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Merge branch 'deprecated/android-4.14-stable' of https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common into lineage-21.0

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Change-Id: I8750f4152cf3c402ef61f9266766128541dfa05c
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Haky86
2024-10-11 16:00:11 +02:00
parent f8789ad88b 014241ad77
commit f01fa25d84
6204 changed files with 77519 additions and 52456 deletions
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5
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-ata
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@@ -59,17 +59,18 @@ class
dma_mode
Transfer modes supported by the device when in DMA mode.
DMA transfer mode used by the device.
Mostly used by PATA device.
pio_mode
Transfer modes supported by the device when in PIO mode.
PIO transfer mode used by the device.
Mostly used by PATA device.
xfer_mode
Current transfer mode.
Mostly used by PATA device.
id

5
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio
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@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ Description:
Raw capacitance measurement from channel Y. Units after
application of scale and offset are nanofarads.
What: /sys/.../iio:deviceX/in_capacitanceY-in_capacitanceZ_raw
What: /sys/.../iio:deviceX/in_capacitanceY-capacitanceZ_raw
KernelVersion: 3.2
Contact: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
Description:
@@ -1524,7 +1524,8 @@ What: /sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_concentrationX_voc_raw
KernelVersion: 4.3
Contact: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
Description:
Raw (unscaled no offset etc.) percentage reading of a substance.
Raw (unscaled no offset etc.) reading of a substance. Units
after application of scale and offset are percents.
What: /sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_resistance_raw
What: /sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_resistanceX_raw

2
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio-vf610
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
What: /sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/conversion_mode
What: /sys/bus/iio/devices/iio:deviceX/in_conversion_mode
KernelVersion: 4.2
Contact: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
Description:

12
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
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@@ -375,15 +375,17 @@ Description: information about CPUs heterogeneity.
cpu_capacity: capacity of cpu#.
What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities

6
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
What: /sys/kernel/oops_count
Date: November 2022
KernelVersion: 6.2.0
Contact: Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
Description:
Shows how many times the system has Oopsed since last boot.

6
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
What: /sys/kernel/warn_count
Date: November 2022
KernelVersion: 6.2.0
Contact: Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>
Description:
Shows how many times the system has Warned since last boot.

6
Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt
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@@ -2989,10 +2989,10 @@
65 = /dev/infiniband/issm1 Second InfiniBand IsSM device
...
127 = /dev/infiniband/issm63 63rd InfiniBand IsSM device
128 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs0 First InfiniBand verbs device
129 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs1 Second InfiniBand verbs device
192 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs0 First InfiniBand verbs device
193 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs1 Second InfiniBand verbs device
...
159 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs31 31st InfiniBand verbs device
223 = /dev/infiniband/uverbs31 31st InfiniBand verbs device
232 char Biometric Devices
0 = /dev/biometric/sensor0/fingerprint first fingerprint sensor on first device

109
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
GDS - Gather Data Sampling
==========================
Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
speculative access to data which was previously stored in vector registers.
Problem
-------
When a gather instruction performs loads from memory, different data elements
are merged into the destination vector register. However, when a gather
instruction that is transiently executed encounters a fault, stale data from
architectural or internal vector registers may get transiently forwarded to the
destination vector register instead. This will allow a malicious attacker to
infer stale data using typical side channel techniques like cache timing
attacks. GDS is a purely sampling-based attack.
The attacker uses gather instructions to infer the stale vector register data.
The victim does not need to do anything special other than use the vector
registers. The victim does not need to use gather instructions to be
vulnerable.
Because the buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads cross Hyper-Thread attacks
are possible.
Attack scenarios
----------------
Without mitigation, GDS can infer stale data across virtually all
permission boundaries:
Non-enclaves can infer SGX enclave data
Userspace can infer kernel data
Guests can infer data from hosts
Guest can infer guest from other guests
Users can infer data from other users
Because of this, it is important to ensure that the mitigation stays enabled in
lower-privilege contexts like guests and when running outside SGX enclaves.
The hardware enforces the mitigation for SGX. Likewise, VMMs should ensure
that guests are not allowed to disable the GDS mitigation. If a host erred and
allowed this, a guest could theoretically disable GDS mitigation, mount an
attack, and re-enable it.
Mitigation mechanism
--------------------
This issue is mitigated in microcode. The microcode defines the following new
bits:
================================ === ============================
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_CTRL] R/O Enumerates GDS vulnerability
and mitigation support.
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[GDS_NO] R/O Processor is not vulnerable.
IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_DIS] R/W Disables the mitigation
0 by default.
IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[GDS_MITG_LOCK] R/W Locks GDS_MITG_DIS=0. Writes
to GDS_MITG_DIS are ignored
Can't be cleared once set.
================================ === ============================
GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by
disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or
"clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line.
If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning off XSAVE YMM support.
However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support. Userspace that
does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM
support will break.
Mitigation control on the kernel command line
---------------------------------------------
The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or
"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will default
to the mitigation being enabled. Specifying "gather_data_sampling=force" will
use the microcode mitigation when available or disable AVX on affected systems
where the microcode hasn't been updated to include the mitigation.
GDS System Information
------------------------
The kernel provides vulnerability status information through sysfs. For
GDS this can be accessed by the following sysfs file:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
The possible values contained in this file are:
============================== =============================================
Not affected Processor not vulnerable.
Vulnerable Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled.
Vulnerable: No microcode Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
mitigation.
Mitigation: AVX disabled,
no microcode Processor is vulnerable and microcode is missing
mitigation. AVX disabled as mitigation.
Mitigation: Microcode Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
effect.
Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
effect and cannot be disabled.
Unknown: Dependent on
hypervisor status Running on a virtual guest processor that is
affected but with no way to know if host
processor is mitigated or vulnerable.
============================== =============================================
GDS Default mitigation
----------------------
The updated microcode will enable the mitigation by default. The kernel's
default action is to leave the mitigation enabled.

2
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
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@@ -15,3 +15,5 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
tsx_async_abort
multihit.rst
special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
gather_data_sampling.rst

260
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
=========================================
Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities
=========================================
Processor MMIO Stale Data Vulnerabilities are a class of memory-mapped I/O
(MMIO) vulnerabilities that can expose data. The sequences of operations for
exposing data range from simple to very complex. Because most of the
vulnerabilities require the attacker to have access to MMIO, many environments
are not affected. System environments using virtualization where MMIO access is
provided to untrusted guests may need mitigation. These vulnerabilities are
not transient execution attacks. However, these vulnerabilities may propagate
stale data into core fill buffers where the data can subsequently be inferred
by an unmitigated transient execution attack. Mitigation for these
vulnerabilities includes a combination of microcode update and software
changes, depending on the platform and usage model. Some of these mitigations
are similar to those used to mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) or
those used to mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS).
Data Propagators
================
Propagators are operations that result in stale data being copied or moved from
one microarchitectural buffer or register to another. Processor MMIO Stale Data
Vulnerabilities are operations that may result in stale data being directly
read into an architectural, software-visible state or sampled from a buffer or
register.
Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP)
-----------------------------------------
Stale data may propagate from fill buffers (FB) into the non-coherent portion
of the uncore on some non-coherent writes. Fill buffer propagation by itself
does not make stale data architecturally visible. Stale data must be propagated
to a location where it is subject to reading or sampling.
Sideband Stale Data Propagator (SSDP)
-------------------------------------
The sideband stale data propagator (SSDP) is limited to the client (including
Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. The sideband response buffer is
shared by all client cores. For non-coherent reads that go to sideband
destinations, the uncore logic returns 64 bytes of data to the core, including
both requested data and unrequested stale data, from a transaction buffer and
the sideband response buffer. As a result, stale data from the sideband
response and transaction buffers may now reside in a core fill buffer.
Primary Stale Data Propagator (PSDP)
------------------------------------
The primary stale data propagator (PSDP) is limited to the client (including
Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation. Similar to the sideband response
buffer, the primary response buffer is shared by all client cores. For some
processors, MMIO primary reads will return 64 bytes of data to the core fill
buffer including both requested data and unrequested stale data. This is
similar to the sideband stale data propagator.
Vulnerabilities
===============
Device Register Partial Write (DRPW) (CVE-2022-21166)
-----------------------------------------------------
Some endpoint MMIO registers incorrectly handle writes that are smaller than
the register size. Instead of aborting the write or only copying the correct
subset of bytes (for example, 2 bytes for a 2-byte write), more bytes than
specified by the write transaction may be written to the register. On
processors affected by FBSDP, this may expose stale data from the fill buffers
of the core that created the write transaction.
Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS) (CVE-2022-21125)
----------------------------------------------------
After propagators may have moved data around the uncore and copied stale data
into client core fill buffers, processors affected by MFBDS can leak data from
the fill buffer. It is limited to the client (including Intel Xeon server E3)
uncore implementation.
Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) (CVE-2022-21123)
------------------------------------------------
It is similar to Shared Buffer Data Sampling (SBDS) except that the data is
directly read into the architectural software-visible state. It is limited to
the client (including Intel Xeon server E3) uncore implementation.
Affected Processors
===================
Not all the CPUs are affected by all the variants. For instance, most
processors for the server market (excluding Intel Xeon E3 processors) are
impacted by only Device Register Partial Write (DRPW).
Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_:
=================== ============ =========
Common name Family_Model Steppings
=================== ============ =========
HASWELL_X 06_3FH 2,4
SKYLAKE_L 06_4EH 3
BROADWELL_X 06_4FH All
SKYLAKE_X 06_55H 3,4,6,7,11
BROADWELL_D 06_56H 3,4,5
SKYLAKE 06_5EH 3
ICELAKE_X 06_6AH 4,5,6
ICELAKE_D 06_6CH 1
ICELAKE_L 06_7EH 5
ATOM_TREMONT_D 06_86H All
LAKEFIELD 06_8AH 1
KABYLAKE_L 06_8EH 9 to 12
ATOM_TREMONT 06_96H 1
ATOM_TREMONT_L 06_9CH 0
KABYLAKE 06_9EH 9 to 13
COMETLAKE 06_A5H 2,3,5
COMETLAKE_L 06_A6H 0,1
ROCKETLAKE 06_A7H 1
=================== ============ =========
If a CPU is in the affected processor list, but not affected by a variant, it
is indicated by new bits in MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. As described in a later
section, mitigation largely remains the same for all the variants, i.e. to
clear the CPU fill buffers via VERW instruction.
New bits in MSRs
================
Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new
bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate
specific variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities and mitigation
capability.
MSR IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
--------------------------
Bit 13 - SBDR_SSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by either the
Shared Buffers Data Read (SBDR) vulnerability or the sideband stale
data propagator (SSDP).
Bit 14 - FBSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by the Fill Buffer
Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP).
Bit 15 - PSDP_NO - When set, processor is not affected by Primary Stale Data
Propagator (PSDP).
Bit 17 - FB_CLEAR - When set, VERW instruction will overwrite CPU fill buffer
values as part of MD_CLEAR operations. Processors that do not
enumerate MDS_NO (meaning they are affected by MDS) but that do
enumerate support for both L1D_FLUSH and MD_CLEAR implicitly enumerate
FB_CLEAR as part of their MD_CLEAR support.
Bit 18 - FB_CLEAR_CTRL - Processor supports read and write to MSR
IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL[FB_CLEAR_DIS]. On such processors, the FB_CLEAR_DIS
bit can be set to cause the VERW instruction to not perform the
FB_CLEAR action. Not all processors that support FB_CLEAR will support
FB_CLEAR_CTRL.
MSR IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL
---------------------
Bit 3 - FB_CLEAR_DIS - When set, VERW instruction does not perform the FB_CLEAR
action. This may be useful to reduce the performance impact of FB_CLEAR in
cases where system software deems it warranted (for example, when performance
is more critical, or the untrusted software has no MMIO access). Note that
FB_CLEAR_DIS has no impact on enumeration (for example, it does not change
FB_CLEAR or MD_CLEAR enumeration) and it may not be supported on all processors
that enumerate FB_CLEAR.
Mitigation
==========
Like MDS, all variants of Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities have the
same mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before
an attacker can extract the secrets.
This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears the affected CPU
buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
Kernel reuses the MDS function to invoke the buffer clearing:
mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
On MDS affected CPUs, the kernel already invokes CPU buffer clear on
kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state (idle) transitions. No
additional mitigation is needed on such CPUs.
For CPUs not affected by MDS or TAA, mitigation is needed only for the attacker
with MMIO capability. Therefore, VERW is not required for kernel/userspace. For
virtualization case, VERW is only needed at VMENTER for a guest with MMIO
capability.
Mitigation points
-----------------
Return to user space
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Same mitigation as MDS when affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise no mitigation
needed.
C-State transition
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Control register writes by CPU during C-state transition can propagate data
from fill buffer to uncore buffers. Execute VERW before C-state transition to
clear CPU fill buffers.
Guest entry point
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Same mitigation as MDS when processor is also affected by MDS/TAA, otherwise
execute VERW at VMENTER only for MMIO capable guests. On CPUs not affected by
MDS/TAA, guest without MMIO access cannot extract secrets using Processor MMIO
Stale Data vulnerabilities, so there is no need to execute VERW for such guests.
Mitigation control on the kernel command line
---------------------------------------------
The kernel command line allows to control the Processor MMIO Stale Data
mitigations at boot time with the option "mmio_stale_data=". The valid
arguments for this option are:
========== =================================================================
full If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing
on exit to userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are
protected as well. It does not automatically disable SMT.
full,nosmt Same as full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable CPUs. This is the
complete mitigation.
off Disables mitigation completely.
========== =================================================================
If the CPU is affected and mmio_stale_data=off is not supplied on the kernel
command line, then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation.
Mitigation status information
-----------------------------
The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and
which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
The possible values in this file are:
.. list-table::
* - 'Not affected'
- The processor is not vulnerable
* - 'Vulnerable'
- The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
* - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
- The processor is vulnerable, but microcode is not updated. The
mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis.
* - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
- The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
enabled.
* - 'Unknown: No mitigations'
- The processor vulnerability status is unknown because it is
out of Servicing period. Mitigation is not attempted.
Definitions:
------------
Servicing period: The process of providing functional and security updates to
Intel processors or platforms, utilizing the Intel Platform Update (IPU)
process or other similar mechanisms.
End of Servicing Updates (ESU): ESU is the date at which Intel will no
longer provide Servicing, such as through IPU or other similar update
processes. ESU dates will typically be aligned to end of quarter.
If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to
the above information:
======================== ===========================================
'SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled
'SMT disabled' SMT is disabled
'SMT Host state unknown' Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
======================== ===========================================
References
----------
.. [#f1] Affected Processors
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html

79
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
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@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the speculative execution.
Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>`
:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
---------------------------------------
@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ steer its indirect branch speculations to gadget code, and measure the
speculative execution's side effects left in level 1 cache to infer the
victim's data.
Yet another variant 2 attack vector is for the attacker to poison the
Branch History Buffer (BHB) to speculatively steer an indirect branch
to a specific Branch Target Buffer (BTB) entry, even if the entry isn't
associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically,
the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of
Enhanced IBRS.
Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable
unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines).
For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines).
Attack scenarios
----------------
@@ -364,13 +377,15 @@ The possible values in this file are:
- Kernel status:
==================================== =================================
'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
'Vulnerable' Vulnerable, no mitigation
'Mitigation: Full generic retpoline' Software-focused mitigation
'Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline' AMD-specific software mitigation
'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation
==================================== =================================
======================================== =================================
'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
'Mitigation: None' Vulnerable, no mitigation
'Mitigation: Retpolines' Use Retpoline thunks
'Mitigation: LFENCE' Use LFENCE instructions
'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS' Hardware-focused mitigation
'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines' Hardware-focused + Retpolines
'Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE' Hardware-focused + LFENCE
======================================== =================================
- Firmware status: Show if Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) is
used to protect against Spectre variant 2 attacks when calling firmware (x86 only).
@@ -407,6 +422,14 @@ The possible values in this file are:
'RSB filling' Protection of RSB on context switch enabled
============= ===========================================
- EIBRS Post-barrier Return Stack Buffer (PBRSB) protection status:
=========================== =======================================================
'PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence' CPU is affected and protection of RSB on VMEXIT enabled
'PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable' CPU is vulnerable
'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected' CPU is not affected by PBRSB
=========================== =======================================================
Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
report vulnerability.
@@ -456,8 +479,16 @@ Spectre variant 2
On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced
IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.
On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. IBRS
or enhanced IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.
Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at
boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against
Spectre v2 variant attacks, including cross-thread branch target injections
on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, eIBRS enables STIBP too.
Legacy IBRS systems clear the IBRS bit on exit to userspace and
therefore explicitly enable STIBP for that
The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable
CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator
@@ -468,7 +499,7 @@ Spectre variant 2
before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
using the firmware.
Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
@@ -481,9 +512,12 @@ Spectre variant 2
For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs
can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches.
This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch
target buffer left by malicious software. Alternatively, the
programs can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl()
(See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
target buffer left by malicious software.
On legacy IBRS systems, at return to userspace, implicit STIBP is disabled
because the kernel clears the IBRS bit. In this case, the userspace programs
can disable indirect branch speculation via prctl() (See
:ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).
On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the
sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to
flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program.
@@ -584,12 +618,13 @@ kernel command line.
Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
retpoline
replace indirect branches
retpoline,generic
google's original retpoline
retpoline,amd
AMD-specific minimal thunk
retpoline auto pick between generic,lfence
retpoline,generic Retpolines
retpoline,lfence LFENCE; indirect branch
retpoline,amd alias for retpoline,lfence
eibrs enhanced IBRS
eibrs,retpoline enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
eibrs,lfence enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.
@@ -730,7 +765,7 @@ AMD white papers:
.. _spec_ref6:
[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_.
ARM white papers:

145
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
View File

@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@
loops can be debugged more effectively on production
systems.
clearcpuid=BITNUM [X86]
clearcpuid=BITNUM[,BITNUM...] [X86]
Disable CPUID feature X for the kernel. See
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h for the valid bit
numbers. Note the Linux specific bits are not necessarily
@@ -790,10 +790,6 @@
debugpat [X86] Enable PAT debugging
decnet.addr= [HW,NET]
Format: <area>[,<node>]
See also Documentation/networking/decnet.txt.
default_hugepagesz=
[same as hugepagesz=] The size of the default
HugeTLB page size. This is the size represented by
@@ -1254,6 +1250,26 @@
Format: off | on
default: on
gather_data_sampling=
[X86,INTEL] Control the Gather Data Sampling (GDS)
mitigation.
Gather Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which
allows unprivileged speculative access to data which was
previously stored in vector registers.
This issue is mitigated by default in updated microcode.
The mitigation may have a performance impact but can be
disabled. On systems without the microcode mitigation
disabling AVX serves as a mitigation.
force: Disable AVX to mitigate systems without
microcode mitigation. No effect if the microcode
mitigation is present. Known to cause crashes in
userspace with buggy AVX enumeration.
off: Disable GDS mitigation.
gcov_persist= [GCOV] When non-zero (default), profiling data for
kernel modules is saved and remains accessible via
debugfs, even when the module is unloaded/reloaded.
@@ -1932,8 +1948,12 @@
Default is 1 (enabled)
kvm-intel.emulate_invalid_guest_state=
[KVM,Intel] Enable emulation of invalid guest states
Default is 0 (disabled)
[KVM,Intel] Disable emulation of invalid guest state.
Ignored if kvm-intel.enable_unrestricted_guest=1, as
guest state is never invalid for unrestricted guests.
This param doesn't apply to nested guests (L2), as KVM
never emulates invalid L2 guest state.
Default is 1 (enabled)
kvm-intel.flexpriority=
[KVM,Intel] Disable FlexPriority feature (TPR shadow).
@@ -2460,19 +2480,23 @@
Disable all optional CPU mitigations. This
improves system performance, but it may also
expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
Equivalent to: gather_data_sampling=off [X86]
kpti=0 [ARM64]
nospectre_v1 [PPC]
nobp=0 [S390]
nospectre_v1 [X86]
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
l1tf=off [X86]
mds=off [X86]
mmio_stale_data=off [X86]
no_entry_flush [PPC]
no_uaccess_flush [PPC]
nobp=0 [S390]
nopti [X86,PPC]
nospectre_v1 [PPC]
nospectre_v1 [X86]
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
Exceptions:
This does not have any effect on
@@ -2494,6 +2518,7 @@
Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
mds=full,nosmt [X86]
tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86]
mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt [X86]
mminit_loglevel=
[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
@@ -2503,6 +2528,40 @@
log everything. Information is printed at KERN_DEBUG
so loglevel=8 may also need to be specified.
mmio_stale_data=
[X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the Processor
MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Processor MMIO Stale Data is a class of
vulnerabilities that may expose data after an MMIO
operation. Exposed data could originate or end in
the same CPU buffers as affected by MDS and TAA.
Therefore, similar to MDS and TAA, the mitigation
is to clear the affected CPU buffers.
This parameter controls the mitigation. The
options are:
full - Enable mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
full,nosmt - Enable mitigation and disable SMT on
vulnerable CPUs.
off - Unconditionally disable mitigation
On MDS or TAA affected machines,
mmio_stale_data=off can be prevented by an active
MDS or TAA mitigation as these vulnerabilities are
mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to
disable this mitigation, you need to specify
mds=off and tsx_async_abort=off too.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
mmio_stale_data=full.
For details see:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
module.sig_enforce
[KNL] When CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is set, this means that
modules without (valid) signatures will fail to load.
@@ -2776,6 +2835,8 @@
noefi Disable EFI runtime services support.
no_entry_flush [PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache when entering the kernel.
noexec [IA-64]
noexec [X86]
@@ -2825,6 +2886,9 @@
nospec_store_bypass_disable
[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
no_uaccess_flush
[PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache after accessing user data.
noxsave [BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
@@ -3510,6 +3574,18 @@
ramdisk_size= [RAM] Sizes of RAM disks in kilobytes
See Documentation/blockdev/ramdisk.txt.
random.trust_cpu={on,off}
[KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of the
CPU's random number generator (if available) to
fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
[KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
ras=option[,option,...] [KNL] RAS-specific options
cec_disable [X86]
@@ -3948,6 +4024,18 @@
retain_initrd [RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction
retbleed= [X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions)
vulnerability.
off - unconditionally disable
auto - automatically select a migitation
Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run
time according to the CPU.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto.
rfkill.default_state=
0 "airplane mode". All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm,
etc. communication is blocked by default.
@@ -4181,8 +4269,13 @@
Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
retpoline - replace indirect branches
retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
retpoline,amd - AMD-specific minimal thunk
retpoline,generic - Retpolines
retpoline,lfence - LFENCE; indirect branch
retpoline,amd - alias for retpoline,lfence
eibrs - enhanced IBRS
eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
ibrs - use IBRS to protect kernel
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.
@@ -4785,6 +4878,7 @@
device);
j = NO_REPORT_LUNS (don't use report luns
command, uas only);
k = NO_SAME (do not use WRITE_SAME, uas only)
l = NOT_LOCKABLE (don't try to lock and
unlock ejectable media, not on uas);
m = MAX_SECTORS_64 (don't transfer more
@@ -5064,6 +5158,21 @@
Disables the PV optimizations forcing the HVM guest to
run as generic HVM guest with no PV drivers.
xen.balloon_boot_timeout= [XEN]
The time (in seconds) to wait before giving up to boot
in case initial ballooning fails to free enough memory.
Applies only when running as HVM or PVH guest and
started with less memory configured than allowed at
max. Default is 180.
xen.event_eoi_delay= [XEN]
How long to delay EOI handling in case of event
storms (jiffies). Default is 10.
xen.event_loop_timeout= [XEN]
After which time (jiffies) the event handling loop
should start to delay EOI handling. Default is 2.
xirc2ps_cs= [NET,PCMCIA]
Format:
<irq>,<irq_mask>,<io>,<full_duplex>,<do_sound>,<lockup_hack>[,<irq2>[,<irq3>[,<irq4>]]]

24
Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
View File

@@ -42,20 +42,18 @@ disclosure is from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known)
to a few weeks. As a basic default policy, we expect report date to
disclosure date to be on the order of 7 days.
Coordination
------------
Coordination with other groups
------------------------------
Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege
escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private
<linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors
are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the
upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and
will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update
publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate,
the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can
include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
<http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
The kernel security team strongly recommends that reporters of potential
security issues NEVER contact the "linux-distros" mailing list until
AFTER discussing it with the kernel security team. Do not Cc: both
lists at once. You may contact the linux-distros mailing list after a
fix has been agreed on and you fully understand the requirements that
doing so will impose on you and the kernel community.
The different lists have different goals and the linux-distros rules do
not contribute to actually fixing any potential security problems.
CVE assignment
--------------

3
Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.txt
View File

@@ -53,9 +53,12 @@ stable kernels.
| ARM | Cortex-A57 | #832075 | ARM64_ERRATUM_832075 |
| ARM | Cortex-A57 | #852523 | N/A |
| ARM | Cortex-A57 | #834220 | ARM64_ERRATUM_834220 |
| ARM | Cortex-A57 | #1742098 | ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098 |
| ARM | Cortex-A72 | #853709 | N/A |
| ARM | Cortex-A72 | #1655431 | ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098 |
| ARM | Cortex-A73 | #858921 | ARM64_ERRATUM_858921 |
| ARM | Cortex-A55 | #1024718 | ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718 |
| ARM | Cortex-A76 | #1188873 | ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 |
| ARM | Cortex-A76 | #1286807 | ARM64_ERRATUM_1286807 |
| ARM | MMU-500 | #841119,#826419 | N/A |
| | | | |

2
Documentation/conf.py
View File

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ finally:
#
# This is also used if you do content translation via gettext catalogs.
# Usually you set "language" from the command line for these cases.
language = None
language = 'en'
# There are two options for replacing |today|: either, you set today to some
# non-false value, then it is used:

4
Documentation/dev-tools/gdb-kernel-debugging.rst
View File

@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ Setup
this mode. In this case, you should build the kernel with
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE disabled if the architecture supports KASLR.
- Build the gdb scripts (required on kernels v5.1 and above)::
make scripts_gdb
- Enable the gdb stub of QEMU/KVM, either
- at VM startup time by appending "-s" to the QEMU command line

4
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/moxa,moxart-dma.txt
View File

@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ Example:
Use specific request line passing from dma
For example, MMC request line is 5
sdhci: sdhci@98e00000 {
compatible = "moxa,moxart-sdhci";
mmc: mmc@98e00000 {
compatible = "moxa,moxart-mmc";
reg = <0x98e00000 0x5C>;
interrupts = <5 0>;
clocks = <&clk_apb>;

5
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gpio/gpio-altera.txt
View File

@@ -9,8 +9,9 @@ Required properties:
- The second cell is reserved and is currently unused.
- gpio-controller : Marks the device node as a GPIO controller.
- interrupt-controller: Mark the device node as an interrupt controller
- #interrupt-cells : Should be 1. The interrupt type is fixed in the hardware.
- #interrupt-cells : Should be 2. The interrupt type is fixed in the hardware.
- The first cell is the GPIO offset number within the GPIO controller.
- The second cell is the interrupt trigger type and level flags.
- interrupts: Specify the interrupt.
- altr,interrupt-type: Specifies the interrupt trigger type the GPIO
hardware is synthesized. This field is required if the Altera GPIO controller
@@ -38,6 +39,6 @@ gpio_altr: gpio@0xff200000 {
altr,interrupt-type = <IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>;
#gpio-cells = <2>;
gpio-controller;
#interrupt-cells = <1>;
#interrupt-cells = <2>;
interrupt-controller;
};

2
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/multiplexer/io-channel-mux.txt
View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ controller state. The mux controller state is described in
Example:
mux: mux-controller {
compatible = "mux-gpio";
compatible = "gpio-mux";
#mux-control-cells = <0>;
mux-gpios = <&pioA 0 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>,

2
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/mtd/gpmc-nand.txt
View File

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ on various other factors also like;
so the device should have enough free bytes available its OOB/Spare
area to accommodate ECC for entire page. In general following expression
helps in determining if given device can accommodate ECC syndrome:
"2 + (PAGESIZE / 512) * ECC_BYTES" >= OOBSIZE"
"2 + (PAGESIZE / 512) * ECC_BYTES" <= OOBSIZE"
where
OOBSIZE number of bytes in OOB/spare area
PAGESIZE number of bytes in main-area of device page

2
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/btusb.txt
View File

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Following example uses irq pin number 3 of gpio0 for out of band wake-on-bt:
compatible = "usb1286,204e";
reg = <1>;
interrupt-parent = <&gpio0>;
interrupt-name = "wakeup";
interrupt-names = "wakeup";
interrupts = <3 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW>;
};
};

2
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/nxp-nci.txt
View File

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Example (for ARM-based BeagleBone with NPC100 NFC controller on I2C2):
clock-frequency = <100000>;
interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
interrupts = <29 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
interrupts = <29 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
enable-gpios = <&gpio0 30 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
firmware-gpios = <&gpio0 31 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;

2
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/pn544.txt
View File

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Example (for ARM-based BeagleBone with PN544 on I2C2):
clock-frequency = <400000>;
interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
interrupts = <17 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
interrupts = <17 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
enable-gpios = <&gpio3 21 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
firmware-gpios = <&gpio3 19 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;

26
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pinctrl/marvell,armada-37xx-pinctrl.txt
View File

@@ -43,26 +43,26 @@ group emmc_nb
group pwm0
- pin 11 (GPIO1-11)
- functions pwm, gpio
- functions pwm, led, gpio
group pwm1
- pin 12
- functions pwm, gpio
- functions pwm, led, gpio
group pwm2
- pin 13
- functions pwm, gpio
- functions pwm, led, gpio
group pwm3
- pin 14
- functions pwm, gpio
- functions pwm, led, gpio
group pmic1
- pin 17
- pin 7
- functions pmic, gpio
group pmic0
- pin 16
- pin 6
- functions pmic, gpio
group i2c2
@@ -112,17 +112,25 @@ group usb2_drvvbus1
- functions drvbus, gpio
group sdio_sb
- pins 60-64
- pins 60-65
- functions sdio, gpio
group rgmii
- pins 42-55
- pins 42-53
- functions mii, gpio
group pcie1
- pins 39-40
- pins 39
- functions pcie, gpio
group pcie1_clkreq
- pins 40
- functions pcie, gpio
group smi
- pins 54-55
- functions smi, gpio
group ptp
- pins 56-58
- functions ptp, gpio

23
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/samsung,s5m8767.txt
View File

@@ -13,6 +13,14 @@ common regulator binding documented in:
Required properties of the main device node (the parent!):
- s5m8767,pmic-buck-ds-gpios: GPIO specifiers for three host gpio's used
for selecting GPIO DVS lines. It is one-to-one mapped to dvs gpio lines.
[1] If either of the 's5m8767,pmic-buck[2/3/4]-uses-gpio-dvs' optional
property is specified, then all the eight voltage values for the
's5m8767,pmic-buck[2/3/4]-dvs-voltage' should be specified.
Optional properties of the main device node (the parent!):
- s5m8767,pmic-buck2-dvs-voltage: A set of 8 voltage values in micro-volt (uV)
units for buck2 when changing voltage using gpio dvs. Refer to [1] below
for additional information.
@@ -25,26 +33,13 @@ Required properties of the main device node (the parent!):
units for buck4 when changing voltage using gpio dvs. Refer to [1] below
for additional information.
- s5m8767,pmic-buck-ds-gpios: GPIO specifiers for three host gpio's used
for selecting GPIO DVS lines. It is one-to-one mapped to dvs gpio lines.
[1] If none of the 's5m8767,pmic-buck[2/3/4]-uses-gpio-dvs' optional
property is specified, the 's5m8767,pmic-buck[2/3/4]-dvs-voltage'
property should specify atleast one voltage level (which would be a
safe operating voltage).
If either of the 's5m8767,pmic-buck[2/3/4]-uses-gpio-dvs' optional
property is specified, then all the eight voltage values for the
's5m8767,pmic-buck[2/3/4]-dvs-voltage' should be specified.
Optional properties of the main device node (the parent!):
- s5m8767,pmic-buck2-uses-gpio-dvs: 'buck2' can be controlled by gpio dvs.
- s5m8767,pmic-buck3-uses-gpio-dvs: 'buck3' can be controlled by gpio dvs.
- s5m8767,pmic-buck4-uses-gpio-dvs: 'buck4' can be controlled by gpio dvs.
Additional properties required if either of the optional properties are used:
- s5m8767,pmic-buck234-default-dvs-idx: Default voltage setting selected from
- s5m8767,pmic-buck-default-dvs-idx: Default voltage setting selected from
the possible 8 options selectable by the dvs gpios. The value of this
property should be between 0 and 7. If not specified or if out of range, the
default value of this property is set to 0.

18
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/wm8994.txt
View File

@@ -14,9 +14,15 @@ Required properties:
- #gpio-cells : Must be 2. The first cell is the pin number and the
second cell is used to specify optional parameters (currently unused).
- AVDD2-supply, DBVDD1-supply, DBVDD2-supply, DBVDD3-supply, CPVDD-supply,
SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply : power supplies for the device, as covered
in Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/regulator.txt
- power supplies for the device, as covered in
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/regulator.txt, depending
on compatible:
- for wlf,wm1811 and wlf,wm8958:
AVDD1-supply, AVDD2-supply, DBVDD1-supply, DBVDD2-supply, DBVDD3-supply,
DCVDD-supply, CPVDD-supply, SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply
- for wlf,wm8994:
AVDD1-supply, AVDD2-supply, DBVDD-supply, DCVDD-supply, CPVDD-supply,
SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply
Optional properties:
@@ -68,11 +74,11 @@ codec: wm8994@1a {
lineout1-se;
AVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
AVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
CPVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
DBVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
DBVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
DBVDD3-supply = <&regulator>;
DBVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
DCVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
SPKVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
SPKVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
};

2
Documentation/driver-api/libata.rst
View File

@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ High-level taskfile hooks
::
void (*qc_prep) (struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
enum ata_completion_errors (*qc_prep) (struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
int (*qc_issue) (struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);

4
Documentation/driver-api/spi.rst
View File

@@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ hardware, which may be as simple as a set of GPIO pins or as complex as
a pair of FIFOs connected to dual DMA engines on the other side of the
SPI shift register (maximizing throughput). Such drivers bridge between
whatever bus they sit on (often the platform bus) and SPI, and expose
the SPI side of their device as a :c:type:`struct spi_master
<spi_master>`. SPI devices are children of that master,
the SPI side of their device as a :c:type:`struct spi_controller
<spi_controller>`. SPI devices are children of that master,
represented as a :c:type:`struct spi_device <spi_device>` and
manufactured from :c:type:`struct spi_board_info
<spi_board_info>` descriptors which are usually provided by

16
Documentation/filesystems/affs.txt
View File

@@ -93,13 +93,15 @@ The Amiga protection flags RWEDRWEDHSPARWED are handled as follows:
- R maps to r for user, group and others. On directories, R implies x.
- If both W and D are allowed, w will be set.
- W maps to w.
- E maps to x.
- H and P are always retained and ignored under Linux.
- D is ignored.
- A is always reset when a file is written to.
- H, S and P are always retained and ignored under Linux.
- A is cleared when a file is written to.
User id and group id will be used unless set[gu]id are given as mount
options. Since most of the Amiga file systems are single user systems
@@ -111,11 +113,13 @@ Linux -> Amiga:
The Linux rwxrwxrwx file mode is handled as follows:
- r permission will set R for user, group and others.
- r permission will allow R for user, group and others.
- w permission will set W and D for user, group and others.
- w permission will allow W for user, group and others.
- x permission of the user will set E for plain files.
- x permission of the user will allow E for plain files.
- D will be allowed for user, group and others.
- All other flags (suid, sgid, ...) are ignored and will
not be retained.

453
Documentation/filesystems/ext4/ondisk/directory.rst Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
Directory Entries
-----------------
In an ext4 filesystem, a directory is more or less a flat file that maps
an arbitrary byte string (usually ASCII) to an inode number on the
filesystem. There can be many directory entries across the filesystem
that reference the same inode number--these are known as hard links, and
that is why hard links cannot reference files on other filesystems. As
such, directory entries are found by reading the data block(s)
associated with a directory file for the particular directory entry that
is desired.
Linear (Classic) Directories
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
By default, each directory lists its entries in an “almost-linear”
array. I write “almost” because it's not a linear array in the memory
sense because directory entries are not split across filesystem blocks.
Therefore, it is more accurate to say that a directory is a series of
data blocks and that each block contains a linear array of directory
entries. The end of each per-block array is signified by reaching the
end of the block; the last entry in the block has a record length that
takes it all the way to the end of the block. The end of the entire
directory is of course signified by reaching the end of the file. Unused
directory entries are signified by inode = 0. By default the filesystem
uses ``struct ext4_dir_entry_2`` for directory entries unless the
“filetype” feature flag is not set, in which case it uses
``struct ext4_dir_entry``.
The original directory entry format is ``struct ext4_dir_entry``, which
is at most 263 bytes long, though on disk you'll need to reference
``dirent.rec_len`` to know for sure.
.. list-table::
:widths: 1 1 1 77
:header-rows: 1
* - Offset
- Size
- Name
- Description
* - 0x0
- \_\_le32
- inode
- Number of the inode that this directory entry points to.
* - 0x4
- \_\_le16
- rec\_len
- Length of this directory entry. Must be a multiple of 4.
* - 0x6
- \_\_le16
- name\_len
- Length of the file name.
* - 0x8
- char
- name[EXT4\_NAME\_LEN]
- File name.
Since file names cannot be longer than 255 bytes, the new directory
entry format shortens the rec\_len field and uses the space for a file
type flag, probably to avoid having to load every inode during directory
tree traversal. This format is ``ext4_dir_entry_2``, which is at most
263 bytes long, though on disk you'll need to reference
``dirent.rec_len`` to know for sure.
.. list-table::
:widths: 1 1 1 77
:header-rows: 1
* - Offset
- Size
- Name
- Description
* - 0x0
- \_\_le32
- inode
- Number of the inode that this directory entry points to.
* - 0x4
- \_\_le16
- rec\_len
- Length of this directory entry.
* - 0x6
- \_\_u8
- name\_len
- Length of the file name.
* - 0x7
- \_\_u8
- file\_type
- File type code, see ftype_ table below.
* - 0x8
- char
- name[EXT4\_NAME\_LEN]
- File name.
.. _ftype:
The directory file type is one of the following values:
.. list-table::
:widths: 1 79
:header-rows: 1
* - Value
- Description
* - 0x0
- Unknown.
* - 0x1
- Regular file.
* - 0x2
- Directory.
* - 0x3
- Character device file.
* - 0x4
- Block device file.
* - 0x5
- FIFO.
* - 0x6
- Socket.
* - 0x7
- Symbolic link.
To support directories that are both encrypted and casefolded directories, we
must also include hash information in the directory entry. We append
``ext4_extended_dir_entry_2`` to ``ext4_dir_entry_2`` except for the entries
for dot and dotdot, which are kept the same. The structure follows immediately
after ``name`` and is included in the size listed by ``rec_len`` If a directory
entry uses this extension, it may be up to 271 bytes.
.. list-table::
:widths: 8 8 24 40
:header-rows: 1
* - Offset
- Size
- Name
- Description
* - 0x0
- \_\_le32
- hash
- The hash of the directory name
* - 0x4
- \_\_le32
- minor\_hash
- The minor hash of the directory name
In order to add checksums to these classic directory blocks, a phony
``struct ext4_dir_entry`` is placed at the end of each leaf block to
hold the checksum. The directory entry is 12 bytes long. The inode
number and name\_len fields are set to zero to fool old software into
ignoring an apparently empty directory entry, and the checksum is stored
in the place where the name normally goes. The structure is
``struct ext4_dir_entry_tail``:
.. list-table::
:widths: 1 1 1 77
:header-rows: 1
* - Offset
- Size
- Name
- Description
* - 0x0
- \_\_le32
- det\_reserved\_zero1
- Inode number, which must be zero.
* - 0x4
- \_\_le16
- det\_rec\_len
- Length of this directory entry, which must be 12.
* - 0x6
- \_\_u8
- det\_reserved\_zero2
- Length of the file name, which must be zero.
* - 0x7
- \_\_u8
- det\_reserved\_ft
- File type, which must be 0xDE.
* - 0x8
- \_\_le32
- det\_checksum
- Directory leaf block checksum.
The leaf directory block checksum is calculated against the FS UUID, the
directory's inode number, the directory's inode generation number, and
the entire directory entry block up to (but not including) the fake
directory entry.
Hash Tree Directories
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
A linear array of directory entries isn't great for performance, so a
new feature was added to ext3 to provide a faster (but peculiar)
balanced tree keyed off a hash of the directory entry name. If the
EXT4\_INDEX\_FL (0x1000) flag is set in the inode, this directory uses a
hashed btree (htree) to organize and find directory entries. For
backwards read-only compatibility with ext2, this tree is actually
hidden inside the directory file, masquerading as “empty” directory data
blocks! It was stated previously that the end of the linear directory
entry table was signified with an entry pointing to inode 0; this is
(ab)used to fool the old linear-scan algorithm into thinking that the
rest of the directory block is empty so that it moves on.
The root of the tree always lives in the first data block of the
directory. By ext2 custom, the '.' and '..' entries must appear at the
beginning of this first block, so they are put here as two
``struct ext4_dir_entry_2``\ s and not stored in the tree. The rest of
the root node contains metadata about the tree and finally a hash->block
map to find nodes that are lower in the htree. If
``dx_root.info.indirect_levels`` is non-zero then the htree has two
levels; the data block pointed to by the root node's map is an interior
node, which is indexed by a minor hash. Interior nodes in this tree
contains a zeroed out ``struct ext4_dir_entry_2`` followed by a
minor\_hash->block map to find leafe nodes. Leaf nodes contain a linear
array of all ``struct ext4_dir_entry_2``; all of these entries
(presumably) hash to the same value. If there is an overflow, the
entries simply overflow into the next leaf node, and the
least-significant bit of the hash (in the interior node map) that gets
us to this next leaf node is set.
To traverse the directory as a htree, the code calculates the hash of
the desired file name and uses it to find the corresponding block
number. If the tree is flat, the block is a linear array of directory
entries that can be searched; otherwise, the minor hash of the file name
is computed and used against this second block to find the corresponding
third block number. That third block number will be a linear array of
directory entries.
To traverse the directory as a linear array (such as the old code does),
the code simply reads every data block in the directory. The blocks used
for the htree will appear to have no entries (aside from '.' and '..')
and so only the leaf nodes will appear to have any interesting content.
The root of the htree is in ``struct dx_root``, which is the full length
of a data block:
.. list-table::
:widths: 1 1 1 77
:header-rows: 1
* - Offset
- Type
- Name
- Description
* - 0x0
- \_\_le32
- dot.inode
- inode number of this directory.
* - 0x4
- \_\_le16
- dot.rec\_len
- Length of this record, 12.
* - 0x6
- u8
- dot.name\_len
- Length of the name, 1.
* - 0x7
- u8
- dot.file\_type
- File type of this entry, 0x2 (directory) (if the feature flag is set).
* - 0x8
- char
- dot.name[4]
- “.\\0\\0\\0”
* - 0xC
- \_\_le32
- dotdot.inode
- inode number of parent directory.
* - 0x10
- \_\_le16
- dotdot.rec\_len
- block\_size - 12. The record length is long enough to cover all htree
data.
* - 0x12
- u8
- dotdot.name\_len
- Length of the name, 2.
* - 0x13
- u8
- dotdot.file\_type
- File type of this entry, 0x2 (directory) (if the feature flag is set).
* - 0x14
- char
- dotdot\_name[4]
- “..\\0\\0”
* - 0x18
- \_\_le32
- struct dx\_root\_info.reserved\_zero
- Zero.
* - 0x1C
- u8
- struct dx\_root\_info.hash\_version
- Hash type, see dirhash_ table below.
* - 0x1D
- u8
- struct dx\_root\_info.info\_length
- Length of the tree information, 0x8.
* - 0x1E
- u8
- struct dx\_root\_info.indirect\_levels
- Depth of the htree. Cannot be larger than 3 if the INCOMPAT\_LARGEDIR
feature is set; cannot be larger than 2 otherwise.
* - 0x1F
- u8
- struct dx\_root\_info.unused\_flags
-
* - 0x20
- \_\_le16
- limit
- Maximum number of dx\_entries that can follow this header, plus 1 for
the header itself.
* - 0x22
- \_\_le16
- count
- Actual number of dx\_entries that follow this header, plus 1 for the
header itself.
* - 0x24
- \_\_le32
- block
- The block number (within the directory file) that goes with hash=0.
* - 0x28
- struct dx\_entry
- entries[0]
- As many 8-byte ``struct dx_entry`` as fits in the rest of the data block.
.. _dirhash:
The directory hash is one of the following values:
.. list-table::
:widths: 1 79
:header-rows: 1
* - Value
- Description
* - 0x0
- Legacy.
* - 0x1
- Half MD4.
* - 0x2
- Tea.
* - 0x3
- Legacy, unsigned.
* - 0x4
- Half MD4, unsigned.
* - 0x5
- Tea, unsigned.
* - 0x6
- Siphash.
Interior nodes of an htree are recorded as ``struct dx_node``, which is
also the full length of a data block:
.. list-table::
:widths: 1 1 1 77
:header-rows: 1
* - Offset
- Type
- Name
- Description
* - 0x0
- \_\_le32
- fake.inode
- Zero, to make it look like this entry is not in use.
* - 0x4
- \_\_le16
- fake.rec\_len
- The size of the block, in order to hide all of the dx\_node data.
* - 0x6
- u8
- name\_len
- Zero. There is no name for this “unused” directory entry.
* - 0x7
- u8
- file\_type
- Zero. There is no file type for this “unused” directory entry.
* - 0x8
- \_\_le16
- limit
- Maximum number of dx\_entries that can follow this header, plus 1 for
the header itself.
* - 0xA
- \_\_le16
- count
- Actual number of dx\_entries that follow this header, plus 1 for the
header itself.
* - 0xE
- \_\_le32
- block
- The block number (within the directory file) that goes with the lowest
hash value of this block. This value is stored in the parent block.
* - 0x12
- struct dx\_entry
- entries[0]
- As many 8-byte ``struct dx_entry`` as fits in the rest of the data block.
The hash maps that exist in both ``struct dx_root`` and
``struct dx_node`` are recorded as ``struct dx_entry``, which is 8 bytes
long:
.. list-table::
:widths: 1 1 1 77
:header-rows: 1
* - Offset
- Type
- Name
- Description
* - 0x0
- \_\_le32
- hash
- Hash code.
* - 0x4
- \_\_le32
- block
- Block number (within the directory file, not filesystem blocks) of the
next node in the htree.
(If you think this is all quite clever and peculiar, so does the
author.)
If metadata checksums are enabled, the last 8 bytes of the directory
block (precisely the length of one dx\_entry) are used to store a
``struct dx_tail``, which contains the checksum. The ``limit`` and
``count`` entries in the dx\_root/dx\_node structures are adjusted as
necessary to fit the dx\_tail into the block. If there is no space for
the dx\_tail, the user is notified to run e2fsck -D to rebuild the
directory index (which will ensure that there's space for the checksum.
The dx\_tail structure is 8 bytes long and looks like this:
.. list-table::
:widths: 1 1 1 77
:header-rows: 1
* - Offset
- Type
- Name
- Description
* - 0x0
- u32
- dt\_reserved
- Zero.
* - 0x4
- \_\_le32
- dt\_checksum
- Checksum of the htree directory block.
The checksum is calculated against the FS UUID, the htree index header
(dx\_root or dx\_node), all of the htree indices (dx\_entry) that are in
use, and the tail block (dx\_tail).

10
Documentation/filesystems/mandatory-locking.txt
View File

@@ -169,3 +169,13 @@ havoc if they lock crucial files. The way around it is to change the file
permissions (remove the setgid bit) before trying to read or write to it.
Of course, that might be a bit tricky if the system is hung :-(
7. The "mand" mount option
--------------------------
Mandatory locking is disabled on all filesystems by default, and must be
administratively enabled by mounting with "-o mand". That mount option
is only allowed if the mounting task has the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability.
Since kernel v4.5, it is possible to disable mandatory locking
altogether by setting CONFIG_MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING to "n". A kernel
with this disabled will reject attempts to mount filesystems with the
"mand" mount option with the error status EPERM.

8
Documentation/filesystems/sysfs.txt
View File

@@ -211,12 +211,10 @@ Other notes:
is 4096.
- show() methods should return the number of bytes printed into the
buffer. This is the return value of scnprintf().
buffer.
- show() must not use snprintf() when formatting the value to be
returned to user space. If you can guarantee that an overflow
will never happen you can use sprintf() otherwise you must use
scnprintf().
- show() should only use sysfs_emit() or sysfs_emit_at() when formatting
the value to be returned to user space.
- store() should return the number of bytes used from the buffer. If the
entire buffer has been used, just return the count argument.

1
Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt
View File

@@ -290,7 +290,6 @@ Code Seq#(hex) Include File Comments
0x89 00-06 arch/x86/include/asm/sockios.h
0x89 0B-DF linux/sockios.h
0x89 E0-EF linux/sockios.h SIOCPROTOPRIVATE range
0x89 E0-EF linux/dn.h PROTOPRIVATE range
0x89 F0-FF linux/sockios.h SIOCDEVPRIVATE range
0x8B all linux/wireless.h
0x8C 00-3F WiNRADiO driver

9
Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/colorspaces-defs.rst
View File

@@ -29,8 +29,7 @@ whole range, 0-255, dividing the angular value by 1.41. The enum
:c:type:`v4l2_hsv_encoding` specifies which encoding is used.
.. note:: The default R'G'B' quantization is full range for all
colorspaces except for BT.2020 which uses limited range R'G'B'
quantization.
colorspaces. HSV formats are always full range.
.. tabularcolumns:: |p{6.0cm}|p{11.5cm}|
@@ -162,8 +161,8 @@ whole range, 0-255, dividing the angular value by 1.41. The enum
- Details
* - ``V4L2_QUANTIZATION_DEFAULT``
- Use the default quantization encoding as defined by the
colorspace. This is always full range for R'G'B' (except for the
BT.2020 colorspace) and HSV. It is usually limited range for Y'CbCr.
colorspace. This is always full range for R'G'B' and HSV.
It is usually limited range for Y'CbCr.
* - ``V4L2_QUANTIZATION_FULL_RANGE``
- Use the full range quantization encoding. I.e. the range [0…1] is
mapped to [0…255] (with possible clipping to [1…254] to avoid the
@@ -173,4 +172,4 @@ whole range, 0-255, dividing the angular value by 1.41. The enum
* - ``V4L2_QUANTIZATION_LIM_RANGE``
- Use the limited range quantization encoding. I.e. the range [0…1]
is mapped to [16…235]. Cb and Cr are mapped from [-0.5…0.5] to
[16…240].
[16…240]. Limited Range cannot be used with HSV.

5
Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/colorspaces-details.rst
View File

@@ -370,9 +370,8 @@ Colorspace BT.2020 (V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT2020)
The :ref:`itu2020` standard defines the colorspace used by Ultra-high
definition television (UHDTV). The default transfer function is
``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_709``. The default Y'CbCr encoding is
``V4L2_YCBCR_ENC_BT2020``. The default R'G'B' quantization is limited
range (!), and so is the default Y'CbCr quantization. The chromaticities
of the primary colors and the white reference are:
``V4L2_YCBCR_ENC_BT2020``. The default Y'CbCr quantization is limited range.
The chromaticities of the primary colors and the white reference are:

11
Documentation/networking/bonding.txt
View File

@@ -191,11 +191,12 @@ ad_actor_sys_prio
ad_actor_system
In an AD system, this specifies the mac-address for the actor in
protocol packet exchanges (LACPDUs). The value cannot be NULL or
multicast. It is preferred to have the local-admin bit set for this
mac but driver does not enforce it. If the value is not given then
system defaults to using the masters' mac address as actors' system
address.
protocol packet exchanges (LACPDUs). The value cannot be a multicast
address. If the all-zeroes MAC is specified, bonding will internally
use the MAC of the bond itself. It is preferred to have the
local-admin bit set for this mac but driver does not enforce it. If
the value is not given then system defaults to using the masters'
mac address as actors' system address.
This parameter has effect only in 802.3ad mode and is available through
SysFs interface.

232
Documentation/networking/decnet.txt
View File

@@ -1,232 +0,0 @@
Linux DECnet Networking Layer Information
===========================================
1) Other documentation....
o Project Home Pages
http://www.chygwyn.com/ - Kernel info
http://linux-decnet.sourceforge.net/ - Userland tools
http://www.sourceforge.net/projects/linux-decnet/ - Status page
2) Configuring the kernel
Be sure to turn on the following options:
CONFIG_DECNET (obviously)
CONFIG_PROC_FS (to see what's going on)
CONFIG_SYSCTL (for easy configuration)
if you want to try out router support (not properly debugged yet)
you'll need the following options as well...
CONFIG_DECNET_ROUTER (to be able to add/delete routes)
CONFIG_NETFILTER (will be required for the DECnet routing daemon)
CONFIG_DECNET_ROUTE_FWMARK is optional
Don't turn on SIOCGIFCONF support for DECnet unless you are really sure
that you need it, in general you won't and it can cause ifconfig to
malfunction.
Run time configuration has changed slightly from the 2.4 system. If you
want to configure an endnode, then the simplified procedure is as follows:
o Set the MAC address on your ethernet card before starting _any_ other
network protocols.
As soon as your network card is brought into the UP state, DECnet should
start working. If you need something more complicated or are unsure how
to set the MAC address, see the next section. Also all configurations which
worked with 2.4 will work under 2.5 with no change.
3) Command line options
You can set a DECnet address on the kernel command line for compatibility
with the 2.4 configuration procedure, but in general it's not needed any more.
If you do st a DECnet address on the command line, it has only one purpose
which is that its added to the addresses on the loopback device.
With 2.4 kernels, DECnet would only recognise addresses as local if they
were added to the loopback device. In 2.5, any local interface address
can be used to loop back to the local machine. Of course this does not
prevent you adding further addresses to the loopback device if you
want to.
N.B. Since the address list of an interface determines the addresses for
which "hello" messages are sent, if you don't set an address on the loopback
interface then you won't see any entries in /proc/net/neigh for the local
host until such time as you start a connection. This doesn't affect the
operation of the local communications in any other way though.
The kernel command line takes options looking like the following:
decnet.addr=1,2
the two numbers are the node address 1,2 = 1.2 For 2.2.xx kernels
and early 2.3.xx kernels, you must use a comma when specifying the
DECnet address like this. For more recent 2.3.xx kernels, you may
use almost any character except space, although a `.` would be the most
obvious choice :-)
There used to be a third number specifying the node type. This option
has gone away in favour of a per interface node type. This is now set
using /proc/sys/net/decnet/conf/<dev>/forwarding. This file can be
set with a single digit, 0=EndNode, 1=L1 Router and 2=L2 Router.
There are also equivalent options for modules. The node address can
also be set through the /proc/sys/net/decnet/ files, as can other system
parameters.
Currently the only supported devices are ethernet and ip_gre. The
ethernet address of your ethernet card has to be set according to the DECnet
address of the node in order for it to be autoconfigured (and then appear in
/proc/net/decnet_dev). There is a utility available at the above
FTP sites called dn2ethaddr which can compute the correct ethernet
address to use. The address can be set by ifconfig either before or
at the time the device is brought up. If you are using RedHat you can
add the line:
MACADDR=AA:00:04:00:03:04
or something similar, to /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-eth0 or
wherever your network card's configuration lives. Setting the MAC address
of your ethernet card to an address starting with "hi-ord" will cause a
DECnet address which matches to be added to the interface (which you can
verify with iproute2).
The default device for routing can be set through the /proc filesystem
by setting /proc/sys/net/decnet/default_device to the
device you want DECnet to route packets out of when no specific route
is available. Usually this will be eth0, for example:
echo -n "eth0" >/proc/sys/net/decnet/default_device
If you don't set the default device, then it will default to the first
ethernet card which has been autoconfigured as described above. You can
confirm that by looking in the default_device file of course.
There is a list of what the other files under /proc/sys/net/decnet/ do
on the kernel patch web site (shown above).
4) Run time kernel configuration
This is either done through the sysctl/proc interface (see the kernel web
pages for details on what the various options do) or through the iproute2
package in the same way as IPv4/6 configuration is performed.
Documentation for iproute2 is included with the package, although there is
as yet no specific section on DECnet, most of the features apply to both
IP and DECnet, albeit with DECnet addresses instead of IP addresses and
a reduced functionality.
If you want to configure a DECnet router you'll need the iproute2 package
since its the _only_ way to add and delete routes currently. Eventually
there will be a routing daemon to send and receive routing messages for
each interface and update the kernel routing tables accordingly. The
routing daemon will use netfilter to listen to routing packets, and
rtnetlink to update the kernels routing tables.
The DECnet raw socket layer has been removed since it was there purely
for use by the routing daemon which will now use netfilter (a much cleaner
and more generic solution) instead.
5) How can I tell if its working ?
Here is a quick guide of what to look for in order to know if your DECnet
kernel subsystem is working.
- Is the node address set (see /proc/sys/net/decnet/node_address)
- Is the node of the correct type
(see /proc/sys/net/decnet/conf/<dev>/forwarding)
- Is the Ethernet MAC address of each Ethernet card set to match
the DECnet address. If in doubt use the dn2ethaddr utility available
at the ftp archive.
- If the previous two steps are satisfied, and the Ethernet card is up,
you should find that it is listed in /proc/net/decnet_dev and also
that it appears as a directory in /proc/sys/net/decnet/conf/. The
loopback device (lo) should also appear and is required to communicate
within a node.
- If you have any DECnet routers on your network, they should appear
in /proc/net/decnet_neigh, otherwise this file will only contain the
entry for the node itself (if it doesn't check to see if lo is up).
- If you want to send to any node which is not listed in the
/proc/net/decnet_neigh file, you'll need to set the default device
to point to an Ethernet card with connection to a router. This is
again done with the /proc/sys/net/decnet/default_device file.
- Try starting a simple server and client, like the dnping/dnmirror
over the loopback interface. With luck they should communicate.
For this step and those after, you'll need the DECnet library
which can be obtained from the above ftp sites as well as the
actual utilities themselves.
- If this seems to work, then try talking to a node on your local
network, and see if you can obtain the same results.
- At this point you are on your own... :-)
6) How to send a bug report
If you've found a bug and want to report it, then there are several things
you can do to help me work out exactly what it is that is wrong. Useful
information (_most_ of which _is_ _essential_) includes:
- What kernel version are you running ?
- What version of the patch are you running ?
- How far though the above set of tests can you get ?
- What is in the /proc/decnet* files and /proc/sys/net/decnet/* files ?
- Which services are you running ?
- Which client caused the problem ?
- How much data was being transferred ?
- Was the network congested ?
- How can the problem be reproduced ?
- Can you use tcpdump to get a trace ? (N.B. Most (all?) versions of
tcpdump don't understand how to dump DECnet properly, so including
the hex listing of the packet contents is _essential_, usually the -x flag.
You may also need to increase the length grabbed with the -s flag. The
-e flag also provides very useful information (ethernet MAC addresses))
7) MAC FAQ
A quick FAQ on ethernet MAC addresses to explain how Linux and DECnet
interact and how to get the best performance from your hardware.
Ethernet cards are designed to normally only pass received network frames
to a host computer when they are addressed to it, or to the broadcast address.
Linux has an interface which allows the setting of extra addresses for
an ethernet card to listen to. If the ethernet card supports it, the
filtering operation will be done in hardware, if not the extra unwanted packets
received will be discarded by the host computer. In the latter case,
significant processor time and bus bandwidth can be used up on a busy
network (see the NAPI documentation for a longer explanation of these
effects).
DECnet makes use of this interface to allow running DECnet on an ethernet
card which has already been configured using TCP/IP (presumably using the
built in MAC address of the card, as usual) and/or to allow multiple DECnet
addresses on each physical interface. If you do this, be aware that if your
ethernet card doesn't support perfect hashing in its MAC address filter
then your computer will be doing more work than required. Some cards
will simply set themselves into promiscuous mode in order to receive
packets from the DECnet specified addresses. So if you have one of these
cards its better to set the MAC address of the card as described above
to gain the best efficiency. Better still is to use a card which supports
NAPI as well.
8) Mailing list
If you are keen to get involved in development, or want to ask questions
about configuration, or even just report bugs, then there is a mailing
list that you can join, details are at:
http://sourceforge.net/mail/?group_id=4993
9) Legal Info
The Linux DECnet project team have placed their code under the GPL. The
software is provided "as is" and without warranty express or implied.
DECnet is a trademark of Compaq. This software is not a product of
Compaq. We acknowledge the help of people at Compaq in providing extra
documentation above and beyond what was previously publicly available.
Steve Whitehouse <SteveW@ACM.org>

6
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
View File

@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ cipso_cache_enable - BOOLEAN
cipso_cache_bucket_size - INTEGER
The CIPSO label cache consists of a fixed size hash table with each
hash bucket containing a number of cache entries. This variable limits
the number of entries in each hash bucket; the larger the value the
the number of entries in each hash bucket; the larger the value is, the
more CIPSO label mappings that can be cached. When the number of
entries in a given hash bucket reaches this limit adding new entries
causes the oldest entry in the bucket to be removed to make room.
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ ip_nonlocal_bind - BOOLEAN
which can be quite useful - but may break some applications.
Default: 0
ip_dynaddr - BOOLEAN
ip_dynaddr - INTEGER
If set non-zero, enables support for dynamic addresses.
If set to a non-zero value larger than 1, a kernel log
message will be printed when dynamic address rewriting
@@ -1658,7 +1658,7 @@ use_tempaddr - INTEGER
temp_valid_lft - INTEGER
valid lifetime (in seconds) for temporary addresses.
Default: 604800 (7 days)
Default: 172800 (2 days)
temp_prefered_lft - INTEGER
Preferred lifetime (in seconds) for temporary addresses.

3
Documentation/networking/ipvs-sysctl.txt
View File

@@ -30,8 +30,7 @@ conn_reuse_mode - INTEGER
0: disable any special handling on port reuse. The new
connection will be delivered to the same real server that was
servicing the previous connection. This will effectively
disable expire_nodest_conn.
servicing the previous connection.
bit 1: enable rescheduling of new connections when it is safe.
That is, whenever expire_nodest_conn and for TCP sockets, when

5
Documentation/printk-formats.txt
View File

@@ -423,9 +423,8 @@ struct clk
%pC pll1
%pCn pll1
For printing struct clk structures. ``%pC`` and ``%pCn`` print the name
(Common Clock Framework) or address (legacy clock framework) of the
structure.
For printing struct clk structures. %pC and %pCn print the name of the clock
(Common Clock Framework) or a unique 32-bit ID (legacy clock framework).
Passed by reference.

11
Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst
View File

@@ -171,7 +171,16 @@ Trees
- The finalized and tagged releases of all stable kernels can be found
in separate branches per version at:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
- The release candidate of all stable kernel versions can be found at:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git/
.. warning::
The -stable-rc tree is a snapshot in time of the stable-queue tree and
will change frequently, hence will be rebased often. It should only be
used for testing purposes (e.g. to be consumed by CI systems).
Review committee

2
Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst
View File

@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ as you intend it to.
The maintainer will thank you if you write your patch description in a
form which can be easily pulled into Linux's source code management
system, ``git``, as a "commit log". See :ref:`explicit_in_reply_to`.
system, ``git``, as a "commit log". See :ref:`the_canonical_patch_format`.
Solve only one problem per patch. If your description starts to get
long, that's a sign that you probably need to split up your patch.

2
Documentation/sound/hd-audio/models.rst
View File

@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ ref
no-jd
BIOS setup but without jack-detection
intel
Intel DG45* mobos
Intel D*45* mobos
dell-m6-amic
Dell desktops/laptops with analog mics
dell-m6-dmic

6
Documentation/sphinx/load_config.py
View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
import os
import sys
from sphinx.util.pycompat import execfile_
from sphinx.util.osutil import fs_encoding
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
def loadConfig(namespace):
@@ -25,7 +25,9 @@ def loadConfig(namespace):
sys.stdout.write("load additional sphinx-config: %s\n" % config_file)
config = namespace.copy()
config['__file__'] = config_file
execfile_(config_file, config)
with open(config_file, 'rb') as f:
code = compile(f.read(), fs_encoding, 'exec')
exec(code, config)
del config['__file__']
namespace.update(config)
else:

2
Documentation/sphinx/parse-headers.pl
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
#!/usr/bin/perl
#!/usr/bin/env perl
use strict;
use Text::Tabs;
use Getopt::Long;

55
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
View File

@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
- msgmnb
- msgmni
- nmi_watchdog
- oops_limit
- osrelease
- ostype
- overflowgid
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
- threads-max
- unprivileged_bpf_disabled
- unknown_nmi_panic
- warn_limit
- watchdog
- watchdog_thresh
- version
@@ -540,6 +542,15 @@ scanned for a given scan.
==============================================================
oops_limit:
Number of kernel oopses after which the kernel should panic when
``panic_on_oops`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking
the count. Setting this to 1 has the same effect as setting
``panic_on_oops=1``. The default value is 10000.
==============================================================
osrelease, ostype & version:
# cat osrelease
@@ -806,9 +817,40 @@ The kernel command line parameter printk.devkmsg= overrides this and is
a one-time setting until next reboot: once set, it cannot be changed by
this sysctl interface anymore.
==============================================================
pty
===
randomize_va_space:
See Documentation/filesystems/devpts.rst.
random
======
This is a directory, with the following entries:
* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
unvarying after that;
* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
on any RNG behavior;
* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
(as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
randomize_va_space
==================
This option can be used to select the type of process address
space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures
@@ -1056,6 +1098,15 @@ example. If a system hangs up, try pressing the NMI switch.
==============================================================
warn_limit:
Number of kernel warnings after which the kernel should panic when
``panic_on_warn`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking
the warning count. Setting this to 1 has the same effect as setting
``panic_on_warn=1``. The default value is 0.
==============================================================
watchdog:
This parameter can be used to disable or enable the soft lockup detector

1
Documentation/sysctl/net.txt
View File

@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ Table : Subdirectories in /proc/sys/net
ethernet Ethernet protocol rose X.25 PLP layer
ipv4 IP version 4 x25 X.25 protocol
ipx IPX token-ring IBM token ring
bridge Bridging decnet DEC net
ipv6 IP version 6 tipc TIPC
..............................................................................

2
Documentation/target/tcm_mod_builder.py
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
#!/usr/bin/python
#!/usr/bin/env python
# The TCM v4 multi-protocol fabric module generation script for drivers/target/$NEW_MOD
#
# Copyright (c) 2010 Rising Tide Systems

2
Documentation/trace/postprocess/decode_msr.py
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
#!/usr/bin/python
#!/usr/bin/env python
# add symbolic names to read_msr / write_msr in trace
# decode_msr msr-index.h < trace
import sys

2
Documentation/trace/postprocess/trace-pagealloc-postprocess.pl
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
#!/usr/bin/perl
#!/usr/bin/env perl
# This is a POC (proof of concept or piece of crap, take your pick) for reading the
# text representation of trace output related to page allocation. It makes an attempt
# to extract some high-level information on what is going on. The accuracy of the parser

2
Documentation/trace/postprocess/trace-vmscan-postprocess.pl
View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
#!/usr/bin/perl
#!/usr/bin/env perl
# This is a POC for reading the text representation of trace output related to
# page reclaim. It makes an attempt to extract some high-level information on
# what is going on. The accuracy of the parser may vary

4
Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt
View File

@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ Shadow pages contain the following information:
shadow pages) so role.quadrant takes values in the range 0..3. Each
quadrant maps 1GB virtual address space.
role.access:
Inherited guest access permissions in the form uwx. Note execute
permission is positive, not negative.
Inherited guest access permissions from the parent ptes in the form uwx.
Note execute permission is positive, not negative.
role.invalid:
The page is invalid and should not be used. It is a root page that is
currently pinned (by a cpu hardware register pointing to it); once it is

8
MAINTAINERS
View File

@@ -3957,13 +3957,6 @@ F: include/uapi/linux/dccp.h
F: include/linux/tfrc.h
F: net/dccp/
DECnet NETWORK LAYER
W: http://linux-decnet.sourceforge.net
L: linux-decnet-user@lists.sourceforge.net
S: Orphan
F: Documentation/networking/decnet.txt
F: net/decnet/
DECSTATION PLATFORM SUPPORT
M: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@linux-mips.org>
L: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
@@ -11342,6 +11335,7 @@ F: drivers/block/brd.c
RANDOM NUMBER DRIVER
M: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
M: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
S: Maintained
F: drivers/char/random.c

59
Makefile
View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 14
SUBLEVEL = 190
SUBLEVEL = 336
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Petit Gorille
@@ -88,10 +88,17 @@ endif
# If the user is running make -s (silent mode), suppress echoing of
# commands
# make-4.0 (and later) keep single letter options in the 1st word of MAKEFLAGS.
ifneq ($(findstring s,$(filter-out --%,$(MAKEFLAGS))),)
quiet=silent_
tools_silent=s
ifeq ($(filter 3.%,$(MAKE_VERSION)),)
silence:=$(findstring s,$(firstword -$(MAKEFLAGS)))
else
silence:=$(findstring s,$(filter-out --%,$(MAKEFLAGS)))
endif
ifeq ($(silence),s)
quiet=silent_
tools_silent=s
endif
export quiet Q KBUILD_VERBOSE
@@ -404,7 +411,7 @@ endif
AWK = awk
GENKSYMS = scripts/genksyms/genksyms
INSTALLKERNEL := installkernel
DEPMOD = /sbin/depmod
DEPMOD = depmod
PERL = perl
PYTHON = python
CHECK = sparse
@@ -460,6 +467,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_KERNEL :=
KBUILD_AFLAGS_MODULE := -DMODULE
KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE := -DMODULE
KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE := -T $(srctree)/scripts/module-common.lds
LDFLAGS :=
GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS :=
CLANG_FLAGS :=
@@ -805,6 +813,10 @@ LDFLAGS += -O2
endif
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, unused-const-variable)
# These result in bogus false positives
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, dangling-pointer)
ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls
else
@@ -817,12 +829,20 @@ ifndef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fomit-frame-pointer
endif
endif
# Initialize all stack variables with a pattern, if desired.
ifdef CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL
# Initialize all stack variables with a 0xAA pattern.
ifdef CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern
endif
# Initialize all stack variables with a zero value.
ifdef CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
# Future support for zero initialization is still being debated, see
# https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45497. These flags are subject to being
# renamed or dropped.
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang)
endif
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -fno-var-tracking-assignments)
ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO
@@ -849,6 +869,13 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
ifndef CC_FLAGS_FTRACE
CC_FLAGS_FTRACE := -pg
endif
ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD
# gcc 5 supports generating the mcount tables directly
ifeq ($(call cc-option-yn,-mrecord-mcount),y)
CC_FLAGS_FTRACE += -mrecord-mcount
export CC_USING_RECORD_MCOUNT := 1
endif
endif
export CC_FLAGS_FTRACE
ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_FENTRY
CC_USING_FENTRY := $(call cc-option, -mfentry -DCC_USING_FENTRY)
@@ -1000,12 +1027,6 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-Werror=designated-init)
# change __FILE__ to the relative path from the srctree
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fmacro-prefix-map=$(srctree)/=)
# ensure -fcf-protection is disabled when using retpoline as it is
# incompatible with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fcf-protection=none)
endif
# use the deterministic mode of AR if available
KBUILD_ARFLAGS := $(call ar-option,D)
@@ -1020,8 +1041,7 @@ KBUILD_AFLAGS += $(ARCH_AFLAGS) $(KAFLAGS)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(ARCH_CFLAGS) $(KCFLAGS)
# Use --build-id when available.
LDFLAGS_BUILD_ID := $(patsubst -Wl$(comma)%,%,\
$(call cc-ldoption, -Wl$(comma)--build-id,))
LDFLAGS_BUILD_ID := $(call ld-option, --build-id)
KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE += $(LDFLAGS_BUILD_ID)
LDFLAGS_vmlinux += $(LDFLAGS_BUILD_ID)
@@ -1029,6 +1049,9 @@ ifdef CONFIG_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION
LDFLAGS_vmlinux += $(call ld-option, --gc-sections,)
endif
LDFLAGS += -z noexecstack
LDFLAGS += $(call ld-option,--no-warn-rwx-segments)
ifeq ($(CONFIG_STRIP_ASM_SYMS),y)
LDFLAGS_vmlinux += $(call ld-option, -X,)
endif
@@ -1302,7 +1325,7 @@ endif
endif
# Disable clang-specific config options when using a different compiler
clang-specific-configs := LTO_CLANG CFI_CLANG SHADOW_CALL_STACK INIT_STACK_ALL
clang-specific-configs := LTO_CLANG CFI_CLANG SHADOW_CALL_STACK INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
PHONY += check-clang-specific-options
check-clang-specific-options: $(KCONFIG_CONFIG) FORCE
@@ -1388,7 +1411,7 @@ endef
define filechk_version.h
(echo \#define LINUX_VERSION_CODE $(shell \
expr $(VERSION) \* 65536 + 0$(PATCHLEVEL) \* 256 + 0$(SUBLEVEL)); \
expr $(VERSION) \* 65536 + 0$(PATCHLEVEL) \* 256 + 255); \
echo '#define KERNEL_VERSION(a,b,c) (((a) << 16) + ((b) << 8) + (c))';)
endef

13
arch/Kconfig
View File

@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ config ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
config ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
bool
config ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
bool
# Select if arch init_task initializer is different to init/init_task.c
config ARCH_INIT_TASK
bool
@@ -339,6 +342,13 @@ config HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE
config HAVE_RCU_TABLE_INVALIDATE
bool
config ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM
bool
help
Temporary select until all architectures can be converted to have
irqs disabled over activate_mm. Architectures that do IPI based TLB
shootdowns should enable this.
config ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
bool
@@ -1108,6 +1118,9 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_COMPILER_H
linux/compiler-*.h in order to override macro definitions that those
headers generally provide.
config ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
bool
# Select if the architecture has support for applying RELR relocations.
config ARCH_HAS_RELR
bool

20
arch/alpha/include/asm/bugs.h
View File

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
/*
* include/asm-alpha/bugs.h
*
* Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds
*/
/*
* This is included by init/main.c to check for architecture-dependent bugs.
*
* Needs:
* void check_bugs(void);
*/
/*
* I don't know of any alpha bugs yet.. Nice chip
*/
static void check_bugs(void)
{
}

14
arch/alpha/include/asm/io.h
View File

@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ extern inline void set_hae(unsigned long new_hae)
* Change virtual addresses to physical addresses and vv.
*/
#ifdef USE_48_BIT_KSEG
static inline unsigned long virt_to_phys(void *address)
static inline unsigned long virt_to_phys(volatile void *address)
{
return (unsigned long)address - IDENT_ADDR;
}
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static inline void * phys_to_virt(unsigned long address)
return (void *) (address + IDENT_ADDR);
}
#else
static inline unsigned long virt_to_phys(void *address)
static inline unsigned long virt_to_phys(volatile void *address)
{
unsigned long phys = (unsigned long)address;
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static inline dma_addr_t __deprecated isa_page_to_bus(struct page *page)
extern unsigned long __direct_map_base;
extern unsigned long __direct_map_size;
static inline unsigned long __deprecated virt_to_bus(void *address)
static inline unsigned long __deprecated virt_to_bus(volatile void *address)
{
unsigned long phys = virt_to_phys(address);
unsigned long bus = phys + __direct_map_base;
@@ -493,10 +493,10 @@ extern inline void writeq(u64 b, volatile void __iomem *addr)
}
#endif
#define ioread16be(p) be16_to_cpu(ioread16(p))
#define ioread32be(p) be32_to_cpu(ioread32(p))
#define iowrite16be(v,p) iowrite16(cpu_to_be16(v), (p))
#define iowrite32be(v,p) iowrite32(cpu_to_be32(v), (p))
#define ioread16be(p) swab16(ioread16(p))
#define ioread32be(p) swab32(ioread32(p))
#define iowrite16be(v,p) iowrite16(swab16(v), (p))
#define iowrite32be(v,p) iowrite32(swab32(v), (p))
#define inb_p inb
#define inw_p inw

1
arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -28,5 +28,6 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
__asm__ __volatile__ ("rpcc %0" : "=r"(ret));
return ret;
}
#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif

4
arch/alpha/kernel/entry.S
View File

@@ -469,8 +469,10 @@ entSys:
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
lda $6, _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT
and $3, $6, $3
#endif
bne $3, strace
#else
blbs $3, strace /* check for SYSCALL_TRACE in disguise */
#endif
beq $4, 1f
ldq $27, 0($5)
1: jsr $26, ($27), alpha_ni_syscall

4
arch/alpha/kernel/module.c
View File

@@ -158,10 +158,8 @@ apply_relocate_add(Elf64_Shdr *sechdrs, const char *strtab,
base = (void *)sechdrs[sechdrs[relsec].sh_info].sh_addr;
symtab = (Elf64_Sym *)sechdrs[symindex].sh_addr;
/* The small sections were sorted to the end of the segment.
The following should definitely cover them. */
gp = (u64)me->core_layout.base + me->core_layout.size - 0x8000;
got = sechdrs[me->arch.gotsecindex].sh_addr;
gp = got + 0x8000;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
unsigned long r_sym = ELF64_R_SYM (rela[i].r_info);

3
arch/alpha/kernel/setup.c
View File

@@ -469,8 +469,7 @@ setup_memory(void *kernel_end)
extern void setup_memory(void *);
#endif /* !CONFIG_DISCONTIGMEM */
int __init
page_is_ram(unsigned long pfn)
int page_is_ram(unsigned long pfn)
{
struct memclust_struct * cluster;
struct memdesc_struct * memdesc;

2
arch/alpha/kernel/smp.c
View File

@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ void
smp_send_stop(void)
{
cpumask_t to_whom;
cpumask_copy(&to_whom, cpu_possible_mask);
cpumask_copy(&to_whom, cpu_online_mask);
cpumask_clear_cpu(smp_processor_id(), &to_whom);
#ifdef DEBUG_IPI_MSG
if (hard_smp_processor_id() != boot_cpu_id)

2
arch/alpha/kernel/srmcons.c
View File

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ srmcons_do_receive_chars(struct tty_port *port)
} while((result.bits.status & 1) && (++loops < 10));
if (count)
tty_schedule_flip(port);
tty_flip_buffer_push(port);
return count;
}

36
arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c
View File

@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ die_if_kernel(char * str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err, unsigned long *r9_15)
local_irq_enable();
while (1);
}
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
}
#ifndef CONFIG_MATHEMU
@@ -241,7 +241,21 @@ do_entIF(unsigned long type, struct pt_regs *regs)
siginfo_t info;
int signo, code;
if ((regs->ps & ~IPL_MAX) == 0) {
if (type == 3) { /* FEN fault */
/* Irritating users can call PAL_clrfen to disable the
FPU for the process. The kernel will then trap in
do_switch_stack and undo_switch_stack when we try
to save and restore the FP registers.
Given that GCC by default generates code that uses the
FP registers, PAL_clrfen is not useful except for DoS
attacks. So turn the bleeding FPU back on and be done
with it. */
current_thread_info()->pcb.flags |= 1;
__reload_thread(&current_thread_info()->pcb);
return;
}
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
if (type == 1) {
const unsigned int *data
= (const unsigned int *) regs->pc;
@@ -390,20 +404,6 @@ do_entIF(unsigned long type, struct pt_regs *regs)
}
break;
case 3: /* FEN fault */
/* Irritating users can call PAL_clrfen to disable the
FPU for the process. The kernel will then trap in
do_switch_stack and undo_switch_stack when we try
to save and restore the FP registers.
Given that GCC by default generates code that uses the
FP registers, PAL_clrfen is not useful except for DoS
attacks. So turn the bleeding FPU back on and be done
with it. */
current_thread_info()->pcb.flags |= 1;
__reload_thread(&current_thread_info()->pcb);
return;
case 5: /* illoc */
default: /* unexpected instruction-fault type */
;
@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ do_entUna(void * va, unsigned long opcode, unsigned long reg,
printk("Bad unaligned kernel access at %016lx: %p %lx %lu\n",
pc, va, opcode, reg);
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
got_exception:
/* Ok, we caught the exception, but we don't want it. Is there
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ got_exception:
local_irq_enable();
while (1);
}
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
}
/*

2
arch/alpha/mm/fault.c
View File

@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ retry:
printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging request at "
"virtual address %016lx\n", address);
die_if_kernel("Oops", regs, cause, (unsigned long*)regs - 16);
do_exit(SIGKILL);
make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
/* We ran out of memory, or some other thing happened to us that
made us unable to handle the page fault gracefully. */

9
arch/arc/Makefile
View File

@@ -99,14 +99,9 @@ libs-y += arch/arc/lib/ $(LIBGCC)
boot := arch/arc/boot
#default target for make without any arguments.
KBUILD_IMAGE := $(boot)/bootpImage
all: bootpImage
bootpImage: vmlinux
boot_targets += uImage uImage.bin uImage.gz
boot_targets := uImage uImage.bin uImage.gz uImage.lzma
PHONY += $(boot_targets)
$(boot_targets): vmlinux
$(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=$(boot) $(boot)/$@

6
arch/arc/boot/dts/hsdk.dts
View File

@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@
arcpct: pct {
compatible = "snps,archs-pct";
interrupt-parent = <&cpu_intc>;
interrupts = <20>;
};
/* TIMER0 with interrupt for clockevent */
@@ -161,7 +163,7 @@
reg = <0x8000 0x2000>;
interrupts = <10>;
interrupt-names = "macirq";
phy-mode = "rgmii";
phy-mode = "rgmii-id";
snps,pbl = <32>;
snps,multicast-filter-bins = <256>;
clocks = <&gmacclk>;
@@ -177,7 +179,7 @@
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
compatible = "snps,dwmac-mdio";
phy0: ethernet-phy@0 {
phy0: ethernet-phy@0 { /* Micrel KSZ9031 */
reg = <0>;
ti,rx-internal-delay = <DP83867_RGMIIDCTL_2_00_NS>;
ti,tx-internal-delay = <DP83867_RGMIIDCTL_2_00_NS>;

2
arch/arc/include/asm/io.h
View File

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline void ioport_unmap(void __iomem *addr)
{
}
extern void iounmap(const void __iomem *addr);
extern void iounmap(const volatile void __iomem *addr);
#define ioremap_nocache(phy, sz) ioremap(phy, sz)
#define ioremap_wc(phy, sz) ioremap(phy, sz)

1
arch/arc/include/asm/page.h
View File

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#define clear_page(paddr) memset((paddr), 0, PAGE_SIZE)
#define copy_user_page(to, from, vaddr, pg) copy_page(to, from)
#define copy_page(to, from) memcpy((to), (from), PAGE_SIZE)
struct vm_area_struct;

2
arch/arc/include/asm/pgtable.h
View File

@@ -138,8 +138,10 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_ARC_HAS_PAE40
#define PTE_BITS_NON_RWX_IN_PD1 (0xff00000000 | PAGE_MASK | _PAGE_CACHEABLE)
#define MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS 40
#else
#define PTE_BITS_NON_RWX_IN_PD1 (PAGE_MASK | _PAGE_CACHEABLE)
#define MAX_POSSIBLE_PHYSMEM_BITS 32
#endif
/**************************************************************************

1
arch/arc/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
View File

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
*/
struct sigcontext {
struct user_regs_struct regs;
struct user_regs_arcv2 v2abi;
};
#endif /* _ASM_ARC_SIGCONTEXT_H */

21
arch/arc/kernel/entry.S
View File

@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ END(EV_Extension)
tracesys:
; save EFA in case tracer wants the PC of traced task
; using ERET won't work since next-PC has already committed
lr r12, [efa]
GET_CURR_TASK_FIELD_PTR TASK_THREAD, r11
st r12, [r11, THREAD_FAULT_ADDR] ; thread.fault_address
@@ -168,7 +169,7 @@ tracesys:
; Do the Sys Call as we normally would.
; Validate the Sys Call number
cmp r8, NR_syscalls
cmp r8, NR_syscalls - 1
mov.hi r0, -ENOSYS
bhi tracesys_exit
@@ -190,6 +191,7 @@ tracesys_exit:
st r0, [sp, PT_r0] ; sys call return value in pt_regs
;POST Sys Call Ptrace Hook
mov r0, sp ; pt_regs needed
bl @syscall_trace_exit
b ret_from_exception ; NOT ret_from_system_call at is saves r0 which
; we'd done before calling post hook above
@@ -198,9 +200,15 @@ tracesys_exit:
; Breakpoint TRAP
; ---------------------------------------------
trap_with_param:
mov r0, r12 ; EFA in case ptracer/gdb wants stop_pc
; stop_pc info by gdb needs this info
lr r0, [efa]
mov r1, sp
; Now that we have read EFA, it is safe to do "fake" rtie
; and get out of CPU exception mode
FAKE_RET_FROM_EXCPN
; Save callee regs in case gdb wants to have a look
; SP will grow up by size of CALLEE Reg-File
; NOTE: clobbers r12
@@ -227,10 +235,6 @@ ENTRY(EV_Trap)
EXCEPTION_PROLOGUE
lr r12, [efa]
FAKE_RET_FROM_EXCPN
;============ TRAP 1 :breakpoints
; Check ECR for trap with arg (PROLOGUE ensures r9 has ECR)
bmsk.f 0, r9, 7
@@ -238,6 +242,9 @@ ENTRY(EV_Trap)
;============ TRAP (no param): syscall top level
; First return from Exception to pure K mode (Exception/IRQs renabled)
FAKE_RET_FROM_EXCPN
; If syscall tracing ongoing, invoke pre-post-hooks
GET_CURR_THR_INFO_FLAGS r10
btst r10, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE
@@ -246,7 +253,7 @@ ENTRY(EV_Trap)
;============ Normal syscall case
; syscall num shd not exceed the total system calls avail
cmp r8, NR_syscalls
cmp r8, NR_syscalls - 1
mov.hi r0, -ENOSYS
bhi .Lret_from_system_call

47
arch/arc/kernel/signal.c
View File

@@ -64,6 +64,41 @@ struct rt_sigframe {
unsigned int sigret_magic;
};
static int save_arcv2_regs(struct sigcontext *mctx, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int err = 0;
#ifndef CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT
struct user_regs_arcv2 v2abi;
v2abi.r30 = regs->r30;
#ifdef CONFIG_ARC_HAS_ACCL_REGS
v2abi.r58 = regs->r58;
v2abi.r59 = regs->r59;
#else
v2abi.r58 = v2abi.r59 = 0;
#endif
err = __copy_to_user(&mctx->v2abi, &v2abi, sizeof(v2abi));
#endif
return err;
}
static int restore_arcv2_regs(struct sigcontext *mctx, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int err = 0;
#ifndef CONFIG_ISA_ARCOMPACT
struct user_regs_arcv2 v2abi;
err = __copy_from_user(&v2abi, &mctx->v2abi, sizeof(v2abi));
regs->r30 = v2abi.r30;
#ifdef CONFIG_ARC_HAS_ACCL_REGS
regs->r58 = v2abi.r58;
regs->r59 = v2abi.r59;
#endif
#endif
return err;
}
static int
stash_usr_regs(struct rt_sigframe __user *sf, struct pt_regs *regs,
sigset_t *set)
@@ -97,9 +132,13 @@ stash_usr_regs(struct rt_sigframe __user *sf, struct pt_regs *regs,
err = __copy_to_user(&(sf->uc.uc_mcontext.regs.scratch), &uregs.scratch,
sizeof(sf->uc.uc_mcontext.regs.scratch));
if (is_isa_arcv2())
err |= save_arcv2_regs(&(sf->uc.uc_mcontext), regs);
err |= __copy_to_user(&sf->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(sigset_t));
return err;
return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
static int restore_usr_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, struct rt_sigframe __user *sf)
@@ -112,8 +151,12 @@ static int restore_usr_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, struct rt_sigframe __user *sf)
err |= __copy_from_user(&uregs.scratch,
&(sf->uc.uc_mcontext.regs.scratch),
sizeof(sf->uc.uc_mcontext.regs.scratch));
if (is_isa_arcv2())
err |= restore_arcv2_regs(&(sf->uc.uc_mcontext), regs);
if (err)
return err;
return -EFAULT;
set_current_blocked(&set);
regs->bta = uregs.scratch.bta;

30
arch/arc/kernel/stacktrace.c
View File

@@ -41,15 +41,15 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_ARC_DW2_UNWIND
static void seed_unwind_frame_info(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct pt_regs *regs,
struct unwind_frame_info *frame_info)
static int
seed_unwind_frame_info(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pt_regs *regs,
struct unwind_frame_info *frame_info)
{
/*
* synchronous unwinding (e.g. dump_stack)
* - uses current values of SP and friends
*/
if (tsk == NULL && regs == NULL) {
if (regs == NULL && (tsk == NULL || tsk == current)) {
unsigned long fp, sp, blink, ret;
frame_info->task = current;
@@ -68,11 +68,15 @@ static void seed_unwind_frame_info(struct task_struct *tsk,
frame_info->call_frame = 0;
} else if (regs == NULL) {
/*
* Asynchronous unwinding of sleeping task
* - Gets SP etc from task's pt_regs (saved bottom of kernel
* mode stack of task)
* Asynchronous unwinding of a likely sleeping task
* - first ensure it is actually sleeping
* - if so, it will be in __switch_to, kernel mode SP of task
* is safe-kept and BLINK at a well known location in there
*/
if (tsk->state == TASK_RUNNING)
return -1;
frame_info->task = tsk;
frame_info->regs.r27 = TSK_K_FP(tsk);
@@ -106,6 +110,8 @@ static void seed_unwind_frame_info(struct task_struct *tsk,
frame_info->regs.r63 = regs->ret;
frame_info->call_frame = 0;
}
return 0;
}
#endif
@@ -115,11 +121,12 @@ arc_unwind_core(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pt_regs *regs,
int (*consumer_fn) (unsigned int, void *), void *arg)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_ARC_DW2_UNWIND
int ret = 0;
int ret = 0, cnt = 0;
unsigned int address;
struct unwind_frame_info frame_info;
seed_unwind_frame_info(tsk, regs, &frame_info);
if (seed_unwind_frame_info(tsk, regs, &frame_info))
return 0;
while (1) {
address = UNW_PC(&frame_info);
@@ -135,6 +142,11 @@ arc_unwind_core(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pt_regs *regs,
break;
frame_info.regs.r63 = frame_info.regs.r31;
if (cnt++ > 128) {
printk("unwinder looping too long, aborting !\n");
return 0;
}
}
return address; /* return the last address it saw */

2
arch/arc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
View File

@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ SECTIONS
CPUIDLE_TEXT
LOCK_TEXT
KPROBES_TEXT
IRQENTRY_TEXT
SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
*(.fixup)
*(.gnu.warning)
}

2
arch/arc/mm/cache.c
View File

@@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@ void clear_user_page(void *to, unsigned long u_vaddr, struct page *page)
clear_page(to);
clear_bit(PG_dc_clean, &page->flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(clear_user_page);
/**********************************************************************
* Explicit Cache flush request from user space via syscall

2
arch/arc/mm/ioremap.c
View File

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ void __iomem *ioremap_prot(phys_addr_t paddr, unsigned long size,
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ioremap_prot);
void iounmap(const void __iomem *addr)
void iounmap(const volatile void __iomem *addr)
{
/* weird double cast to handle phys_addr_t > 32 bits */
if (arc_uncached_addr_space((phys_addr_t)(u32)addr))

1
arch/arc/plat-eznps/include/plat/ctop.h
View File

@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@
#define CTOP_AUX_DPC (CTOP_AUX_BASE + 0x02C)
#define CTOP_AUX_LPC (CTOP_AUX_BASE + 0x030)
#define CTOP_AUX_EFLAGS (CTOP_AUX_BASE + 0x080)
#define CTOP_AUX_IACK (CTOP_AUX_BASE + 0x088)
#define CTOP_AUX_GPA1 (CTOP_AUX_BASE + 0x08C)
#define CTOP_AUX_UDMC (CTOP_AUX_BASE + 0x300)

1
arch/arc/plat-hsdk/Kconfig
View File

@@ -11,4 +11,5 @@ menuconfig ARC_SOC_HSDK
select ARC_HAS_ACCL_REGS
select ARC_IRQ_NO_AUTOSAVE
select CLK_HSDK
select RESET_CONTROLLER
select RESET_HSDK

6
arch/arm/Kconfig
View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ config ARM
bool
default y
select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_DATA
select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT if MMU
select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ config ARM
select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS if (CPU_V6 || CPU_V6K || CPU_V7) && MMU
select HAVE_EXIT_THREAD
select HAVE_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD if (!XIP_KERNEL)
select HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER if (!THUMB2_KERNEL)
select HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER if (!THUMB2_KERNEL && !CC_IS_CLANG)
select HAVE_FUNCTION_TRACER if (!XIP_KERNEL)
select HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG if FUTEX
select HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
@@ -635,7 +636,9 @@ config ARCH_S3C24XX
select HAVE_S3C_RTC if RTC_CLASS
select MULTI_IRQ_HANDLER
select NEED_MACH_IO_H
select S3C2410_WATCHDOG
select SAMSUNG_ATAGS
select WATCHDOG
help
Samsung S3C2410, S3C2412, S3C2413, S3C2416, S3C2440, S3C2442, S3C2443
and S3C2450 SoCs based systems, such as the Simtec Electronics BAST
@@ -2051,7 +2054,6 @@ config CMDLINE
choice
prompt "Kernel command line type" if CMDLINE != ""
default CMDLINE_FROM_BOOTLOADER
depends on ATAGS
config CMDLINE_FROM_BOOTLOADER
bool "Use bootloader kernel arguments if available"

46
arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
View File

@@ -16,30 +16,42 @@ config ARM_PTDUMP
kernel.
If in doubt, say "N"
# RMK wants arm kernels compiled with frame pointers or stack unwinding.
# If you know what you are doing and are willing to live without stack
# traces, you can get a slightly smaller kernel by setting this option to
# n, but then RMK will have to kill you ;).
config FRAME_POINTER
bool
depends on !THUMB2_KERNEL
default y if !ARM_UNWIND || FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
choice
prompt "Choose kernel unwinder"
default UNWINDER_ARM if AEABI
default UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER if !AEABI
help
If you say N here, the resulting kernel will be slightly smaller and
faster. However, if neither FRAME_POINTER nor ARM_UNWIND are enabled,
when a problem occurs with the kernel, the information that is
reported is severely limited.
This determines which method will be used for unwinding kernel stack
traces for panics, oopses, bugs, warnings, perf, /proc/<pid>/stack,
livepatch, lockdep, and more.
config ARM_UNWIND
bool "Enable stack unwinding support (EXPERIMENTAL)"
depends on AEABI
default y
config UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER
bool "Frame pointer unwinder"
depends on !THUMB2_KERNEL && !CC_IS_CLANG
select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS
select FRAME_POINTER
help
This option enables the frame pointer unwinder for unwinding
kernel stack traces.
config UNWINDER_ARM
bool "ARM EABI stack unwinder"
depends on AEABI && !FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
select ARM_UNWIND
help
This option enables stack unwinding support in the kernel
using the information automatically generated by the
compiler. The resulting kernel image is slightly bigger but
the performance is not affected. Currently, this feature
only works with EABI compilers. If unsure say Y.
only works with EABI compilers.
endchoice
config ARM_UNWIND
bool
config FRAME_POINTER
bool
config OLD_MCOUNT
bool

24
arch/arm/Makefile
View File

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_BUILD_ARM64_DT_OVERLAY),y)
export DTC_FLAGS := -@
endif
LDFLAGS_vmlinux :=-p --no-undefined -X --pic-veneer
LDFLAGS_vmlinux := --no-undefined -X --pic-veneer
ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_ENDIAN_BE8),y)
LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --be8
LDFLAGS_MODULE += --be8
@@ -76,15 +76,15 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fno-ipa-sra)
# Note that GCC does not numerically define an architecture version
# macro, but instead defines a whole series of macros which makes
# testing for a specific architecture or later rather impossible.
arch-$(CONFIG_CPU_32v7M) =-D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__=7 -march=armv7-m -Wa,-march=armv7-m
arch-$(CONFIG_CPU_32v7) =-D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__=7 $(call cc-option,-march=armv7-a,-march=armv5t -Wa$(comma)-march=armv7-a)
arch-$(CONFIG_CPU_32v6) =-D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__=6 $(call cc-option,-march=armv6,-march=armv5t -Wa$(comma)-march=armv6)
arch-$(CONFIG_CPU_32v7M) =-D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__=7 -march=armv7-m
arch-$(CONFIG_CPU_32v7) =-D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__=7 -march=armv7-a
arch-$(CONFIG_CPU_32v6) =-D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__=6 -march=armv6
# Only override the compiler option if ARMv6. The ARMv6K extensions are
# always available in ARMv7
ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_32v6),y)
arch-$(CONFIG_CPU_32v6K) =-D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__=6 $(call cc-option,-march=armv6k,-march=armv5t -Wa$(comma)-march=armv6k)
arch-$(CONFIG_CPU_32v6K) =-D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__=6 -march=armv6k
endif
arch-$(CONFIG_CPU_32v5) =-D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__=5 $(call cc-option,-march=armv5te,-march=armv4t)
arch-$(CONFIG_CPU_32v5) =-D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__=5 -march=armv5te
arch-$(CONFIG_CPU_32v4T) =-D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__=4 -march=armv4t
arch-$(CONFIG_CPU_32v4) =-D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__=4 -march=armv4
arch-$(CONFIG_CPU_32v3) =-D__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__=3 -march=armv3
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_ARM720T) =-mtune=arm7tdmi
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_ARM740T) =-mtune=arm7tdmi
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_ARM9TDMI) =-mtune=arm9tdmi
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_ARM940T) =-mtune=arm9tdmi
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_ARM946E) =$(call cc-option,-mtune=arm9e,-mtune=arm9tdmi)
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_ARM946E) =-mtune=arm9e
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_ARM920T) =-mtune=arm9tdmi
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_ARM922T) =-mtune=arm9tdmi
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_ARM925T) =-mtune=arm9tdmi
@@ -106,11 +106,11 @@ tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_ARM926T) =-mtune=arm9tdmi
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_FA526) =-mtune=arm9tdmi
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_SA110) =-mtune=strongarm110
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_SA1100) =-mtune=strongarm1100
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_XSCALE) =$(call cc-option,-mtune=xscale,-mtune=strongarm110) -Wa,-mcpu=xscale
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_XSC3) =$(call cc-option,-mtune=xscale,-mtune=strongarm110) -Wa,-mcpu=xscale
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_FEROCEON) =$(call cc-option,-mtune=marvell-f,-mtune=xscale)
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_V6) =$(call cc-option,-mtune=arm1136j-s,-mtune=strongarm)
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_V6K) =$(call cc-option,-mtune=arm1136j-s,-mtune=strongarm)
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_XSCALE) =-mtune=xscale
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_XSC3) =-mtune=xscale
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_FEROCEON) =-mtune=xscale
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_V6) =-mtune=arm1136j-s
tune-$(CONFIG_CPU_V6K) =-mtune=arm1136j-s
# Evaluate tune cc-option calls now
tune-y := $(tune-y)

2
arch/arm/boot/bootp/Makefile
View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
GCOV_PROFILE := n
LDFLAGS_bootp :=-p --no-undefined -X \
LDFLAGS_bootp := --no-undefined -X \
--defsym initrd_phys=$(INITRD_PHYS) \
--defsym params_phys=$(PARAMS_PHYS) -T
AFLAGS_initrd.o :=-DINITRD=\"$(INITRD)\"

2
arch/arm/boot/bootp/init.S
View File

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
* size immediately following the kernel, we could build this into
* a binary blob, and concatenate the zImage using the cat command.
*/
.section .start,#alloc,#execinstr
.section .start, "ax"
.type _start, #function
.globl _start

4
arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
View File

@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(libfdt_objs) atags_to_fdt.o): \
$(addprefix $(obj)/,$(libfdt_hdrs))
ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM_ATAG_DTB_COMPAT),y)
CFLAGS_REMOVE_atags_to_fdt.o += -Wframe-larger-than=${CONFIG_FRAME_WARN}
CFLAGS_atags_to_fdt.o += -Wframe-larger-than=1280
OBJS += $(libfdt_objs) atags_to_fdt.o
endif
@@ -127,8 +129,6 @@ endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_ENDIAN_BE8),y)
LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --be8
endif
# ?
LDFLAGS_vmlinux += -p
# Report unresolved symbol references
LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --no-undefined
# Delete all temporary local symbols

2
arch/arm/boot/compressed/big-endian.S
View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* Author: Nicolas Pitre
*/
.section ".start", #alloc, #execinstr
.section ".start", "ax"
mrc p15, 0, r0, c1, c0, 0 @ read control reg
orr r0, r0, #(1 << 7) @ enable big endian mode

3
arch/arm/boot/compressed/decompress.c
View File

@@ -49,7 +49,10 @@ extern int memcmp(const void *cs, const void *ct, size_t count);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KERNEL_XZ
/* Prevent KASAN override of string helpers in decompressor */
#undef memmove
#define memmove memmove
#undef memcpy
#define memcpy memcpy
#include "../../../../lib/decompress_unxz.c"
#endif

6
arch/arm/boot/compressed/head.S
View File

@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@
#endif
.endm
.section ".start", #alloc, #execinstr
.section ".start", "ax"
/*
* sort out different calling conventions
*/
@@ -1090,9 +1090,9 @@ __armv4_mmu_cache_off:
__armv7_mmu_cache_off:
mrc p15, 0, r0, c1, c0
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
bic r0, r0, #0x000d
bic r0, r0, #0x0005
#else
bic r0, r0, #0x000c
bic r0, r0, #0x0004
#endif
mcr p15, 0, r0, c1, c0 @ turn MMU and cache off
mov r12, lr

2
arch/arm/boot/compressed/piggy.S
View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
.section .piggydata,#alloc
.section .piggydata, "a"
.globl input_data
input_data:
.incbin "arch/arm/boot/compressed/piggy_data"

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-cm-t335.dts
View File

@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ status = "okay";
status = "okay";
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&spi0_pins>;
ti,pindir-d0-out-d1-in = <1>;
ti,pindir-d0-out-d1-in;
/* WLS1271 WiFi */
wlcore: wlcore@1 {
compatible = "ti,wl1271";

28
arch/arm/boot/dts/am335x-pcm-953.dtsi
View File

@@ -15,22 +15,20 @@
compatible = "phytec,am335x-pcm-953", "phytec,am335x-phycore-som", "ti,am33xx";
/* Power */
regulators {
vcc3v3: fixedregulator@1 {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "vcc3v3";
regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
regulator-boot-on;
};
vcc3v3: fixedregulator1 {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "vcc3v3";
regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
regulator-boot-on;
};
vcc1v8: fixedregulator@2 {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "vcc1v8";
regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
regulator-boot-on;
};
vcc1v8: fixedregulator2 {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "vcc1v8";
regulator-min-microvolt = <1800000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1800000>;
regulator-boot-on;
};
/* User IO */

3
arch/arm/boot/dts/am33xx.dtsi
View File

@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
ethernet1 = &cpsw_emac1;
spi0 = &spi0;
spi1 = &spi1;
mmc0 = &mmc1;
mmc1 = &mmc2;
mmc2 = &mmc3;
};
cpus {

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/am43x-epos-evm.dts
View File

@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@
status = "okay";
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&i2c0_pins>;
clock-frequency = <400000>;
clock-frequency = <100000>;
tps65218: tps65218@24 {
reg = <0x24>;

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-370.dtsi
View File

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@
pcie2: pcie@2,0 {
device_type = "pci";
assigned-addresses = <0x82002800 0 0x80000 0 0x2000>;
assigned-addresses = <0x82001000 0 0x80000 0 0x2000>;
reg = <0x1000 0 0 0 0>;
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-375.dtsi
View File

@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@
pcie1: pcie@2,0 {
device_type = "pci";
assigned-addresses = <0x82000800 0 0x44000 0 0x2000>;
assigned-addresses = <0x82001000 0 0x44000 0 0x2000>;
reg = <0x1000 0 0 0 0>;
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;

4
arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-380.dtsi
View File

@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@
/* x1 port */
pcie@2,0 {
device_type = "pci";
assigned-addresses = <0x82000800 0 0x40000 0 0x2000>;
assigned-addresses = <0x82001000 0 0x40000 0 0x2000>;
reg = <0x1000 0 0 0 0>;
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
/* x1 port */
pcie@3,0 {
device_type = "pci";
assigned-addresses = <0x82000800 0 0x44000 0 0x2000>;
assigned-addresses = <0x82001800 0 0x44000 0 0x2000>;
reg = <0x1800 0 0 0 0>;
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;

23
arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-385-turris-omnia.dts
View File

@@ -55,6 +55,12 @@
stdout-path = &uart0;
};
aliases {
ethernet0 = &eth0;
ethernet1 = &eth1;
ethernet2 = &eth2;
};
memory {
device_type = "memory";
reg = <0x00000000 0x40000000>; /* 1024 MB */
@@ -269,6 +275,7 @@
status = "okay";
compatible = "ethernet-phy-id0141.0DD1", "ethernet-phy-ieee802.3-c22";
reg = <1>;
marvell,reg-init = <3 18 0 0x4985>;
/* irq is connected to &pcawan pin 7 */
};
@@ -323,7 +330,17 @@
};
};
/* port 6 is connected to eth0 */
ports@6 {
reg = <6>;
label = "cpu";
ethernet = <&eth0>;
phy-mode = "rgmii-id";
fixed-link {
speed = <1000>;
full-duplex;
};
};
};
};
};
@@ -339,7 +356,7 @@
marvell,function = "spi0";
};
spi0cs1_pins: spi0cs1-pins {
spi0cs2_pins: spi0cs2-pins {
marvell,pins = "mpp26";
marvell,function = "spi0";
};
@@ -374,7 +391,7 @@
};
};
/* MISO, MOSI, SCLK and CS1 are routed to pin header CN11 */
/* MISO, MOSI, SCLK and CS2 are routed to pin header CN11 */
};
&uart0 {

6
arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-385.dtsi
View File

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
/* x1 port */
pcie2: pcie@2,0 {
device_type = "pci";
assigned-addresses = <0x82000800 0 0x40000 0 0x2000>;
assigned-addresses = <0x82001000 0 0x40000 0 0x2000>;
reg = <0x1000 0 0 0 0>;
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@
/* x1 port */
pcie3: pcie@3,0 {
device_type = "pci";
assigned-addresses = <0x82000800 0 0x44000 0 0x2000>;
assigned-addresses = <0x82001800 0 0x44000 0 0x2000>;
reg = <0x1800 0 0 0 0>;
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@
*/
pcie4: pcie@4,0 {
device_type = "pci";
assigned-addresses = <0x82000800 0 0x48000 0 0x2000>;
assigned-addresses = <0x82002000 0 0x48000 0 0x2000>;
reg = <0x2000 0 0 0 0>;
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;

6
arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-39x.dtsi
View File

@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@
/* x1 port */
pcie@2,0 {
device_type = "pci";
assigned-addresses = <0x82000800 0 0x40000 0 0x2000>;
assigned-addresses = <0x82001000 0 0x40000 0 0x2000>;
reg = <0x1000 0 0 0 0>;
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@
/* x1 port */
pcie@3,0 {
device_type = "pci";
assigned-addresses = <0x82000800 0 0x44000 0 0x2000>;
assigned-addresses = <0x82001800 0 0x44000 0 0x2000>;
reg = <0x1800 0 0 0 0>;
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@
*/
pcie@4,0 {
device_type = "pci";
assigned-addresses = <0x82000800 0 0x48000 0 0x2000>;
assigned-addresses = <0x82002000 0 0x48000 0 0x2000>;
reg = <0x2000 0 0 0 0>;
#address-cells = <3>;
#size-cells = <2>;

5
arch/arm/boot/dts/armada-xp-98dx3236.dtsi
View File

@@ -303,11 +303,6 @@
reg = <0x11000 0x100>;
};
&i2c1 {
compatible = "marvell,mv78230-i2c", "marvell,mv64xxx-i2c";
reg = <0x11100 0x100>;
};
&mpic {
reg = <0x20a00 0x2d0>, <0x21070 0x58>;
};

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