPU features and vulnerability. + + Default mitigation: + If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl" + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + spectre_v2_user=auto. + + In general the kernel by default selects + reasonable mitigations for the current CPU. To + disable Spectre variant 2 mitigations, boot with + spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations + cannot be disabled. + +Mitigation selection guide +-------------------------- + +1. Trusted userspace +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + If all userspace applications are from trusted sources and do not + execute externally supplied untrusted code, then the mitigations can + be disabled. + +2. Protect sensitive programs +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + For security-sensitive programs that have secrets (e.g. crypto + keys), protection against Spectre variant 2 can be put in place by + disabling indirect branch speculation when the program is running + (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst `). + +3. Sandbox untrusted programs +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + Untrusted programs that could be a source of attacks can be cordoned + off by disabling their indirect branch speculation when they are run + (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst `). + This prevents untrusted programs from polluting the branch target + buffer. All programs running in SECCOMP sandboxes have indirect + branch speculation restricted by default. This behavior can be + changed via the kernel command line and sysfs control files. See + :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`. + +3. High security mode +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ + + All Spectre variant 2 mitigations can be forced on + at boot time for all programs (See the "on" option in + :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`). This will add + overhead as indirect branch speculations for all programs will be + restricted. + + On x86, branch target buffer will be flushed with IBPB when switching + to a new program. STIBP is left on all the time to protect programs + against variant 2 attacks originating from programs running on + sibling threads. + + Alternatively, STIBP can be used only when running programs + whose indirect branch speculation is explicitly disabled, + while IBPB is still used all the time when switching to a new + program to clear the branch target buffer (See "ibpb" option in + :ref:`spectre_mitigation_control_command_line`). This "ibpb" option + has less performance cost than the "on" option, which leaves STIBP + on all the time. + +References on Spectre +--------------------- + +Intel white papers: + +.. _spec_ref1: + +[1] `Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels `_. + +.. _spec_ref2: + +[2] `Bounds check bypass `_. + +.. _spec_ref3: + +[3] `Deep dive: Retpoline: A branch target injection mitigation `_. + +.. _spec_ref4: + +[4] `Deep Dive: Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors `_. + +AMD white papers: + +.. _spec_ref5: + +[5] `AMD64 technology indirect branch control extension `_. + +.. _spec_ref6: + +[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors `_. + +ARM white papers: + +.. _spec_ref7: + +[7] `Cache speculation side-channels `_. + +.. _spec_ref8: + +[8] `Cache speculation issues update `_. + +Google white paper: + +.. _spec_ref9: + +[9] `Retpoline: a software construct for preventing branch-target-injection `_. + +MIPS white paper: + +.. _spec_ref10: + +[10] `MIPS: response on speculative execution and side channel vulnerabilities `_. + +Academic papers: + +.. _spec_ref11: + +[11] `Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution `_. + +.. _spec_ref12: + +[12] `NetSpectre: Read Arbitrary Memory over Network `_. + +.. _spec_ref13: + +[13] `Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack Buffer `_. diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst index c4dbe6f7cdae..0fda8f614110 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation misfeature will fail. +.. _set_spec_ctrl: + PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL ----------------------- From ebd45bdd74ffe4e199e5af39b4d7765059419a9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 14:52:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 47/81] mwifiex: Abort at too short BSS descriptor element commit 685c9b7750bfacd6fc1db50d86579980593b7869 upstream. Currently mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie() implicitly assumes that the source descriptor entries contain the enough size for each type and performs copying without checking the source size. This may lead to read over boundary. Fix this by putting the source size check in appropriate places. Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c index c08a4574c396..2f7f4c9e5993 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c @@ -1266,6 +1266,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, break; case WLAN_EID_FH_PARAMS: + if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(*fh_param_set)) + return -EINVAL; fh_param_set = (struct ieee_types_fh_param_set *) current_ptr; memcpy(&bss_entry->phy_param_set.fh_param_set, @@ -1274,6 +1276,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, break; case WLAN_EID_DS_PARAMS: + if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(*ds_param_set)) + return -EINVAL; ds_param_set = (struct ieee_types_ds_param_set *) current_ptr; @@ -1285,6 +1289,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, break; case WLAN_EID_CF_PARAMS: + if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(*cf_param_set)) + return -EINVAL; cf_param_set = (struct ieee_types_cf_param_set *) current_ptr; memcpy(&bss_entry->ss_param_set.cf_param_set, @@ -1293,6 +1299,8 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, break; case WLAN_EID_IBSS_PARAMS: + if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(*ibss_param_set)) + return -EINVAL; ibss_param_set = (struct ieee_types_ibss_param_set *) current_ptr; @@ -1302,10 +1310,14 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, break; case WLAN_EID_ERP_INFO: + if (!element_len) + return -EINVAL; bss_entry->erp_flags = *(current_ptr + 2); break; case WLAN_EID_PWR_CONSTRAINT: + if (!element_len) + return -EINVAL; bss_entry->local_constraint = *(current_ptr + 2); bss_entry->sensed_11h = true; break; @@ -1345,6 +1357,9 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, break; case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC: + if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(vendor_ie->vend_hdr)) + return -EINVAL; + vendor_ie = (struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *) current_ptr; From b1459fb34061337efbf0d47a3ba6208f2f59829d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 15:18:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 48/81] mwifiex: Fix heap overflow in mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_ies() commit 69ae4f6aac1578575126319d3f55550e7e440449 upstream. A few places in mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_ies() perform memcpy() unconditionally, which may lead to either buffer overflow or read over boundary. This patch addresses the issues by checking the read size and the destination size at each place more properly. Along with the fixes, the patch cleans up the code slightly by introducing a temporary variable for the token size, and unifies the error path with the standard goto statement. Reported-by: huangwen Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/ie.c | 45 +++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/ie.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/ie.c index 922e3d69fd84..32853496fe8c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/ie.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/ie.c @@ -329,6 +329,8 @@ static int mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_ies(struct mwifiex_private *priv, struct ieee80211_vendor_ie *vendorhdr; u16 gen_idx = MWIFIEX_AUTO_IDX_MASK, ie_len = 0; int left_len, parsed_len = 0; + unsigned int token_len; + int err = 0; if (!info->tail || !info->tail_len) return 0; @@ -344,6 +346,12 @@ static int mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_ies(struct mwifiex_private *priv, */ while (left_len > sizeof(struct ieee_types_header)) { hdr = (void *)(info->tail + parsed_len); + token_len = hdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header); + if (token_len > left_len) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + switch (hdr->element_id) { case WLAN_EID_SSID: case WLAN_EID_SUPP_RATES: @@ -357,13 +365,16 @@ static int mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_ies(struct mwifiex_private *priv, case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC: break; default: - memcpy(gen_ie->ie_buffer + ie_len, hdr, - hdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header)); - ie_len += hdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header); + if (ie_len + token_len > IEEE_MAX_IE_SIZE) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(gen_ie->ie_buffer + ie_len, hdr, token_len); + ie_len += token_len; break; } - left_len -= hdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header); - parsed_len += hdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header); + left_len -= token_len; + parsed_len += token_len; } /* parse only WPA vendor IE from tail, WMM IE is configured by @@ -373,15 +384,17 @@ static int mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_ies(struct mwifiex_private *priv, WLAN_OUI_TYPE_MICROSOFT_WPA, info->tail, info->tail_len); if (vendorhdr) { - memcpy(gen_ie->ie_buffer + ie_len, vendorhdr, - vendorhdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header)); - ie_len += vendorhdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header); + token_len = vendorhdr->len + sizeof(struct ieee_types_header); + if (ie_len + token_len > IEEE_MAX_IE_SIZE) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(gen_ie->ie_buffer + ie_len, vendorhdr, token_len); + ie_len += token_len; } - if (!ie_len) { - kfree(gen_ie); - return 0; - } + if (!ie_len) + goto out; gen_ie->ie_index = cpu_to_le16(gen_idx); gen_ie->mgmt_subtype_mask = cpu_to_le16(MGMT_MASK_BEACON | @@ -391,13 +404,15 @@ static int mwifiex_uap_parse_tail_ies(struct mwifiex_private *priv, if (mwifiex_update_uap_custom_ie(priv, gen_ie, &gen_idx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) { - kfree(gen_ie); - return -1; + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; } priv->gen_idx = gen_idx; + + out: kfree(gen_ie); - return 0; + return err; } /* This function parses different IEs-head & tail IEs, beacon IEs, From ced121ed856092c4b81d7125b85b04ebeb2c590e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Brian Norris Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 17:13:20 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 49/81] mwifiex: Don't abort on small, spec-compliant vendor IEs commit 63d7ef36103d26f20325a921ecc96a3288560146 upstream. Per the 802.11 specification, vendor IEs are (at minimum) only required to contain an OUI. A type field is also included in ieee80211.h (struct ieee80211_vendor_ie) but doesn't appear in the specification. The remaining fields (subtype, version) are a convention used in WMM headers. Thus, we should not reject vendor-specific IEs that have only the minimum length (3 bytes) -- we should skip over them (since we only want to match longer IEs, that match either WMM or WPA formats). We can reject elements that don't have the minimum-required 3 byte OUI. While we're at it, move the non-standard subtype and version fields into the WMM structs, to avoid this confusion in the future about generic "vendor header" attributes. Fixes: 685c9b7750bf ("mwifiex: Abort at too short BSS descriptor element") Cc: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Brian Norris Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h | 12 +++++++++--- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c | 18 +++++++++++------- .../net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c | 4 ++-- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h index 9e75522d248a..342555ebafd7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h @@ -1744,9 +1744,10 @@ struct mwifiex_ie_types_wmm_queue_status { struct ieee_types_vendor_header { u8 element_id; u8 len; - u8 oui[4]; /* 0~2: oui, 3: oui_type */ - u8 oui_subtype; - u8 version; + struct { + u8 oui[3]; + u8 oui_type; + } __packed oui; } __packed; struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter { @@ -1760,6 +1761,9 @@ struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter { * Version [1] */ struct ieee_types_vendor_header vend_hdr; + u8 oui_subtype; + u8 version; + u8 qos_info_bitmap; u8 reserved; struct ieee_types_wmm_ac_parameters ac_params[IEEE80211_NUM_ACS]; @@ -1777,6 +1781,8 @@ struct ieee_types_wmm_info { * Version [1] */ struct ieee_types_vendor_header vend_hdr; + u8 oui_subtype; + u8 version; u8 qos_info_bitmap; } __packed; diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c index 2f7f4c9e5993..29284f9a0646 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/scan.c @@ -1357,21 +1357,25 @@ int mwifiex_update_bss_desc_with_ie(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, break; case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC: - if (element_len + 2 < sizeof(vendor_ie->vend_hdr)) - return -EINVAL; - vendor_ie = (struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *) current_ptr; - if (!memcmp - (vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wpa_oui, - sizeof(wpa_oui))) { + /* 802.11 requires at least 3-byte OUI. */ + if (element_len < sizeof(vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui.oui)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Not long enough for a match? Skip it. */ + if (element_len < sizeof(wpa_oui)) + break; + + if (!memcmp(&vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wpa_oui, + sizeof(wpa_oui))) { bss_entry->bcn_wpa_ie = (struct ieee_types_vendor_specific *) current_ptr; bss_entry->wpa_offset = (u16) (current_ptr - bss_entry->beacon_buf); - } else if (!memcmp(vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wmm_oui, + } else if (!memcmp(&vendor_ie->vend_hdr.oui, wmm_oui, sizeof(wmm_oui))) { if (total_ie_len == sizeof(struct ieee_types_wmm_parameter) || diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c index a6077ab3efc3..82828a207963 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c @@ -1388,7 +1388,7 @@ mwifiex_set_gen_ie_helper(struct mwifiex_private *priv, u8 *ie_data_ptr, /* Test to see if it is a WPA IE, if not, then * it is a gen IE */ - if (!memcmp(pvendor_ie->oui, wpa_oui, + if (!memcmp(&pvendor_ie->oui, wpa_oui, sizeof(wpa_oui))) { /* IE is a WPA/WPA2 IE so call set_wpa function */ @@ -1398,7 +1398,7 @@ mwifiex_set_gen_ie_helper(struct mwifiex_private *priv, u8 *ie_data_ptr, goto next_ie; } - if (!memcmp(pvendor_ie->oui, wps_oui, + if (!memcmp(&pvendor_ie->oui, wps_oui, sizeof(wps_oui))) { /* Test to see if it is a WPS IE, * if so, enable wps session flag diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c index 0edd26881321..7fba4d940131 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/wmm.c @@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ mwifiex_wmm_setup_queue_priorities(struct mwifiex_private *priv, mwifiex_dbg(priv->adapter, INFO, "info: WMM Parameter IE: version=%d,\t" "qos_info Parameter Set Count=%d, Reserved=%#x\n", - wmm_ie->vend_hdr.version, wmm_ie->qos_info_bitmap & + wmm_ie->version, wmm_ie->qos_info_bitmap & IEEE80211_WMM_IE_AP_QOSINFO_PARAM_SET_CNT_MASK, wmm_ie->reserved); From 5b549d502afc86dbc1d6080ab7c15d985dbd08c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Fritiofson Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 15:08:34 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 50/81] USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add ID for isodebug v1 commit f8377eff548170e8ea8022c067a1fbdf9e1c46a8 upstream. This adds the vid:pid of the isodebug v1 isolated JTAG/SWD+UART. Only the second channel is available for use as a serial port. Signed-off-by: Andreas Fritiofson Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c | 1 + drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c index e76395d7f17d..d2349c094767 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c @@ -1024,6 +1024,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_table_combined[] = { { USB_DEVICE(AIRBUS_DS_VID, AIRBUS_DS_P8GR) }, /* EZPrototypes devices */ { USB_DEVICE(EZPROTOTYPES_VID, HJELMSLUND_USB485_ISO_PID) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NUMBER(UNJO_VID, UNJO_ISODEBUG_V1_PID, 1) }, { } /* Terminating entry */ }; diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h index 5755f0df0025..f12d806220b4 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h @@ -1543,3 +1543,9 @@ #define CHETCO_SEASMART_DISPLAY_PID 0xA5AD /* SeaSmart NMEA2000 Display */ #define CHETCO_SEASMART_LITE_PID 0xA5AE /* SeaSmart Lite USB Adapter */ #define CHETCO_SEASMART_ANALOG_PID 0xA5AF /* SeaSmart Analog Adapter */ + +/* + * Unjo AB + */ +#define UNJO_VID 0x22B7 +#define UNJO_ISODEBUG_V1_PID 0x150D From 771340b0346d996d7445c0c8d7ad8f50fb4199ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?J=C3=B6rgen=20Storvist?= Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 00:30:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 51/81] USB: serial: option: add support for GosunCn ME3630 RNDIS mode MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit aed2a26283528fb69c38e414f649411aa48fb391 upstream. Added USB IDs for GosunCn ME3630 cellular module in RNDIS mode. T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=01 Cnt=03 Dev#= 18 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=19d2 ProdID=0601 Rev=03.18 S: Manufacturer=Android S: Product=Android S: SerialNumber=b950269c C: #Ifs= 5 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=03 Driver=rndis_host I: If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=rndis_host I: If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=option I: If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option I: If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=option Signed-off-by: Jörgen Storvist Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c index 3c8e4970876c..8b9e12ab1fe6 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c @@ -1346,6 +1346,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = { .driver_info = RSVD(4) }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0414, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) }, { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0417, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff) }, + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0601, 0xff) }, /* GosunCn ZTE WeLink ME3630 (RNDIS mode) */ { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x0602, 0xff) }, /* GosunCn ZTE WeLink ME3630 (MBIM mode) */ { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(ZTE_VENDOR_ID, 0x1008, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff), .driver_info = RSVD(4) }, From 658a16c5128f57964cb71a86b893b462cd0e2467 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Barta Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 10:16:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 52/81] Revert "serial: 8250: Don't service RX FIFO if interrupts are disabled" commit 3f2640ed7be838c3f05c0d2b0f7c7508e7431e48 upstream. This reverts commit 2e9fe539108320820016f78ca7704a7342788380. Reading LSR unconditionally but processing the error flags only if UART_IIR_RDI bit was set before in IIR may lead to a loss of transmission error information on UARTs where the transmission error flags are cleared by a read of LSR. Information are lost in case an error is detected right before the read of LSR while processing e.g. an UART_IIR_THRI interrupt. Signed-off-by: Oliver Barta Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Fixes: 2e9fe5391083 ("serial: 8250: Don't service RX FIFO if interrupts are disabled") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c index ecf3d631bc09..ab0796d14ac1 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c @@ -1873,8 +1873,7 @@ int serial8250_handle_irq(struct uart_port *port, unsigned int iir) status = serial_port_in(port, UART_LSR); - if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI) && - iir & UART_IIR_RDI) { + if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI)) { if (!up->dma || handle_rx_dma(up, iir)) status = serial8250_rx_chars(up, status); } From c760ecb74f84f729ae31b9fbc6b772923cdc78df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Stern Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 10:44:21 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 53/81] p54usb: Fix race between disconnect and firmware loading commit 6e41e2257f1094acc37618bf6c856115374c6922 upstream. The syzbot fuzzer found a bug in the p54 USB wireless driver. The issue involves a race between disconnect and the firmware-loader callback routine, and it has several aspects. One big problem is that when the firmware can't be loaded, the callback routine tries to unbind the driver from the USB _device_ (by calling device_release_driver) instead of from the USB _interface_ to which it is actually bound (by calling usb_driver_release_interface). The race involves access to the private data structure. The driver's disconnect handler waits for a completion that is signalled by the firmware-loader callback routine. As soon as the completion is signalled, you have to assume that the private data structure may have been deallocated by the disconnect handler -- even if the firmware was loaded without errors. However, the callback routine does access the private data several times after that point. Another problem is that, in order to ensure that the USB device structure hasn't been freed when the callback routine runs, the driver takes a reference to it. This isn't good enough any more, because now that the callback routine calls usb_driver_release_interface, it has to ensure that the interface structure hasn't been freed. Finally, the driver takes an unnecessary reference to the USB device structure in the probe function and drops the reference in the disconnect handler. This extra reference doesn't accomplish anything, because the USB core already guarantees that a device structure won't be deallocated while a driver is still bound to any of its interfaces. To fix these problems, this patch makes the following changes: Call usb_driver_release_interface() rather than device_release_driver(). Don't signal the completion until after the important information has been copied out of the private data structure, and don't refer to the private data at all thereafter. Lock udev (the interface's parent) before unbinding the driver instead of locking udev->parent. During the firmware loading process, take a reference to the USB interface instead of the USB device. Don't take an unnecessary reference to the device during probe (and then don't drop it during disconnect). Signed-off-by: Alan Stern Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+200d4bb11b23d929335f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com CC: Acked-by: Christian Lamparter Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c | 43 +++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c index b0b86f701061..15661da6eedc 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intersil/p54/p54usb.c @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ MODULE_ALIAS("prism54usb"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("isl3886usb"); MODULE_FIRMWARE("isl3887usb"); +static struct usb_driver p54u_driver; + /* * Note: * @@ -921,9 +923,9 @@ static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware, { struct p54u_priv *priv = context; struct usb_device *udev = priv->udev; + struct usb_interface *intf = priv->intf; int err; - complete(&priv->fw_wait_load); if (firmware) { priv->fw = firmware; err = p54u_start_ops(priv); @@ -932,26 +934,22 @@ static void p54u_load_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *firmware, dev_err(&udev->dev, "Firmware not found.\n"); } + complete(&priv->fw_wait_load); + /* + * At this point p54u_disconnect may have already freed + * the "priv" context. Do not use it anymore! + */ + priv = NULL; + if (err) { - struct device *parent = priv->udev->dev.parent; + dev_err(&intf->dev, "failed to initialize device (%d)\n", err); - dev_err(&udev->dev, "failed to initialize device (%d)\n", err); - - if (parent) - device_lock(parent); - - device_release_driver(&udev->dev); - /* - * At this point p54u_disconnect has already freed - * the "priv" context. Do not use it anymore! - */ - priv = NULL; - - if (parent) - device_unlock(parent); + usb_lock_device(udev); + usb_driver_release_interface(&p54u_driver, intf); + usb_unlock_device(udev); } - usb_put_dev(udev); + usb_put_intf(intf); } static int p54u_load_firmware(struct ieee80211_hw *dev, @@ -972,14 +970,14 @@ static int p54u_load_firmware(struct ieee80211_hw *dev, dev_info(&priv->udev->dev, "Loading firmware file %s\n", p54u_fwlist[i].fw); - usb_get_dev(udev); + usb_get_intf(intf); err = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1, p54u_fwlist[i].fw, device, GFP_KERNEL, priv, p54u_load_firmware_cb); if (err) { dev_err(&priv->udev->dev, "(p54usb) cannot load firmware %s " "(%d)!\n", p54u_fwlist[i].fw, err); - usb_put_dev(udev); + usb_put_intf(intf); } return err; @@ -1011,8 +1009,6 @@ static int p54u_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, skb_queue_head_init(&priv->rx_queue); init_usb_anchor(&priv->submitted); - usb_get_dev(udev); - /* really lazy and simple way of figuring out if we're a 3887 */ /* TODO: should just stick the identification in the device table */ i = intf->altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints; @@ -1053,10 +1049,8 @@ static int p54u_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, priv->upload_fw = p54u_upload_firmware_net2280; } err = p54u_load_firmware(dev, intf); - if (err) { - usb_put_dev(udev); + if (err) p54_free_common(dev); - } return err; } @@ -1072,7 +1066,6 @@ static void p54u_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) wait_for_completion(&priv->fw_wait_load); p54_unregister_common(dev); - usb_put_dev(interface_to_usbdev(intf)); release_firmware(priv->fw); p54_free_common(dev); } From 052a14ec8b31102bc729833fe24a772b32239132 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kiruthika Varadarajan Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 08:39:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 54/81] usb: gadget: ether: Fix race between gether_disconnect and rx_submit commit d29fcf7078bc8be2b6366cbd4418265b53c94fac upstream. On spin lock release in rx_submit, gether_disconnect get a chance to run, it makes port_usb NULL, rx_submit access NULL port USB, hence null pointer crash. Fixed by releasing the lock in rx_submit after port_usb is used. Fixes: 2b3d942c4878 ("usb ethernet gadget: split out network core") Cc: Signed-off-by: Kiruthika Varadarajan Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c index 3a0e4f5d7b83..81d84e0c3c6c 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c @@ -190,11 +190,12 @@ rx_submit(struct eth_dev *dev, struct usb_request *req, gfp_t gfp_flags) out = dev->port_usb->out_ep; else out = NULL; - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags); if (!out) + { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags); return -ENOTCONN; - + } /* Padding up to RX_EXTRA handles minor disagreements with host. * Normally we use the USB "terminate on short read" convention; @@ -218,6 +219,7 @@ rx_submit(struct eth_dev *dev, struct usb_request *req, gfp_t gfp_flags) if (dev->port_usb->is_fixed) size = max_t(size_t, size, dev->port_usb->fixed_out_len); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags); skb = __netdev_alloc_skb(dev->net, size + NET_IP_ALIGN, gfp_flags); if (skb == NULL) { From 769b7aa4fda594ffe693e8d37e9167f4072749da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yoshihiro Shimoda Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 22:06:33 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 55/81] usb: renesas_usbhs: add a workaround for a race condition of workqueue commit b2357839c56ab7d06bcd4e866ebc2d0e2b7997f3 upstream. The old commit 6e4b74e4690d ("usb: renesas: fix scheduling in atomic context bug") fixed an atomic issue by using workqueue for the shdmac dmaengine driver. However, this has a potential race condition issue between the work pending and usbhsg_ep_free_request() in gadget mode. When usbhsg_ep_free_request() is called while pending the queue, since the work_struct will be freed and then the work handler is called, kernel panic happens on process_one_work(). To fix the issue, if we could call cancel_work_sync() at somewhere before the free request, it could be easy. However, the usbhsg_ep_free_request() is called on atomic (e.g. f_ncm driver calls free request via gether_disconnect()). For now, almost all users are having "USB-DMAC" and the DMAengine driver can be used on atomic. So, this patch adds a workaround for a race condition to call the DMAengine APIs without the workqueue. This means we still have TODO on shdmac environment (SH7724), but since it doesn't have SMP, the race condition might not happen. Fixes: ab330cf3888d ("usb: renesas_usbhs: add support for USB-DMAC") Cc: # v4.1+ Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c index 5d369b38868a..b6d9308d43ba 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c +++ b/drivers/usb/renesas_usbhs/fifo.c @@ -818,9 +818,8 @@ static int __usbhsf_dma_map_ctrl(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, int map) } static void usbhsf_dma_complete(void *arg); -static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work) +static void usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt) { - struct usbhs_pkt *pkt = container_of(work, struct usbhs_pkt, work); struct usbhs_pipe *pipe = pkt->pipe; struct usbhs_fifo *fifo; struct usbhs_priv *priv = usbhs_pipe_to_priv(pipe); @@ -828,12 +827,10 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work) struct dma_chan *chan; struct device *dev = usbhs_priv_to_dev(priv); enum dma_transfer_direction dir; - unsigned long flags; - usbhs_lock(priv, flags); fifo = usbhs_pipe_to_fifo(pipe); if (!fifo) - goto xfer_work_end; + return; chan = usbhsf_dma_chan_get(fifo, pkt); dir = usbhs_pipe_is_dir_in(pipe) ? DMA_DEV_TO_MEM : DMA_MEM_TO_DEV; @@ -842,7 +839,7 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work) pkt->trans, dir, DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK); if (!desc) - goto xfer_work_end; + return; desc->callback = usbhsf_dma_complete; desc->callback_param = pipe; @@ -850,7 +847,7 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work) pkt->cookie = dmaengine_submit(desc); if (pkt->cookie < 0) { dev_err(dev, "Failed to submit dma descriptor\n"); - goto xfer_work_end; + return; } dev_dbg(dev, " %s %d (%d/ %d)\n", @@ -861,8 +858,17 @@ static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work) dma_async_issue_pending(chan); usbhsf_dma_start(pipe, fifo); usbhs_pipe_enable(pipe); +} -xfer_work_end: +static void xfer_work(struct work_struct *work) +{ + struct usbhs_pkt *pkt = container_of(work, struct usbhs_pkt, work); + struct usbhs_pipe *pipe = pkt->pipe; + struct usbhs_priv *priv = usbhs_pipe_to_priv(pipe); + unsigned long flags; + + usbhs_lock(priv, flags); + usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt); usbhs_unlock(priv, flags); } @@ -915,8 +921,13 @@ static int usbhsf_dma_prepare_push(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, int *is_done) pkt->trans = len; usbhsf_tx_irq_ctrl(pipe, 0); - INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work); - schedule_work(&pkt->work); + /* FIXME: Workaound for usb dmac that driver can be used in atomic */ + if (usbhs_get_dparam(priv, has_usb_dmac)) { + usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt); + } else { + INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work); + schedule_work(&pkt->work); + } return 0; @@ -1022,8 +1033,7 @@ static int usbhsf_dma_prepare_pop_with_usb_dmac(struct usbhs_pkt *pkt, pkt->trans = pkt->length; - INIT_WORK(&pkt->work, xfer_work); - schedule_work(&pkt->work); + usbhsf_dma_xfer_preparing(pkt); return 0; From a1fcfe095c8c22f67aaee0eba7acfd46559b75d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ian Abbott Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 14:18:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 56/81] staging: comedi: dt282x: fix a null pointer deref on interrupt commit b8336be66dec06bef518030a0df9847122053ec5 upstream. The interrupt handler `dt282x_interrupt()` causes a null pointer dereference for those supported boards that have no analog output support. For these boards, `dev->write_subdev` will be `NULL` and therefore the `s_ao` subdevice pointer variable will be `NULL`. In that case, the following call near the end of the interrupt handler results in a null pointer dereference: comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao); Fix it by only calling the above function if `s_ao` is valid. (There are other uses of `s_ao` by the interrupt handler that may or may not be reached depending on values of hardware registers. Trust that they are reliable for now.) Note: commit 4f6f009b204f ("staging: comedi: dt282x: use comedi_handle_events()") propagates an earlier error from commit f21c74fa4cfe ("staging: comedi: dt282x: use cfc_handle_events()"). Fixes: 4f6f009b204f ("staging: comedi: dt282x: use comedi_handle_events()") Cc: # v3.19+ Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c index d5295bbdd28c..37133d54dda1 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c +++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/dt282x.c @@ -566,7 +566,8 @@ static irqreturn_t dt282x_interrupt(int irq, void *d) } #endif comedi_handle_events(dev, s); - comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao); + if (s_ao) + comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao); return IRQ_RETVAL(handled); } From cea29db65e075585dbc8b58e9119c1447ad1adc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ian Abbott Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 14:17:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 57/81] staging: comedi: amplc_pci230: fix null pointer deref on interrupt commit 7379e6baeddf580d01feca650ec1ad508b6ea8ee upstream. The interrupt handler `pci230_interrupt()` causes a null pointer dereference for a PCI260 card. There is no analog output subdevice for a PCI260. The `dev->write_subdev` subdevice pointer and therefore the `s_ao` subdevice pointer variable will be `NULL` for a PCI260. The following call near the end of the interrupt handler results in the null pointer dereference for a PCI260: comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao); Fix it by only calling the above function if `s_ao` is valid. Note that the other uses of `s_ao` in the calls `pci230_handle_ao_nofifo(dev, s_ao);` and `pci230_handle_ao_fifo(dev, s_ao);` will never be reached for a PCI260, so they are safe. Fixes: 39064f23284c ("staging: comedi: amplc_pci230: use comedi_handle_events()") Cc: # v3.19+ Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c index 48c7890c3007..2b0b757dc626 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c +++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/amplc_pci230.c @@ -2339,7 +2339,8 @@ static irqreturn_t pci230_interrupt(int irq, void *d) devpriv->intr_running = false; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devpriv->isr_spinlock, irqflags); - comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao); + if (s_ao) + comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ao); comedi_handle_events(dev, s_ai); return IRQ_HANDLED; From 67f6f4a6d4219ae78198880a17ab74d057449d0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Todd Kjos Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 10:54:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 58/81] binder: fix memory leak in error path commit 1909a671dbc3606685b1daf8b22a16f65ea7edda upstream. syzkallar found a 32-byte memory leak in a rarely executed error case. The transaction complete work item was not freed if put_user() failed when writing the BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE to the user command buffer. Fixed by freeing it before put_user() is called. Reported-by: syzbot+182ce46596c3f2e1eb24@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/android/binder.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index 96a0f940e54d..1af9f36f89cf 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -3876,6 +3876,8 @@ retry: case BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE: { binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc); cmd = BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE; + kfree(w); + binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE); if (put_user(cmd, (uint32_t __user *)ptr)) return -EFAULT; ptr += sizeof(uint32_t); @@ -3884,8 +3886,6 @@ retry: binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE, "%d:%d BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE\n", proc->pid, thread->pid); - kfree(w); - binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE); } break; case BINDER_WORK_NODE: { struct binder_node *node = container_of(w, struct binder_node, work); From e178cbbcc803c18aad0301d4ffd92b0bf01c5a11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Lamparter Date: Sat, 8 Jun 2019 16:49:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 59/81] carl9170: fix misuse of device driver API commit feb09b2933275a70917a869989ea2823e7356be8 upstream. This patch follows Alan Stern's recent patch: "p54: Fix race between disconnect and firmware loading" that overhauled carl9170 buggy firmware loading and driver unbinding procedures. Since the carl9170 code was adapted from p54 it uses the same functions and is likely to have the same problem, but it's just that the syzbot hasn't reproduce them (yet). a summary from the changes (copied from the p54 patch): * Call usb_driver_release_interface() rather than device_release_driver(). * Lock udev (the interface's parent) before unbinding the driver instead of locking udev->parent. * During the firmware loading process, take a reference to the USB interface instead of the USB device. * Don't take an unnecessary reference to the device during probe (and then don't drop it during disconnect). and * Make sure to prevent use-after-free bugs by explicitly setting the driver context to NULL after signaling the completion. Cc: Cc: Alan Stern Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter Acked-by: Alan Stern Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c | 39 +++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c index e7c3f3b8457d..99f1897a775d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/carl9170/usb.c @@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id carl9170_usb_ids[] = { }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(usb, carl9170_usb_ids); +static struct usb_driver carl9170_driver; + static void carl9170_usb_submit_data_urb(struct ar9170 *ar) { struct urb *urb; @@ -966,32 +968,28 @@ err_out: static void carl9170_usb_firmware_failed(struct ar9170 *ar) { - struct device *parent = ar->udev->dev.parent; - struct usb_device *udev; - - /* - * Store a copy of the usb_device pointer locally. - * This is because device_release_driver initiates - * carl9170_usb_disconnect, which in turn frees our - * driver context (ar). + /* Store a copies of the usb_interface and usb_device pointer locally. + * This is because release_driver initiates carl9170_usb_disconnect, + * which in turn frees our driver context (ar). */ - udev = ar->udev; + struct usb_interface *intf = ar->intf; + struct usb_device *udev = ar->udev; complete(&ar->fw_load_wait); + /* at this point 'ar' could be already freed. Don't use it anymore */ + ar = NULL; /* unbind anything failed */ - if (parent) - device_lock(parent); + usb_lock_device(udev); + usb_driver_release_interface(&carl9170_driver, intf); + usb_unlock_device(udev); - device_release_driver(&udev->dev); - if (parent) - device_unlock(parent); - - usb_put_dev(udev); + usb_put_intf(intf); } static void carl9170_usb_firmware_finish(struct ar9170 *ar) { + struct usb_interface *intf = ar->intf; int err; err = carl9170_parse_firmware(ar); @@ -1009,7 +1007,7 @@ static void carl9170_usb_firmware_finish(struct ar9170 *ar) goto err_unrx; complete(&ar->fw_load_wait); - usb_put_dev(ar->udev); + usb_put_intf(intf); return; err_unrx: @@ -1052,7 +1050,6 @@ static int carl9170_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, return PTR_ERR(ar); udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf); - usb_get_dev(udev); ar->udev = udev; ar->intf = intf; ar->features = id->driver_info; @@ -1094,15 +1091,14 @@ static int carl9170_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, atomic_set(&ar->rx_anch_urbs, 0); atomic_set(&ar->rx_pool_urbs, 0); - usb_get_dev(ar->udev); + usb_get_intf(intf); carl9170_set_state(ar, CARL9170_STOPPED); err = request_firmware_nowait(THIS_MODULE, 1, CARL9170FW_NAME, &ar->udev->dev, GFP_KERNEL, ar, carl9170_usb_firmware_step2); if (err) { - usb_put_dev(udev); - usb_put_dev(udev); + usb_put_intf(intf); carl9170_free(ar); } return err; @@ -1131,7 +1127,6 @@ static void carl9170_usb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) carl9170_release_firmware(ar); carl9170_free(ar); - usb_put_dev(udev); } #ifdef CONFIG_PM From 17fcbc4ad12d6e6f263d900c262d85ce6ae47373 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vishnu DASA Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 15:13:10 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 60/81] VMCI: Fix integer overflow in VMCI handle arrays commit 1c2eb5b2853c9f513690ba6b71072d8eb65da16a upstream. The VMCI handle array has an integer overflow in vmci_handle_arr_append_entry when it tries to expand the array. This can be triggered from a guest, since the doorbell link hypercall doesn't impose a limit on the number of doorbell handles that a VM can create in the hypervisor, and these handles are stored in a handle array. In this change, we introduce a mandatory max capacity for handle arrays/lists to avoid excessive memory usage. Signed-off-by: Vishnu Dasa Reviewed-by: Adit Ranadive Reviewed-by: Jorgen Hansen Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c | 80 +++++++++++++---------- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c | 38 +++++++---- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h | 29 +++++--- include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h | 11 +++- 4 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c index 21d0fa592145..bc089e634a75 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ #include "vmci_driver.h" #include "vmci_event.h" +/* Use a wide upper bound for the maximum contexts. */ +#define VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS 2000 + /* * List of current VMCI contexts. Contexts can be added by * vmci_ctx_create() and removed via vmci_ctx_destroy(). @@ -125,19 +128,22 @@ struct vmci_ctx *vmci_ctx_create(u32 cid, u32 priv_flags, /* Initialize host-specific VMCI context. */ init_waitqueue_head(&context->host_context.wait_queue); - context->queue_pair_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0); + context->queue_pair_array = + vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_COUNT); if (!context->queue_pair_array) { error = -ENOMEM; goto err_free_ctx; } - context->doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0); + context->doorbell_array = + vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT); if (!context->doorbell_array) { error = -ENOMEM; goto err_free_qp_array; } - context->pending_doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0); + context->pending_doorbell_array = + vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT); if (!context->pending_doorbell_array) { error = -ENOMEM; goto err_free_db_array; @@ -212,7 +218,7 @@ static int ctx_fire_notification(u32 context_id, u32 priv_flags) * We create an array to hold the subscribers we find when * scanning through all contexts. */ - subscriber_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0); + subscriber_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS); if (subscriber_array == NULL) return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM; @@ -631,20 +637,26 @@ int vmci_ctx_add_notification(u32 context_id, u32 remote_cid) spin_lock(&context->lock); - list_for_each_entry(n, &context->notifier_list, node) { - if (vmci_handle_is_equal(n->handle, notifier->handle)) { - exists = true; - break; + if (context->n_notifiers < VMCI_MAX_CONTEXTS) { + list_for_each_entry(n, &context->notifier_list, node) { + if (vmci_handle_is_equal(n->handle, notifier->handle)) { + exists = true; + break; + } } - } - if (exists) { - kfree(notifier); - result = VMCI_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS; + if (exists) { + kfree(notifier); + result = VMCI_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS; + } else { + list_add_tail_rcu(¬ifier->node, + &context->notifier_list); + context->n_notifiers++; + result = VMCI_SUCCESS; + } } else { - list_add_tail_rcu(¬ifier->node, &context->notifier_list); - context->n_notifiers++; - result = VMCI_SUCCESS; + kfree(notifier); + result = VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM; } spin_unlock(&context->lock); @@ -729,8 +741,7 @@ static int vmci_ctx_get_chkpt_doorbells(struct vmci_ctx *context, u32 *buf_size, void **pbuf) { struct dbell_cpt_state *dbells; - size_t n_doorbells; - int i; + u32 i, n_doorbells; n_doorbells = vmci_handle_arr_get_size(context->doorbell_array); if (n_doorbells > 0) { @@ -868,7 +879,8 @@ int vmci_ctx_rcv_notifications_get(u32 context_id, spin_lock(&context->lock); *db_handle_array = context->pending_doorbell_array; - context->pending_doorbell_array = vmci_handle_arr_create(0); + context->pending_doorbell_array = + vmci_handle_arr_create(0, VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT); if (!context->pending_doorbell_array) { context->pending_doorbell_array = *db_handle_array; *db_handle_array = NULL; @@ -950,12 +962,11 @@ int vmci_ctx_dbell_create(u32 context_id, struct vmci_handle handle) return VMCI_ERROR_NOT_FOUND; spin_lock(&context->lock); - if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->doorbell_array, handle)) { - vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->doorbell_array, handle); - result = VMCI_SUCCESS; - } else { + if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->doorbell_array, handle)) + result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->doorbell_array, + handle); + else result = VMCI_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ENTRY; - } spin_unlock(&context->lock); vmci_ctx_put(context); @@ -1091,15 +1102,16 @@ int vmci_ctx_notify_dbell(u32 src_cid, if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry( dst_context->pending_doorbell_array, handle)) { - vmci_handle_arr_append_entry( + result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry( &dst_context->pending_doorbell_array, handle); - - ctx_signal_notify(dst_context); - wake_up(&dst_context->host_context.wait_queue); - + if (result == VMCI_SUCCESS) { + ctx_signal_notify(dst_context); + wake_up(&dst_context->host_context.wait_queue); + } + } else { + result = VMCI_SUCCESS; } - result = VMCI_SUCCESS; } spin_unlock(&dst_context->lock); } @@ -1126,13 +1138,11 @@ int vmci_ctx_qp_create(struct vmci_ctx *context, struct vmci_handle handle) if (context == NULL || vmci_handle_is_invalid(handle)) return VMCI_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS; - if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->queue_pair_array, handle)) { - vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(&context->queue_pair_array, - handle); - result = VMCI_SUCCESS; - } else { + if (!vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(context->queue_pair_array, handle)) + result = vmci_handle_arr_append_entry( + &context->queue_pair_array, handle); + else result = VMCI_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ENTRY; - } return result; } diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c index 344973a0fb0a..917e18a8af95 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.c @@ -16,24 +16,29 @@ #include #include "vmci_handle_array.h" -static size_t handle_arr_calc_size(size_t capacity) +static size_t handle_arr_calc_size(u32 capacity) { - return sizeof(struct vmci_handle_arr) + + return VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE + capacity * sizeof(struct vmci_handle); } -struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(size_t capacity) +struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(u32 capacity, u32 max_capacity) { struct vmci_handle_arr *array; + if (max_capacity == 0 || capacity > max_capacity) + return NULL; + if (capacity == 0) - capacity = VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_SIZE; + capacity = min((u32)VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_CAPACITY, + max_capacity); array = kmalloc(handle_arr_calc_size(capacity), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!array) return NULL; array->capacity = capacity; + array->max_capacity = max_capacity; array->size = 0; return array; @@ -44,27 +49,34 @@ void vmci_handle_arr_destroy(struct vmci_handle_arr *array) kfree(array); } -void vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr, - struct vmci_handle handle) +int vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr, + struct vmci_handle handle) { struct vmci_handle_arr *array = *array_ptr; if (unlikely(array->size >= array->capacity)) { /* reallocate. */ struct vmci_handle_arr *new_array; - size_t new_capacity = array->capacity * VMCI_ARR_CAP_MULT; - size_t new_size = handle_arr_calc_size(new_capacity); + u32 capacity_bump = min(array->max_capacity - array->capacity, + array->capacity); + size_t new_size = handle_arr_calc_size(array->capacity + + capacity_bump); + + if (array->size >= array->max_capacity) + return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM; new_array = krealloc(array, new_size, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!new_array) - return; + return VMCI_ERROR_NO_MEM; - new_array->capacity = new_capacity; + new_array->capacity += capacity_bump; *array_ptr = array = new_array; } array->entries[array->size] = handle; array->size++; + + return VMCI_SUCCESS; } /* @@ -74,7 +86,7 @@ struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr *array, struct vmci_handle entry_handle) { struct vmci_handle handle = VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE; - size_t i; + u32 i; for (i = 0; i < array->size; i++) { if (vmci_handle_is_equal(array->entries[i], entry_handle)) { @@ -109,7 +121,7 @@ struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_tail(struct vmci_handle_arr *array) * Handle at given index, VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE if invalid index. */ struct vmci_handle -vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index) +vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, u32 index) { if (unlikely(index >= array->size)) return VMCI_INVALID_HANDLE; @@ -120,7 +132,7 @@ vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index) bool vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, struct vmci_handle entry_handle) { - size_t i; + u32 i; for (i = 0; i < array->size; i++) if (vmci_handle_is_equal(array->entries[i], entry_handle)) diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h index b5f3a7f98cf1..0fc58597820e 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_handle_array.h @@ -17,32 +17,41 @@ #define _VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_H_ #include +#include #include -#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_SIZE 4 -#define VMCI_ARR_CAP_MULT 2 /* Array capacity multiplier */ - struct vmci_handle_arr { - size_t capacity; - size_t size; + u32 capacity; + u32 max_capacity; + u32 size; + u32 pad; struct vmci_handle entries[]; }; -struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(size_t capacity); +#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE \ + offsetof(struct vmci_handle_arr, entries) +/* Select a default capacity that results in a 64 byte sized array */ +#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_DEFAULT_CAPACITY 6 +/* Make sure that the max array size can be expressed by a u32 */ +#define VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_MAX_CAPACITY \ + ((U32_MAX - VMCI_HANDLE_ARRAY_HEADER_SIZE - 1) / \ + sizeof(struct vmci_handle)) + +struct vmci_handle_arr *vmci_handle_arr_create(u32 capacity, u32 max_capacity); void vmci_handle_arr_destroy(struct vmci_handle_arr *array); -void vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr, - struct vmci_handle handle); +int vmci_handle_arr_append_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr **array_ptr, + struct vmci_handle handle); struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_entry(struct vmci_handle_arr *array, struct vmci_handle entry_handle); struct vmci_handle vmci_handle_arr_remove_tail(struct vmci_handle_arr *array); struct vmci_handle -vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, size_t index); +vmci_handle_arr_get_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, u32 index); bool vmci_handle_arr_has_entry(const struct vmci_handle_arr *array, struct vmci_handle entry_handle); struct vmci_handle *vmci_handle_arr_get_handles(struct vmci_handle_arr *array); -static inline size_t vmci_handle_arr_get_size( +static inline u32 vmci_handle_arr_get_size( const struct vmci_handle_arr *array) { return array->size; diff --git a/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h b/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h index b724ef7005de..53c5e40a2a8f 100644 --- a/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h @@ -68,9 +68,18 @@ enum { /* * A single VMCI device has an upper limit of 128MB on the amount of - * memory that can be used for queue pairs. + * memory that can be used for queue pairs. Since each queue pair + * consists of at least two pages, the memory limit also dictates the + * number of queue pairs a guest can create. */ #define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_MEMORY (128 * 1024 * 1024) +#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_COUNT (VMCI_MAX_GUEST_QP_MEMORY / PAGE_SIZE / 2) + +/* + * There can be at most PAGE_SIZE doorbells since there is one doorbell + * per byte in the doorbell bitmap page. + */ +#define VMCI_MAX_GUEST_DOORBELL_COUNT PAGE_SIZE /* * Queues with pre-mapped data pages must be small, so that we don't pin From 8fe38c0e7d1451fb1d89a1e9c6a5a30d3a901aac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Young Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 16:09:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 61/81] MIPS: Remove superfluous check for __linux__ commit 1287533d3d95d5ad8b02773733044500b1be06bc upstream. When building BPF code using "clang -target bpf -c", clang does not define __linux__. To build BPF IR decoders the include linux/lirc.h is needed which includes linux/types.h. Currently this workaround is needed: https://git.linuxtv.org/v4l-utils.git/commit/?id=dd3ff81f58c4e1e6f33765dc61ad33c48ae6bb07 This check might otherwise be useful to stop users from using a non-linux compiler, but if you're doing that you are going to have a lot more trouble anyway. Signed-off-by: Sean Young Signed-off-by: Paul Burton Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/21149/ Cc: Ralf Baechle Cc: James Hogan Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Hauke Mehrtens Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/sgidefs.h | 8 -------- 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/sgidefs.h b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/sgidefs.h index 26143e3b7c26..69c3de90c536 100644 --- a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/sgidefs.h +++ b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/sgidefs.h @@ -11,14 +11,6 @@ #ifndef __ASM_SGIDEFS_H #define __ASM_SGIDEFS_H -/* - * Using a Linux compiler for building Linux seems logic but not to - * everybody. - */ -#ifndef __linux__ -#error Use a Linux compiler or give up. -#endif - /* * Definitions for the ISA levels * From 01894d27130c0f7aaf03fce673bcf8d1515b0841 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tony Lindgren Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 23:55:57 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 62/81] clk: ti: clkctrl: Fix returning uninitialized data [ Upstream commit 41b3588dba6ef4b7995735a97e47ff0aeea6c276 ] If we do a clk_get() for a clock that does not exists, we have _ti_omap4_clkctrl_xlate() return uninitialized data if no match is found. This can be seen in some cases with SLAB_DEBUG enabled: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 5a5a5a5a ... clk_hw_create_clk.part.33 sysc_notifier_call notifier_call_chain blocking_notifier_call_chain device_add Let's fix this by setting a found flag only when we find a match. Reported-by: Tomi Valkeinen Fixes: 88a172526c32 ("clk: ti: add support for clkctrl clocks") Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren Tested-by: Peter Ujfalusi Tested-by: Tomi Valkeinen Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/clk/ti/clkctrl.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/clk/ti/clkctrl.c b/drivers/clk/ti/clkctrl.c index 82e4d5cccf84..2df8564f08a0 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/ti/clkctrl.c +++ b/drivers/clk/ti/clkctrl.c @@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ static struct clk_hw *_ti_omap4_clkctrl_xlate(struct of_phandle_args *clkspec, { struct omap_clkctrl_provider *provider = data; struct omap_clkctrl_clk *entry; + bool found = false; if (clkspec->args_count != 2) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); @@ -224,11 +225,13 @@ static struct clk_hw *_ti_omap4_clkctrl_xlate(struct of_phandle_args *clkspec, list_for_each_entry(entry, &provider->clocks, node) { if (entry->reg_offset == clkspec->args[0] && - entry->bit_offset == clkspec->args[1]) + entry->bit_offset == clkspec->args[1]) { + found = true; break; + } } - if (!entry) + if (!found) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); return entry->clk; From 555c2ac63cadf2494a129e512b121c0bf63209fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hans de Goede Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 15:28:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 63/81] efi/bgrt: Drop BGRT status field reserved bits check [ Upstream commit a483fcab38b43fb34a7f12ab1daadd3907f150e2 ] Starting with ACPI 6.2 bits 1 and 2 of the BGRT status field are no longer reserved. These bits are now used to indicate if the image needs to be rotated before being displayed. The first device using these bits has now shown up (the GPD MicroPC) and the reserved bits check causes us to reject the valid BGRT table on this device. Rather then changing the reserved bits check, allowing only the 2 new bits, instead just completely remove it so that we do not end up with a similar problem when more bits are added in the future. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c index 50793fda7819..e3d86aa1ad5d 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi-bgrt.c @@ -50,11 +50,6 @@ void __init efi_bgrt_init(struct acpi_table_header *table) bgrt->version); goto out; } - if (bgrt->status & 0xfe) { - pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: reserved status bits are non-zero %u\n", - bgrt->status); - goto out; - } if (bgrt->image_type != 0) { pr_notice("Ignoring BGRT: invalid image type %u (expected 0)\n", bgrt->image_type); From a68c5a52d5a1e42830b0563d7c5421e0153ae636 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 14:37:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 64/81] perf/core: Fix perf_sample_regs_user() mm check [ Upstream commit 085ebfe937d7a7a5df1729f35a12d6d655fea68c ] perf_sample_regs_user() uses 'current->mm' to test for the presence of userspace, but this is insufficient, consider use_mm(). A better test is: '!(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)', exec() clears PF_KTHREAD after it sets the new ->mm but before it drops to userspace for the first time. Possibly obsoletes: bf05fc25f268 ("powerpc/perf: Fix oops when kthread execs user process") Reported-by: Ravi Bangoria Reported-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Acked-by: Will Deacon Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Frederic Weisbecker Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: Naveen N. Rao Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Fixes: 4018994f3d87 ("perf: Add ability to attach user level registers dump to sample") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 580616e6fcee..3d4eb6f840eb 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -5630,7 +5630,7 @@ static void perf_sample_regs_user(struct perf_regs *regs_user, if (user_mode(regs)) { regs_user->abi = perf_reg_abi(current); regs_user->regs = regs; - } else if (current->mm) { + } else if (!(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) { perf_get_regs_user(regs_user, regs, regs_user_copy); } else { regs_user->abi = PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_ABI_NONE; From 3ef2115d01a22b5971ac48778977420f568a07b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 15:04:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 65/81] ARM: omap2: remove incorrect __init annotation [ Upstream commit 27e23d8975270df6999f8b5b3156fc0c04927451 ] omap3xxx_prm_enable_io_wakeup() is marked __init, but its caller is not, so we get a warning with clang-8: WARNING: vmlinux.o(.text+0x343c8): Section mismatch in reference from the function omap3xxx_prm_late_init() to the function .init.text:omap3xxx_prm_enable_io_wakeup() The function omap3xxx_prm_late_init() references the function __init omap3xxx_prm_enable_io_wakeup(). This is often because omap3xxx_prm_late_init lacks a __init annotation or the annotation of omap3xxx_prm_enable_io_wakeup is wrong. When building with gcc, omap3xxx_prm_enable_io_wakeup() is always inlined, so we never noticed in the past. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor Acked-by: Tony Lindgren Reviewed-by: Andrew Murray Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/mach-omap2/prm3xxx.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-omap2/prm3xxx.c b/arch/arm/mach-omap2/prm3xxx.c index a2dd13217c89..2819c43fe754 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-omap2/prm3xxx.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-omap2/prm3xxx.c @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static void omap3_prm_reconfigure_io_chain(void) * registers, and omap3xxx_prm_reconfigure_io_chain() must be called. * No return value. */ -static void __init omap3xxx_prm_enable_io_wakeup(void) +static void omap3xxx_prm_enable_io_wakeup(void) { if (prm_features & PRM_HAS_IO_WAKEUP) omap2_prm_set_mod_reg_bits(OMAP3430_EN_IO_MASK, WKUP_MOD, From 67320a0d43d7617538b69a67fec707cafdfe260d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Petr Oros Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 14:29:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 66/81] be2net: fix link failure after ethtool offline test [ Upstream commit 2e5db6eb3c23e5dc8171eb8f6af7a97ef9fcf3a9 ] Certain cards in conjunction with certain switches need a little more time for link setup that results in ethtool link test failure after offline test. Patch adds a loop that waits for a link setup finish. Changes in v2: - added fixes header Fixes: 4276e47e2d1c ("be2net: Add link test to list of ethtool self tests.") Signed-off-by: Petr Oros Reviewed-by: Ivan Vecera Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- .../net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c | 28 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c index 6ce7b8435ace..f66b246acaea 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_ethtool.c @@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ static void be_self_test(struct net_device *netdev, struct ethtool_test *test, u64 *data) { struct be_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev); - int status; + int status, cnt; u8 link_status = 0; if (adapter->function_caps & BE_FUNCTION_CAPS_SUPER_NIC) { @@ -904,6 +904,9 @@ static void be_self_test(struct net_device *netdev, struct ethtool_test *test, memset(data, 0, sizeof(u64) * ETHTOOL_TESTS_NUM); + /* check link status before offline tests */ + link_status = netif_carrier_ok(netdev); + if (test->flags & ETH_TEST_FL_OFFLINE) { if (be_loopback_test(adapter, BE_MAC_LOOPBACK, &data[0]) != 0) test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED; @@ -924,13 +927,26 @@ static void be_self_test(struct net_device *netdev, struct ethtool_test *test, test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED; } - status = be_cmd_link_status_query(adapter, NULL, &link_status, 0); - if (status) { - test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED; - data[4] = -1; - } else if (!link_status) { + /* link status was down prior to test */ + if (!link_status) { test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED; data[4] = 1; + return; + } + + for (cnt = 10; cnt; cnt--) { + status = be_cmd_link_status_query(adapter, NULL, &link_status, + 0); + if (status) { + test->flags |= ETH_TEST_FL_FAILED; + data[4] = -1; + break; + } + + if (link_status) + break; + + msleep_interruptible(500); } } From 297ab0a08b8753d0c64737d31ac38beeee9c727d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 15:34:07 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 67/81] ppp: mppe: Add softdep to arc4 [ Upstream commit aad1dcc4f011ea409850e040363dff1e59aa4175 ] The arc4 crypto is mandatory at ppp_mppe probe time, so let's put a softdep line, so that the corresponding module gets prepared gracefully. Without this, a simple inclusion to initrd via dracut failed due to the missing dependency, for example. Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c index 6c7fd98cb00a..d9eda7c217e9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c +++ b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ MODULE_AUTHOR("Frank Cusack "); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Point-to-Point Protocol Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption support"); MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL"); MODULE_ALIAS("ppp-compress-" __stringify(CI_MPPE)); +MODULE_SOFTDEP("pre: arc4"); MODULE_VERSION("1.0.2"); static unsigned int From d2bbc75ababde7a6cdbf357058c318c2789d0280 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sergej Benilov Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 11:02:18 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 68/81] sis900: fix TX completion [ Upstream commit 8ac8a01092b2added0749ef937037bf1912e13e3 ] Since commit 605ad7f184b60cfaacbc038aa6c55ee68dee3c89 "tcp: refine TSO autosizing", outbound throughput is dramatically reduced for some connections, as sis900 is doing TX completion within idle states only. Make TX completion happen after every transmitted packet. Test: netperf before patch: > netperf -H remote -l -2000000 -- -s 1000000 MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 () port 0 AF_INET to 95.223.112.76 () port 0 AF_INET : demo Recv Send Send Socket Socket Message Elapsed Size Size Size Time Throughput bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec 87380 327680 327680 253.44 0.06 after patch: > netperf -H remote -l -10000000 -- -s 1000000 MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 () port 0 AF_INET to 95.223.112.76 () port 0 AF_INET : demo Recv Send Send Socket Socket Message Elapsed Size Size Size Time Throughput bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec 87380 327680 327680 5.38 14.89 Thx to Dave Miller and Eric Dumazet for helpful hints Signed-off-by: Sergej Benilov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c index 40bd88362e3d..693f9582173b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c @@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ sis900_open(struct net_device *net_dev) sis900_set_mode(sis_priv, HW_SPEED_10_MBPS, FDX_CAPABLE_HALF_SELECTED); /* Enable all known interrupts by setting the interrupt mask. */ - sw32(imr, RxSOVR | RxORN | RxERR | RxOK | TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE); + sw32(imr, RxSOVR | RxORN | RxERR | RxOK | TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE | TxDESC); sw32(cr, RxENA | sr32(cr)); sw32(ier, IE); @@ -1580,7 +1580,7 @@ static void sis900_tx_timeout(struct net_device *net_dev) sw32(txdp, sis_priv->tx_ring_dma); /* Enable all known interrupts by setting the interrupt mask. */ - sw32(imr, RxSOVR | RxORN | RxERR | RxOK | TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE); + sw32(imr, RxSOVR | RxORN | RxERR | RxOK | TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE | TxDESC); } /** @@ -1620,7 +1620,7 @@ sis900_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *net_dev) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sis_priv->lock, flags); return NETDEV_TX_OK; } - sis_priv->tx_ring[entry].cmdsts = (OWN | skb->len); + sis_priv->tx_ring[entry].cmdsts = (OWN | INTR | skb->len); sw32(cr, TxENA | sr32(cr)); sis_priv->cur_tx ++; @@ -1676,7 +1676,7 @@ static irqreturn_t sis900_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_instance) do { status = sr32(isr); - if ((status & (HIBERR|TxURN|TxERR|TxIDLE|RxORN|RxERR|RxOK)) == 0) + if ((status & (HIBERR|TxURN|TxERR|TxIDLE|TxDESC|RxORN|RxERR|RxOK)) == 0) /* nothing intresting happened */ break; handled = 1; @@ -1686,7 +1686,7 @@ static irqreturn_t sis900_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_instance) /* Rx interrupt */ sis900_rx(net_dev); - if (status & (TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE)) + if (status & (TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE | TxDESC)) /* Tx interrupt */ sis900_finish_xmit(net_dev); @@ -1898,8 +1898,8 @@ static void sis900_finish_xmit (struct net_device *net_dev) if (tx_status & OWN) { /* The packet is not transmitted yet (owned by hardware) ! - * Note: the interrupt is generated only when Tx Machine - * is idle, so this is an almost impossible case */ + * Note: this is an almost impossible condition + * in case of TxDESC ('descriptor interrupt') */ break; } @@ -2475,7 +2475,7 @@ static int sis900_resume(struct pci_dev *pci_dev) sis900_set_mode(sis_priv, HW_SPEED_10_MBPS, FDX_CAPABLE_HALF_SELECTED); /* Enable all known interrupts by setting the interrupt mask. */ - sw32(imr, RxSOVR | RxORN | RxERR | RxOK | TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE); + sw32(imr, RxSOVR | RxORN | RxERR | RxOK | TxURN | TxERR | TxIDLE | TxDESC); sw32(cr, RxENA | sr32(cr)); sw32(ier, IE); From 387decd695e1ca309f45009d8b242a98e75b66e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?S=C3=A9bastien=20Szymanski?= Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 17:58:34 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 69/81] ARM: dts: imx6ul: fix PWM[1-4] interrupts MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 3cf10132ac8d536565f2c02f60a3aeb315863a52 ] According to the i.MX6UL/L RM, table 3.1 "ARM Cortex A7 domain interrupt summary", the interrupts for the PWM[1-4] go from 83 to 86. Fixes: b9901fe84f02 ("ARM: dts: imx6ul: add pwm[1-4] nodes") Signed-off-by: Sébastien Szymanski Reviewed-by: Fabio Estevam Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6ul.dtsi | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6ul.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6ul.dtsi index 036aeba4f02c..49f4bdc0d864 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6ul.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6ul.dtsi @@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ pwm1: pwm@02080000 { compatible = "fsl,imx6ul-pwm", "fsl,imx27-pwm"; reg = <0x02080000 0x4000>; - interrupts = ; + interrupts = ; clocks = <&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM1>, <&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM1>; clock-names = "ipg", "per"; @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ pwm2: pwm@02084000 { compatible = "fsl,imx6ul-pwm", "fsl,imx27-pwm"; reg = <0x02084000 0x4000>; - interrupts = ; + interrupts = ; clocks = <&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM2>, <&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM2>; clock-names = "ipg", "per"; @@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ pwm3: pwm@02088000 { compatible = "fsl,imx6ul-pwm", "fsl,imx27-pwm"; reg = <0x02088000 0x4000>; - interrupts = ; + interrupts = ; clocks = <&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM3>, <&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM3>; clock-names = "ipg", "per"; @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ pwm4: pwm@0208c000 { compatible = "fsl,imx6ul-pwm", "fsl,imx27-pwm"; reg = <0x0208c000 0x4000>; - interrupts = ; + interrupts = ; clocks = <&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM4>, <&clks IMX6UL_CLK_PWM4>; clock-names = "ipg", "per"; From e5516f59de3c03ed6370f48d3542a248c0e37c2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Milan Broz Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 13:00:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 70/81] dm verity: use message limit for data block corruption message [ Upstream commit 2eba4e640b2c4161e31ae20090a53ee02a518657 ] DM verity should also use DMERR_LIMIT to limit repeat data block corruption messages. Signed-off-by: Milan Broz Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c index 8573c70a1880..e705799976c2 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity-target.c @@ -276,8 +276,8 @@ static int verity_handle_err(struct dm_verity *v, enum verity_block_type type, BUG(); } - DMERR("%s: %s block %llu is corrupted", v->data_dev->name, type_str, - block); + DMERR_LIMIT("%s: %s block %llu is corrupted", v->data_dev->name, + type_str, block); if (v->corrupted_errs == DM_VERITY_MAX_CORRUPTED_ERRS) DMERR("%s: reached maximum errors", v->data_dev->name); From 1642b93f1152e4795f67b95226393b442380eab6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 14:23:45 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 71/81] x86/boot/64: Fix crash if kernel image crosses page table boundary [ Upstream commit 81c7ed296dcd02bc0b4488246d040e03e633737a ] A kernel which boots in 5-level paging mode crashes in a small percentage of cases if KASLR is enabled. This issue was tracked down to the case when the kernel image unpacks in a way that it crosses an 1G boundary. The crash is caused by an overrun of the PMD page table in __startup_64() and corruption of P4D page table allocated next to it. This particular issue is not visible with 4-level paging as P4D page tables are not used. But the P4D and the PUD calculation have similar problems. The PMD index calculation is wrong due to operator precedence, which fails to confine the PMDs in the PMD array on wrap around. The P4D calculation for 5-level paging and the PUD calculation calculate the first index correctly, but then blindly increment it which causes the same issue when a kernel image is located across a 512G and for 5-level paging across a 46T boundary. This wrap around mishandling was introduced when these parts moved from assembly to C. Restore it to the correct behaviour. Fixes: c88d71508e36 ("x86/boot/64: Rewrite startup_64() in C") Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190620112345.28833-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kernel/head64.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c index 45b5c6c4a55e..7c67d8939f3e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c @@ -117,26 +117,27 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr, pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags; pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)p4d + pgtable_flags; - i = (physaddr >> P4D_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_P4D; - p4d[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; - p4d[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; + i = physaddr >> P4D_SHIFT; + p4d[(i + 0) % PTRS_PER_P4D] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; + p4d[(i + 1) % PTRS_PER_P4D] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; } else { i = (physaddr >> PGDIR_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PGD; pgd[i + 0] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; pgd[i + 1] = (pgdval_t)pud + pgtable_flags; } - i = (physaddr >> PUD_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PUD; - pud[i + 0] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags; - pud[i + 1] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags; + i = physaddr >> PUD_SHIFT; + pud[(i + 0) % PTRS_PER_PUD] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags; + pud[(i + 1) % PTRS_PER_PUD] = (pudval_t)pmd + pgtable_flags; pmd_entry = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL; pmd_entry += sme_get_me_mask(); pmd_entry += physaddr; for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(_end - _text, PMD_SIZE); i++) { - int idx = i + (physaddr >> PMD_SHIFT) % PTRS_PER_PMD; - pmd[idx] = pmd_entry + i * PMD_SIZE; + int idx = i + (physaddr >> PMD_SHIFT); + + pmd[idx % PTRS_PER_PMD] = pmd_entry + i * PMD_SIZE; } /* From 8f5e923556d11ee183ca5c4f332afd3b3a5b35bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eiichi Tsukata Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 11:47:32 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 72/81] cpu/hotplug: Fix out-of-bounds read when setting fail state [ Upstream commit 33d4a5a7a5b4d02915d765064b2319e90a11cbde ] Setting invalid value to /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpuX/hotplug/fail can control `struct cpuhp_step *sp` address, results in the following global-out-of-bounds read. Reproducer: # echo -2 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/hotplug/fail KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in write_cpuhp_fail+0x2cd/0x2e0 Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff89734438 by task bash/1941 CPU: 0 PID: 1941 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6+ #31 Call Trace: write_cpuhp_fail+0x2cd/0x2e0 dev_attr_store+0x58/0x80 sysfs_kf_write+0x13d/0x1a0 kernfs_fop_write+0x2bc/0x460 vfs_write+0x1e1/0x560 ksys_write+0x126/0x250 do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x390 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7f05e4f4c970 The buggy address belongs to the variable: cpu_hotplug_lock+0x98/0xa0 Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff89734300: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffffffff89734380: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffffffff89734400: 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa ^ ffffffff89734480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffffffff89734500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Add a sanity check for the value written from user space. Fixes: 1db49484f21ed ("smp/hotplug: Hotplug state fail injection") Signed-off-by: Eiichi Tsukata Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: peterz@infradead.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627024732.31672-1-devel@etsukata.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/cpu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c index f370a0f43005..d768e15bef83 100644 --- a/kernel/cpu.c +++ b/kernel/cpu.c @@ -1944,6 +1944,9 @@ static ssize_t write_cpuhp_fail(struct device *dev, if (ret) return ret; + if (fail < CPUHP_OFFLINE || fail > CPUHP_ONLINE) + return -EINVAL; + /* * Cannot fail STARTING/DYING callbacks. */ From 6ad56d51446f9dca44a9868f16a3c5ef0fb36e2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vinod Koul Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 12:07:21 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 73/81] linux/kernel.h: fix overflow for DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL [ Upstream commit 8f9fab480c7a87b10bb5440b5555f370272a5d59 ] DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL adds the two arguments and then invokes DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL. But on a 32bit system the addition of two 32 bit values can overflow. DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL does it correctly and stashes the addition into a unsigned long long so cast the result to unsigned long long here to avoid the overflow condition. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL must be an rval] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190625100518.30753-1-vkoul@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Cc: Bjorn Andersson Cc: Randy Dunlap Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/kernel.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h index 1c5469adaa85..bb7baecef002 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h @@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ #define DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL(ll, d) \ ({ unsigned long long _tmp = (ll); do_div(_tmp, d); _tmp; }) -#define DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(ll, d) DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL((ll) + (d) - 1, (d)) +#define DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(ll, d) \ + DIV_ROUND_DOWN_ULL((unsigned long long)(ll) + (d) - 1, (d)) #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 # define DIV_ROUND_UP_SECTOR_T(ll,d) DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(ll, d) From 7498108f2b6293c266e829074d5084fac33153a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Wed, 3 Jul 2019 15:39:25 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 74/81] ARC: hide unused function unw_hdr_alloc commit fd5de2721ea7d16e2b16c4049ac49f229551b290 upstream. As kernelci.org reports, this function is not used in vdk_hs38_defconfig: arch/arc/kernel/unwind.c:188:14: warning: 'unw_hdr_alloc' defined but not used [-Wunused-function] Fixes: bc79c9a72165 ("ARC: dw2 unwind: Reinstante unwinding out of modules") Link: https://kernelci.org/build/id/5d1cae3f59b514300340c132/logs/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arc/kernel/unwind.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arc/kernel/unwind.c b/arch/arc/kernel/unwind.c index 333daab7def0..93453fa48193 100644 --- a/arch/arc/kernel/unwind.c +++ b/arch/arc/kernel/unwind.c @@ -185,11 +185,6 @@ static void *__init unw_hdr_alloc_early(unsigned long sz) MAX_DMA_ADDRESS); } -static void *unw_hdr_alloc(unsigned long sz) -{ - return kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL); -} - static void init_unwind_table(struct unwind_table *table, const char *name, const void *core_start, unsigned long core_size, const void *init_start, unsigned long init_size, @@ -370,6 +365,10 @@ ret_err: } #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES +static void *unw_hdr_alloc(unsigned long sz) +{ + return kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL); +} static struct unwind_table *last_table; From 6f477767c52fd3aade15cd61e8543e625e49ed7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heiko Carstens Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 14:02:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 75/81] s390: fix stfle zero padding commit 4f18d869ffd056c7858f3d617c71345cf19be008 upstream. The stfle inline assembly returns the number of double words written (condition code 0) or the double words it would have written (condition code 3), if the memory array it got as parameter would have been large enough. The current stfle implementation assumes that the array is always large enough and clears those parts of the array that have not been written to with a subsequent memset call. If however the array is not large enough memset will get a negative length parameter, which means that memset clears memory until it gets an exception and the kernel crashes. To fix this simply limit the maximum length. Move also the inline assembly to an extra function to avoid clobbering of register 0, which might happen because of the added min_t invocation together with code instrumentation. The bug was introduced with commit 14375bc4eb8d ("[S390] cleanup facility list handling") but was rather harmless, since it would only write to a rather large array. It became a potential problem with commit 3ab121ab1866 ("[S390] kernel: Add z/VM LGR detection"). Since then it writes to an array with only four double words, while some machines already deliver three double words. As soon as machines have a facility bit within the fifth double a crash on IPL would happen. Fixes: 14375bc4eb8d ("[S390] cleanup facility list handling") Cc: # v2.6.37+ Reviewed-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/include/asm/facility.h | 21 ++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/facility.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/facility.h index 2d58478c2745..9fee469d7130 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/facility.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/facility.h @@ -59,6 +59,18 @@ static inline int test_facility(unsigned long nr) return __test_facility(nr, &S390_lowcore.stfle_fac_list); } +static inline unsigned long __stfle_asm(u64 *stfle_fac_list, int size) +{ + register unsigned long reg0 asm("0") = size - 1; + + asm volatile( + ".insn s,0xb2b00000,0(%1)" /* stfle */ + : "+d" (reg0) + : "a" (stfle_fac_list) + : "memory", "cc"); + return reg0; +} + /** * stfle - Store facility list extended * @stfle_fac_list: array where facility list can be stored @@ -76,13 +88,8 @@ static inline void stfle(u64 *stfle_fac_list, int size) memcpy(stfle_fac_list, &S390_lowcore.stfl_fac_list, 4); if (S390_lowcore.stfl_fac_list & 0x01000000) { /* More facility bits available with stfle */ - register unsigned long reg0 asm("0") = size - 1; - - asm volatile(".insn s,0xb2b00000,0(%1)" /* stfle */ - : "+d" (reg0) - : "a" (stfle_fac_list) - : "memory", "cc"); - nr = (reg0 + 1) * 8; /* # bytes stored by stfle */ + nr = __stfle_asm(stfle_fac_list, size); + nr = min_t(unsigned long, (nr + 1) * 8, size * 8); } memset((char *) stfle_fac_list + nr, 0, size * 8 - nr); preempt_enable(); From a25b1a8fb197b25a59406d0ef6845b902b6fc222 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Wiedmann Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 11:25:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 76/81] s390/qdio: (re-)initialize tiqdio list entries commit e54e4785cb5cb4896cf4285964aeef2125612fb2 upstream. When tiqdio_remove_input_queues() removes a queue from the tiq_list as part of qdio_shutdown(), it doesn't re-initialize the queue's list entry and the prev/next pointers go stale. If a subsequent qdio_establish() fails while sending the ESTABLISH cmd, it calls qdio_shutdown() again in QDIO_IRQ_STATE_ERR state and tiqdio_remove_input_queues() will attempt to remove the queue entry a second time. This dereferences the stale pointers, and bad things ensue. Fix this by re-initializing the list entry after removing it from the list. For good practice also initialize the list entry when the queue is first allocated, and remove the quirky checks that papered over this omission. Note that prior to commit e521813468f7 ("s390/qdio: fix access to uninitialized qdio_q fields"), these checks were bogus anyway. setup_queues_misc() clears the whole queue struct, and thus needs to re-init the prev/next pointers as well. Fixes: 779e6e1c724d ("[S390] qdio: new qdio driver.") Cc: Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c | 2 ++ drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c index 35286907c636..d0090c5c88e7 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c +++ b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_setup.c @@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ static int __qdio_allocate_qs(struct qdio_q **irq_ptr_qs, int nr_queues) return -ENOMEM; } irq_ptr_qs[i] = q; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->entry); } return 0; } @@ -178,6 +179,7 @@ static void setup_queues_misc(struct qdio_q *q, struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr, q->mask = 1 << (31 - i); q->nr = i; q->handler = handler; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->entry); } static void setup_storage_lists(struct qdio_q *q, struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr, diff --git a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c index a739bdf9630e..21295f148027 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c +++ b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c @@ -91,14 +91,14 @@ void tiqdio_remove_input_queues(struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr) struct qdio_q *q; q = irq_ptr->input_qs[0]; - /* if establish triggered an error */ - if (!q || !q->entry.prev || !q->entry.next) + if (!q) return; mutex_lock(&tiq_list_lock); list_del_rcu(&q->entry); mutex_unlock(&tiq_list_lock); synchronize_rcu(); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->entry); } static inline int has_multiple_inq_on_dsci(struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr) From 9583ec77c920639ca220b6091a3e20555890c01d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Wiedmann Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 13:12:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 77/81] s390/qdio: don't touch the dsci in tiqdio_add_input_queues() commit ac6639cd3db607d386616487902b4cc1850a7be5 upstream. Current code sets the dsci to 0x00000080. Which doesn't make any sense, as the indicator area is located in the _left-most_ byte. Worse: if the dsci is the _shared_ indicator, this potentially clears the indication of activity for a _different_ device. tiqdio_thinint_handler() will then have no reason to call that device's IRQ handler, and the device ends up stalling. Fixes: d0c9d4a89fff ("[S390] qdio: set correct bit in dsci") Cc: Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c index 21295f148027..831a3a0a2837 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c +++ b/drivers/s390/cio/qdio_thinint.c @@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ void tiqdio_add_input_queues(struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr) mutex_lock(&tiq_list_lock); list_add_rcu(&irq_ptr->input_qs[0]->entry, &tiq_list); mutex_unlock(&tiq_list_lock); - xchg(irq_ptr->dsci, 1 << 7); } void tiqdio_remove_input_queues(struct qdio_irq *irq_ptr) From 772cabe226268eb2e748e661cb6a0ba9d8ab6d22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haren Myneni Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 12:09:22 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 78/81] crypto/NX: Set receive window credits to max number of CRBs in RxFIFO commit e52d484d9869eb291140545746ccbe5ffc7c9306 upstream. System gets checkstop if RxFIFO overruns with more requests than the maximum possible number of CRBs in FIFO at the same time. The max number of requests per window is controlled by window credits. So find max CRBs from FIFO size and set it to receive window credits. Fixes: b0d6c9bab5e4 ("crypto/nx: Add P9 NX support for 842 compression engine") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+ Signed-off-by:Haren Myneni Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842-powernv.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842-powernv.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842-powernv.c index 874ddf5e9087..dbf80b55c2a4 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842-powernv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842-powernv.c @@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("842-nx"); #define WORKMEM_ALIGN (CRB_ALIGN) #define CSB_WAIT_MAX (5000) /* ms */ #define VAS_RETRIES (10) -/* # of requests allowed per RxFIFO at a time. 0 for unlimited */ -#define MAX_CREDITS_PER_RXFIFO (1024) struct nx842_workmem { /* Below fields must be properly aligned */ @@ -801,7 +799,11 @@ static int __init vas_cfg_coproc_info(struct device_node *dn, int chip_id, rxattr.lnotify_lpid = lpid; rxattr.lnotify_pid = pid; rxattr.lnotify_tid = tid; - rxattr.wcreds_max = MAX_CREDITS_PER_RXFIFO; + /* + * Maximum RX window credits can not be more than #CRBs in + * RxFIFO. Otherwise, can get checkstop if RxFIFO overruns. + */ + rxattr.wcreds_max = fifo_size / CRB_SIZE; /* * Open a VAS receice window which is used to configure RxFIFO From 24cb483b557a141d7bcab2a411809308d37ceaed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Airlie Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 13:36:17 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 79/81] drm/udl: introduce a macro to convert dev to udl. commit fd96e0dba19c53c2d66f2a398716bb74df8ca85e upstream. This just makes it easier to later embed drm into udl. [rez] Regarding the backport to v4.14.y, the only difference is due to the fact that in v4.14.y the udl_gem_mmap() function doesn't have a local 'struct udl_device' pointer so it didn't need to be converted. Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190405031715.5959-3-airlied@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h | 2 ++ drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c | 10 +++++----- drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c | 12 ++++++------ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h index 307455dd6526..ba0146e06b1e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h @@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ struct udl_device { atomic_t cpu_kcycles_used; /* transpired during pixel processing */ }; +#define to_udl(x) ((x)->dev_private) + struct udl_gem_object { struct drm_gem_object base; struct page **pages; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c index 491f1892b50e..1e78767df06c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ int udl_handle_damage(struct udl_framebuffer *fb, int x, int y, int width, int height) { struct drm_device *dev = fb->base.dev; - struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private; + struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev); int i, ret; char *cmd; cycles_t start_cycles, end_cycles; @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int udl_fb_open(struct fb_info *info, int user) { struct udl_fbdev *ufbdev = info->par; struct drm_device *dev = ufbdev->ufb.base.dev; - struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private; + struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev); /* If the USB device is gone, we don't accept new opens */ if (drm_dev_is_unplugged(udl->ddev)) @@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ static void udl_fbdev_destroy(struct drm_device *dev, int udl_fbdev_init(struct drm_device *dev) { - struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private; + struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev); int bpp_sel = fb_bpp; struct udl_fbdev *ufbdev; int ret; @@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ free: void udl_fbdev_cleanup(struct drm_device *dev) { - struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private; + struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev); if (!udl->fbdev) return; @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ void udl_fbdev_cleanup(struct drm_device *dev) void udl_fbdev_unplug(struct drm_device *dev) { - struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private; + struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev); struct udl_fbdev *ufbdev; if (!udl->fbdev) return; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c index 60866b422f81..05c14c80024c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static int udl_parse_vendor_descriptor(struct drm_device *dev, struct usb_device *usbdev) { - struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private; + struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev); char *desc; char *buf; char *desc_end; @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ void udl_urb_completion(struct urb *urb) static void udl_free_urb_list(struct drm_device *dev) { - struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private; + struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev); int count = udl->urbs.count; struct list_head *node; struct urb_node *unode; @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static void udl_free_urb_list(struct drm_device *dev) static int udl_alloc_urb_list(struct drm_device *dev, int count, size_t size) { - struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private; + struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev); struct urb *urb; struct urb_node *unode; char *buf; @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ retry: struct urb *udl_get_urb(struct drm_device *dev) { - struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private; + struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev); int ret = 0; struct list_head *entry; struct urb_node *unode; @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ error: int udl_submit_urb(struct drm_device *dev, struct urb *urb, size_t len) { - struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private; + struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev); int ret; BUG_ON(len > udl->urbs.size); @@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ int udl_drop_usb(struct drm_device *dev) void udl_driver_unload(struct drm_device *dev) { - struct udl_device *udl = dev->dev_private; + struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev); if (udl->urbs.count) udl_free_urb_list(dev); From a5fb6a7e126484e364786ee1ee41efa689915d96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Airlie Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 13:36:18 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 80/81] drm/udl: move to embedding drm device inside udl device. commit 6ecac85eadb9d4065b9038fa3d3c66d49038e14b upstream. This should help with some of the lifetime issues, and move us away from load/unload. [rez] Regarding the backport to v4.14.y, the only difference is due to the fact that in v4.14.y the udl_usb_probe() function still uses drm_dev_unref() instead of drm_dev_put(). Backport notes: On Mon, Jul 15, 2019 at 09:13:08PM -0400, Sasha Levin wrote: > Hm, we don't need ac3b35f11a06 here? Why not? I'd love to document that > with the backport. Nope, we don't need that patch in the v4.14 backport. In v4.19.y we have two functions, drm_dev_put() and drm_dev_unref(), which are aliases for one another (drm_dev_unref() just calls drm_dev_put()). drm_dev_unref() is the older of the two, and was introduced back in v4.0. drm_dev_put() was introduced in v4.15 with 9a96f55034e41 drm: introduce drm_dev_{get/put} functions and slowly callers were moved from the old name (_unref) to the new name (_put). The patch you mentioned, ac3b35f11a06, is one such patch where we are replacing a drm_dev_unref() call with a drm_dev_put() call. This doesn't have a functional change, but was necessary so that the third patch in the v4.19.y series I sent would apply cleanly. For the v4.14.y series, though, the drm_dev_put() function hasn't yet been defined and everyone is still using drm_dev_unref(). So, we don't need a backport of ac3b35f11a06, and I also had a small backport change in the last patch of the v4.14.y series where I had to change a drm_dev_put() call with a drm_dev_unref() call. Just for posterity, the drm_dev_unref() calls were eventually all changed to drm_dev_put() in v5.0, and drm_dev_unref() was removed entirely. That happened with the following two patches: 808bad32ea423 drm: replace "drm_dev_unref" function with "drm_dev_put" ba1d345401476 drm: remove deprecated "drm_dev_unref" function Acked-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20190405031715.5959-4-airlied@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ross Zwisler Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h | 9 +++--- drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c | 2 +- drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c | 23 ++------------ 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.c index b45ac6bc8add..b428c3da7576 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.c @@ -43,10 +43,16 @@ static const struct file_operations udl_driver_fops = { .llseek = noop_llseek, }; +static void udl_driver_release(struct drm_device *dev) +{ + udl_fini(dev); + udl_modeset_cleanup(dev); + drm_dev_fini(dev); + kfree(dev); +} + static struct drm_driver driver = { .driver_features = DRIVER_MODESET | DRIVER_GEM | DRIVER_PRIME, - .load = udl_driver_load, - .unload = udl_driver_unload, .release = udl_driver_release, /* gem hooks */ @@ -70,28 +76,56 @@ static struct drm_driver driver = { .patchlevel = DRIVER_PATCHLEVEL, }; +static struct udl_device *udl_driver_create(struct usb_interface *interface) +{ + struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface); + struct udl_device *udl; + int r; + + udl = kzalloc(sizeof(*udl), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!udl) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + r = drm_dev_init(&udl->drm, &driver, &interface->dev); + if (r) { + kfree(udl); + return ERR_PTR(r); + } + + udl->udev = udev; + udl->drm.dev_private = udl; + + r = udl_init(udl); + if (r) { + drm_dev_fini(&udl->drm); + kfree(udl); + return ERR_PTR(r); + } + + usb_set_intfdata(interface, udl); + return udl; +} + static int udl_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, const struct usb_device_id *id) { - struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface); - struct drm_device *dev; int r; + struct udl_device *udl; - dev = drm_dev_alloc(&driver, &interface->dev); - if (IS_ERR(dev)) - return PTR_ERR(dev); + udl = udl_driver_create(interface); + if (IS_ERR(udl)) + return PTR_ERR(udl); - r = drm_dev_register(dev, (unsigned long)udev); + r = drm_dev_register(&udl->drm, 0); if (r) goto err_free; - usb_set_intfdata(interface, dev); - DRM_INFO("Initialized udl on minor %d\n", dev->primary->index); + DRM_INFO("Initialized udl on minor %d\n", udl->drm.primary->index); return 0; err_free: - drm_dev_unref(dev); + drm_dev_unref(&udl->drm); return r; } diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h index ba0146e06b1e..d5a5dcd15dd8 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_drv.h @@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ struct urb_list { struct udl_fbdev; struct udl_device { + struct drm_device drm; struct device *dev; - struct drm_device *ddev; struct usb_device *udev; struct drm_crtc *crtc; @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ struct udl_device { atomic_t cpu_kcycles_used; /* transpired during pixel processing */ }; -#define to_udl(x) ((x)->dev_private) +#define to_udl(x) container_of(x, struct udl_device, drm) struct udl_gem_object { struct drm_gem_object base; @@ -101,9 +101,8 @@ struct urb *udl_get_urb(struct drm_device *dev); int udl_submit_urb(struct drm_device *dev, struct urb *urb, size_t len); void udl_urb_completion(struct urb *urb); -int udl_driver_load(struct drm_device *dev, unsigned long flags); -void udl_driver_unload(struct drm_device *dev); -void udl_driver_release(struct drm_device *dev); +int udl_init(struct udl_device *udl); +void udl_fini(struct drm_device *dev); int udl_fbdev_init(struct drm_device *dev); void udl_fbdev_cleanup(struct drm_device *dev); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c index 1e78767df06c..f41fd0684ce4 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_fb.c @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static int udl_fb_open(struct fb_info *info, int user) struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev); /* If the USB device is gone, we don't accept new opens */ - if (drm_dev_is_unplugged(udl->ddev)) + if (drm_dev_is_unplugged(&udl->drm)) return -ENODEV; ufbdev->fb_count++; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c index 05c14c80024c..124428f33e1e 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/udl/udl_main.c @@ -311,20 +311,12 @@ int udl_submit_urb(struct drm_device *dev, struct urb *urb, size_t len) return ret; } -int udl_driver_load(struct drm_device *dev, unsigned long flags) +int udl_init(struct udl_device *udl) { - struct usb_device *udev = (void*)flags; - struct udl_device *udl; + struct drm_device *dev = &udl->drm; int ret = -ENOMEM; DRM_DEBUG("\n"); - udl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct udl_device), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!udl) - return -ENOMEM; - - udl->udev = udev; - udl->ddev = dev; - dev->dev_private = udl; if (!udl_parse_vendor_descriptor(dev, udl->udev)) { ret = -ENODEV; @@ -359,7 +351,6 @@ err_fb: err: if (udl->urbs.count) udl_free_urb_list(dev); - kfree(udl); DRM_ERROR("%d\n", ret); return ret; } @@ -370,7 +361,7 @@ int udl_drop_usb(struct drm_device *dev) return 0; } -void udl_driver_unload(struct drm_device *dev) +void udl_fini(struct drm_device *dev) { struct udl_device *udl = to_udl(dev); @@ -378,12 +369,4 @@ void udl_driver_unload(struct drm_device *dev) udl_free_urb_list(dev); udl_fbdev_cleanup(dev); - kfree(udl); -} - -void udl_driver_release(struct drm_device *dev) -{ - udl_modeset_cleanup(dev); - drm_dev_fini(dev); - kfree(dev); } From ff33472c282e209da54cbc0c7c1c06ddfcc93d33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sun, 21 Jul 2019 09:04:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 81/81] Linux 4.14.134 --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index c36e64bd9ae7..97c744513af0 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 14 -SUBLEVEL = 133 +SUBLEVEL = 134 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Petit Gorille