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[ALPS05077885] [Do NOT Sync]Merge branch android-4.14 into alps-trunk-r0.basic

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[Detail]
	Parent: 234de92896
		Merge 4.14.150 into android-4.14
	Start: 7d642373db
		ANDROID: refactor build.config files to remove duplication
	Target: 32bc956bc2
		Merge 4.14.174 into android-4.14

MTK-Commit-Id: 73aee9b6172d4865b3b10bd396f7cfa40e7207b1

Feature: Others
Change-Id: Id09b858cd9f7f12db63cdb0bea42254d233a9fbd
CR-Id: ALPS05077885
Signed-off-by: Breeze.Li <breeze.li@mediatek.com>
This commit is contained in:
skylake.huang
2020-04-16 17:06:03 +08:00
committed by Breeze.Li
parent e48abc0636 32bc956bc2
commit 2f9c776ac2
3040 changed files with 63500 additions and 19319 deletions
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8
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-coresight-devices-tmc
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@@ -83,3 +83,11 @@ KernelVersion: 4.7
Contact: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Description: (R) Indicates the capabilities of the Coresight TMC.
The value is read directly from the DEVID register, 0xFC8,
What: /sys/bus/coresight/devices/<memory_map>.tmc/buffer_size
Date: December 2018
KernelVersion: 4.19
Contact: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Description: (RW) Size of the trace buffer for TMC-ETR when used in SYSFS
mode. Writable only for TMC-ETR configurations. The value
should be aligned to the kernel pagesize.

2
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-mei
View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ KernelVersion: 3.10
Contact: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
linux-mei@linux.intel.com
Description: Stores the same MODALIAS value emitted by uevent
Format: mei:<mei device name>:<device uuid>:
Format: mei:<mei device name>:<device uuid>:<protocol version>
What: /sys/bus/mei/devices/.../name
Date: May 2015

7
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-devfreq
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@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ Description:
The name of devfreq object denoted as ... is same as the
name of device using devfreq.
What: /sys/class/devfreq/.../name
Date: November 2019
Contact: Chanwoo Choi <cw00.choi@samsung.com>
Description:
The /sys/class/devfreq/.../name shows the name of device
of the corresponding devfreq object.
What: /sys/class/devfreq/.../governor
Date: September 2011
Contact: MyungJoo Ham <myungjoo.ham@samsung.com>

15
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-gnss Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
What: /sys/class/gnss/gnssN/type
Date: May 2018
KernelVersion: 4.18
Contact: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Description:
The GNSS receiver type. The currently identified types reflect
the protocol(s) supported by the receiver:
"NMEA" NMEA 0183
"SiRF" SiRF Binary
"UBX" UBX
Note that also non-"NMEA" type receivers typically support a
subset of NMEA 0183 with vendor extensions (e.g. to allow
switching to a vendor protocol).

2
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
View File

@@ -381,6 +381,8 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities

280
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-fs-f2fs
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@@ -1,260 +1,320 @@
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/gc_max_sleep_time
Date: July 2013
Contact: "Namjae Jeon" <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Description:
Controls the maximun sleep time for gc_thread. Time
is in milliseconds.
Description: Controls the maximum sleep time for gc_thread. Time
is in milliseconds.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/gc_min_sleep_time
Date: July 2013
Contact: "Namjae Jeon" <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Description:
Controls the minimum sleep time for gc_thread. Time
is in milliseconds.
Description: Controls the minimum sleep time for gc_thread. Time
is in milliseconds.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/gc_no_gc_sleep_time
Date: July 2013
Contact: "Namjae Jeon" <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Description:
Controls the default sleep time for gc_thread. Time
is in milliseconds.
Description: Controls the default sleep time for gc_thread. Time
is in milliseconds.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/gc_idle
Date: July 2013
Contact: "Namjae Jeon" <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Description:
Controls the victim selection policy for garbage collection.
Description: Controls the victim selection policy for garbage collection.
Setting gc_idle = 0(default) will disable this option. Setting
gc_idle = 1 will select the Cost Benefit approach & setting
gc_idle = 2 will select the greedy approach.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/reclaim_segments
Date: October 2013
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
Description: This parameter controls the number of prefree segments to be
reclaimed. If the number of prefree segments is larger than
the number of segments in the proportion to the percentage
over total volume size, f2fs tries to conduct checkpoint to
reclaim the prefree segments to free segments.
By default, 5% over total # of segments.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/main_blkaddr
Date: November 2019
Contact: "Ramon Pantin" <pantin@google.com>
Description:
Controls the issue rate of segment discard commands.
Shows first block address of MAIN area.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/ipu_policy
Date: November 2013
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
Description:
Controls the in-place-update policy.
Description: Controls the in-place-update policy.
updates in f2fs. User can set:
0x01: F2FS_IPU_FORCE, 0x02: F2FS_IPU_SSR,
0x04: F2FS_IPU_UTIL, 0x08: F2FS_IPU_SSR_UTIL,
0x10: F2FS_IPU_FSYNC, 0x20: F2FS_IPU_ASYNC,
0x40: F2FS_IPU_NOCACHE.
Refer segment.h for details.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/min_ipu_util
Date: November 2013
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
Description:
Controls the FS utilization condition for the in-place-update
policies.
Description: Controls the FS utilization condition for the in-place-update
policies. It is used by F2FS_IPU_UTIL and F2FS_IPU_SSR_UTIL policies.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/min_fsync_blocks
Date: September 2014
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Description:
Controls the dirty page count condition for the in-place-update
policies.
Description: Controls the dirty page count condition for the in-place-update
policies.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/min_seq_blocks
Date: August 2018
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Description:
Controls the dirty page count condition for batched sequential
writes in ->writepages.
Description: Controls the dirty page count condition for batched sequential
writes in writepages.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/min_hot_blocks
Date: March 2017
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Description:
Controls the dirty page count condition for redefining hot data.
Description: Controls the dirty page count condition for redefining hot data.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/min_ssr_sections
Date: October 2017
Contact: "Chao Yu" <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Description:
Controls the fee section threshold to trigger SSR allocation.
Description: Controls the free section threshold to trigger SSR allocation.
If this is large, SSR mode will be enabled early.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/max_small_discards
Date: November 2013
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
Description:
Controls the issue rate of small discard commands.
Description: Controls the issue rate of discard commands that consist of small
blocks less than 2MB. The candidates to be discarded are cached until
checkpoint is triggered, and issued during the checkpoint.
By default, it is disabled with 0.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/discard_granularity
Date: July 2017
Contact: "Chao Yu" <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Description:
Controls discard granularity of inner discard thread, inner thread
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/discard_granularity
Date: July 2017
Contact: "Chao Yu" <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Description: Controls discard granularity of inner discard thread. Inner thread
will not issue discards with size that is smaller than granularity.
The unit size is one block, now only support configuring in range
of [1, 512].
The unit size is one block(4KB), now only support configuring
in range of [1, 512]. Default value is 4(=16KB).
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/umount_discard_timeout
Date: January 2019
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Description:
Set timeout to issue discard commands during umount.
Default: 5 secs
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/umount_discard_timeout
Date: January 2019
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Description: Set timeout to issue discard commands during umount.
Default: 5 secs
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/max_victim_search
Date: January 2014
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
Description:
Controls the number of trials to find a victim segment.
Description: Controls the number of trials to find a victim segment
when conducting SSR and cleaning operations. The default value
is 4096 which covers 8GB block address range.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/migration_granularity
Date: October 2018
Contact: "Chao Yu" <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Description:
Controls migration granularity of garbage collection on large
section, it can let GC move partial segment{s} of one section
in one GC cycle, so that dispersing heavy overhead GC to
multiple lightweight one.
Description: Controls migration granularity of garbage collection on large
section, it can let GC move partial segment{s} of one section
in one GC cycle, so that dispersing heavy overhead GC to
multiple lightweight one.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/dir_level
Date: March 2014
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
Description:
Controls the directory level for large directory.
Description: Controls the directory level for large directory. If a
directory has a number of files, it can reduce the file lookup
latency by increasing this dir_level value. Otherwise, it
needs to decrease this value to reduce the space overhead.
The default value is 0.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/ram_thresh
Date: March 2014
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>
Description:
Controls the memory footprint used by f2fs.
Description: Controls the memory footprint used by free nids and cached
nat entries. By default, 1 is set, which indicates
10 MB / 1 GB RAM.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/batched_trim_sections
Date: February 2015
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Description:
Controls the trimming rate in batch mode.
<deprecated>
Description: Controls the trimming rate in batch mode.
<deprecated>
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/cp_interval
Date: October 2015
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Description:
Controls the checkpoint timing.
Description: Controls the checkpoint timing, set to 60 seconds by default.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/idle_interval
Date: January 2016
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Description:
Controls the idle timing for all paths other than
discard and gc path.
Description: Controls the idle timing of system, if there is no FS operation
during given interval.
Set to 5 seconds by default.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/discard_idle_interval
Date: September 2018
Contact: "Chao Yu" <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Contact: "Sahitya Tummala" <stummala@codeaurora.org>
Description:
Controls the idle timing for discard path.
Description: Controls the idle timing of discard thread given
this time interval.
Default is 5 secs.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/gc_idle_interval
Date: September 2018
Contact: "Chao Yu" <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Contact: "Sahitya Tummala" <stummala@codeaurora.org>
Description:
Controls the idle timing for gc path.
Description: Controls the idle timing for gc path. Set to 5 seconds by default.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/iostat_enable
Date: August 2017
Contact: "Chao Yu" <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Description:
Controls to enable/disable IO stat.
Description: Controls to enable/disable IO stat.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/ra_nid_pages
Date: October 2015
Contact: "Chao Yu" <chao2.yu@samsung.com>
Description:
Controls the count of nid pages to be readaheaded.
Description: Controls the count of nid pages to be readaheaded.
When building free nids, F2FS reads NAT blocks ahead for
speed up. Default is 0.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/dirty_nats_ratio
Date: January 2016
Contact: "Chao Yu" <chao2.yu@samsung.com>
Description:
Controls dirty nat entries ratio threshold, if current
ratio exceeds configured threshold, checkpoint will
be triggered for flushing dirty nat entries.
Description: Controls dirty nat entries ratio threshold, if current
ratio exceeds configured threshold, checkpoint will
be triggered for flushing dirty nat entries.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/lifetime_write_kbytes
Date: January 2016
Contact: "Shuoran Liu" <liushuoran@huawei.com>
Description:
Shows total written kbytes issued to disk.
Description: Shows total written kbytes issued to disk.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/feature
Date: July 2017
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Description:
Shows all enabled features in current device.
Description: Shows all enabled features in current device.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/inject_rate
Date: May 2016
Contact: "Sheng Yong" <shengyong1@huawei.com>
Description:
Controls the injection rate.
Description: Controls the injection rate of arbitrary faults.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/inject_type
Date: May 2016
Contact: "Sheng Yong" <shengyong1@huawei.com>
Description:
Controls the injection type.
Description: Controls the injection type of arbitrary faults.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/dirty_segments
Date: October 2017
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Description: Shows the number of dirty segments.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/reserved_blocks
Date: June 2017
Contact: "Chao Yu" <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Description:
Controls target reserved blocks in system, the threshold
is soft, it could exceed current available user space.
Description: Controls target reserved blocks in system, the threshold
is soft, it could exceed current available user space.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/current_reserved_blocks
Date: October 2017
Contact: "Yunlong Song" <yunlong.song@huawei.com>
Contact: "Chao Yu" <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Description:
Shows current reserved blocks in system, it may be temporarily
smaller than target_reserved_blocks, but will gradually
increase to target_reserved_blocks when more free blocks are
freed by user later.
Description: Shows current reserved blocks in system, it may be temporarily
smaller than target_reserved_blocks, but will gradually
increase to target_reserved_blocks when more free blocks are
freed by user later.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/gc_urgent
Date: August 2017
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Description:
Do background GC agressively
Description: Do background GC agressively when set. When gc_urgent = 1,
background thread starts to do GC by given gc_urgent_sleep_time
interval. It is set to 0 by default.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/gc_urgent_sleep_time
Date: August 2017
Contact: "Jaegeuk Kim" <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Description:
Controls sleep time of GC urgent mode
Description: Controls sleep time of GC urgent mode. Set to 500ms by default.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/readdir_ra
Date: November 2017
Contact: "Sheng Yong" <shengyong1@huawei.com>
Description:
Controls readahead inode block in readdir.
Description: Controls readahead inode block in readdir. Enabled by default.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/gc_pin_file_thresh
Date: January 2018
Contact: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Description: This indicates how many GC can be failed for the pinned
file. If it exceeds this, F2FS doesn't guarantee its pinning
state. 2048 trials is set by default.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/extension_list
Date: Feburary 2018
Contact: "Chao Yu" <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Description:
Used to control configure extension list:
- Query: cat /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/extension_list
- Add: echo '[h/c]extension' > /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/extension_list
- Del: echo '[h/c]!extension' > /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/extension_list
- [h] means add/del hot file extension
- [c] means add/del cold file extension
Description: Used to control configure extension list:
- Query: cat /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/extension_list
- Add: echo '[h/c]extension' > /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/extension_list
- Del: echo '[h/c]!extension' > /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/extension_list
- [h] means add/del hot file extension
- [c] means add/del cold file extension
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/unusable
Date April 2019
Contact: "Daniel Rosenberg" <drosen@google.com>
Description:
If checkpoint=disable, it displays the number of blocks that are unusable.
If checkpoint=enable it displays the enumber of blocks that would be unusable
if checkpoint=disable were to be set.
Description: If checkpoint=disable, it displays the number of blocks that
are unusable.
If checkpoint=enable it displays the enumber of blocks that
would be unusable if checkpoint=disable were to be set.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/encoding
Date July 2019
Contact: "Daniel Rosenberg" <drosen@google.com>
Description:
Displays name and version of the encoding set for the filesystem.
If no encoding is set, displays (none)
Description: Displays name and version of the encoding set for the filesystem.
If no encoding is set, displays (none)
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/free_segments
Date: September 2019
Contact: "Hridya Valsaraju" <hridya@google.com>
Description: Number of free segments in disk.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/cp_foreground_calls
Date: September 2019
Contact: "Hridya Valsaraju" <hridya@google.com>
Description: Number of checkpoint operations performed on demand. Available when
CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/cp_background_calls
Date: September 2019
Contact: "Hridya Valsaraju" <hridya@google.com>
Description: Number of checkpoint operations performed in the background to
free segments. Available when CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/gc_foreground_calls
Date: September 2019
Contact: "Hridya Valsaraju" <hridya@google.com>
Description: Number of garbage collection operations performed on demand.
Available when CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/gc_background_calls
Date: September 2019
Contact: "Hridya Valsaraju" <hridya@google.com>
Description: Number of garbage collection operations triggered in background.
Available when CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/moved_blocks_foreground
Date: September 2019
Contact: "Hridya Valsaraju" <hridya@google.com>
Description: Number of blocks moved by garbage collection in foreground.
Available when CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/moved_blocks_background
Date: September 2019
Contact: "Hridya Valsaraju" <hridya@google.com>
Description: Number of blocks moved by garbage collection in background.
Available when CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/avg_vblocks
Date: September 2019
Contact: "Hridya Valsaraju" <hridya@google.com>
Description: Average number of valid blocks.
Available when CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y.

27
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-ion Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
What: /sys/kernel/ion
Date: Dec 2019
KernelVersion: 4.14.158
Contact: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Description:
The /sys/kernel/ion directory contains a snapshot of the
internal state of ION memory heaps and pools.
Users: kernel memory tuning tools
What: /sys/kernel/ion/total_heaps_kb
Date: Dec 2019
KernelVersion: 4.14.158
Contact: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Description:
The total_heaps_kb file is read-only and specifies how much
memory in Kb is allocated to ION heaps.
What: /sys/kernel/ion/total_pools_kb
Date: Dec 2019
KernelVersion: 4.14.158
Contact: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Description:
The total_pools_kb file is read-only and specifies how much
memory in Kb is allocated to ION pools.

3
Documentation/admin-guide/dynamic-debug-howto.rst
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@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ If you make a mistake with the syntax, the write will fail thus::
<debugfs>/dynamic_debug/control
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
Note, for systems without 'debugfs' enabled, the control file can be
found in ``/proc/dynamic_debug/control``.
Viewing Dynamic Debug Behaviour
===============================

2
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
View File

@@ -12,3 +12,5 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
spectre
l1tf
mds
tsx_async_abort
multihit.rst

7
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
View File

@@ -265,8 +265,11 @@ time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are:
============ =============================================================
Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full".
Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full". For processors
that are affected by both TAA (TSX Asynchronous Abort) and MDS,
specifying just "mds=off" without an accompanying "tsx_async_abort=off"
will have no effect as the same mitigation is used for both
vulnerabilities.
Mitigation selection guide
--------------------------

163
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.rst Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
iTLB multihit
=============
iTLB multihit is an erratum where some processors may incur a machine check
error, possibly resulting in an unrecoverable CPU lockup, when an
instruction fetch hits multiple entries in the instruction TLB. This can
occur when the page size is changed along with either the physical address
or cache type. A malicious guest running on a virtualized system can
exploit this erratum to perform a denial of service attack.
Affected processors
-------------------
Variations of this erratum are present on most Intel Core and Xeon processor
models. The erratum is not present on:
- non-Intel processors
- Some Atoms (Airmont, Bonnell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus, Saltwell, Silvermont)
- Intel processors that have the PSCHANGE_MC_NO bit set in the
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
Related CVEs
------------
The following CVE entry is related to this issue:
============== =================================================
CVE-2018-12207 Machine Check Error Avoidance on Page Size Change
============== =================================================
Problem
-------
Privileged software, including OS and virtual machine managers (VMM), are in
charge of memory management. A key component in memory management is the control
of the page tables. Modern processors use virtual memory, a technique that creates
the illusion of a very large memory for processors. This virtual space is split
into pages of a given size. Page tables translate virtual addresses to physical
addresses.
To reduce latency when performing a virtual to physical address translation,
processors include a structure, called TLB, that caches recent translations.
There are separate TLBs for instruction (iTLB) and data (dTLB).
Under this errata, instructions are fetched from a linear address translated
using a 4 KB translation cached in the iTLB. Privileged software modifies the
paging structure so that the same linear address using large page size (2 MB, 4
MB, 1 GB) with a different physical address or memory type. After the page
structure modification but before the software invalidates any iTLB entries for
the linear address, a code fetch that happens on the same linear address may
cause a machine-check error which can result in a system hang or shutdown.
Attack scenarios
----------------
Attacks against the iTLB multihit erratum can be mounted from malicious
guests in a virtualized system.
iTLB multihit system information
--------------------------------
The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current iTLB
multihit status of the system:whether the system is vulnerable and which
mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
The possible values in this file are:
.. list-table::
* - Not affected
- The processor is not vulnerable.
* - KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages
- Software changes mitigate this issue.
* - KVM: Vulnerable
- The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
Enumeration of the erratum
--------------------------------
A new bit has been allocated in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) msr
and will be set on CPU's which are mitigated against this issue.
======================================= =========== ===============================
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR Not present Possibly vulnerable,check model
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO] '0' Likely vulnerable,check model
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO] '1' Not vulnerable
======================================= =========== ===============================
Mitigation mechanism
-------------------------
This erratum can be mitigated by restricting the use of large page sizes to
non-executable pages. This forces all iTLB entries to be 4K, and removes
the possibility of multiple hits.
In order to mitigate the vulnerability, KVM initially marks all huge pages
as non-executable. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages,
the page is broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
If EPT is disabled or not available on the host, KVM is in control of TLB
flushes and the problematic situation cannot happen. However, the shadow
EPT paging mechanism used by nested virtualization is vulnerable, because
the nested guest can trigger multiple iTLB hits by modifying its own
(non-nested) page tables. For simplicity, KVM will make large pages
non-executable in all shadow paging modes.
Mitigation control on the kernel command line and KVM - module parameter
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism for marking huge pages as
non-executable can be controlled with a module parameter "nx_huge_pages=".
The kernel command line allows to control the iTLB multihit mitigations at
boot time with the option "kvm.nx_huge_pages=".
The valid arguments for these options are:
========== ================================================================
force Mitigation is enabled. In this case, the mitigation implements
non-executable huge pages in Linux kernel KVM module. All huge
pages in the EPT are marked as non-executable.
If a guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
off Mitigation is disabled.
auto Enable mitigation only if the platform is affected and the kernel
was not booted with the "mitigations=off" command line parameter.
This is the default option.
========== ================================================================
Mitigation selection guide
--------------------------
1. No virtualization in use
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
action is required.
2. Virtualization with trusted guests
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If the guest comes from a trusted source, you may assume that the guest will
not attempt to maliciously exploit these errata and no further action is
required.
3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If the guest comes from an untrusted source, the guest host kernel will need
to apply iTLB multihit mitigation via the kernel command line or kvm
module parameter.

279
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
TAA - TSX Asynchronous Abort
======================================
TAA is a hardware vulnerability that allows unprivileged speculative access to
data which is available in various CPU internal buffers by using asynchronous
aborts within an Intel TSX transactional region.
Affected processors
-------------------
This vulnerability only affects Intel processors that support Intel
Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) when the TAA_NO bit (bit 8)
is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. On processors where the MDS_NO bit
(bit 5) is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR, the existing MDS mitigations
also mitigate against TAA.
Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the TAA
vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`tsx_async_abort_sys_info`.
Related CVEs
------------
The following CVE entry is related to this TAA issue:
============== ===== ===================================================
CVE-2019-11135 TAA TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) condition on some
microprocessors utilizing speculative execution may
allow an authenticated user to potentially enable
information disclosure via a side channel with
local access.
============== ===== ===================================================
Problem
-------
When performing store, load or L1 refill operations, processors write
data into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in
those buffers can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
Intel TSX is an extension to the x86 instruction set architecture that adds
hardware transactional memory support to improve performance of multi-threaded
software. TSX lets the processor expose and exploit concurrency hidden in an
application due to dynamically avoiding unnecessary synchronization.
TSX supports atomic memory transactions that are either committed (success) or
aborted. During an abort, operations that happened within the transactional region
are rolled back. An asynchronous abort takes place, among other options, when a
different thread accesses a cache line that is also used within the transactional
region when that access might lead to a data race.
Immediately after an uncompleted asynchronous abort, certain speculatively
executed loads may read data from those internal buffers and pass it to dependent
operations. This can be then used to infer the value via a cache side channel
attack.
Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
The victim of a malicious actor does not need to make use of TSX. Only the
attacker needs to begin a TSX transaction and raise an asynchronous abort
which in turn potenitally leaks data stored in the buffers.
More detailed technical information is available in the TAA specific x86
architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst <tsx_async_abort>`.
Attack scenarios
----------------
Attacks against the TAA vulnerability can be implemented from unprivileged
applications running on hosts or guests.
As for MDS, the attacker has no control over the memory addresses that can
be leaked. Only the victim is responsible for bringing data to the CPU. As
a result, the malicious actor has to sample as much data as possible and
then postprocess it to try to infer any useful information from it.
A potential attacker only has read access to the data. Also, there is no direct
privilege escalation by using this technique.
.. _tsx_async_abort_sys_info:
TAA system information
-----------------------
The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current TAA status
of mitigated systems. The relevant sysfs file is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
The possible values in this file are:
.. list-table::
* - 'Vulnerable'
- The CPU is affected by this vulnerability and the microcode and kernel mitigation are not applied.
* - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
- The system tries to clear the buffers but the microcode might not support the operation.
* - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
- The microcode has been updated to clear the buffers. TSX is still enabled.
* - 'Mitigation: TSX disabled'
- TSX is disabled.
* - 'Not affected'
- The CPU is not affected by this issue.
.. _ucode_needed:
Best effort mitigation mode
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode-based
mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
effort mitigation mode. This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the
CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection takes
effect; otherwise a few CPU cycles are wasted pointlessly.
The state in the tsx_async_abort sysfs file reflects this situation
accordingly.
Mitigation mechanism
--------------------
The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode which is
required. If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
enables the mitigation by default.
The mitigation can be controlled at boot time via a kernel command line option.
See :ref:`taa_mitigation_control_command_line`.
.. _virt_mechanism:
Virtualization mitigation
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Affected systems where the host has TAA microcode and TAA is mitigated by
having disabled TSX previously, are not vulnerable regardless of the status
of the VMs.
In all other cases, if the host either does not have the TAA microcode or
the kernel is not mitigated, the system might be vulnerable.
.. _taa_mitigation_control_command_line:
Mitigation control on the kernel command line
---------------------------------------------
The kernel command line allows to control the TAA mitigations at boot time with
the option "tsx_async_abort=". The valid arguments for this option are:
============ =============================================================
off This option disables the TAA mitigation on affected platforms.
If the system has TSX enabled (see next parameter) and the CPU
is affected, the system is vulnerable.
full TAA mitigation is enabled. If TSX is enabled, on an affected
system it will clear CPU buffers on ring transitions. On
systems which are MDS-affected and deploy MDS mitigation,
TAA is also mitigated. Specifying this option on those
systems will have no effect.
full,nosmt The same as tsx_async_abort=full, with SMT disabled on
vulnerable CPUs that have TSX enabled. This is the complete
mitigation. When TSX is disabled, SMT is not disabled because
CPU is not vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
============ =============================================================
Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full". For
processors that are affected by both TAA and MDS, specifying just
"tsx_async_abort=off" without an accompanying "mds=off" will have no
effect as the same mitigation is used for both vulnerabilities.
The kernel command line also allows to control the TSX feature using the
parameter "tsx=" on CPUs which support TSX control. MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is used
to control the TSX feature and the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM
and HLE) in CPUID.
The valid options are:
============ =============================================================
off Disables TSX on the system.
Note that this option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1
and which get the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
update. This new MSR allows for the reliable deactivation of
the TSX functionality.
on Enables TSX.
Although there are mitigations for all known security
vulnerabilities, TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
several previous speculation-related CVEs, and so there may be
unknown security risks associated with leaving it enabled.
auto Disables TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enables TSX
on the system.
============ =============================================================
Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx=off".
The following combinations of the "tsx_async_abort" and "tsx" are possible. For
affected platforms tsx=auto is equivalent to tsx=off and the result will be:
========= ========================== =========================================
tsx=on tsx_async_abort=full The system will use VERW to clear CPU
buffers. Cross-thread attacks are still
possible on SMT machines.
tsx=on tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt As above, cross-thread attacks on SMT
mitigated.
tsx=on tsx_async_abort=off The system is vulnerable.
tsx=off tsx_async_abort=full TSX might be disabled if microcode
provides a TSX control MSR. If so,
system is not vulnerable.
tsx=off tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt Ditto
tsx=off tsx_async_abort=off ditto
========= ========================== =========================================
For unaffected platforms "tsx=on" and "tsx_async_abort=full" does not clear CPU
buffers. For platforms without TSX control (MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=0)
"tsx" command line argument has no effect.
For the affected platforms below table indicates the mitigation status for the
combinations of CPUID bit MD_CLEAR and IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bits MDS_NO
and TSX_CTRL_MSR.
======= ========= ============= ========================================
MDS_NO MD_CLEAR TSX_CTRL_MSR Status
======= ========= ============= ========================================
0 0 0 Vulnerable (needs microcode)
0 1 0 MDS and TAA mitigated via VERW
1 1 0 MDS fixed, TAA vulnerable if TSX enabled
because MD_CLEAR has no meaning and
VERW is not guaranteed to clear buffers
1 X 1 MDS fixed, TAA can be mitigated by
VERW or TSX_CTRL_MSR
======= ========= ============= ========================================
Mitigation selection guide
--------------------------
1. Trusted userspace and guests
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If all user space applications are from a trusted source and do not execute
untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation can be
disabled. The same applies to virtualized environments with trusted guests.
2. Untrusted userspace and guests
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If there are untrusted applications or guests on the system, enabling TSX
might allow a malicious actor to leak data from the host or from other
processes running on the same physical core.
If the microcode is available and the TSX is disabled on the host, attacks
are prevented in a virtualized environment as well, even if the VMs do not
explicitly enable the mitigation.
.. _taa_default_mitigations:
Default mitigations
-------------------
The kernel's default action for vulnerable processors is:
- Deploy TSX disable mitigation (tsx_async_abort=full tsx=off).

181
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
View File

@@ -137,6 +137,10 @@
dynamic table installation which will install SSDT
tables to /sys/firmware/acpi/tables/dynamic.
acpi_no_watchdog [HW,ACPI,WDT]
Ignore the ACPI-based watchdog interface (WDAT) and let
a native driver control the watchdog device instead.
acpi_rsdp= [ACPI,EFI,KEXEC]
Pass the RSDP address to the kernel, mostly used
on machines running EFI runtime service to boot the
@@ -1854,6 +1858,12 @@
Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y,
the default is off.
kpti= [ARM64] Control page table isolation of user
and kernel address spaces.
Default: enabled on cores which need mitigation.
0: force disabled
1: force enabled
kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled MSRs.
Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP)
@@ -1861,6 +1871,25 @@
KVM MMU at runtime.
Default is 0 (off)
kvm.nx_huge_pages=
[KVM] Controls the software workaround for the
X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT bug.
force : Always deploy workaround.
off : Never deploy workaround.
auto : Deploy workaround based on the presence of
X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT.
Default is 'auto'.
If the software workaround is enabled for the host,
guests do need not to enable it for nested guests.
kvm.nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio=
[KVM] Controls how many 4KiB pages are periodically zapped
back to huge pages. 0 disables the recovery, otherwise if
the value is N KVM will zap 1/Nth of the 4KiB pages every
minute. The default is 60.
kvm-amd.nested= [KVM,AMD] Allow nested virtualization in KVM/SVM.
Default is 1 (enabled)
@@ -2223,6 +2252,38 @@
Format: <first>,<last>
Specifies range of consoles to be captured by the MDA.
mds= [X86,INTEL]
Control mitigation for the Micro-architectural Data
Sampling (MDS) vulnerability.
Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU
internal buffers which can forward information to a
disclosure gadget under certain conditions.
In vulnerable processors, the speculatively
forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel
attack, to access data to which the attacker does
not have direct access.
This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The
options are:
full - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
full,nosmt - Enable MDS mitigation and disable
SMT on vulnerable CPUs
off - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
On TAA-affected machines, mds=off can be prevented by
an active TAA mitigation as both vulnerabilities are
mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
this mitigation, you need to specify tsx_async_abort=off
too.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
mds=full.
For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
mem=nn[KMG] [KNL,BOOT] Force usage of a specific amount of memory
Amount of memory to be used when the kernel is not able
to see the whole system memory or for test.
@@ -2372,8 +2433,8 @@
http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
mitigations=
[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated,
[X86,PPC,S390,ARM64] Control optional mitigations for
CPU vulnerabilities. This is a set of curated,
arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
@@ -2382,14 +2443,23 @@
improves system performance, but it may also
expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
kpti=0 [ARM64]
nospectre_v1 [PPC]
nobp=0 [S390]
nospectre_v1 [X86]
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
l1tf=off [X86]
mds=off [X86]
tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
Exceptions:
This does not have any effect on
kvm.nx_huge_pages when
kvm.nx_huge_pages=force.
auto (default)
Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2405,6 +2475,7 @@
be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
mds=full,nosmt [X86]
tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86]
mminit_loglevel=
[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
@@ -2728,10 +2799,10 @@
(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks
are possible in the system.
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
to spectre_v2=off.
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E,ARM64] Disable all mitigations for
the Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch prediction)
vulnerability. System may allow data leaks with this
option.
nospec_store_bypass_disable
[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
@@ -4490,6 +4561,76 @@
platforms where RDTSC is slow and this accounting
can add overhead.
tsx= [X86] Control Transactional Synchronization
Extensions (TSX) feature in Intel processors that
support TSX control.
This parameter controls the TSX feature. The options are:
on - Enable TSX on the system. Although there are
mitigations for all known security vulnerabilities,
TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
several previous speculation-related CVEs, and
so there may be unknown security risks associated
with leaving it enabled.
off - Disable TSX on the system. (Note that this
option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1 and which get
the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
update. This new MSR allows for the reliable
deactivation of the TSX functionality.)
auto - Disable TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present,
otherwise enable TSX on the system.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to tsx=off.
See Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
for more details.
tsx_async_abort= [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the TSX Async
Abort (TAA) vulnerability.
Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS)
certain CPUs that support Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) are vulnerable to an
exploit against CPU internal buffers which can forward
information to a disclosure gadget under certain
conditions.
In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
data can be used in a cache side channel attack, to
access data to which the attacker does not have direct
access.
This parameter controls the TAA mitigation. The
options are:
full - Enable TAA mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
if TSX is enabled.
full,nosmt - Enable TAA mitigation and disable SMT on
vulnerable CPUs. If TSX is disabled, SMT
is not disabled because CPU is not
vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
off - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation
On MDS-affected machines, tsx_async_abort=off can be
prevented by an active MDS mitigation as both vulnerabilities
are mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
this mitigation, you need to specify mds=off too.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
tsx_async_abort=full. On CPUs which are MDS affected
and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not
required and doesn't provide any additional
mitigation.
For details see:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
turbografx.map[2|3]= [HW,JOY]
TurboGraFX parallel port interface
Format:
@@ -4575,13 +4716,13 @@
Flags is a set of characters, each corresponding
to a common usb-storage quirk flag as follows:
a = SANE_SENSE (collect more than 18 bytes
of sense data);
of sense data, not on uas);
b = BAD_SENSE (don't collect more than 18
bytes of sense data);
bytes of sense data, not on uas);
c = FIX_CAPACITY (decrease the reported
device capacity by one sector);
d = NO_READ_DISC_INFO (don't use
READ_DISC_INFO command);
READ_DISC_INFO command, not on uas);
e = NO_READ_CAPACITY_16 (don't use
READ_CAPACITY_16 command);
f = NO_REPORT_OPCODES (don't use report opcodes
@@ -4596,17 +4737,18 @@
j = NO_REPORT_LUNS (don't use report luns
command, uas only);
l = NOT_LOCKABLE (don't try to lock and
unlock ejectable media);
unlock ejectable media, not on uas);
m = MAX_SECTORS_64 (don't transfer more
than 64 sectors = 32 KB at a time);
than 64 sectors = 32 KB at a time,
not on uas);
n = INITIAL_READ10 (force a retry of the
initial READ(10) command);
initial READ(10) command, not on uas);
o = CAPACITY_OK (accept the capacity
reported by the device);
reported by the device, not on uas);
p = WRITE_CACHE (the device cache is ON
by default);
by default, not on uas);
r = IGNORE_RESIDUE (the device reports
bogus residue values);
bogus residue values, not on uas);
s = SINGLE_LUN (the device has only one
Logical Unit);
t = NO_ATA_1X (don't allow ATA(12) and ATA(16)
@@ -4615,7 +4757,8 @@
w = NO_WP_DETECT (don't test whether the
medium is write-protected).
y = ALWAYS_SYNC (issue a SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE
even if the device claims no cache)
even if the device claims no cache,
not on uas)
Example: quirks=0419:aaf5:rl,0421:0433:rc
user_debug= [KNL,ARM]
@@ -4860,6 +5003,10 @@
the unplug protocol
never -- do not unplug even if version check succeeds
xen_legacy_crash [X86,XEN]
Crash from Xen panic notifier, without executing late
panic() code such as dumping handler.
xen_nopvspin [X86,XEN]
Disables the ticketlock slowpath using Xen PV
optimizations.

17
Documentation/arm64/cpu-feature-registers.txt
View File

@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ infrastructure:
| Name | bits | visible |
|--------------------------------------------------|
| RES0 | [63-48] | n |
| TS | [55-52] | y |
|--------------------------------------------------|
| FHM | [51-48] | y |
|--------------------------------------------------|
| DP | [47-44] | y |
|--------------------------------------------------|
@@ -133,8 +136,6 @@ infrastructure:
| SHA1 | [11-8] | y |
|--------------------------------------------------|
| AES | [7-4] | y |
|--------------------------------------------------|
| RES0 | [3-0] | n |
x--------------------------------------------------x
@@ -142,7 +143,9 @@ infrastructure:
x--------------------------------------------------x
| Name | bits | visible |
|--------------------------------------------------|
| RES0 | [63-28] | n |
| DIT | [51-48] | y |
|--------------------------------------------------|
| SVE | [35-32] | y |
|--------------------------------------------------|
| GIC | [27-24] | n |
|--------------------------------------------------|
@@ -193,6 +196,14 @@ infrastructure:
| DPB | [3-0] | y |
x--------------------------------------------------x
5) ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1 - Memory model feature register 2
x--------------------------------------------------x
| Name | bits | visible |
|--------------------------------------------------|
| AT | [35-32] | y |
x--------------------------------------------------x
Appendix I: Example
---------------------------

11
Documentation/arm64/tagged-address-abi.rst
View File

@@ -44,8 +44,15 @@ The AArch64 Tagged Address ABI has two stages of relaxation depending
how the user addresses are used by the kernel:
1. User addresses not accessed by the kernel but used for address space
management (e.g. ``mmap()``, ``mprotect()``, ``madvise()``). The use
of valid tagged pointers in this context is always allowed.
management (e.g. ``mprotect()``, ``madvise()``). The use of valid
tagged pointers in this context is allowed with the exception of
``brk()``, ``mmap()`` and the ``new_address`` argument to
``mremap()`` as these have the potential to alias with existing
user addresses.
NOTE: This behaviour changed in v5.6 and so some earlier kernels may
incorrectly accept valid tagged pointers for the ``brk()``,
``mmap()`` and ``mremap()`` system calls.
2. User addresses accessed by the kernel (e.g. ``write()``). This ABI
relaxation is disabled by default and the application thread needs to

2
Documentation/block/00-INDEX
View File

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ data-integrity.txt
- Block data integrity
deadline-iosched.txt
- Deadline IO scheduler tunables
inline-encryption.rst
- Blk-crypto internals and inline encryption
ioprio.txt
- Block io priorities (in CFQ scheduler)
pr.txt

26
Documentation/block/index.rst Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
=====
Block
=====
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 1
bfq-iosched
biodoc
biovecs
capability
cmdline-partition
data-integrity
deadline-iosched
inline-encryption
ioprio
kyber-iosched
null_blk
pr
queue-sysfs
request
stat
switching-sched
writeback_cache_control

183
Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
=================
Inline Encryption
=================
Objective
=========
We want to support inline encryption (IE) in the kernel.
To allow for testing, we also want a crypto API fallback when actual
IE hardware is absent. We also want IE to work with layered devices
like dm and loopback (i.e. we want to be able to use the IE hardware
of the underlying devices if present, or else fall back to crypto API
en/decryption).
Constraints and notes
=====================
- IE hardware have a limited number of "keyslots" that can be programmed
with an encryption context (key, algorithm, data unit size, etc.) at any time.
One can specify a keyslot in a data request made to the device, and the
device will en/decrypt the data using the encryption context programmed into
that specified keyslot. When possible, we want to make multiple requests with
the same encryption context share the same keyslot.
- We need a way for filesystems to specify an encryption context to use for
en/decrypting a struct bio, and a device driver (like UFS) needs to be able
to use that encryption context when it processes the bio.
- We need a way for device drivers to expose their capabilities in a unified
way to the upper layers.
Design
======
We add a struct bio_crypt_ctx to struct bio that can represent an
encryption context, because we need to be able to pass this encryption
context from the FS layer to the device driver to act upon.
While IE hardware works on the notion of keyslots, the FS layer has no
knowledge of keyslots - it simply wants to specify an encryption context to
use while en/decrypting a bio.
We introduce a keyslot manager (KSM) that handles the translation from
encryption contexts specified by the FS to keyslots on the IE hardware.
This KSM also serves as the way IE hardware can expose their capabilities to
upper layers. The generic mode of operation is: each device driver that wants
to support IE will construct a KSM and set it up in its struct request_queue.
Upper layers that want to use IE on this device can then use this KSM in
the device's struct request_queue to translate an encryption context into
a keyslot. The presence of the KSM in the request queue shall be used to mean
that the device supports IE.
On the device driver end of the interface, the device driver needs to tell the
KSM how to actually manipulate the IE hardware in the device to do things like
programming the crypto key into the IE hardware into a particular keyslot. All
this is achieved through the :c:type:`struct keyslot_mgmt_ll_ops` that the
device driver passes to the KSM when creating it.
It uses refcounts to track which keyslots are idle (either they have no
encryption context programmed, or there are no in-flight struct bios
referencing that keyslot). When a new encryption context needs a keyslot, it
tries to find a keyslot that has already been programmed with the same
encryption context, and if there is no such keyslot, it evicts the least
recently used idle keyslot and programs the new encryption context into that
one. If no idle keyslots are available, then the caller will sleep until there
is at least one.
Blk-crypto
==========
The above is sufficient for simple cases, but does not work if there is a
need for a crypto API fallback, or if we are want to use IE with layered
devices. To these ends, we introduce blk-crypto. Blk-crypto allows us to
present a unified view of encryption to the FS (so FS only needs to specify
an encryption context and not worry about keyslots at all), and blk-crypto
can decide whether to delegate the en/decryption to IE hardware or to the
crypto API. Blk-crypto maintains an internal KSM that serves as the crypto
API fallback.
Blk-crypto needs to ensure that the encryption context is programmed into the
"correct" keyslot manager for IE. If a bio is submitted to a layered device
that eventually passes the bio down to a device that really does support IE, we
want the encryption context to be programmed into a keyslot for the KSM of the
device with IE support. However, blk-crypto does not know a priori whether a
particular device is the final device in the layering structure for a bio or
not. So in the case that a particular device does not support IE, since it is
possibly the final destination device for the bio, if the bio requires
encryption (i.e. the bio is doing a write operation), blk-crypto must fallback
to the crypto API *before* sending the bio to the device.
Blk-crypto ensures that:
- The bio's encryption context is programmed into a keyslot in the KSM of the
request queue that the bio is being submitted to (or the crypto API fallback
KSM if the request queue doesn't have a KSM), and that the ``bc_ksm``
in the ``bi_crypt_context`` is set to this KSM
- That the bio has its own individual reference to the keyslot in this KSM.
Once the bio passes through blk-crypto, its encryption context is programmed
in some KSM. The "its own individual reference to the keyslot" ensures that
keyslots can be released by each bio independently of other bios while
ensuring that the bio has a valid reference to the keyslot when, for e.g., the
crypto API fallback KSM in blk-crypto performs crypto on the device's behalf.
The individual references are ensured by increasing the refcount for the
keyslot in the ``bc_ksm`` when a bio with a programmed encryption
context is cloned.
What blk-crypto does on bio submission
--------------------------------------
**Case 1:** blk-crypto is given a bio with only an encryption context that hasn't
been programmed into any keyslot in any KSM (for e.g. a bio from the FS).
In this case, blk-crypto will program the encryption context into the KSM of the
request queue the bio is being submitted to (and if this KSM does not exist,
then it will program it into blk-crypto's internal KSM for crypto API
fallback). The KSM that this encryption context was programmed into is stored
as the ``bc_ksm`` in the bio's ``bi_crypt_context``.
**Case 2:** blk-crypto is given a bio whose encryption context has already been
programmed into a keyslot in the *crypto API fallback* KSM.
In this case, blk-crypto does nothing; it treats the bio as not having
specified an encryption context. Note that we cannot do here what we will do
in Case 3 because we would have already encrypted the bio via the crypto API
by this point.
**Case 3:** blk-crypto is given a bio whose encryption context has already been
programmed into a keyslot in some KSM (that is *not* the crypto API fallback
KSM).
In this case, blk-crypto first releases that keyslot from that KSM and then
treats the bio as in Case 1.
This way, when a device driver is processing a bio, it can be sure that
the bio's encryption context has been programmed into some KSM (either the
device driver's request queue's KSM, or blk-crypto's crypto API fallback KSM).
It then simply needs to check if the bio's ``bc_ksm`` is the device's
request queue's KSM. If so, then it should proceed with IE. If not, it should
simply do nothing with respect to crypto, because some other KSM (perhaps the
blk-crypto crypto API fallback KSM) is handling the en/decryption.
Blk-crypto will release the keyslot that is being held by the bio (and also
decrypt it if the bio is using the crypto API fallback KSM) once
``bio_remaining_done`` returns true for the bio.
Layered Devices
===============
Layered devices that wish to support IE need to create their own keyslot
manager for their request queue, and expose whatever functionality they choose.
When a layered device wants to pass a bio to another layer (either by
resubmitting the same bio, or by submitting a clone), it doesn't need to do
anything special because the bio (or the clone) will once again pass through
blk-crypto, which will work as described in Case 3. If a layered device wants
for some reason to do the IO by itself instead of passing it on to a child
device, but it also chose to expose IE capabilities by setting up a KSM in its
request queue, it is then responsible for en/decrypting the data itself. In
such cases, the device can choose to call the blk-crypto function
``blk_crypto_fallback_to_kernel_crypto_api`` (TODO: Not yet implemented), which will
cause the en/decryption to be done via the crypto API fallback.
Future Optimizations for layered devices
========================================
Creating a keyslot manager for the layered device uses up memory for each
keyslot, and in general, a layered device (like dm-linear) merely passes the
request on to a "child" device, so the keyslots in the layered device itself
might be completely unused. We can instead define a new type of KSM; the
"passthrough KSM", that layered devices can use to let blk-crypto know that
this layered device *will* pass the bio to some child device (and hence
through blk-crypto again, at which point blk-crypto can program the encryption
context, instead of programming it into the layered device's KSM). Again, if
the device "lies" and decides to do the IO itself instead of passing it on to
a child device, it is responsible for doing the en/decryption (and can choose
to call ``blk_crypto_fallback_to_kernel_crypto_api``). Another use case for the
"passthrough KSM" is for IE devices that want to manage their own keyslots/do
not have a limited number of keyslots.

228
Documentation/dev-tools/kcov.rst
View File

@@ -12,19 +12,31 @@ To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts
and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic parts of kernel is
disabled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Usage
-----
kcov is also able to collect comparison operands from the instrumented code
(this feature currently requires that the kernel is compiled with clang).
Prerequisites
-------------
Configure the kernel with::
CONFIG_KCOV=y
CONFIG_KCOV requires gcc built on revision 231296 or later.
If the comparison operands need to be collected, set::
CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS=y
Profiling data will only become accessible once debugfs has been mounted::
mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug
The following program demonstrates kcov usage from within a test program:
Coverage collection
-------------------
The following program demonstrates coverage collection from within a test
program using kcov:
.. code-block:: c
@@ -44,6 +56,9 @@ The following program demonstrates kcov usage from within a test program:
#define KCOV_DISABLE _IO('c', 101)
#define COVER_SIZE (64<<10)
#define KCOV_TRACE_PC 0
#define KCOV_TRACE_CMP 1
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int fd;
@@ -64,7 +79,7 @@ The following program demonstrates kcov usage from within a test program:
if ((void*)cover == MAP_FAILED)
perror("mmap"), exit(1);
/* Enable coverage collection on the current thread. */
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_ENABLE, 0))
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_ENABLE, KCOV_TRACE_PC))
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
/* Reset coverage from the tail of the ioctl() call. */
__atomic_store_n(&cover[0], 0, __ATOMIC_RELAXED);
@@ -111,3 +126,208 @@ The interface is fine-grained to allow efficient forking of test processes.
That is, a parent process opens /sys/kernel/debug/kcov, enables trace mode,
mmaps coverage buffer and then forks child processes in a loop. Child processes
only need to enable coverage (disable happens automatically on thread end).
Comparison operands collection
------------------------------
Comparison operands collection is similar to coverage collection:
.. code-block:: c
/* Same includes and defines as above. */
/* Number of 64-bit words per record. */
#define KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP 4
/*
* The format for the types of collected comparisons.
*
* Bit 0 shows whether one of the arguments is a compile-time constant.
* Bits 1 & 2 contain log2 of the argument size, up to 8 bytes.
*/
#define KCOV_CMP_CONST (1 << 0)
#define KCOV_CMP_SIZE(n) ((n) << 1)
#define KCOV_CMP_MASK KCOV_CMP_SIZE(3)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int fd;
uint64_t *cover, type, arg1, arg2, is_const, size;
unsigned long n, i;
fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov", O_RDWR);
if (fd == -1)
perror("open"), exit(1);
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_INIT_TRACE, COVER_SIZE))
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
/*
* Note that the buffer pointer is of type uint64_t*, because all
* the comparison operands are promoted to uint64_t.
*/
cover = (uint64_t *)mmap(NULL, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long),
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
if ((void*)cover == MAP_FAILED)
perror("mmap"), exit(1);
/* Note KCOV_TRACE_CMP instead of KCOV_TRACE_PC. */
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_ENABLE, KCOV_TRACE_CMP))
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
__atomic_store_n(&cover[0], 0, __ATOMIC_RELAXED);
read(-1, NULL, 0);
/* Read number of comparisons collected. */
n = __atomic_load_n(&cover[0], __ATOMIC_RELAXED);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
type = cover[i * KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP + 1];
/* arg1 and arg2 - operands of the comparison. */
arg1 = cover[i * KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP + 2];
arg2 = cover[i * KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP + 3];
/* ip - caller address. */
ip = cover[i * KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP + 4];
/* size of the operands. */
size = 1 << ((type & KCOV_CMP_MASK) >> 1);
/* is_const - true if either operand is a compile-time constant.*/
is_const = type & KCOV_CMP_CONST;
printf("ip: 0x%lx type: 0x%lx, arg1: 0x%lx, arg2: 0x%lx, "
"size: %lu, %s\n",
ip, type, arg1, arg2, size,
is_const ? "const" : "non-const");
}
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_DISABLE, 0))
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
/* Free resources. */
if (munmap(cover, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long)))
perror("munmap"), exit(1);
if (close(fd))
perror("close"), exit(1);
return 0;
}
Note that the kcov modes (coverage collection or comparison operands) are
mutually exclusive.
Remote coverage collection
--------------------------
With KCOV_ENABLE coverage is collected only for syscalls that are issued
from the current process. With KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE it's possible to collect
coverage for arbitrary parts of the kernel code, provided that those parts
are annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
This allows to collect coverage from two types of kernel background
threads: the global ones, that are spawned during kernel boot in a limited
number of instances (e.g. one USB hub_event() worker thread is spawned per
USB HCD); and the local ones, that are spawned when a user interacts with
some kernel interface (e.g. vhost workers).
To enable collecting coverage from a global background thread, a unique
global handle must be assigned and passed to the corresponding
kcov_remote_start() call. Then a userspace process can pass a list of such
handles to the KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE ioctl in the handles array field of the
kcov_remote_arg struct. This will attach the used kcov device to the code
sections, that are referenced by those handles.
Since there might be many local background threads spawned from different
userspace processes, we can't use a single global handle per annotation.
Instead, the userspace process passes a non-zero handle through the
common_handle field of the kcov_remote_arg struct. This common handle gets
saved to the kcov_handle field in the current task_struct and needs to be
passed to the newly spawned threads via custom annotations. Those threads
should in turn be annotated with kcov_remote_start()/kcov_remote_stop().
Internally kcov stores handles as u64 integers. The top byte of a handle
is used to denote the id of a subsystem that this handle belongs to, and
the lower 4 bytes are used to denote the id of a thread instance within
that subsystem. A reserved value 0 is used as a subsystem id for common
handles as they don't belong to a particular subsystem. The bytes 4-7 are
currently reserved and must be zero. In the future the number of bytes
used for the subsystem or handle ids might be increased.
When a particular userspace proccess collects coverage by via a common
handle, kcov will collect coverage for each code section that is annotated
to use the common handle obtained as kcov_handle from the current
task_struct. However non common handles allow to collect coverage
selectively from different subsystems.
.. code-block:: c
struct kcov_remote_arg {
__u32 trace_mode;
__u32 area_size;
__u32 num_handles;
__aligned_u64 common_handle;
__aligned_u64 handles[0];
};
#define KCOV_INIT_TRACE _IOR('c', 1, unsigned long)
#define KCOV_DISABLE _IO('c', 101)
#define KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE _IOW('c', 102, struct kcov_remote_arg)
#define COVER_SIZE (64 << 10)
#define KCOV_TRACE_PC 0
#define KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_COMMON (0x00ull << 56)
#define KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_USB (0x01ull << 56)
#define KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_MASK (0xffull << 56)
#define KCOV_INSTANCE_MASK (0xffffffffull)
static inline __u64 kcov_remote_handle(__u64 subsys, __u64 inst)
{
if (subsys & ~KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_MASK || inst & ~KCOV_INSTANCE_MASK)
return 0;
return subsys | inst;
}
#define KCOV_COMMON_ID 0x42
#define KCOV_USB_BUS_NUM 1
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int fd;
unsigned long *cover, n, i;
struct kcov_remote_arg *arg;
fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov", O_RDWR);
if (fd == -1)
perror("open"), exit(1);
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_INIT_TRACE, COVER_SIZE))
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
cover = (unsigned long*)mmap(NULL, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long),
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
if ((void*)cover == MAP_FAILED)
perror("mmap"), exit(1);
/* Enable coverage collection via common handle and from USB bus #1. */
arg = calloc(1, sizeof(*arg) + sizeof(uint64_t));
if (!arg)
perror("calloc"), exit(1);
arg->trace_mode = KCOV_TRACE_PC;
arg->area_size = COVER_SIZE;
arg->num_handles = 1;
arg->common_handle = kcov_remote_handle(KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_COMMON,
KCOV_COMMON_ID);
arg->handles[0] = kcov_remote_handle(KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_USB,
KCOV_USB_BUS_NUM);
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE, arg))
perror("ioctl"), free(arg), exit(1);
free(arg);
/*
* Here the user needs to trigger execution of a kernel code section
* that is either annotated with the common handle, or to trigger some
* activity on USB bus #1.
*/
sleep(2);
n = __atomic_load_n(&cover[0], __ATOMIC_RELAXED);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
printf("0x%lx\n", cover[i + 1]);
if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_DISABLE, 0))
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
if (munmap(cover, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long)))
perror("munmap"), exit(1);
if (close(fd))
perror("close"), exit(1);
return 0;
}

14
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/coresight.txt
View File

@@ -73,6 +73,15 @@ its hardware characteristcs.
* port or ports: same as above.
* Optional properties for all components:
* arm,coresight-loses-context-with-cpu : boolean. Indicates that the
hardware will lose register context on CPU power down (e.g. CPUIdle).
An example of where this may be needed are systems which contain a
coresight component and CPU in the same power domain. When the CPU
powers down the coresight component also powers down and loses its
context. This property is currently only used for the ETM 4.x driver.
* Optional properties for ETM/PTMs:
* arm,cp14: must be present if the system accesses ETM/PTM management
@@ -84,8 +93,11 @@ its hardware characteristcs.
* Optional property for TMC:
* arm,buffer-size: size of contiguous buffer space for TMC ETR
(embedded trace router)
(embedded trace router). This property is obsolete. The buffer size
can be configured dynamically via buffer_size property in sysfs.
* arm,scatter-gather: boolean. Indicates that the TMC-ETR can safely
use the SG mode on this system.
Example:

2
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/renesas,rcar-usb2-clock-sel.txt
View File

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Required properties:
Example (R-Car H3):
usb2_clksel: clock-controller@e6590630 {
compatible = "renesas,r8a77950-rcar-usb2-clock-sel",
compatible = "renesas,r8a7795-rcar-usb2-clock-sel",
"renesas,rcar-gen3-usb2-clock-sel";
reg = <0 0xe6590630 0 0x02>;
clocks = <&cpg CPG_MOD 703>, <&usb_extal>, <&usb_xtal>;

36
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gnss/gnss.txt Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
GNSS Receiver DT binding
This documents the binding structure and common properties for GNSS receiver
devices.
A GNSS receiver node is a node named "gnss" and typically resides on a serial
bus (e.g. UART, I2C or SPI).
Please refer to the following documents for generic properties:
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/slave-device.txt
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/spi/spi-bus.txt
Required properties:
- compatible : A string reflecting the vendor and specific device the node
represents
Optional properties:
- enable-gpios : GPIO used to enable the device
- timepulse-gpios : Time pulse GPIO
Example:
serial@1234 {
compatible = "ns16550a";
gnss {
compatible = "u-blox,neo-8";
vcc-supply = <&gnss_reg>;
timepulse-gpios = <&gpio0 16 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
current-speed = <4800>;
};
};

4
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/media/i2c/adv748x.txt
View File

@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Example:
};
};
port@10 {
port@a {
reg = <10>;
adv7482_txa: endpoint {
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Example:
};
};
port@11 {
port@b {
reg = <11>;
adv7482_txb: endpoint {

3
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/brcm,unimac-mdio.txt
View File

@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ Optional properties:
- interrupt-names: must be "mdio_done_error" when there is a share interrupt fed
to this hardware block, or must be "mdio_done" for the first interrupt and
"mdio_error" for the second when there are separate interrupts
- clocks: A reference to the clock supplying the MDIO bus controller
- clock-frequency: the MDIO bus clock that must be output by the MDIO bus
hardware, if absent, the default hardware values are used
Child nodes of this MDIO bus controller node are standard Ethernet PHY device
nodes as described in Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/phy.txt

2
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/rtc/abracon,abx80x.txt
View File

@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ and valid to enable charging:
- "abracon,tc-diode": should be "standard" (0.6V) or "schottky" (0.3V)
- "abracon,tc-resistor": should be <0>, <3>, <6> or <11>. 0 disables the output
resistor, the other values are in ohm.
resistor, the other values are in kOhm.

2
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/dwc3.txt
View File

@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ Optional properties:
from P0 to P1/P2/P3 without delay.
- snps,dis-tx-ipgap-linecheck-quirk: when set, disable u2mac linestate check
during HS transmit.
- snps,dis_metastability_quirk: when set, disable metastability workaround.
CAUTION: use only if you are absolutely sure of it.
- snps,is-utmi-l1-suspend: true when DWC3 asserts output signal
utmi_l1_suspend_n, false when asserts utmi_sleep_n
- snps,hird-threshold: HIRD threshold

213
Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.txt
View File

@@ -235,6 +235,17 @@ checkpoint=%s[:%u[%]] Set to "disable" to turn off checkpointing. Set to "en
hide up to all remaining free space. The actual space that
would be unusable can be viewed at /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/unusable
This space is reclaimed once checkpoint=enable.
compress_algorithm=%s Control compress algorithm, currently f2fs supports "lzo"
and "lz4" algorithm.
compress_log_size=%u Support configuring compress cluster size, the size will
be 4KB * (1 << %u), 16KB is minimum size, also it's
default size.
compress_extension=%s Support adding specified extension, so that f2fs can enable
compression on those corresponding files, e.g. if all files
with '.ext' has high compression rate, we can set the '.ext'
on compression extension list and enable compression on
these file by default rather than to enable it via ioctl.
For other files, we can still enable compression via ioctl.
================================================================================
DEBUGFS ENTRIES
@@ -259,167 +270,6 @@ The files in each per-device directory are shown in table below.
Files in /sys/fs/f2fs/<devname>
(see also Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-fs-f2fs)
..............................................................................
File Content
gc_urgent_sleep_time This parameter controls sleep time for gc_urgent.
500 ms is set by default. See above gc_urgent.
gc_min_sleep_time This tuning parameter controls the minimum sleep
time for the garbage collection thread. Time is
in milliseconds.
gc_max_sleep_time This tuning parameter controls the maximum sleep
time for the garbage collection thread. Time is
in milliseconds.
gc_no_gc_sleep_time This tuning parameter controls the default sleep
time for the garbage collection thread. Time is
in milliseconds.
gc_idle This parameter controls the selection of victim
policy for garbage collection. Setting gc_idle = 0
(default) will disable this option. Setting
gc_idle = 1 will select the Cost Benefit approach
& setting gc_idle = 2 will select the greedy approach.
gc_urgent This parameter controls triggering background GCs
urgently or not. Setting gc_urgent = 0 [default]
makes back to default behavior, while if it is set
to 1, background thread starts to do GC by given
gc_urgent_sleep_time interval.
reclaim_segments This parameter controls the number of prefree
segments to be reclaimed. If the number of prefree
segments is larger than the number of segments
in the proportion to the percentage over total
volume size, f2fs tries to conduct checkpoint to
reclaim the prefree segments to free segments.
By default, 5% over total # of segments.
max_small_discards This parameter controls the number of discard
commands that consist small blocks less than 2MB.
The candidates to be discarded are cached until
checkpoint is triggered, and issued during the
checkpoint. By default, it is disabled with 0.
discard_granularity This parameter controls the granularity of discard
command size. It will issue discard commands iif
the size is larger than given granularity. Its
unit size is 4KB, and 4 (=16KB) is set by default.
The maximum value is 128 (=512KB).
reserved_blocks This parameter indicates the number of blocks that
f2fs reserves internally for root.
batched_trim_sections This parameter controls the number of sections
to be trimmed out in batch mode when FITRIM
conducts. 32 sections is set by default.
ipu_policy This parameter controls the policy of in-place
updates in f2fs. There are five policies:
0x01: F2FS_IPU_FORCE, 0x02: F2FS_IPU_SSR,
0x04: F2FS_IPU_UTIL, 0x08: F2FS_IPU_SSR_UTIL,
0x10: F2FS_IPU_FSYNC.
min_ipu_util This parameter controls the threshold to trigger
in-place-updates. The number indicates percentage
of the filesystem utilization, and used by
F2FS_IPU_UTIL and F2FS_IPU_SSR_UTIL policies.
min_fsync_blocks This parameter controls the threshold to trigger
in-place-updates when F2FS_IPU_FSYNC mode is set.
The number indicates the number of dirty pages
when fsync needs to flush on its call path. If
the number is less than this value, it triggers
in-place-updates.
min_seq_blocks This parameter controls the threshold to serialize
write IOs issued by multiple threads in parallel.
min_hot_blocks This parameter controls the threshold to allocate
a hot data log for pending data blocks to write.
min_ssr_sections This parameter adds the threshold when deciding
SSR block allocation. If this is large, SSR mode
will be enabled early.
ram_thresh This parameter controls the memory footprint used
by free nids and cached nat entries. By default,
10 is set, which indicates 10 MB / 1 GB RAM.
ra_nid_pages When building free nids, F2FS reads NAT blocks
ahead for speed up. Default is 0.
dirty_nats_ratio Given dirty ratio of cached nat entries, F2FS
determines flushing them in background.
max_victim_search This parameter controls the number of trials to
find a victim segment when conducting SSR and
cleaning operations. The default value is 4096
which covers 8GB block address range.
migration_granularity For large-sized sections, F2FS can stop GC given
this granularity instead of reclaiming entire
section.
dir_level This parameter controls the directory level to
support large directory. If a directory has a
number of files, it can reduce the file lookup
latency by increasing this dir_level value.
Otherwise, it needs to decrease this value to
reduce the space overhead. The default value is 0.
cp_interval F2FS tries to do checkpoint periodically, 60 secs
by default.
idle_interval F2FS detects system is idle, if there's no F2FS
operations during given interval, 5 secs by
default.
discard_idle_interval F2FS detects the discard thread is idle, given
time interval. Default is 5 secs.
gc_idle_interval F2FS detects the GC thread is idle, given time
interval. Default is 5 secs.
umount_discard_timeout When unmounting the disk, F2FS waits for finishing
queued discard commands which can take huge time.
This gives time out for it, 5 secs by default.
iostat_enable This controls to enable/disable iostat in F2FS.
readdir_ra This enables/disabled readahead of inode blocks
in readdir, and default is enabled.
gc_pin_file_thresh This indicates how many GC can be failed for the
pinned file. If it exceeds this, F2FS doesn't
guarantee its pinning state. 2048 trials is set
by default.
extension_list This enables to change extension_list for hot/cold
files in runtime.
inject_rate This controls injection rate of arbitrary faults.
inject_type This controls injection type of arbitrary faults.
dirty_segments This shows # of dirty segments.
lifetime_write_kbytes This shows # of data written to the disk.
features This shows current features enabled on F2FS.
current_reserved_blocks This shows # of blocks currently reserved.
unusable If checkpoint=disable, this shows the number of
blocks that are unusable.
If checkpoint=enable it shows the number of blocks
that would be unusable if checkpoint=disable were
to be set.
encoding This shows the encoding used for casefolding.
If casefolding is not enabled, returns (none)
================================================================================
USAGE
@@ -777,3 +627,44 @@ zero or random data, which is useful to the below scenario where:
4. address = fibmap(fd, offset)
5. open(blkdev)
6. write(blkdev, address)
Compression implementation
--------------------------
- New term named cluster is defined as basic unit of compression, file can
be divided into multiple clusters logically. One cluster includes 4 << n
(n >= 0) logical pages, compression size is also cluster size, each of
cluster can be compressed or not.
- In cluster metadata layout, one special block address is used to indicate
cluster is compressed one or normal one, for compressed cluster, following
metadata maps cluster to [1, 4 << n - 1] physical blocks, in where f2fs
stores data including compress header and compressed data.
- In order to eliminate write amplification during overwrite, F2FS only
support compression on write-once file, data can be compressed only when
all logical blocks in file are valid and cluster compress ratio is lower
than specified threshold.
- To enable compression on regular inode, there are three ways:
* chattr +c file
* chattr +c dir; touch dir/file
* mount w/ -o compress_extension=ext; touch file.ext
Compress metadata layout:
[Dnode Structure]
+-----------------------------------------------+
| cluster 1 | cluster 2 | ......... | cluster N |
+-----------------------------------------------+
. . . .
. . . .
. Compressed Cluster . . Normal Cluster .
+----------+---------+---------+---------+ +---------+---------+---------+---------+
|compr flag| block 1 | block 2 | block 3 | | block 1 | block 2 | block 3 | block 4 |
+----------+---------+---------+---------+ +---------+---------+---------+---------+
. .
. .
. .
+-------------+-------------+----------+----------------------------+
| data length | data chksum | reserved | compressed data |
+-------------+-------------+----------+----------------------------+

141
Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst
View File

@@ -234,8 +234,8 @@ HKDF is more flexible, is nonreversible, and evenly distributes
entropy from the master key. HKDF is also standardized and widely
used by other software, whereas the AES-128-ECB based KDF is ad-hoc.
Per-file keys
-------------
Per-file encryption keys
------------------------
Since each master key can protect many files, it is necessary to
"tweak" the encryption of each file so that the same plaintext in two
@@ -256,13 +256,8 @@ alternative master keys or to support rotating master keys. Instead,
the master keys may be wrapped in userspace, e.g. as is done by the
`fscrypt <https://github.com/google/fscrypt>`_ tool.
Including the inode number in the IVs was considered. However, it was
rejected as it would have prevented ext4 filesystems from being
resized, and by itself still wouldn't have been sufficient to prevent
the same key from being directly reused for both XTS and CTS-CBC.
DIRECT_KEY and per-mode keys
----------------------------
DIRECT_KEY policies
-------------------
The Adiantum encryption mode (see `Encryption modes and usage`_) is
suitable for both contents and filenames encryption, and it accepts
@@ -273,9 +268,9 @@ is greater than that of an AES-256-XTS key.
Therefore, to improve performance and save memory, for Adiantum a
"direct key" configuration is supported. When the user has enabled
this by setting FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY in the fscrypt policy,
per-file keys are not used. Instead, whenever any data (contents or
filenames) is encrypted, the file's 16-byte nonce is included in the
IV. Moreover:
per-file encryption keys are not used. Instead, whenever any data
(contents or filenames) is encrypted, the file's 16-byte nonce is
included in the IV. Moreover:
- For v1 encryption policies, the encryption is done directly with the
master key. Because of this, users **must not** use the same master
@@ -285,6 +280,21 @@ IV. Moreover:
key derived using the KDF. Users may use the same master key for
other v2 encryption policies.
IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies
-----------------------
When FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64 is set in the fscrypt policy,
the encryption keys are derived from the master key, encryption mode
number, and filesystem UUID. This normally results in all files
protected by the same master key sharing a single contents encryption
key and a single filenames encryption key. To still encrypt different
files' data differently, inode numbers are included in the IVs.
Consequently, shrinking the filesystem may not be allowed.
This format is optimized for use with inline encryption hardware
compliant with the UFS or eMMC standards, which support only 64 IV
bits per I/O request and may have only a small number of keyslots.
Key identifiers
---------------
@@ -292,6 +302,16 @@ For master keys used for v2 encryption policies, a unique 16-byte "key
identifier" is also derived using the KDF. This value is stored in
the clear, since it is needed to reliably identify the key itself.
Dirhash keys
------------
For directories that are indexed using a secret-keyed dirhash over the
plaintext filenames, the KDF is also used to derive a 128-bit
SipHash-2-4 key per directory in order to hash filenames. This works
just like deriving a per-file encryption key, except that a different
KDF context is used. Currently, only casefolded ("case-insensitive")
encrypted directories use this style of hashing.
Encryption modes and usage
==========================
@@ -308,17 +328,18 @@ If unsure, you should use the (AES-256-XTS, AES-256-CTS-CBC) pair.
AES-128-CBC was added only for low-powered embedded devices with
crypto accelerators such as CAAM or CESA that do not support XTS. To
use AES-128-CBC, CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256 (or another SHA-256
implementation) must be enabled so that ESSIV can be used.
use AES-128-CBC, CONFIG_CRYPTO_ESSIV and CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256 (or
another SHA-256 implementation) must be enabled so that ESSIV can be
used.
Adiantum is a (primarily) stream cipher-based mode that is fast even
on CPUs without dedicated crypto instructions. It's also a true
wide-block mode, unlike XTS. It can also eliminate the need to derive
per-file keys. However, it depends on the security of two primitives,
XChaCha12 and AES-256, rather than just one. See the paper
"Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors"
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. To use
Adiantum, CONFIG_CRYPTO_ADIANTUM must be enabled. Also, fast
per-file encryption keys. However, it depends on the security of two
primitives, XChaCha12 and AES-256, rather than just one. See the
paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level
processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details.
To use Adiantum, CONFIG_CRYPTO_ADIANTUM must be enabled. Also, fast
implementations of ChaCha and NHPoly1305 should be enabled, e.g.
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON and CONFIG_CRYPTO_NHPOLY1305_NEON for ARM.
@@ -341,10 +362,16 @@ a little endian number, except that:
is encrypted with AES-256 where the AES-256 key is the SHA-256 hash
of the file's data encryption key.
- In the "direct key" configuration (FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY
set in the fscrypt_policy), the file's nonce is also appended to the
IV. Currently this is only allowed with the Adiantum encryption
mode.
- With `DIRECT_KEY policies`_, the file's nonce is appended to the IV.
Currently this is only allowed with the Adiantum encryption mode.
- With `IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies`_, the logical block number is limited
to 32 bits and is placed in bits 0-31 of the IV. The inode number
(which is also limited to 32 bits) is placed in bits 32-63.
Note that because file logical block numbers are included in the IVs,
filesystems must enforce that blocks are never shifted around within
encrypted files, e.g. via "collapse range" or "insert range".
Filenames encryption
--------------------
@@ -354,10 +381,10 @@ the requirements to retain support for efficient directory lookups and
filenames of up to 255 bytes, the same IV is used for every filename
in a directory.
However, each encrypted directory still uses a unique key; or
alternatively (for the "direct key" configuration) has the file's
nonce included in the IVs. Thus, IV reuse is limited to within a
single directory.
However, each encrypted directory still uses a unique key, or
alternatively has the file's nonce (for `DIRECT_KEY policies`_) or
inode number (for `IV_INO_LBLK_64 policies`_) included in the IVs.
Thus, IV reuse is limited to within a single directory.
With CTS-CBC, the IV reuse means that when the plaintext filenames
share a common prefix at least as long as the cipher block size (16
@@ -431,12 +458,15 @@ This structure must be initialized as follows:
(1) for ``contents_encryption_mode`` and FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_CTS
(4) for ``filenames_encryption_mode``.
- ``flags`` must contain a value from ``<linux/fscrypt.h>`` which
identifies the amount of NUL-padding to use when encrypting
filenames. If unsure, use FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32 (0x3).
Additionally, if the encryption modes are both
FSCRYPT_MODE_ADIANTUM, this can contain
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY; see `DIRECT_KEY and per-mode keys`_.
- ``flags`` contains optional flags from ``<linux/fscrypt.h>``:
- FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_*: The amount of NUL padding to use when
encrypting filenames. If unsure, use FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32
(0x3).
- FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY: See `DIRECT_KEY policies`_.
- FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64: See `IV_INO_LBLK_64
policies`_. This is mutually exclusive with DIRECT_KEY and is not
supported on v1 policies.
- For v2 encryption policies, ``__reserved`` must be zeroed.
@@ -493,7 +523,9 @@ FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY can fail with the following errors:
- ``EEXIST``: the file is already encrypted with an encryption policy
different from the one specified
- ``EINVAL``: an invalid encryption policy was specified (invalid
version, mode(s), or flags; or reserved bits were set)
version, mode(s), or flags; or reserved bits were set); or a v1
encryption policy was specified but the directory has the casefold
flag enabled (casefolding is incompatible with v1 policies).
- ``ENOKEY``: a v2 encryption policy was specified, but the key with
the specified ``master_key_identifier`` has not been added, nor does
the process have the CAP_FOWNER capability in the initial user
@@ -618,7 +650,8 @@ follows::
struct fscrypt_add_key_arg {
struct fscrypt_key_specifier key_spec;
__u32 raw_size;
__u32 __reserved[9];
__u32 key_id;
__u32 __reserved[8];
__u8 raw[];
};
@@ -635,6 +668,12 @@ follows::
} u;
};
struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload {
__u32 type;
__u32 __reserved;
__u8 raw[];
};
:c:type:`struct fscrypt_add_key_arg` must be zeroed, then initialized
as follows:
@@ -657,9 +696,26 @@ as follows:
``Documentation/security/keys/core.rst``).
- ``raw_size`` must be the size of the ``raw`` key provided, in bytes.
Alternatively, if ``key_id`` is nonzero, this field must be 0, since
in that case the size is implied by the specified Linux keyring key.
- ``key_id`` is 0 if the raw key is given directly in the ``raw``
field. Otherwise ``key_id`` is the ID of a Linux keyring key of
type "fscrypt-provisioning" whose payload is a :c:type:`struct
fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload` whose ``raw`` field contains the
raw key and whose ``type`` field matches ``key_spec.type``. Since
``raw`` is variable-length, the total size of this key's payload
must be ``sizeof(struct fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload)`` plus the
raw key size. The process must have Search permission on this key.
Most users should leave this 0 and specify the raw key directly.
The support for specifying a Linux keyring key is intended mainly to
allow re-adding keys after a filesystem is unmounted and re-mounted,
without having to store the raw keys in userspace memory.
- ``raw`` is a variable-length field which must contain the actual
key, ``raw_size`` bytes long.
key, ``raw_size`` bytes long. Alternatively, if ``key_id`` is
nonzero, then this field is unused.
For v2 policy keys, the kernel keeps track of which user (identified
by effective user ID) added the key, and only allows the key to be
@@ -681,11 +737,16 @@ FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY can fail with the following errors:
- ``EACCES``: FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR was specified, but the
caller does not have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the initial
user namespace
user namespace; or the raw key was specified by Linux key ID but the
process lacks Search permission on the key.
- ``EDQUOT``: the key quota for this user would be exceeded by adding
the key
- ``EINVAL``: invalid key size or key specifier type, or reserved bits
were set
- ``EKEYREJECTED``: the raw key was specified by Linux key ID, but the
key has the wrong type
- ``ENOKEY``: the raw key was specified by Linux key ID, but no key
exists with that ID
- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement encryption
- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with encryption
support for this filesystem, or the filesystem superblock has not
@@ -1088,8 +1149,8 @@ The context structs contain the same information as the corresponding
policy structs (see `Setting an encryption policy`_), except that the
context structs also contain a nonce. The nonce is randomly generated
by the kernel and is used as KDF input or as a tweak to cause
different files to be encrypted differently; see `Per-file keys`_ and
`DIRECT_KEY and per-mode keys`_.
different files to be encrypted differently; see `Per-file encryption
keys`_ and `DIRECT_KEY policies`_.
Data path changes
-----------------
@@ -1141,7 +1202,7 @@ filesystem-specific hash(es) needed for directory lookups. This
allows the filesystem to still, with a high degree of confidence, map
the filename given in ->lookup() back to a particular directory entry
that was previously listed by readdir(). See :c:type:`struct
fscrypt_digested_name` in the source for more details.
fscrypt_nokey_name` in the source for more details.
Note that the precise way that filenames are presented to userspace
without the key is subject to change in the future. It is only meant

12
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
View File

@@ -226,6 +226,14 @@ To do so, check for FS_VERITY_FL (0x00100000) in the returned flags.
The verity flag is not settable via FS_IOC_SETFLAGS. You must use
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY instead, since parameters must be provided.
statx
-----
Since Linux v5.5, the statx() system call sets STATX_ATTR_VERITY if
the file has fs-verity enabled. This can perform better than
FS_IOC_GETFLAGS and FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY because it doesn't require
opening the file, and opening verity files can be expensive.
Accessing verity files
======================
@@ -398,7 +406,7 @@ pages have been read into the pagecache. (See `Verifying data`_.)
ext4
----
ext4 supports fs-verity since Linux TODO and e2fsprogs v1.45.2.
ext4 supports fs-verity since Linux v5.4 and e2fsprogs v1.45.2.
To create verity files on an ext4 filesystem, the filesystem must have
been formatted with ``-O verity`` or had ``tune2fs -O verity`` run on
@@ -434,7 +442,7 @@ also only supports extent-based files.
f2fs
----
f2fs supports fs-verity since Linux TODO and f2fs-tools v1.11.0.
f2fs supports fs-verity since Linux v5.4 and f2fs-tools v1.11.0.
To create verity files on an f2fs filesystem, the filesystem must have
been formatted with ``-O verity``.

7
Documentation/filesystems/porting
View File

@@ -606,3 +606,10 @@ in your dentry operations instead.
dentry separately, and it now has request_mask and query_flags arguments
to specify the fields and sync type requested by statx. Filesystems not
supporting any statx-specific features may ignore the new arguments.
--
[mandatory]
[should've been added in 2016] stale comment in finish_open()
nonwithstanding, failure exits in ->atomic_open() instances should
*NOT* fput() the file, no matter what. Everything is handled by the
caller.

4
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
View File

@@ -862,6 +862,7 @@ Writeback: 0 kB
AnonPages: 861800 kB
Mapped: 280372 kB
Shmem: 644 kB
KReclaimable: 168048 kB
Slab: 284364 kB
SReclaimable: 159856 kB
SUnreclaim: 124508 kB
@@ -925,6 +926,9 @@ AnonHugePages: Non-file backed huge pages mapped into userspace page tables
ShmemHugePages: Memory used by shared memory (shmem) and tmpfs allocated
with huge pages
ShmemPmdMapped: Shared memory mapped into userspace with huge pages
KReclaimable: Kernel allocations that the kernel will attempt to reclaim
under memory pressure. Includes SReclaimable (below), and other
direct allocations with a shrinker.
Slab: in-kernel data structures cache
SReclaimable: Part of Slab, that might be reclaimed, such as caches
SUnreclaim: Part of Slab, that cannot be reclaimed on memory pressure

2
Documentation/hid/uhid.txt
View File

@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ them but you should handle them according to your needs.
UHID_OUTPUT:
This is sent if the HID device driver wants to send raw data to the I/O
device on the interrupt channel. You should read the payload and forward it to
the device. The payload is of type "struct uhid_data_req".
the device. The payload is of type "struct uhid_output_req".
This may be received even though you haven't received UHID_OPEN, yet.
UHID_GET_REPORT:

45
Documentation/scheduler/sched-bwc.txt
View File

@@ -90,6 +90,51 @@ There are two ways in which a group may become throttled:
In case b) above, even though the child may have runtime remaining it will not
be allowed to until the parent's runtime is refreshed.
CFS Bandwidth Quota Caveats
---------------------------
Once a slice is assigned to a cpu it does not expire. However all but 1ms of
the slice may be returned to the global pool if all threads on that cpu become
unrunnable. This is configured at compile time by the min_cfs_rq_runtime
variable. This is a performance tweak that helps prevent added contention on
the global lock.
The fact that cpu-local slices do not expire results in some interesting corner
cases that should be understood.
For cgroup cpu constrained applications that are cpu limited this is a
relatively moot point because they will naturally consume the entirety of their
quota as well as the entirety of each cpu-local slice in each period. As a
result it is expected that nr_periods roughly equal nr_throttled, and that
cpuacct.usage will increase roughly equal to cfs_quota_us in each period.
For highly-threaded, non-cpu bound applications this non-expiration nuance
allows applications to briefly burst past their quota limits by the amount of
unused slice on each cpu that the task group is running on (typically at most
1ms per cpu or as defined by min_cfs_rq_runtime). This slight burst only
applies if quota had been assigned to a cpu and then not fully used or returned
in previous periods. This burst amount will not be transferred between cores.
As a result, this mechanism still strictly limits the task group to quota
average usage, albeit over a longer time window than a single period. This
also limits the burst ability to no more than 1ms per cpu. This provides
better more predictable user experience for highly threaded applications with
small quota limits on high core count machines. It also eliminates the
propensity to throttle these applications while simultanously using less than
quota amounts of cpu. Another way to say this, is that by allowing the unused
portion of a slice to remain valid across periods we have decreased the
possibility of wastefully expiring quota on cpu-local silos that don't need a
full slice's amount of cpu time.
The interaction between cpu-bound and non-cpu-bound-interactive applications
should also be considered, especially when single core usage hits 100%. If you
gave each of these applications half of a cpu-core and they both got scheduled
on the same CPU it is theoretically possible that the non-cpu bound application
will use up to 1ms additional quota in some periods, thereby preventing the
cpu-bound application from fully using its quota by that same amount. In these
instances it will be up to the CFS algorithm (see sched-design-CFS.rst) to
decide which application is chosen to run, as they will both be runnable and
have remaining quota. This runtime discrepancy will be made up in the following
periods when the interactive application idles.
Examples
--------
1. Limit a group to 1 CPU worth of runtime.

4
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
View File

@@ -653,8 +653,7 @@ allowed to execute.
perf_event_paranoid:
Controls use of the performance events system by unprivileged
users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN). The default value is 3 if
CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT is set, or 2 otherwise.
users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN). The default value is 2.
-1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK
@@ -662,7 +661,6 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT is set, or 2 otherwise.
Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>=1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>=2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>=3: Disallow all event access by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
==============================================================

4
Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt
View File

@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ The acquisition orders for mutexes are as follows:
On x86, vcpu->mutex is taken outside kvm->arch.hyperv.hv_lock.
For spinlocks, kvm_lock is taken outside kvm->mmu_lock.
Everything else is a leaf: no other lock is taken inside the critical
sections.
@@ -169,7 +167,7 @@ which time it will be set using the Dirty tracking mechanism described above.
------------
Name: kvm_lock
Type: spinlock_t
Type: mutex
Arch: any
Protects: - vm_list

1
Documentation/x86/index.rst
View File

@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@ x86 architecture specifics
:maxdepth: 1
mds
tsx_async_abort

117
Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
TSX Async Abort (TAA) mitigation
================================
.. _tsx_async_abort:
Overview
--------
TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel attack on internal buffers in some
Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS). In this
case certain loads may speculatively pass invalid data to dependent operations
when an asynchronous abort condition is pending in a Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) transaction. This includes loads with no
fault or assist condition. Such loads may speculatively expose stale data from
the same uarch data structures as in MDS, with same scope of exposure i.e.
same-thread and cross-thread. This issue affects all current processors that
support TSX.
Mitigation strategy
-------------------
a) TSX disable - one of the mitigations is to disable TSX. A new MSR
IA32_TSX_CTRL will be available in future and current processors after
microcode update which can be used to disable TSX. In addition, it
controls the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM and HLE) in CPUID.
b) Clear CPU buffers - similar to MDS, clearing the CPU buffers mitigates this
vulnerability. More details on this approach can be found in
:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst <mds>`.
Kernel internal mitigation modes
--------------------------------
============= ============================================================
off Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
tsx_async_abort=off is supplied on the kernel command line.
tsx disabled Mitigation is enabled. TSX feature is disabled by default at
bootup on processors that support TSX control.
verw Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
advertised in CPUID.
ucode needed Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
effort approach without guarantee.
============= ============================================================
If the CPU is affected and the "tsx_async_abort" kernel command line parameter is
not provided then the kernel selects an appropriate mitigation depending on the
status of RTM and MD_CLEAR CPUID bits.
Below tables indicate the impact of tsx=on|off|auto cmdline options on state of
TAA mitigation, VERW behavior and TSX feature for various combinations of
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits.
1. "tsx=off"
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits Result with cmdline tsx=off
---------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
TAA_NO MDS_NO TSX_CTRL_MSR TSX state VERW can clear TAA mitigation TAA mitigation
after bootup CPU buffers tsx_async_abort=off tsx_async_abort=full
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
0 0 1 Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case
0 1 0 HW default No Need ucode update Need ucode update
0 1 1 Disabled Yes TSX disabled TSX disabled
1 X 1 Disabled X None needed None needed
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
2. "tsx=on"
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits Result with cmdline tsx=on
---------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
TAA_NO MDS_NO TSX_CTRL_MSR TSX state VERW can clear TAA mitigation TAA mitigation
after bootup CPU buffers tsx_async_abort=off tsx_async_abort=full
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
0 0 1 Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case
0 1 0 HW default No Need ucode update Need ucode update
0 1 1 Enabled Yes None Same as MDS
1 X 1 Enabled X None needed None needed
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
3. "tsx=auto"
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits Result with cmdline tsx=auto
---------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
TAA_NO MDS_NO TSX_CTRL_MSR TSX state VERW can clear TAA mitigation TAA mitigation
after bootup CPU buffers tsx_async_abort=off tsx_async_abort=full
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
0 0 1 Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case
0 1 0 HW default No Need ucode update Need ucode update
0 1 1 Disabled Yes TSX disabled TSX disabled
1 X 1 Enabled X None needed None needed
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
In the tables, TSX_CTRL_MSR is a new bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES that
indicates whether MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is supported.
There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:
Bit 0: When set it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
XBEGIN instruction).
Bit 1: When set it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
(i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).

23
MAINTAINERS
View File

@@ -5847,6 +5847,14 @@ F: Documentation/isdn/README.gigaset
F: drivers/isdn/gigaset/
F: include/uapi/linux/gigaset_dev.h
GNSS SUBSYSTEM
M: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
S: Maintained
F: Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-gnss
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gnss/
F: drivers/gnss/
F: include/linux/gnss.h
GO7007 MPEG CODEC
M: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
@@ -6891,7 +6899,7 @@ M: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
M: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
L: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
W: https://01.org/linuxgraphics/
B: https://01.org/linuxgraphics/documentation/how-report-bugs
B: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/wikis/How-to-file-i915-bugs
C: irc://chat.freenode.net/intel-gfx
Q: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/project/intel-gfx/
T: git git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm-intel
@@ -7878,6 +7886,13 @@ Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-nvdimm/list/
S: Supported
F: drivers/nvdimm/pmem*
LIBNVDIMM: DEVICETREE BINDINGS
M: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>
L: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-nvdimm/list/
S: Supported
F: drivers/nvdimm/of_pmem.c
LIBNVDIMM: NON-VOLATILE MEMORY DEVICE SUBSYSTEM
M: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
L: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
@@ -9576,6 +9591,12 @@ S: Maintained
F: Documentation/scsi/NinjaSCSI.txt
F: drivers/scsi/nsp32*
NINTENDO HID DRIVER
M: Daniel J. Ogorchock <djogorchock@gmail.com>
L: linux-input@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: drivers/hid/hid-nintendo*
NIOS2 ARCHITECTURE
M: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
L: nios2-dev@lists.rocketboards.org (moderated for non-subscribers)

89
Makefile
View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 14
SUBLEVEL = 150
SUBLEVEL = 174
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Petit Gorille
@@ -499,6 +499,10 @@ CLANG_FLAGS += -Werror=unknown-warning-option
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(CLANG_FLAGS)
KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(CLANG_FLAGS)
export CLANG_FLAGS
ifeq ($(ld-name),lld)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fuse-ld=lld
endif
KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -Qunused-arguments
endif
RETPOLINE_CFLAGS_GCC := -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register
@@ -593,6 +597,8 @@ ifeq ($(dot-config),1)
-include include/config/auto.conf
ifeq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),)
include/config/auto.conf.cmd: check-clang-specific-options
# Read in dependencies to all Kconfig* files, make sure to run
# oldconfig if changes are detected.
-include include/config/auto.conf.cmd
@@ -645,8 +651,7 @@ KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fno-PIE)
CFLAGS_GCOV := -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage \
$(call cc-option,-fno-tree-loop-im) \
$(call cc-disable-warning,maybe-uninitialized,)
CFLAGS_KCOV := $(call cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc,)
export CFLAGS_GCOV CFLAGS_KCOV
export CFLAGS_GCOV
# Make toolchain changes before including arch/$(SRCARCH)/Makefile to ensure
# ar/cc/ld-* macros return correct values.
@@ -660,8 +665,8 @@ endif
# use llvm-ar for building symbol tables from IR files, and llvm-dis instead
# of objdump for processing symbol versions and exports
LLVM_AR := llvm-ar
LLVM_DIS := llvm-dis
export LLVM_AR LLVM_DIS
LLVM_NM := llvm-nm
export LLVM_AR LLVM_NM
endif
# The arch Makefile can set ARCH_{CPP,A,C}FLAGS to override the default
@@ -701,6 +706,7 @@ ifeq ($(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-goto.sh $(CC) $(KBUILD_CFLA
KBUILD_AFLAGS += -DCC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO
endif
include scripts/Makefile.kcov
include scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
ifdef CONFIG_READABLE_ASM
@@ -740,7 +746,6 @@ endif
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flag)
ifeq ($(cc-name),clang)
KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Qunused-arguments,)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, format-invalid-specifier)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, gnu)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, duplicate-decl-specifier)
@@ -758,6 +763,10 @@ else
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, unused-but-set-variable)
endif
ifeq ($(ld-name),lld)
LDFLAGS += -O2
endif
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, unused-const-variable)
ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls
@@ -825,10 +834,24 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fdata-sections,)
endif
ifdef CONFIG_LTO_CLANG
lto-clang-flags := -flto -fvisibility=hidden
ifdef CONFIG_THINLTO
lto-clang-flags := -flto=thin
LDFLAGS += --thinlto-cache-dir=.thinlto-cache
else
lto-clang-flags := -flto
endif
lto-clang-flags += -fvisibility=default $(call cc-option, -fsplit-lto-unit)
# Limit inlining across translation units to reduce binary size
LD_FLAGS_LTO_CLANG := -mllvm -import-instr-limit=5
KBUILD_LDFLAGS += $(LD_FLAGS_LTO_CLANG)
KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE += $(LD_FLAGS_LTO_CLANG)
KBUILD_LDS_MODULE += $(srctree)/scripts/module-lto.lds
# allow disabling only clang LTO where needed
DISABLE_LTO_CLANG := -fno-lto -fvisibility=default
DISABLE_LTO_CLANG := -fno-lto
export DISABLE_LTO_CLANG
endif
@@ -845,7 +868,7 @@ export LDFINAL_vmlinux LDFLAGS_FINAL_vmlinux
endif
ifdef CONFIG_CFI_CLANG
cfi-clang-flags += -fsanitize=cfi $(call cc-option, -fsplit-lto-unit)
cfi-clang-flags += -fsanitize=cfi -fno-sanitize-cfi-canonical-jump-tables
DISABLE_CFI_CLANG := -fno-sanitize=cfi
ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
cfi-clang-flags += -fsanitize-cfi-cross-dso
@@ -871,6 +894,12 @@ DISABLE_LTO += $(DISABLE_CFI)
export DISABLE_CFI
endif
ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
CC_FLAGS_SCS := -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(CC_FLAGS_SCS)
export CC_FLAGS_SCS
endif
# arch Makefile may override CC so keep this after arch Makefile is included
NOSTDINC_FLAGS += -nostdinc -isystem $(shell $(CC) -print-file-name=include)
CHECKFLAGS += $(NOSTDINC_FLAGS)
@@ -917,6 +946,15 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types)
# Require designated initializers for all marked structures
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Werror=designated-init)
# change __FILE__ to the relative path from the srctree
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fmacro-prefix-map=$(srctree)/=)
# ensure -fcf-protection is disabled when using retpoline as it is
# incompatible with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fcf-protection=none)
endif
# use the deterministic mode of AR if available
KBUILD_ARFLAGS := $(call ar-option,D)
@@ -1043,6 +1081,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION
endif
endif
PHONY += prepare0
ifeq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),)
core-y += kernel/ certs/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ block/
@@ -1137,8 +1176,7 @@ include/config/kernel.release: include/config/auto.conf FORCE
# archprepare is used in arch Makefiles and when processed asm symlink,
# version.h and scripts_basic is processed / created.
# Listed in dependency order
PHONY += prepare archprepare prepare0 prepare1 prepare2 prepare3
PHONY += prepare archprepare prepare1 prepare2 prepare3
# prepare3 is used to check if we are building in a separate output directory,
# and if so do:
@@ -1190,6 +1228,22 @@ else
endif
endif
# Disable clang-specific config options when using a different compiler
clang-specific-configs := LTO_CLANG CFI_CLANG SHADOW_CALL_STACK INIT_STACK_ALL
PHONY += check-clang-specific-options
check-clang-specific-options: $(KCONFIG_CONFIG) FORCE
ifneq ($(cc-name),clang)
ifneq ($(findstring y,$(shell $(CONFIG_SHELL) \
$(srctree)/scripts/config --file $(KCONFIG_CONFIG) \
$(foreach c,$(clang-specific-configs),-s $(c)))),)
@echo WARNING: Disabling clang-specific options with $(cc-name) >&2
$(Q)$(srctree)/scripts/config --file $(KCONFIG_CONFIG) \
$(foreach c,$(clang-specific-configs),-d $(c)) && \
$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile olddefconfig
endif
endif
# Check for CONFIG flags that require compiler support. Abort the build
# after .config has been processed, but before the kernel build starts.
#
@@ -1207,7 +1261,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_LTO_CLANG
endif
ifneq ($(ld-name),lld)
ifneq ($(call gold-ifversion, -ge, 112000000, y), y)
@echo Cannot use CONFIG_LTO_CLANG: requires GNU gold 1.12 or later >&2 && exit 1
@echo Cannot use CONFIG_LTO_CLANG: requires GNU gold 1.12 or later >&2 && exit 1
endif
endif
endif
@@ -1624,9 +1678,6 @@ else # KBUILD_EXTMOD
# We are always building modules
KBUILD_MODULES := 1
PHONY += crmodverdir
crmodverdir:
$(cmd_crmodverdir)
PHONY += $(objtree)/Module.symvers
$(objtree)/Module.symvers:
@@ -1638,7 +1689,7 @@ $(objtree)/Module.symvers:
module-dirs := $(addprefix _module_,$(KBUILD_EXTMOD))
PHONY += $(module-dirs) modules
$(module-dirs): crmodverdir $(objtree)/Module.symvers
$(module-dirs): prepare $(objtree)/Module.symvers
$(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=$(patsubst _module_%,%,$@)
modules: $(module-dirs)
@@ -1679,7 +1730,8 @@ help:
# Dummies...
PHONY += prepare scripts
prepare: ;
prepare:
$(cmd_crmodverdir)
scripts: ;
endif # KBUILD_EXTMOD
@@ -1805,17 +1857,14 @@ endif
# Modules
/: prepare scripts FORCE
$(cmd_crmodverdir)
$(Q)$(MAKE) KBUILD_MODULES=$(if $(CONFIG_MODULES),1) \
$(build)=$(build-dir)
# Make sure the latest headers are built for Documentation
Documentation/ samples/: headers_install
%/: prepare scripts FORCE
$(cmd_crmodverdir)
$(Q)$(MAKE) KBUILD_MODULES=$(if $(CONFIG_MODULES),1) \
$(build)=$(build-dir)
%.ko: prepare scripts FORCE
$(cmd_crmodverdir)
$(Q)$(MAKE) KBUILD_MODULES=$(if $(CONFIG_MODULES),1) \
$(build)=$(build-dir) $(@:.ko=.o)
$(Q)$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/scripts/Makefile.modpost

58
arch/Kconfig
View File

@@ -622,6 +622,18 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_LTO_CLANG
- compiling inline assembly with clang's integrated assembler,
- and linking with either lld or GNU gold w/ LLVMgold.
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_THINLTO
bool
help
An architecture should select this if it supports clang's ThinLTO.
config THINLTO
bool "Use clang ThinLTO (EXPERIMENTAL)"
depends on LTO_CLANG && ARCH_SUPPORTS_THINLTO
default y
help
Use ThinLTO to speed up Link Time Optimization.
choice
prompt "Link-Time Optimization (LTO) (EXPERIMENTAL)"
default LTO_NONE
@@ -680,6 +692,52 @@ config CFI_CLANG_SHADOW
If you select this option, the kernel builds a fast look-up table of
CFI check functions in loaded modules to reduce overhead.
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
bool
help
An architecture should select this if it supports Clang's Shadow
Call Stack, has asm/scs.h, and implements runtime support for shadow
stack switching.
choice
prompt "Return-oriented programming (ROP) protection"
default ROP_PROTECTION_NONE
help
This option controls kernel protections against return-oriented
programming (ROP) attacks, which involve overwriting function return
addresses.
config ROP_PROTECTION_NONE
bool "None"
config SHADOW_CALL_STACK
bool "Clang Shadow Call Stack"
depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
help
This option enables Clang's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a
shadow stack to protect function return addresses from being
overwritten by an attacker. More information can be found from
Clang's documentation:
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html
Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the ones
documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses of shadow
stacks used by other tasks and interrupt handlers in memory, which
means an attacker capable reading and writing arbitrary memory may
be able to locate them and hijack control flow by modifying shadow
stacks that are not currently in use.
endchoice
config SHADOW_CALL_STACK_VMAP
bool "Use virtually mapped shadow call stacks"
depends on SHADOW_CALL_STACK
help
Use virtually mapped shadow call stacks. Selecting this option
provides better stack exhaustion protection, but increases per-thread
memory consumption as a full page is allocated for each shadow stack.
config HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
bool
help

1
arch/arc/boot/dts/axs10x_mb.dtsi
View File

@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
interrupt-names = "macirq";
phy-mode = "rgmii";
snps,pbl = < 32 >;
snps,multicast-filter-bins = <256>;
clocks = <&apbclk>;
clock-names = "stmmaceth";
max-speed = <100>;

2
arch/arc/include/asm/linkage.h
View File

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
#define ASM_NL ` /* use '`' to mark new line in macro */
#define __ALIGN .align 4
#define __ALIGN_STR __stringify(__ALIGN)
/* annotation for data we want in DCCM - if enabled in .config */
.macro ARCFP_DATA nm

4
arch/arc/kernel/perf_event.c
View File

@@ -488,8 +488,8 @@ static int arc_pmu_device_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
/* loop thru all available h/w condition indexes */
for (j = 0; j < cc_bcr.c; j++) {
write_aux_reg(ARC_REG_CC_INDEX, j);
cc_name.indiv.word0 = read_aux_reg(ARC_REG_CC_NAME0);
cc_name.indiv.word1 = read_aux_reg(ARC_REG_CC_NAME1);
cc_name.indiv.word0 = le32_to_cpu(read_aux_reg(ARC_REG_CC_NAME0));
cc_name.indiv.word1 = le32_to_cpu(read_aux_reg(ARC_REG_CC_NAME1));
/* See if it has been mapped to a perf event_id */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(arc_pmu_ev_hw_map); i++) {

2
arch/arc/plat-eznps/Kconfig
View File

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
menuconfig ARC_PLAT_EZNPS
bool "\"EZchip\" ARC dev platform"
select CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
select CLKSRC_NPS
select CLKSRC_NPS if !PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT
select EZNPS_GIC
select EZCHIP_NPS_MANAGEMENT_ENET if ETHERNET
help

9
arch/arm/Kconfig
View File

@@ -1535,12 +1535,10 @@ config THUMB2_KERNEL
bool "Compile the kernel in Thumb-2 mode" if !CPU_THUMBONLY
depends on (CPU_V7 || CPU_V7M) && !CPU_V6 && !CPU_V6K
default y if CPU_THUMBONLY
select ARM_ASM_UNIFIED
select ARM_UNWIND
help
By enabling this option, the kernel will be compiled in
Thumb-2 mode. A compiler/assembler that understand the unified
ARM-Thumb syntax is needed.
Thumb-2 mode.
If unsure, say N.
@@ -1575,9 +1573,6 @@ config THUMB2_AVOID_R_ARM_THM_JUMP11
Unless you are sure your tools don't have this problem, say Y.
config ARM_ASM_UNIFIED
bool
config ARM_PATCH_IDIV
bool "Runtime patch udiv/sdiv instructions into __aeabi_{u}idiv()"
depends on CPU_32v7 && !XIP_KERNEL
@@ -2052,7 +2047,7 @@ config XIP_PHYS_ADDR
config KEXEC
bool "Kexec system call (EXPERIMENTAL)"
depends on (!SMP || PM_SLEEP_SMP)
depends on !CPU_V7M
depends on MMU
select KEXEC_CORE
help
kexec is a system call that implements the ability to shutdown your

51
arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
View File

@@ -1023,14 +1023,21 @@ choice
Say Y here if you want kernel low-level debugging support
on SOCFPGA(Cyclone 5 and Arria 5) based platforms.
config DEBUG_SOCFPGA_UART1
config DEBUG_SOCFPGA_ARRIA10_UART1
depends on ARCH_SOCFPGA
bool "Use SOCFPGA UART1 for low-level debug"
bool "Use SOCFPGA Arria10 UART1 for low-level debug"
select DEBUG_UART_8250
help
Say Y here if you want kernel low-level debugging support
on SOCFPGA(Arria 10) based platforms.
config DEBUG_SOCFPGA_CYCLONE5_UART1
depends on ARCH_SOCFPGA
bool "Use SOCFPGA Cyclone 5 UART1 for low-level debug"
select DEBUG_UART_8250
help
Say Y here if you want kernel low-level debugging support
on SOCFPGA(Cyclone 5 and Arria 5) based platforms.
config DEBUG_SUN9I_UART0
bool "Kernel low-level debugging messages via sun9i UART0"
@@ -1376,21 +1383,21 @@ config DEBUG_OMAP2PLUS_UART
depends on ARCH_OMAP2PLUS
config DEBUG_IMX_UART_PORT
int "i.MX Debug UART Port Selection" if DEBUG_IMX1_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX25_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX21_IMX27_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX31_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX35_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX50_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX51_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX53_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX6Q_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX6SL_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX6SX_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX6UL_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX7D_UART
int "i.MX Debug UART Port Selection"
depends on DEBUG_IMX1_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX25_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX21_IMX27_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX31_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX35_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX50_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX51_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX53_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX6Q_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX6SL_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX6SX_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX6UL_UART || \
DEBUG_IMX7D_UART
default 1
depends on ARCH_MXC
help
Choose UART port on which kernel low-level debug messages
should be output.
@@ -1585,7 +1592,8 @@ config DEBUG_UART_PHYS
default 0xfe800000 if ARCH_IOP32X
default 0xff690000 if DEBUG_RK32_UART2
default 0xffc02000 if DEBUG_SOCFPGA_UART0
default 0xffc02100 if DEBUG_SOCFPGA_UART1
default 0xffc02100 if DEBUG_SOCFPGA_ARRIA10_UART1
default 0xffc03000 if DEBUG_SOCFPGA_CYCLONE5_UART1
default 0xffd82340 if ARCH_IOP13XX
default 0xffe40000 if DEBUG_RCAR_GEN1_SCIF0
default 0xffe42000 if DEBUG_RCAR_GEN1_SCIF2
@@ -1689,7 +1697,8 @@ config DEBUG_UART_VIRT
default 0xfeb30c00 if DEBUG_KEYSTONE_UART0
default 0xfeb31000 if DEBUG_KEYSTONE_UART1
default 0xfec02000 if DEBUG_SOCFPGA_UART0
default 0xfec02100 if DEBUG_SOCFPGA_UART1
default 0xfec02100 if DEBUG_SOCFPGA_ARRIA10_UART1
default 0xfec03000 if DEBUG_SOCFPGA_CYCLONE5_UART1
default 0xfec12000 if (DEBUG_MVEBU_UART0 || DEBUG_MVEBU_UART0_ALTERNATE) && ARCH_MVEBU
default 0xfec12100 if DEBUG_MVEBU_UART1_ALTERNATE
default 0xfec10000 if DEBUG_SIRFATLAS7_UART0
@@ -1737,9 +1746,9 @@ config DEBUG_UART_8250_WORD
depends on DEBUG_LL_UART_8250 || DEBUG_UART_8250
depends on DEBUG_UART_8250_SHIFT >= 2
default y if DEBUG_PICOXCELL_UART || \
DEBUG_SOCFPGA_UART0 || DEBUG_SOCFPGA_UART1 || \
DEBUG_KEYSTONE_UART0 || DEBUG_KEYSTONE_UART1 || \
DEBUG_ALPINE_UART0 || \
DEBUG_SOCFPGA_UART0 || DEBUG_SOCFPGA_ARRIA10_UART1 || \
DEBUG_SOCFPGA_CYCLONE5_UART1 || DEBUG_KEYSTONE_UART0 || \
DEBUG_KEYSTONE_UART1 || DEBUG_ALPINE_UART0 || \
DEBUG_DAVINCI_DMx_UART0 || DEBUG_DAVINCI_DA8XX_UART1 || \
DEBUG_DAVINCI_DA8XX_UART2 || \
DEBUG_BCM_KONA_UART || DEBUG_RK32_UART2

15
arch/arm/Makefile
View File

@@ -39,7 +39,10 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mno-unaligned-access)
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER),y)
KBUILD_CFLAGS +=-fno-omit-frame-pointer -mapcs -mno-sched-prolog
KBUILD_CFLAGS +=-fno-omit-frame-pointer
ifeq ($(cc-name),gcc)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mapcs -mno-sched-prolog
endif
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN),y)
@@ -115,9 +118,15 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM_UNWIND),y)
CFLAGS_ABI +=-funwind-tables
endif
ifeq ($(cc-name),clang)
CFLAGS_ABI += -meabi gnu
endif
# Accept old syntax despite ".syntax unified"
AFLAGS_NOWARN :=$(call as-option,-Wa$(comma)-mno-warn-deprecated,-Wa$(comma)-W)
ifeq ($(CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL),y)
AFLAGS_AUTOIT :=$(call as-option,-Wa$(comma)-mimplicit-it=always,-Wa$(comma)-mauto-it)
AFLAGS_NOWARN :=$(call as-option,-Wa$(comma)-mno-warn-deprecated,-Wa$(comma)-W)
CFLAGS_ISA :=-mthumb $(AFLAGS_AUTOIT) $(AFLAGS_NOWARN)
AFLAGS_ISA :=$(CFLAGS_ISA) -Wa$(comma)-mthumb
# Work around buggy relocation from gas if requested:
@@ -125,7 +134,7 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_THUMB2_AVOID_R_ARM_THM_JUMP11),y)
CFLAGS_MODULE +=-fno-optimize-sibling-calls
endif
else
CFLAGS_ISA :=$(call cc-option,-marm,)
CFLAGS_ISA :=$(call cc-option,-marm,) $(AFLAGS_NOWARN)
AFLAGS_ISA :=$(CFLAGS_ISA)
endif

4
arch/arm/boot/compressed/libfdt_env.h
View File

@@ -2,10 +2,14 @@
#ifndef _ARM_LIBFDT_ENV_H
#define _ARM_LIBFDT_ENV_H
#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#define INT32_MAX S32_MAX
#define UINT32_MAX U32_MAX
typedef __be16 fdt16_t;
typedef __be32 fdt32_t;
typedef __be64 fdt64_t;

5
arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-boneblack-common.dtsi
View File

@@ -131,6 +131,11 @@
};
/ {
memory@80000000 {
device_type = "memory";
reg = <0x80000000 0x20000000>; /* 512 MB */
};
clk_mcasp0_fixed: clk_mcasp0_fixed {
#clock-cells = <0>;
compatible = "fixed-clock";

12
arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-evm.dts
View File

@@ -724,6 +724,7 @@
pinctrl-0 = <&cpsw_default>;
pinctrl-1 = <&cpsw_sleep>;
status = "okay";
slaves = <1>;
};
&davinci_mdio {
@@ -731,15 +732,14 @@
pinctrl-0 = <&davinci_mdio_default>;
pinctrl-1 = <&davinci_mdio_sleep>;
status = "okay";
ethphy0: ethernet-phy@0 {
reg = <0>;
};
};
&cpsw_emac0 {
phy_id = <&davinci_mdio>, <0>;
phy-mode = "rgmii-txid";
};
&cpsw_emac1 {
phy_id = <&davinci_mdio>, <1>;
phy-handle = <&ethphy0>;
phy-mode = "rgmii-txid";
};

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/am4372.dtsi
View File

@@ -1118,6 +1118,8 @@
ti,hwmods = "dss_dispc";
clocks = <&disp_clk>;
clock-names = "fck";
max-memory-bandwidth = <230000000>;
};
rfbi: rfbi@4832a800 {

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/am437x-gp-evm.dts
View File

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
};
lcd0: display {
compatible = "osddisplays,osd057T0559-34ts", "panel-dpi";
compatible = "osddisplays,osd070t1718-19ts", "panel-dpi";
label = "lcd";
panel-timing {

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/am43x-epos-evm.dts
View File

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
};
lcd0: display {
compatible = "osddisplays,osd057T0559-34ts", "panel-dpi";
compatible = "osddisplays,osd070t1718-19ts", "panel-dpi";
label = "lcd";
panel-timing {

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/am571x-idk.dts
View File

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
&pcie1_rc {
status = "okay";
gpios = <&gpio3 23 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
gpios = <&gpio5 18 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
};
&pcie1_ep {

21
arch/arm/boot/dts/am57xx-beagle-x15-common.dtsi
View File

@@ -32,6 +32,27 @@
reg = <0x0 0x80000000 0x0 0x80000000>;
};
main_12v0: fixedregulator-main_12v0 {
/* main supply */
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "main_12v0";
regulator-min-microvolt = <12000000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <12000000>;
regulator-always-on;
regulator-boot-on;
};
evm_5v0: fixedregulator-evm_5v0 {
/* Output of TPS54531D */
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "evm_5v0";
regulator-min-microvolt = <5000000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <5000000>;
vin-supply = <&main_12v0>;
regulator-always-on;
regulator-boot-on;
};
vdd_3v3: fixedregulator-vdd_3v3 {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "vdd_3v3";

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/arm-realview-eb.dtsi
View File

@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@
clock-names = "uartclk", "apb_pclk";
};
ssp: ssp@1000d000 {
ssp: spi@1000d000 {
compatible = "arm,pl022", "arm,primecell";
reg = <0x1000d000 0x1000>;
clocks = <&sspclk>, <&pclk>;

6
arch/arm/boot/dts/arm-realview-pb1176.dts
View File

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
};
/* The voltage to the MMC card is hardwired at 3.3V */
vmmc: fixedregulator@0 {
vmmc: regulator-vmmc {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "vmmc";
regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
regulator-boot-on;
};
veth: fixedregulator@0 {
veth: regulator-veth {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "veth";
regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@
clock-names = "apb_pclk";
};
pb1176_ssp: ssp@1010b000 {
pb1176_ssp: spi@1010b000 {
compatible = "arm,pl022", "arm,primecell";
reg = <0x1010b000 0x1000>;
interrupt-parent = <&intc_dc1176>;

6
arch/arm/boot/dts/arm-realview-pb11mp.dts
View File

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
};
/* The voltage to the MMC card is hardwired at 3.3V */
vmmc: fixedregulator@0 {
vmmc: regulator-vmmc {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "vmmc";
regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@
regulator-boot-on;
};
veth: fixedregulator@0 {
veth: regulator-veth {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "veth";
regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@
clock-names = "uartclk", "apb_pclk";
};
ssp@1000d000 {
spi@1000d000 {
compatible = "arm,pl022", "arm,primecell";
reg = <0x1000d000 0x1000>;
interrupt-parent = <&intc_pb11mp>;

7
arch/arm/boot/dts/arm-realview-pbx.dtsi
View File

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
};
/* The voltage to the MMC card is hardwired at 3.3V */
vmmc: fixedregulator@0 {
vmmc: regulator-vmmc {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "vmmc";
regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
regulator-boot-on;
};
veth: fixedregulator@0 {
veth: regulator-veth {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "veth";
regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@
clock-names = "uartclk", "apb_pclk";
};
ssp: ssp@1000d000 {
ssp: spi@1000d000 {
compatible = "arm,pl022", "arm,primecell";
reg = <0x1000d000 0x1000>;
clocks = <&sspclk>, <&pclk>;
@@ -539,4 +539,3 @@
};
};
};

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-388-clearfog.dtsi
View File

@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@
&clearfog_sdhci_cd_pins>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
status = "okay";
vmmc = <&reg_3p3v>;
vmmc-supply = <&reg_3p3v>;
wp-inverted;
};

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/at91-sama5d4_xplained.dts
View File

@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@
rootfs@800000 {
label = "rootfs";
reg = <0x800000 0x0f800000>;
reg = <0x800000 0x1f800000>;
};
};
};

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9g45.dtsi
View File

@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@
};
};
uart1 {
usart1 {
pinctrl_usart1: usart1-0 {
atmel,pins =
<AT91_PIOB 4 AT91_PERIPH_A AT91_PINCTRL_PULL_UP /* PB4 periph A with pullup */

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/at91sam9x5cm.dtsi
View File

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
rootfs@800000 {
label = "rootfs";
reg = <0x800000 0x1f800000>;
reg = <0x800000 0x0f800000>;
};
};
};

4
arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm-cygnus.dtsi
View File

@@ -165,8 +165,8 @@
mdio: mdio@18002000 {
compatible = "brcm,iproc-mdio";
reg = <0x18002000 0x8>;
#size-cells = <1>;
#address-cells = <0>;
#size-cells = <0>;
#address-cells = <1>;
status = "disabled";
gphy0: ethernet-phy@0 {

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm283x.dtsi
View File

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
trips {
cpu-crit {
temperature = <80000>;
temperature = <90000>;
hysteresis = <0>;
type = "critical";
};

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/dove-cubox.dts
View File

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
status = "okay";
clock-frequency = <100000>;
si5351: clock-generator {
si5351: clock-generator@60 {
compatible = "silabs,si5351a-msop";
reg = <0x60>;
#address-cells = <1>;

6
arch/arm/boot/dts/dove.dtsi
View File

@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@
0xffffe000 MBUS_ID(0x03, 0x01) 0 0x0000800 /* CESA SRAM 2k */
0xfffff000 MBUS_ID(0x0d, 0x00) 0 0x0000800>; /* PMU SRAM 2k */
spi0: spi-ctrl@10600 {
spi0: spi@10600 {
compatible = "marvell,orion-spi";
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@
status = "disabled";
};
i2c: i2c-ctrl@11000 {
i2c: i2c@11000 {
compatible = "marvell,mv64xxx-i2c";
reg = <0x11000 0x20>;
#address-cells = <1>;
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@
status = "disabled";
};
spi1: spi-ctrl@14600 {
spi1: spi@14600 {
compatible = "marvell,orion-spi";
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;

3
arch/arm/boot/dts/dra7.dtsi
View File

@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@
<0 0 0 2 &pcie1_intc 2>,
<0 0 0 3 &pcie1_intc 3>,
<0 0 0 4 &pcie1_intc 4>;
ti,syscon-unaligned-access = <&scm_conf1 0x14 1>;
status = "disabled";
pcie1_intc: interrupt-controller {
interrupt-controller;
@@ -367,6 +368,7 @@
<0 0 0 2 &pcie2_intc 2>,
<0 0 0 3 &pcie2_intc 3>,
<0 0 0 4 &pcie2_intc 4>;
ti,syscon-unaligned-access = <&scm_conf1 0x14 2>;
pcie2_intc: interrupt-controller {
interrupt-controller;
#address-cells = <0>;
@@ -1540,6 +1542,7 @@
dr_mode = "otg";
snps,dis_u3_susphy_quirk;
snps,dis_u2_susphy_quirk;
snps,dis_metastability_quirk;
};
};

5
arch/arm/boot/dts/dra76x.dtsi
View File

@@ -17,3 +17,8 @@
&crossbar_mpu {
ti,irqs-skip = <10 67 68 133 139 140>;
};
&mmc3 {
/* dra76x is not affected by i887 */
max-frequency = <96000000>;
};

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos3250.dtsi
View File

@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@
};
hsotg: hsotg@12480000 {
compatible = "snps,dwc2";
compatible = "samsung,s3c6400-hsotg", "snps,dwc2";
reg = <0x12480000 0x20000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 141 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&cmu CLK_USBOTG>;

9
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-arndale.dts
View File

@@ -169,6 +169,8 @@
reg = <0x66>;
interrupt-parent = <&gpx3>;
interrupts = <2 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&s5m8767_irq>;
vinb1-supply = <&main_dc_reg>;
vinb2-supply = <&main_dc_reg>;
@@ -544,6 +546,13 @@
cap-sd-highspeed;
};
&pinctrl_0 {
s5m8767_irq: s5m8767-irq {
samsung,pins = "gpx3-2";
samsung,pin-pud = <EXYNOS_PIN_PULL_NONE>;
};
};
&rtc {
status = "okay";
};

11
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5250-snow-rev5.dts
View File

@@ -23,6 +23,14 @@
samsung,model = "Snow-I2S-MAX98090";
samsung,audio-codec = <&max98090>;
cpu {
sound-dai = <&i2s0 0>;
};
codec {
sound-dai = <&max98090 0>, <&hdmi>;
};
};
};
@@ -34,6 +42,9 @@
interrupt-parent = <&gpx0>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&max98090_irq>;
clocks = <&pmu_system_controller 0>;
clock-names = "mclk";
#sound-dai-cells = <1>;
};
};

3
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5420-peach-pit.dts
View File

@@ -301,6 +301,7 @@
regulator-name = "vdd_1v35";
regulator-min-microvolt = <1350000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1350000>;
regulator-always-on;
regulator-boot-on;
regulator-state-mem {
regulator-on-in-suspend;
@@ -322,6 +323,7 @@
regulator-name = "vdd_2v";
regulator-min-microvolt = <2000000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <2000000>;
regulator-always-on;
regulator-boot-on;
regulator-state-mem {
regulator-on-in-suspend;
@@ -332,6 +334,7 @@
regulator-name = "vdd_1v8";
regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
regulator-always-on;
regulator-boot-on;
regulator-state-mem {
regulator-on-in-suspend;

3
arch/arm/boot/dts/exynos5800-peach-pi.dts
View File

@@ -301,6 +301,7 @@
regulator-name = "vdd_1v35";
regulator-min-microvolt = <1350000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1350000>;
regulator-always-on;
regulator-boot-on;
regulator-state-mem {
regulator-on-in-suspend;
@@ -322,6 +323,7 @@
regulator-name = "vdd_2v";
regulator-min-microvolt = <2000000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <2000000>;
regulator-always-on;
regulator-boot-on;
regulator-state-mem {
regulator-on-in-suspend;
@@ -332,6 +334,7 @@
regulator-name = "vdd_1v8";
regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
regulator-always-on;
regulator-boot-on;
regulator-state-mem {
regulator-on-in-suspend;

37
arch/arm/boot/dts/gemini-sq201.dts
View File

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
};
chosen {
bootargs = "console=ttyS0,115200n8";
bootargs = "console=ttyS0,115200n8 root=/dev/mtdblock2 rw rootfstype=squashfs,jffs2 rootwait";
stdout-path = &uart0;
};
@@ -71,37 +71,10 @@
/* 16MB of flash */
reg = <0x30000000 0x01000000>;
partition@0 {
label = "RedBoot";
reg = <0x00000000 0x00120000>;
read-only;
};
partition@120000 {
label = "Kernel";
reg = <0x00120000 0x00200000>;
};
partition@320000 {
label = "Ramdisk";
reg = <0x00320000 0x00600000>;
};
partition@920000 {
label = "Application";
reg = <0x00920000 0x00600000>;
};
partition@f20000 {
label = "VCTL";
reg = <0x00f20000 0x00020000>;
read-only;
};
partition@f40000 {
label = "CurConf";
reg = <0x00f40000 0x000a0000>;
read-only;
};
partition@fe0000 {
label = "FIS directory";
reg = <0x00fe0000 0x00020000>;
read-only;
partitions {
compatible = "redboot-fis";
/* Eraseblock at 0xfe0000 */
fis-index-block = <0x1fc>;
};
};

8
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53-voipac-dmm-668.dtsi
View File

@@ -17,12 +17,8 @@
memory@70000000 {
device_type = "memory";
reg = <0x70000000 0x20000000>;
};
memory@b0000000 {
device_type = "memory";
reg = <0xb0000000 0x20000000>;
reg = <0x70000000 0x20000000>,
<0xb0000000 0x20000000>;
};
regulators {

6
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-zii-rdu2.dtsi
View File

@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@
pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_usdhc2>;
bus-width = <4>;
cd-gpios = <&gpio2 2 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
wp-gpios = <&gpio2 3 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
disable-wp;
vmmc-supply = <&reg_3p3v_sd>;
vqmmc-supply = <&reg_3p3v>;
status = "okay";
@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@
pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_usdhc3>;
bus-width = <4>;
cd-gpios = <&gpio2 0 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
wp-gpios = <&gpio2 1 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
disable-wp;
vmmc-supply = <&reg_3p3v_sd>;
vqmmc-supply = <&reg_3p3v>;
status = "okay";
@@ -1001,7 +1001,6 @@
MX6QDL_PAD_SD2_DAT1__SD2_DATA1 0x17059
MX6QDL_PAD_SD2_DAT2__SD2_DATA2 0x17059
MX6QDL_PAD_SD2_DAT3__SD2_DATA3 0x17059
MX6QDL_PAD_NANDF_D3__GPIO2_IO03 0x40010040
MX6QDL_PAD_NANDF_D2__GPIO2_IO02 0x40010040
>;
};
@@ -1014,7 +1013,6 @@
MX6QDL_PAD_SD3_DAT1__SD3_DATA1 0x17059
MX6QDL_PAD_SD3_DAT2__SD3_DATA2 0x17059
MX6QDL_PAD_SD3_DAT3__SD3_DATA3 0x17059
MX6QDL_PAD_NANDF_D1__GPIO2_IO01 0x40010040
MX6QDL_PAD_NANDF_D0__GPIO2_IO00 0x40010040
>;

8
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx7s.dtsi
View File

@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx7d-gpt", "fsl,imx6sx-gpt";
reg = <0x302d0000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 55 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_GPT1_ROOT_CLK>,
<&clks IMX7D_GPT1_ROOT_CLK>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
};
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx7d-gpt", "fsl,imx6sx-gpt";
reg = <0x302e0000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 54 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_GPT2_ROOT_CLK>,
<&clks IMX7D_GPT2_ROOT_CLK>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
status = "disabled";
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx7d-gpt", "fsl,imx6sx-gpt";
reg = <0x302f0000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 53 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_GPT3_ROOT_CLK>,
<&clks IMX7D_GPT3_ROOT_CLK>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
status = "disabled";
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx7d-gpt", "fsl,imx6sx-gpt";
reg = <0x30300000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 52 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_GPT4_ROOT_CLK>,
<&clks IMX7D_GPT4_ROOT_CLK>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
status = "disabled";

4
arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-torpedo-som.dtsi
View File

@@ -270,3 +270,7 @@
&twl_gpio {
ti,use-leds;
};
&twl_keypad {
status = "disabled";
};

4
arch/arm/boot/dts/lpc3250-phy3250.dts
View File

@@ -49,8 +49,8 @@
sd_reg: regulator@2 {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "sd_reg";
regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
gpio = <&gpio 5 5 0>;
enable-active-high;
};

14
arch/arm/boot/dts/lpc32xx.dtsi
View File

@@ -139,11 +139,11 @@
};
clcd: clcd@31040000 {
compatible = "arm,pl110", "arm,primecell";
compatible = "arm,pl111", "arm,primecell";
reg = <0x31040000 0x1000>;
interrupts = <14 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk LPC32XX_CLK_LCD>;
clock-names = "apb_pclk";
clocks = <&clk LPC32XX_CLK_LCD>, <&clk LPC32XX_CLK_LCD>;
clock-names = "clcdclk", "apb_pclk";
status = "disabled";
};
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@
* ssp0 and spi1 are shared pins;
* enable one in your board dts, as needed.
*/
ssp0: ssp@20084000 {
ssp0: spi@20084000 {
compatible = "arm,pl022", "arm,primecell";
reg = <0x20084000 0x1000>;
interrupts = <20 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@
* ssp1 and spi2 are shared pins;
* enable one in your board dts, as needed.
*/
ssp1: ssp@2008c000 {
ssp1: spi@2008c000 {
compatible = "arm,pl022", "arm,primecell";
reg = <0x2008c000 0x1000>;
interrupts = <21 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
@@ -462,7 +462,9 @@
key: key@40050000 {
compatible = "nxp,lpc3220-key";
reg = <0x40050000 0x1000>;
interrupts = <54 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk LPC32XX_CLK_KEY>;
interrupt-parent = <&sic1>;
interrupts = <22 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
status = "disabled";
};

9
arch/arm/boot/dts/ls1021a-twr.dts
View File

@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@
};
&enet0 {
tbi-handle = <&tbi1>;
tbi-handle = <&tbi0>;
phy-handle = <&sgmii_phy2>;
phy-connection-type = "sgmii";
status = "okay";
@@ -222,6 +222,13 @@
sgmii_phy2: ethernet-phy@2 {
reg = <0x2>;
};
tbi0: tbi-phy@1f {
reg = <0x1f>;
device_type = "tbi-phy";
};
};
&mdio1 {
tbi1: tbi-phy@1f {
reg = <0x1f>;
device_type = "tbi-phy";

9
arch/arm/boot/dts/ls1021a.dtsi
View File

@@ -569,6 +569,15 @@
reg = <0x0 0x2d24000 0x0 0x4000>;
};
mdio1: mdio@2d64000 {
compatible = "gianfar";
device_type = "mdio";
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
reg = <0x0 0x2d64000 0x0 0x4000>,
<0x0 0x2d50030 0x0 0x4>;
};
ptp_clock@2d10e00 {
compatible = "fsl,etsec-ptp";
reg = <0x0 0x2d10e00 0x0 0xb0>;

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/meson8.dtsi
View File

@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@
#clock-cells = <1>;
#reset-cells = <1>;
compatible = "amlogic,meson8-clkc";
reg = <0x8000 0x4>, <0x4000 0x460>;
reg = <0x8000 0x4>, <0x4000 0x400>;
};
pwm_ef: pwm@86c0 {

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/meson8b.dtsi
View File

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
#clock-cells = <1>;
#reset-cells = <1>;
compatible = "amlogic,meson8b-clkc";
reg = <0x8000 0x4>, <0x4000 0x460>;
reg = <0x8000 0x4>, <0x4000 0x400>;
};
reset: reset-controller@4404 {

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/mmp2.dtsi
View File

@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@
clocks = <&soc_clocks MMP2_CLK_GPIO>;
resets = <&soc_clocks MMP2_CLK_GPIO>;
interrupt-controller;
#interrupt-cells = <1>;
#interrupt-cells = <2>;
ranges;
gcb0: gpio@d4019000 {

49
arch/arm/boot/dts/omap3-gta04.dtsi
View File

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
aliases {
display0 = &lcd;
display1 = &tv0;
};
gpio-keys {
@@ -71,7 +72,7 @@
#sound-dai-cells = <0>;
};
spi_lcd {
spi_lcd: spi_lcd {
compatible = "spi-gpio";
#address-cells = <0x1>;
#size-cells = <0x0>;
@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@
};
tv0: connector {
compatible = "svideo-connector";
compatible = "composite-video-connector";
label = "tv";
port {
@@ -135,7 +136,7 @@
tv_amp: opa362 {
compatible = "ti,opa362";
enable-gpios = <&gpio1 23 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
enable-gpios = <&gpio1 23 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>; /* GPIO_23 to enable video out amplifier */
ports {
#address-cells = <1>;
@@ -274,6 +275,13 @@
OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x2134, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP | MUX_MODE4) /* gpio112 */
>;
};
penirq_pins: pinmux_penirq_pins {
pinctrl-single,pins = <
/* here we could enable to wakeup the cpu from suspend by a pen touch */
OMAP3_CORE1_IOPAD(0x2194, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP | MUX_MODE4) /* gpio160 */
>;
};
};
&omap3_pmx_core2 {
@@ -411,10 +419,19 @@
tsc2007@48 {
compatible = "ti,tsc2007";
reg = <0x48>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&penirq_pins>;
interrupt-parent = <&gpio6>;
interrupts = <0 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_FALLING>; /* GPIO_160 */
gpios = <&gpio6 0 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
gpios = <&gpio6 0 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>; /* GPIO_160 */
ti,x-plate-ohms = <600>;
touchscreen-size-x = <480>;
touchscreen-size-y = <640>;
touchscreen-max-pressure = <1000>;
touchscreen-fuzz-x = <3>;
touchscreen-fuzz-y = <8>;
touchscreen-fuzz-pressure = <10>;
touchscreen-inverted-y;
};
/* RFID EEPROM */
@@ -520,6 +537,12 @@
regulator-max-microvolt = <3150000>;
};
/* Needed to power the DPI pins */
&vpll2 {
regulator-always-on;
};
&dss {
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = < &dss_dpi_pins >;
@@ -540,10 +563,14 @@
vdda-supply = <&vdac>;
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
port {
reg = <0>;
venc_out: endpoint {
remote-endpoint = <&opa_in>;
ti,channels = <2>;
ti,channels = <1>;
ti,invert-polarity;
};
};
@@ -587,22 +614,22 @@
bootloaders@80000 {
label = "U-Boot";
reg = <0x80000 0x1e0000>;
reg = <0x80000 0x1c0000>;
};
bootloaders_env@260000 {
bootloaders_env@240000 {
label = "U-Boot Env";
reg = <0x260000 0x20000>;
reg = <0x240000 0x40000>;
};
kernel@280000 {
label = "Kernel";
reg = <0x280000 0x400000>;
reg = <0x280000 0x600000>;
};
filesystem@680000 {
filesystem@880000 {
label = "File System";
reg = <0x680000 0xf980000>;
reg = <0x880000 0>; /* 0 = MTDPART_SIZ_FULL */
};
};
};

36
arch/arm/boot/dts/omap3-pandora-common.dtsi
View File

@@ -221,6 +221,17 @@
gpio = <&gpio6 4 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>; /* GPIO_164 */
};
/* wl1251 wifi+bt module */
wlan_en: fixed-regulator-wg7210_en {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "vwlan";
regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
startup-delay-us = <50000>;
enable-active-high;
gpio = <&gpio1 23 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
};
/* wg7210 (wifi+bt module) 32k clock buffer */
wg7210_32k: fixed-regulator-wg7210_32k {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
@@ -514,9 +525,30 @@
/*wp-gpios = <&gpio4 31 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;*/ /* GPIO_127 */
};
/* mmc3 is probed using pdata-quirks to pass wl1251 card data */
&mmc3 {
status = "disabled";
vmmc-supply = <&wlan_en>;
bus-width = <4>;
non-removable;
ti,non-removable;
cap-power-off-card;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&mmc3_pins>;
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
wlan: wifi@1 {
compatible = "ti,wl1251";
reg = <1>;
interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
interrupts = <21 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; /* GPIO_21 */
ti,wl1251-has-eeprom;
};
};
/* bluetooth*/

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/omap3-tao3530.dtsi
View File

@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@
pinctrl-0 = <&mmc1_pins>;
vmmc-supply = <&vmmc1>;
vqmmc-supply = <&vsim>;
cd-gpios = <&twl_gpio 0 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
cd-gpios = <&twl_gpio 0 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
bus-width = <8>;
};

5
arch/arm/boot/dts/omap5-board-common.dtsi
View File

@@ -694,6 +694,11 @@
vbus-supply = <&smps10_out1_reg>;
};
&dwc3 {
extcon = <&extcon_usb3>;
dr_mode = "otg";
};
&mcspi1 {
};

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/orion5x-linkstation.dtsi
View File

@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@
&i2c {
status = "okay";
rtc {
rtc@32 {
compatible = "ricoh,rs5c372a";
reg = <0x32>;
};

4
arch/arm/boot/dts/pxa25x.dtsi
View File

@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@
#pwm-cells = <1>;
clocks = <&clks CLK_PWM1>;
};
rtc@40900000 {
clocks = <&clks CLK_OSC32k768>;
};
};
timer@40a00000 {

8
arch/arm/boot/dts/pxa27x.dtsi
View File

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
clocks = <&clks CLK_NONE>;
};
pxa27x_ohci: usb@4c000000 {
usb0: usb@4c000000 {
compatible = "marvell,pxa-ohci";
reg = <0x4c000000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <3>;
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
clocks = <&clks CLK_PWM1>;
};
pwri2c: i2c@40f000180 {
pwri2c: i2c@40f00180 {
compatible = "mrvl,pxa-i2c";
reg = <0x40f00180 0x24>;
interrupts = <6>;
@@ -113,6 +113,10 @@
status = "disabled";
};
rtc@40900000 {
clocks = <&clks CLK_OSC32k768>;
};
};
clocks {

7
arch/arm/boot/dts/pxa2xx.dtsi
View File

@@ -117,13 +117,6 @@
status = "disabled";
};
usb0: ohci@4c000000 {
compatible = "marvell,pxa-ohci";
reg = <0x4c000000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <3>;
status = "disabled";
};
mmc0: mmc@41100000 {
compatible = "marvell,pxa-mmc";
reg = <0x41100000 0x1000>;

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/pxa3xx.dtsi
View File

@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@
status = "disabled";
};
pxa3xx_ohci: usb@4c000000 {
usb0: usb@4c000000 {
compatible = "marvell,pxa-ohci";
reg = <0x4c000000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <3>;

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/qcom-ipq4019.dtsi
View File

@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@
saw0: regulator@b089000 {
compatible = "qcom,saw2";
reg = <0x02089000 0x1000>, <0x0b009000 0x1000>;
reg = <0x0b089000 0x1000>, <0x0b009000 0x1000>;
regulator;
};

8
arch/arm/boot/dts/r8a7779.dtsi
View File

@@ -67,6 +67,14 @@
<0xf0000100 0x100>;
};
timer@f0000200 {
compatible = "arm,cortex-a9-global-timer";
reg = <0xf0000200 0x100>;
interrupts = <GIC_PPI 11
(GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) | IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING)>;
clocks = <&cpg_clocks R8A7779_CLK_ZS>;
};
timer@f0000600 {
compatible = "arm,cortex-a9-twd-timer";
reg = <0xf0000600 0x20>;

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3036.dtsi
View File

@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@
/* no rts / cts for uart2 */
};
spi {
spi-pins {
spi_txd:spi-txd {
rockchip,pins = <1 29 RK_FUNC_3 &pcfg_pull_default>;
};

8
arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3188-radxarock.dts
View File

@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@
regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
gpio = <&gpio3 RK_PA1 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&sdmmc_pwr>;
startup-delay-us = <100000>;
vin-supply = <&vcc_io>;
};
@@ -348,6 +350,12 @@
};
};
sd0 {
sdmmc_pwr: sdmmc-pwr {
rockchip,pins = <RK_GPIO3 1 RK_FUNC_GPIO &pcfg_pull_none>;
};
};
usb {
host_vbus_drv: host-vbus-drv {
rockchip,pins = <0 3 RK_FUNC_GPIO &pcfg_pull_none>;

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-rock2-som.dtsi
View File

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
vcc_flash: flash-regulator {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "vcc_sys";
regulator-name = "vcc_flash";
regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
startup-delay-us = <150>;

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